Early modern systems of command : Queen Anne's generality, staff officers and the direction of allied warfare in the Low Countries and Germany, 1702-11 by Stansfield, Anthony Stewart
Early modern systems of 
command 
Queen Anne's generality, staff officers and 
the direction of allied warfare in the Low 
Countries and Germany, 1702-11 
Stewart Anthony Stansfield 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Ph. D. 
The University of Leeds, School of History 
July 2010 
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his/her own and that 
appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the 
work of others. 
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright 
material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without 
proper acknowledgement. 
The right of Stewart Anthony Stansfield to be identified as Author of this 
work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
© 2010 The University of Leeds and Stewart Anthony Stansfield. 
quotation from Stowe 57, vol. i, on p. 87 (letter of James 
ages to Benjamin Sweet, London, 3/14 December 1706) is 
oduced by permission of The Huntington Library, San 
ino. California. 
King Papers are used with the permission of Her Majesty 
-- Vl-kof1, TT 
11 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank the School of History and the University of Leeds for their 
support, particularly during difficult times, and my Dad and Liz, who provided help 
when it was most needed. 
I would particularly like to thank Pamela Clark and the staff at the Royal Archives, 
Windsor Castle for their help with the King Papers; and Mary Robertson and the staff 
at the Huntington Library, San Marino, CA for their assistance in studying the 
Chandos Papers. I would also like to gratefully acknowledge the support of a Mayers 
Fellowship, which supported my research at the Huntington Library. 
I am most especially grateful to Di and Kit Teather for their kind hospitality in London 
during my research trips there, without which this thesis would never have been 
completed. 
111 
Abstract 
Throughout the operations of the War of the Spanish Succession in the Low Countries 
and Germany, senior commanders such as John Churchill, duke of Marlborough, were 
aided, abetted and, on occasion, disrupted by a number of general and staff officers. 
These officers provided the mechanism by which supra-regimental command, military 
direction and management was effected. While these individuals possessed military 
dignity according to their rank and station, their real authority in the army was in no 
small part drawn from the powers and duties delegated to them by the commander-in- 
chief, or assumed upon their own initiative; clear chains of command did not exist. 
Such officers functioned not only as vital elements in their own army, but within the 
broader context of the confederate warfare as a whole, in an army composed of English 
(later British), Dutch, Imperial, Danish and auxiliary German contingents. They came 
from diverse backgrounds and could possess constrasting political affiliations, 
aspirations and notions of duty. Their careers were governed as much by patronage 
and preference as any personal merit. A burgeoning sense of military duty was 
complicated by personal prejudice and the boundary between public and private 
endeavour was indistinct. Some officers gained wealth and financial security; others 
were ruined by the peculations of others. 
Note 
Dates are listed as Old Style (O. S. ) or New Style (N. S. ) depending on the context. For 
clarity, the English convention to start the new year with Lady Day (25 March O. S. /5 
April N. S. ) has been ignored. 
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I 
Introduction 
With the recent tercentenaries of the battles of Blenheim (1704), Ramillies (1706), 
Oudenaarde (1708) and Malplaquet (1709), there has been a brief renascence in the 
publication of works relating to the War of the Spanish Succession - or, more 
accurately, the role and agency of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough (1650-1722), in 
such, with particular regard to the campaigns in Germany and the Low Countries, 
1702-1711. This has brought a spate of such works as Charles, Earl Spencer's Blenheim: 
battle for Europe (London, 2004); and James Falkners present quartet of Great and 
glorious days: the Duke of Marlborough's battles, 1704-1709: Schellenberg, Blenheim, 
Ramillies, Oudenaarde, Malplaquet (Staplehurst, 2002); Blenheim 1704: Marlborough's 
greatest victory (Barnsley, 2004); Marlborough's Wars: Eyewitness Accounts 1702-1713 
(Barnsley, 2005) and Ramillies 1706: year of miracles (Barnsley, 2006). 
The above works have been published with the considerable, popular military history 
market in mind. None claim any new powers of analysis with respect to the period, its 
actors, or the paradigms of early modern warfare (if, indeed, they are written with 
regard to such), nor do they advance understanding of a field that has seen but little 
development in the past quarter of a century. Instead they are in the main readable 
narratives that refresh a relatively little-known period of British and European history 
in the popular consciousness, satisfying a niche in the popular market that exists. Yet 
the works are also indicative in style, format and focus of the great majority of material 
published on both the War of the Spanish Succession and the Duke of Marlborough 
himself, by and for an Anglophone British audience. In such works man and conflict 
can often appear to be synonymous, with the literature focusing on Marlburian 
biography (albeit with no little focus on military endeavour), or semi-biographic 
military studies of the Captain-General's campaigns themselves. 
1 
There is no shortage of writings describing the life of Marlborough. ' Recently, James 
Rees Jones' brief but cogent Marlborough (Cambridge, 1993), and Corelli Barnett's own 
Marlborough (London, 1974; Ware, 1999) have proven the most instructive for a general 
readership. Yet all such works suffer by their scope of reference, as a function of the 
difficulties attending the historian in researching the primary materials, by far the 
largest collection of which - the Blenheim Papers, concerning a wealth of 
correspondence and documents pertaining to Marlborough, Sarah and Sidney Earl 
Godolphin, among others - was until relatively recently kept in private hands. Those 
biographies that have enjoyed such access to these archives, formerly at Blenheim 
Palace, thus formed a source upon which all others have been dependent. Those that 
have had recourse to view the Blenheim Papers, such as Barnett, have still used the 
source manuscripts as an adjunct to those works that have guided the later 
historiography: the biographies of Archdeacon William Coxe, Sir Winston Churchill 
and, to a far lesser extent, Thomas Lediard. 
Coxe's Memoirs of John, Duke of Marlborough (new edition, ed. J. Wade, 3 volumes, 
London, 1847), part-biography, part-reproduction of original correspondence, has 
proven the most influential since its publication, Lediard's The Life of John, Duke of 
Marlborough (3 volumes, London, 1736) having waned in importance relative to this 
later work. Coxe's access to and copious use of Marlborough's correspondence in the 
Blenheim Papers, together with his early categorisation of such, supplied his volumes 
with a direct connection to their subject that was unsurpassed until another multi- 
volume work was published a century later. Furthermore, the subsequent loss of some 
of the manuscripts rendered into printed form by Coxe in the Memoirs fortifies the 
volumes' continuing import, though elements of the Blenheim Papers are now better 
served by other printed collations. 
1 For example: Anon., Memoirs of the Lives and Conduct of... Prince Eugene of Savoy and John, Duke 
of Marlborough (London, 1742); Archibald Alison, The Life of John, Duke of Marlborough (2-volume 
2nd edition, London, 1852-1855); Maurice Ashley, Marlborough (London, 1939); Iris Butler, The 
Rule of Three: Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough and Her Companions in Power (London, 1967); Virginia 
Cowles, The Great Marlborough and his Duchess (London, 1973); J. F. Dutems (rev. Duclos), 
l'Histoire de jean, Duc de Marlborough (Paris, 1806); Christopher Hibbert, The Marlboroughs: John 
and Sarah Churchill, 1650-1744 (London, 2001); A. L. Rowse, The Early Qiurchills (London, 1956); 
G. M. Thompson, The First Churchill (London, 1959); Garnet, Viscount Wolseley, The Life of John 
Churchill, Duke of Marlborough to the Accession of Queen Anne (2 volumes, London, 1894). 
2 
Sir Winston Churchill's Marlborough, his Life and Times (4-volume edition, London, 
1933-1938; 2-volume edition, Chicago, 1947) could be said to bestride Marlburian 
biography much as 'Colossus' [Marlborough] bestrode his milieu, with occasionally the 
same irony. ' Though Churchill also used Coxe heavily, his (and his team of highly 
capable researchers') access to his kinsman's papers allowed a work that, in terms of 
sheer breadth, is unlikely to be matched. With its contemporaneous counterpart, G. M. 
Trevelyan's England under Queen Anne (3 volumes, London, 1930-4), Churchill's work 
defined the period and person, for better or worse and for much of the twentieth 
century. No biography has since attempted to analyse Marlborough and depict his life 
in the detail to which Churchill did; and though he provides a highly personal analysis 
that indulges in self-identification, polemic, familial myth and heroism, the depth of 
inquiry and wide utilisation of domestic and foreign sources can still illuminate those 
that look beyond Sir Winston s own manner and agenda. Only Richard Holmes' recent 
Marlborough: England's Fragile Genius (London, 2008) has come close to matching 
Churchill's work in its scope; though it does not match it in depth, it provides a more 
lucid and balanced insight into its subject. 
Like biography, the military history of Marlborough and his campaigns is somewhat 
limited by its depth of reference. Excepting Holmes-whose biography, while covering 
the broad scope of Marlborough's activities, is militarily founded-no history has 
made extensive, or even notional, use of the Blenheim Papers, which provide the 
largest single collection of operational details with regard to the campaigns, 1702-1711. 
Studies of the war are thus dependent in part upon Coxe, Churchill, and printed 
collections of primary sources, such as Sir George Murray's Letters and Dispatches of 
John Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough from 1702 to 1712 (5 volumes, London, 1845), 
together with the reports of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts and the 
holdings of the National Archives (ne Public Record Office), all of which shall be 
discussed further below. 
Though Frank Taylor's The Wars of Marlborough, 1702-1709 (2 volumes, Oxford, 1921) 
has remained a useful narrative, the core of the Anglophone historiography in the 
2 Oliver's pocket looking-glass: new fram'd and clean'd to give a clear view of the great modern 
Colossus begun by K. C. -, carry'd on by K. J -, augmented by K. W -, and now finish'd in order 
to be thrown down in the glorious r- of Q. A-, 1711. 
3 
twentieth century and beyond has been provided by two authors, Christopher T. 
Atkinson and David G. Chandler. Atkinson's Marlborough and the Rise of the British 
Army (2nd edition, London, 1924), together with his numerous contributions to the 
Journal of the Society for Army Research, have proven important in framing the issues 
discussed and guiding the tenor and approach of subsequent historians. ' David G. 
Chandler, a student of Atkinson in more ways than one, has inherited the role as the 
pre-eminent British military historian of Marlborough and his role in the War of the 
Spanish Succession, both in the discussion of the central issues of the conflict and the 
collation of primary sources for public consumption. Chandler's Marlborough as 
Military Commander (London, 1973) has provided the standard modem source in 
English on the duke's campaigns, influencing the authors of the tercentenary works 
noted above, not least Earl Spencer; while his The Art of Warfare in the Age of 
Marlborough (London, 1976), and the his more recent Blenheim Preparation, The English 
Army on the March to the Danube: Collected Essays (Staplehurst, 2004) have provided 
informative case studies of more particular elements, not least the tactical handling of 
the various arms of the service. 
Like many works of military history, Chandler's publications have often blurred the 
gap between popular study and more rigorous academic analysis. In common with 
Atkinson, Churchill and a great deal of the British historiography, Chandler's portrayal 
of Marlborough as a captain whose military capabilities were beyond reproach has 
brought mixed comment. Retained references to Marlborough's avarice and 
connivance, although diminished relative to Swift and Macaulay's condemnation, 
occasionally carry the appearance of a crutch of objectivity against which the Captain- 
General's myriad qualities may be all the better set. Churchill, though arguing that 
such avarice "never prejudiced [Marlborough's] public duty", nevertheless "sought not 
to palliate his voice of foible in money matters"; whilst Chandler noted as to the same 
3 Atkinson s articles in JSAHR include 'Marlborough's sieges', 13 (1934), 195-205; 
'Marlborough's orders of battle', 15 (1936), 107-113; 'Notes on the Spanish Succession War. 
Gleanings from W. O. IV and other sources in the Public Record Office', 21 (1942), 83-96; 
'Material for military history in the reports of the Historical Manuscripts Commission', 21 
(1942), 17-34; 'One of Marlborough's men: Matthew Bishop of Webb's', 23 (1945), 157-169; 
'Marlborough's sieges. Further evidence', 24 (1946), 83-87; 'The Ramillies battlefield', 32 (1954), 
14-18; 'The cost of Queen Annes war. Evidence from the 'Calendar of Treasury Books and 
Papers', 1702-1712', 33 (1955), 174-183; 'Wyndendael', 34 (1956), 26-31; 'Gleanings from the 
Calendar of Treasury books and papers', 36 (1958), 25-29,48-60. 
4 
allegations that "there was a little fire beneath all the smoke of party and factional 
vituperation". ' Whether or not Marlborough's fiscal desires and/or improprieties were 
significantly greater than others' in a period marked by a somewhat idiosyncratic 
approach to the conflation of public and private enterprise, or are indeed exacerbated 
by the eye and sensibilities of the beholder, is open to further comment. 
Modern criticisms of British portrayals of the military character of the duke have 
focused upon two elements, usually in conjunction: (i) the edification of Marlborough's 
thoughts and deeds in particular, and many British military personnel in general, to 
the detriment of those among the other allies (Prince Eugene usually excepted), most 
notably the Dutch - an anglocentric motif commonly witnessed in the supposed trials 
and tribulations of Marlborough in the face of Dutch obstruction; and (ii) a tendency to 
portray Marlborough as a commander who was less a captain in the context of the 
early modern military paradigm in which he operated, but rather a harbinger or 
practitioner of a more modem military practice, not least in his recognition of the 
importance and efficacy of battle, and his ability to enforce it -a conception that links 
in with the above in the motif of a rationally aggressive and decisive Marlborough, 
held against the Dutch with their stultified notions of strategy. 
It is difficult to defend popular British military history, Churchill or indeed elements of 
Chandler's analyses from either charge. The works hitherto noted have generally 
lacked any balanced appreciation of the Dutch or the German allies and auxiliaries, 
and all too little consideration of the detailed workings of confederate warfare. 
Analyses of the character of the Anglo-Dutch alliance, as in R. Geikie and I. 
Montgomery's The Dutch Barrier, 1705-19 (Cambridge, 1930), or Douglas Coombs' The 
Conduct of the Dutch: British Opinion and the Dutch Alliance during the War of the Spanish 
Succession (The Hague, 1958) and 'The Augmentation of 1709: a study in the Workings 
of the Anglo-Dutch Alliance', EHR, lxxii (1957), 642-661, are rare. Primary English 
sources, which so often display informative, contemporary prejudices against the 
Dutch and other allies, should be investigated with regard to their merits, as opposed 
to being taken de facto as objective accounts of the war. 
4 Churchill, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 20; Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander, p. 317. 
5 
Such criticisms might not in fairness be levelled at Ivor Burton's The Captain-General: 
The Career of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, from 1702 to 1711 (London, 1968) - 
though a slim book at a little over two hundred pages, it provides perhaps the most 
concise and measured account of its subject; but though historians of the period are by 
necessity francophone, a knowledge of the Dutch sources is near absent. Knowledge of 
the standard Dutch account of the conflict, J. W. Wijn s (ed. ) Het Staatsche Leger, vol. 8, 
Het Tijdperk van de Spaanse Successieoorlog, 1702-1715 (The Hague, 1959-64), which 
although somewhat dated provides a more balanced account than most English 
sources, is minimal; Chandler's Marlborough as Military Commander makes no reference. 
In the Anglophone historiography itself, A. J. Veenendaal (pere)'s contributions 
typically display the greatest consideration of all parties: 'The Opening Phase of 
Marlborough's Campaign in 1708 in the Netherlands', History, 35 (1950), 34-48; 'The 
War of the Spanish Succession in Europe', The New Cambridge Modern History, vol. vi: 
The Rise of Great Britain and Russia 1688-1715/25 (J. S. Bromley, ed.; Cambridge, 1970), 
pp. 410-445. 
The predilection for battle, real and imagined, and with regard to Marlborough and 
historians alike, is considered in detail by Jamel Ostwald in his paper 'The "Decisive" 
Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern Warfare', 
Journal of Military History, vol. 64, no. 3 (2000), 649-677. It is certainly true that studies of 
the tactical engagements of Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenaarde and Malplaquet &c. 
preponderate over those of other elements of operations, such as the passage of the 
Lines of Brabant and Ne Plus Ultra. Ostwald succeeds in promoting the study of 
Marlborough and his actions in the context of the military paradigm of the time, and 
such careful reappraisals and criticisms inform John B. Hattendorf's entry on 
Marlborough in the new edition of the Dictionary of National Biography (2004-7). 
Hattendorf had earlier promoted a far wider conception of the nature of the conflict in 
his England in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study of the English View and Conduct of 
Grand Strategy (New York, 1987). To understand the degree to which leading historians 
in the early modern academic community have revised their common opinion in 
opposition to the general trend of the British historiography, it is worth quoting one of 
Hattendorf's closing DNB paragraphs in full: 
6 
As a general and as the allied commander-in-chief during the War of the Spanish 
Succession, Marlborough based his success on his ability to co-operate effectively 
with the Dutch, who had the largest number of troops under his command, paid 
the largest share of the military effort, and controlled the army's logistics. As a field 
commander he was noted for promoting mobile warfare, manoeuvring to engage in 
decisive battle, using effective operational intelligence, planning long-range 
logistical support, and having a remarkable ability to analyse and to react to 
changing tactical situations in the heat of battle. Some of these same characteristics 
led contemporaries to see him as impulsive, imprudent, and reckless in terms of 
eighteenth-century warfare. Seen at a distance of three centuries, these 
characteristics appear much more appropriate to warfare in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Nevertheless, in viewing him at long range, some military 
specialists have applied anachronistic values that distort the view of Marlborough 
within his own time. 
Though one might consider this statement fair and accurate, the lack of any 
involvement by historians intimately aware of the British primary sources in such a 
reappraisal proves problematic. A line such as "... the Dutch... controlled the army's 
logistics" is a touch disingenuous. British historians have often considered the nature 
of supply and transport in the War of the Spanish Succession, not least with regard to 
the'famous' march to the Danube that is a constituent part of Marlburian legendry, but 
the analyses of same by such as Alan Francis and Ivan Phelan lack weight. ' Certainly 
there is no British work to match Olaf van Nimwegen s De subsistentie van het leger: 
Logistiek en Strategie van het Geallieerde en met name het Staatse leger tijdens de Spaanse 
Successieoorlog in de Nederlanden en het Heilige Roomse Rijk (1701-1712) (Amsterdam, 
1995), whose work, along with Ostwald's, forms much of the basis for Hattendorf's 
revision. 
Van Nimwegen, in his summary', comments upon the fact that, excepting Henry 
Snyder, British historians otherwise remain ignorant of a great many logistical 
documents present in the archives of Blenheim Palace [sic], but he makes no reference 
to them himself. An analysis of such suggests a slightly more ecumenical consideration 
of logistics with regard to the allied army. Such does not diminish the great Dutch 
responsibility in this regard, or even the preponderance thereof in a great many areas 
of supply; but to minimise to negligibility of British actors in such matters takes a 
5 Alan David Francis, 'Marlborough's march to the Danube, 1704', JSAHR, 50 (1972), 78-100; 
Ivan Phelan, 'Marlborough as Logistician, JSAHR, 272-4 (1985). 
6 Van Nimwegen, op. cit., pp. 332 (Dutch) & 340 (English). 
7 
wholly valid and necessary reappraisal a little too far. Though of great merit, De 
subsistentie remains based largely on Dutch sources, and an understanding of logistics, 
within both the wider allied army and those forces in English and joint Anglo-Dutch 
pay, will be better served when the multitude of operational minutiae in the Blenheim 
Papers are brought to public attention. 
This is a common problem in the reading of primary sources relative to military 
operations in the War of the Spanish Succession. Much of the bias detected may be less 
a function of national prejudice, intentional or otherwise (though a full cognisance of 
all sources, no matter the language of provenance, would assuredly eliminate the 
issue), than a result of source-perception that might be exacerbated in sources of 
greatest familiarity. Affirmative statements of agency by an actor in a given regard are 
too often taken as exclusive, whereas they are often anything but. It was all too 
common in the somewhat pluralistic command structures of the allied army and its 
constituent parts, with less than rigorously defined networks of responsibility, to 
witness a multiplicity of people carrying out exactly the same duties in similar or 
differing contexts. Whilst a zero-sum principle may seem reasonable - the notion that 
any reassessment of Dutch responsibility sponsors a commensurate and outright 
reduction in the agency of others - it is not necessarily correct. 
Beyond the Marlburian historiography noted above, relatively little has been written 
on the army, its administration and its personnel during the War of the Spanish 
Succession. Though authors such as Chandler touch on elements of organisation and 
function, not least tactical, there is no analysis that can compare with Major Raibeart E. 
Scouller's The Armies of Queen Anne (Oxford, 1966), itself influenced by Clifford 
Waltons still-useful History of the British Standing Army 1660-1700 (London, 1894). Like 
Henry Snyder and Ivor Burton, Scouller contributed considerably to the understanding 
of the British army and its personalities in the period, without exclusive recourse to the 
typical pattern of biography or campaign history. ' The Armies of Queen Anne remains 
7 Ivor F. Burton, The Secretary at War and the administration of the army during the War of the 
Spanish Succession, Ph. D. thesis (University of London, 1960); 'The Committee of Council at the 
War Office: an experiment in Cabinet government under Anne', HJ, vol. 4 (1961), 78-84. For 
Scouller's other works informing The Armies of Queen Anne, and subsequent publications, see: 
'Queen Anne's Secretaries at War', AQ, 57 (1949), 215-220; 'Quarters and barracks', JRUSI, 98 
(1953), 91-94; 'Recruiting: a familiar problem', AQ, 71 (1955), 105-112; 'Secretaries at War to 
8 
the most valuable work on its subject, and perhaps also of any publication regarding 
the British army in any way, shape or form in the period. 
The sole criticism concerning Scouller's work relates to the nature of his source 
material. The still-private nature of the Blenheim Papers in the 1960s resulted in a book 
that drew heavily upon, in addition to the usual sources, a great many documents at 
the Public Record Office. Though Scouller's use of such resulted in a highly 
informative work, the very nature of the PRO papers, drawn from largely domestic 
sources, provided a representation of army administration that spoke more as to the 
broad schema of general organisation in overview, principle and theory than the 
particular nature of organisation and function in the field, as practised in the Low 
Countries. Scouller attempted to rectify this problem to an extent in the subsequent 
article 'Marlborough's administration in the field', Army Quarterly, 95 (1968), 197-208; 
96 (1968), 102-113, but the brevity of such, and the lack of detailed reference to the mass 
of pertinent information in the Blenheim Papers, reduce the utility of the analysis. 
Of related import are studies of the English forces that operated in the Low Countries 
during the Nine Years' War. This conflict provided considerable experience to the 
soldiers and officers that would serve in the War of the Spanish Succession, and forms 
a useful point of reference for later studies. John Childs' The British Army of William III, 
1689-1702 (Manchester, 1987) and The Nine Years' War and the British Army, 1688-1697: 
The Operations in the Low Countries (Manchester, 1991) provide an excellent survey, but 
of particular interest is Louis M. Waddell's unpublished Ph. D. thesis, 'The 
Administration English Army in Flanders and Brabant from 1689 to 1697' (University 
of North Carolina, 1971). While Waddell investigated some similar themes to those 
explored in this thesis, his work is more akin to that of Scouller. There is little detailed 
coverage of the workings of command and control on campaign, particularly at a lower 
level; rather it is a broader overview. If it is lighter on certain administrative and 
material elements than Scouller, it offers greater specificity relative to the campaigns, 
and greater coverage of the social, political and economic context. 
Queen Anne', JSAHR, 38 (1960), 3-10; 'The first Mutiny Act. Its antecedents and some 
developments', AQ, 102 (1972), 330-337; 'The Mutiny Acts', JSAHR, 50 (1972), 42-45; 
'Marlborough - the international commander', AQ, 102 (1972), 438-450. 
9 
Both works are dry, with their analyses set within relatively narrow limits (no 
criticism, given the nature of much of the English-language literature); there is no work 
on the English or British army of the period to match John Lynn's Giant of the Grand 
Siecle: the French Army 1610-1714 (Cambridge, 1997), for example. Lynn's work covers a 
much greater province, both temporally and ideologically, and his arguments and 
syntheses on the nature of the warfare of the period are deeper and wider-ranging. If 
the sheer breadth of the study limits its depth with regard to specific topics (such as the 
nature of command in the War of the Spanish Succession in particular), it does not 
diminish the broader insights, emphasising the Why? as much as the What? 
Alongside The Armies of Queen Anne, the most useful work to any historian of the 
English and British armies in the Low Countries is Charles Dalton's English Army Lists 
and Commission Registers, 1661-1714 (6 volumes; London, 1898-1904). Though 
occasionally in error and not always complete (see, for example, Ivor F. Burton and 
Aubrey N. Newman's article 'Sir John Cope: promotion in the 18th century army', 
EHR, 78 (1963), 655-668), Dalton s mammoth collation of commissions, rolls and 
various ancillary information remains an invaluable aid, not least in the investigations 
of the staff officers that served as at all levels - general, brigade and regimental - to 
accommodate the better functioning of the forces in camp, winter quarters and on the 
march, from supply and quartering to discipline and formation in the line of battle. 
Studies of the headquarters staff employed by the allied forces in the War of the 
Spanish Succession, irrespective of nationality or position, are distinctly lacking; 
beyond occasional eulogising references to such, typically in passing, their agency is in 
no small part subsumed into the Gestalt commander-in-chief's function as army 
comptroller. ' 
The most famous and distinguished member of Marlborough's staff, William (later 
Earl) Cadogan, Quartermaster-General to the British forces in the Low Countries (and, 
by extension, acting in part in a similar capacity to the allied army as a whole) and 
sometime diplomatic envoy and administrator, is the only individual to have attracted 
particular notice, in the form of J. N. P. Watson's biography, Marlborough's Shadow, the 
Life of the First Earl Cadogan (Barnsley, 2003). If, indeed, 'Marlborough's Shadow reveals 
8 E. g. Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander, p. 67; Blenheim Preparation, pp. 213,224,289. 
10 
that, not only was Cadogan the power behind, and major influence on his master 
Marlborough... ' then it is perhaps unconvincing in doing so. Watson's revisionist 
portrayal of Cadogan indulges in part in the zero-sum forms of argument hitherto 
noted. The transfer of capability and worth does not serve particularly well in 
characterising the nature of the professional, reciprocal relationship between Cadogan 
and Marlborough, nor the greater framework of command within which they existed 
as prominent nodes. 
Faced with the peculiarly fluid and variable paradigm of early modem command, it is 
can prove all too easy to suppose the existence of distinct and exclusive structures 
more common to the modem period. Watson positions Cadogan in the role as 
Marlborough's 'chief of staff, chief of intelligence'; while James Falkner, in his 
Dictionary of National Biography (2004-7 ed. ) article, follows Watson in casting Cadogan 
as 'unofficially, [Marlborough's] chief of staff and director of military intelligence, 
although these posts did not exist in the modem sense at that time' - nor, one might 
argue, did they exist in any sense at that time. Setting aside the issue of Cadogari s 
purported role as 'chief of staff' (which, albeit requiring a great deal of further 
discussion, might bear some truth after a fashion), his depiction as a chief of 
intelligence, even military, is flawed. 
Though Cadogan, in his twin roles as Quartermaster-General and diplomat, directed 
the collection of and personally collated a sizeable amount of intelligence, particularly 
of an operational nature, he did not oversee all such activities for the army, nor the 
many other officers who through personal initiative, or direction from Marlborough or 
others, acted in a like manner. Cadogan's aides and deputy quartermasters-general, 
such as Alexander Spotswood, John Armstrong and Richard King, were often as liable 
to communicate directly with Marlborough (via Cardonnel) as with Cadogan himself, 
or be directed to act as the situation required by diverse other officers for the good of 
the service. 
These other officers, the general officers of the army, appear largely as ciphers to the 
modern audience. There is no work on the corps as a whole, or that discusses in any 
depth their agency in the War of the Spanish Succession. There is certainly no study of 
the form of Erik Lund's War for the Every Day: Generals, Knowledge, and Warfare in Earl 
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Modern Europe, 1680-1740 (Westport, CT, 1999). Lund attempts, with success, to recover 
for the modern reader the experience, background, education and outlook of the 
Imperial generals of that period; to provide a more cogent investigation of the tasks 
these officers engaged in and the degree to which they were prepared for them. Even if 
it is difficult to apply Lund's ideas on the scientific nature of personal and corporate 
military development to some of the British generality, his thesis, particularly in its 
application of the 'economy of knowledge' and its provocative counterpoint to those 
that charactertise the warfare of the time as stolid and unimaginative, is apposite. The 
likes of Cadogan, Armstrong, King and Lascelles in particular have much in common 
with Lund's 'soldier-scholars'. 
Though the secondary literature, therefore, does not provide the most cogent model of 
the field administration and control of the British and allied army, the primary sources, 
both printed and manuscript, provide a considerable wealth of detail that should 
promote the better formulation of such. The actions of Marlborough and his 
subordinates in the Low Countries and Germany are quite well served in terms of the 
contemporary papers collated and printed for a wider audience. In addition to Coxe's 
Memoirs, three major series of printed correspondence provide a significant proportion 
of the correspondence of Marlborough in readily accessible form. Sir George Murray's 
edition of Letters and Dispatches of John Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough from 1702 to 
1712 (5 volumes, London, 1845), though poorly indexed and not without occasional 
errors [as in, for example, the attribution of Josiah Sandby's account of the Blenheim 
campaign to Dr Francis Hare; see Robert D. Horn, Marlborough, a survey: panegyrics, 
satires, and biographical writings, 1688-1788 (Folkestone, 1975), item 75; and F. Harris, 
'The Authorship of the Manuscript Blenheim Journal', Bulletin of the Institute of 
Historical Research, Iv (1982), 203-206] is a useful compendium of diplomatic and 
military correspondence, including that with many field officers. 
Bert van 't Hoff's edition of The Correspondence 1701 - 1711 of John Churchill, First Duke 
of Marlborough, and Anthonie Heinsius, Grand Pensionary of Holland (The Hague, 1951) 
provides a valuable record of the direction of allied warfare at the highest levels; and is 
superbly accompanied and expanded upon by the considerable endeavour of A. J. 
Veenendaal (fils) in producing the nineteen volumes of De briefivisseling van Anthonie 
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Heinsius 1702-1720 (The Hague, 1976-2001). Henry L. Snyder 's The Marlborough - 
Godolphin Correspondence (3 volumes, Oxford, 1975), does likewise with regard to the 
activities of the 'duumvirate', in many cases surpassing Coxe's Memoirs in such 
usefulness. Furthermore, Snyder 's erudite edition and notation, lacking parochialisms 
and written in a multinational context, means the volumes transcend their value as a 
collection of primary sources, and provide additional utility. 
These provide necessary insights into the actions of such as Marlborough, military, 
politic, diplomatic and otherwise. Yet, with the partial exception of Murray's Letters 
and Dispatches, they focus on the very highest echelons of command; a state that is 
mirrored in the largest reproduction of the Blenheim Papers, the microfilm edition 
prepared by David Hayton. Though a significant amount of Marlborough and Adam 
de Cardonnel's correspondence with field officers is transferred to the microfilm 
edition (British Library, Add. MSS 61101-61413 passim), the great majority of 
manuscripts pertaining to a wealth of operational details and matters of army 
administration are not, with the focus of the edition remaining the correspondence of 
Marlborough, Sarah, and Charles Spencer, third Earl of Sunderland. 
In addition to Marlborough's own papers, there are a significant number of published, 
contemporary accounts of the campaigns in the Low Countries and Germany. Of 
considerable importance is Dr Francis Hare's The Conduct of the Duke of Marlborough 
during the Present War, with Original Papers (London, 1712), a more impartial account 
than might be expected of a strong supporter of, and Chaplain-General to, the duke, 
not least on the origin and development of the antipathy between Marlborough and 
Frederick Johan van Baer, Baron Slangenburg. 9 The remainder of the Anglophone 
accounts are of martial provenance, belonging to commissioned and non- 
commissioned officers and private soldiers in the regiments serving in the northern 
European theatres. The materials are of varying degrees of utility; many writers are all 
too laconic with regard to a great many details of campaign and camp life that would 
favour a more vibrant social history of the army; and accounts occasionally provide but 
the merest itinerary of the march. Nevertheless, for all their limitations and unfulfilled 
promise, the following remain as a whole a valuable source. 
9 Hare, op. cit., p. 17. 
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Of goodly import is Captain Robert Parker's Memoirs of the Most Remarkable Military 
Transactions from 1683 to 1718 (London, 1746), one of the more revealing accounts of the 
war and most recently republished in Chandler's collection Robert Parker and the Comte 
de Merode-Westerloo (London, 1968); in terms of military detail it may be set comfortably 
aside Richard Kane's Campaigns of King William and Queen Anne from 1689 to 1712. Also, 
a new system of military discipline for a battalion of foot on action, with the most essential 
exercise of the cavalry... (London, 1745). Of additional note is The life and diary of Lieut. 
Col. J. Blackader of the Cameronian Regiment (ed. Andrew Crichton; Edinburgh, 1824), 
who served with Cranstoun (see below); while The memoirs of Capt. Peter Drake. 
Containing, an account of many strange and surprising events... and several material 
anecdotes, regarding King William and Queen Anne's wars with Lewis XIV of France. (2 
volumes, Dublin, 1755; reprinted London, 1960, ed. S. Burrell, Amiable Renegade) are 
more fascinatingly ribald than either Cranstoun or Blackader's tales, but should be 
treated with attendant caution. Finally, a handful of George Hamilton, first Earl of 
Orkney's missives are published in H. H. E. Cra'ster's edition of 'Letters of the First 
Lord Orkney during Marlborough's Campaigns', English Historical Review, Vol. 19, No. 
74 (April 1904), 307-321, with particular reference to the field of battle. 
Corporal Matthew Bishop's The life and adventures of Matthew Bishop of Deddington in 
Oxfordshire... (London, 1744), and Chandler's editions of Private John Marshall Deane's 
account in A Journal of Marlborough's Campaigns during the War of the Spanish Succession, 
1704-1711 (Society for Army Historical Research, Special Publication No. 12; London, 
1984); and Sergeant John Wilson's 'The Journal of John Wilson, an 'Old Flanderkin 
Sergeant', who served 1694-1727, Military Miscellany 11: Manuscripts from Marlborough's 
Wars, the American War of Independence and the Boer War (Publications of the Army 
Records Society, vol. 23; Stroud, 2005) provide often useful accounts from the lesser 
ranks; though Sergeant John Millner's A Compendious Journal of all the Marches, Battles, 
Sieges and other Actions of the Allies in their War against France in Holland, Germany and 
Flanders, 1701-12 (London, 1733) is the least colourful of records, if suitably 
compendious. 
Of the foreign sources relating to the functioning of the confederate armies, of primary 
importance is Sicco van Goslinga's Memoires relatif a la Guerre de succession de 1706-1711. 
As a 'field deputy' for the province of Friesland during the years in question (1710 
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excepted), Goslinga was intimately involved with the direction of the war in Flanders, 
and his account provides a necessary Dutch voice. Sadly other Dutch accounts are less 
forthcoming in published form, but there are several German sources, most notably in 
the Feldzüge of Prince Eugene (Series I, vols vii-ix; Series II, vols i-vi ; Vienna, 1876- 
1881); the Kriegs- und Staatschriften über den spanischen Erbfolgekrieg of Ludwig Wilhelm, 
Margrave of Baden (2 volumes, ed. P. Roder, 1850); and Kurd von Schöning's edition of 
Des General Feldmarschalls Dubislav G. von Natzmer Leben und Kriegsthaten (Berlin, 1838) 
is particularly informative. 
The Reports of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts contain in calendars, 
abstracts and extracts a great deal of pertinent correspondence. Of particular note with 
regard to officers' correspondence are the letters of Colonel Cranstoun and others in 
the Portland MSS, Series 29; the letters of Lord Orkney, since repeated in Cra'ster, op. 
cit., in the Atholl MSS, Series 26; and also the letters of John, Baron Cutts of Gowran, in 
the Frankland-Russell-Astley MSS, Series 52. The Bath MSS, Series 58, contain a great 
deal of correspondence to and from Marlborough, and the Hare MSS, Series 38 detail 
the letters of Dr Francis Hare, Chaplain-General to the army in Flanders. A variety of 
other series, including the Bagot MSS, Series 13; the Clement MSS, Series 55; the Cowper 
MSS, Series 23; the Dartmouth MSS, Series 20; the Downshire MSS, Series 75; the Ketton 
MSS, Series 27; the House of Lords MSS, Series 17; the Mar and Kellie MSS, Series 60; the 
Ormonde MSS, Series 6; and the Townshend MSS, Series 19 contain various letters of 
interest relating to officers serving in, and commenting upon, the state and nature of 
the campaigns in the Low Countries and Germany, 1702-1711. 
* 7: ý 
In reviewing the published literature, it will be seen the systematic nature of command 
and control in warfare represents one of the least studied of subjects in early modem 
military history, not least in the War of the Spanish Succession. The conflict occurred in 
that era Martin van Creveld provocatively dubbed the 'Stone Age of Command' in his 
Command in War (Harvard, 1987). Certainly the armies of the grand siecle lacked the 
operational flexibility and systemised organisations of later divisional and corps-level 
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formations; military cartography was somewhat ordinary; and staff work did not 
adopt the formalised and dauntingly impressive-sounding bureaucracies of later eras. 
Admittedly it also remained an era of often personal, immediate direction, exercised by 
officers whose talents and conceptions of duty varied considerably; but this did not 
presuppose inefficiency in control and leadership, or indeed the lack of any apparatus 
of organisation aiding a commander like the Duke of Marlborough and his 
contemporaries. 
Throughout the War of the Spanish Succession, Marlborough was supported by 
various individuals, in both public and private service, in the management of the 
conflict. In a military context, two particular groups are apparent. The first is the 
generality of the British and Allied armies, those subordinate officers of general rank 
that served under the aegis of the commander-in-chief, ready to accept duties and 
responsibilities on the campaign as dictated. These individuals-the 'full' generals of 
infantry and cavalry, the lieutenants- and majors-general, and the brigadiers-were 
often deputed with considerable authority and played a major part in the prosecution 
of the conflict. Their duties frequently transcended the boundaries of what a modern 
audience might perceive to be such commanders' due spheres of control and interest, 
yet their agency and their relationship with their commander in the field is rarely 
discussed. 
The second group comprises the staff officers of the army, a diverse organisation of 
individuals, their deputies and aides-de-camp, often under a general's immanent 
oversight but not infrequently beyond it, responsible for actioning the daily 
sustenance, maintenance and operation of the army on campaign or in winter quarters. 
The British staff officers included such figures as William Cadogan, quartermaster- 
general and envoy; Adam Cardonnel, Marlborough's personal and military secretary; 
Thomas Meredyth, Henry Durrell and Metcalfe Graham, adjutants-general; such 
engineers and logisticians as John Armstrong and Richard King; and a variety of 
brigade-majors and aides-de-camp. Their acts, and relationships with both their 
commander-in-chief and their peers, subsumed friendship, rivalry, prejudice, politics 
and patronage as well as service, and provide a fertile source for any social, political 
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and/or military historian who wishes to take a more pluralistic approach to Britain's 
army in the war. 
Such individuals provided but the British contingent relative to control of a war that 
was an allied enterprise, not least in the campaigns in the Low Countries and 
Germany. The Duke of Marlborough controlled both a discrete British force within the 
context of a larger confederate force, with its own internal command apparatus; and 
this greater force itself, consisting also of Dutch soldiers and a variety of other allied 
and auxiliary forces in their own, English, Dutch or joint Anglo-Dutch pay. The 
direction of the field army as a whole thus further drew upon the talents and services 
of a variety of individuals from the States-General and the Raad van State of both 
Brussels and The Hague, the gedeputeerden to velde or 'field deputies' representing same, 
and the general and supporting officers of the Dutch and Imperial forces. 
This thesis seeks to provide a more developed and critical analysis of the agency of 
these individuals and offices in the management of war in the Low Countries and 
Germany in this period. Because of the breadth of the topic, and the sheer wealth of the 
sources available, it has been necessary to limit its primary line of inquiry to the study 
of the British general and staff officers serving in the Low Countries - albeit with full 
reference to their activities within the context of a confederate force. Whilst this is 
lamentable, given the preponderance of studies on British military topics, analyses of 
the detailed apparatus of army control on campaign are very rare. Hopefully it is but a 
first step towards an integration of its findings with further research on the Dutch, 
Imperial and auxiliary forces. 
The thesis will attempt through its investigations to contribute to the understanding of 
the military, political, social and economic history of the British army within the wider 
European context; and to provide a more ecumenical approach to the study of 
Marlborough's provincia. The thesis shall examine the hierarchy and mechanisms of 
command and control in the army, including the organisation of logistics, discipline 
and military justice on campaign and in winter quarters; the collection, collation and 
transfer of information; and the active planning of operations in the field, in response 
to a variety of factors, domestic, foreign and local. It shall investigate the degree to 
which all actors, from commander-in-chief to subordinate officers, were active in the 
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decision-making processes of the campaign, and the extent to which their actions 
proceeded from the direction of others, and/or from personal or group initiative. I 
shall also pay particular attention to the nature of the personal, professional and 
political relationships of the parties involved, the degree to which their roles conflicted 
and complemented each other, and the interaction of the public and the private spheres 
in the apparatus of army command and administration. 
The thesis is split into eight chapters. Beyond this introduction and survey of the 
historiography, Chapter II provides an overview of the nature and organisation of the 
general and staff officers of the British army, their major roles and functions, together 
with a full list of all (known) individuals who served in such posts, from aides-de- 
camp and majors of brigade to the general officers themselves. Chapter III discusses 
the life and paradigm of the early officer, on campaign and otherwise, with regard to 
the individuals and their thoughts, experiences and relationships during operations. 
Chapter IV considers the conflicts between public and private enterprise that occurred 
within the army, and the degree to which individuals enriched themselves - or found 
penury -- through their own and other's conduct. 
Chapter V highlights the importance of communication and the gathering of 
intelligence in the function of the army on campaign, including the nature and role of 
posts and packets, the interception of such, and the organisation of human intelligence. 
Chapter VI analyses the part general and staff officers played in the decision-making 
process during the campaign, and the degree to which military and political authority 
was centralised or delegated. Chapter VII discusses the role of general and staff 
officers in the day-to-day management of the army, be it on the march, in camp or in 
garrison. Chapter VIII looks at the systems of command utilised in the preparations 
for and conduct of the sieges and battles of the War of the Spanish Succession in the 
Low Countries and Germany. 
The thesis draws upon a variety of source material, but three particular sources bear 
highlighting. The first is Chandos Papers, held at the Huntington Library in San 
Marino, California. The papers of paymaster James Brydges, later duke of Chandos, 
they provide an invaluable perspective on the financial supply (and misdemeanours) 
of the army under Marlborough. The second is the Blenheim Papers, now held (in the 
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main) at the British Library. No study of the British army in the War of the Spanish 
Succession has used these to any significant degree and they offer a wealth of 
information on all aspects of British military practice in the period. The third is perhaps 
the most interesting. These are the papers of Richard King, held in the Royal Collection 
at Windsor Castle. Beyond a whimsical overview in Sir John Fortescue's Historical and 
Military Essays (London, 1928) -Sir John discovered the mislabelled papers during his 
tenure as Royal Librarian-they do not appear to have been studied by any other 
historian. These papers were uncatalogued; I have endeavoured to provide a summary 
and a provisional catalogue in the Appendix. 
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II 
The apparatus of command: 
General and staff officers, c. 1700 
The general officers of the early modern English army were exactly that: officers with a 
general responsibility, as opposed to a specific local authority provided by a 
regimental commission. They existed as a loose umbrella of command over and above 
the fundamental building blocks of the army-its still heavily proprietorialised 
permanent and semi-permanent regiments -beyond which there was no persistent 
organisational structure. Regimental and general rank were not mutually exclusive; 
many (indeed, most) general officers were substantive colonels in their own right, 
possessing a regiment and overseeing it as their fief. 
Though a general officer demanded respect and deference (not to mention a 
considerable level of financial remuneration) according to his rank and seniority, it 
would be misleading to suggest that such simply provided a de facto level of authority 
over those of lesser rank. Their commissions specified no particular aspect of 
command, other than a branch of military service: Horse, Dragoons or Foot. They were 
officers to whom a commander-in-chief (see below) 'deputed his own powers in a 
subordinate degree and within certain local limits'. 10 Rank alone perhaps best 
represented potential authority-with all its power and portent-rather than absolute 
authority; more dignitas than auctoritas. The actual authority of a general officer was a 
product of both his rank and the charge bestowed upon him by a superior. 
This is perhaps best illustrated by a supreme example of a general officer in Queen 
Anne's army, the Captain-General. John Churchill, the (then) Earl of Marlborough's 
commission as captain-general was heavy on style but lighter on substance. As captain- 
general, Marlborough was to command, regulate and keep discipline in Her Majesty's 
10 Col. Clifford Walton, History of the British Standing Army 1660-1700 (London, 1894), p. 618. 
[Hereafter 'Walton'. ] 
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Land Forces; and to enjoy the office's "Powers, Authoritys, Rights, Priviledges, 
Prehemincies, Perquisits, Profits, Allowances, Advantages, and Emoluments... " Much 
alliteration, but less transparent meaning. Indeed, Queen Anne even gave the attorney 
or solicitor-general free rein to insert into this commission "all such apt and proper 
Clauses as [he should] think fit and necessary for this purpose... " 11 Its opaque 
pageantry rivalled the post of Generalissimo, Marlborough's notional superior in the 
army, held by Prince George of Denmark. By Marlborough's time the post of captain- 
general had lost many of the powers it had possessed in the immediate aftermath of 
the Restoration, when held by George Monck: it had no power, for example, to raise 
forces or exert control over money and stores. 12 
Much of Marlborough's functional authority in the army in the Low Countries 
stemmed from his warrant to act as Commander-in-Chief, together with his post as 
Master-General of the Ordnance (which gave considerable powers with regard to the 
officers, equipment and supply of the train of artillery, as well as the arms and 
ammunition of the army itself). It was as commander-in-chief that Marlborough held 
the specific authority to command all English forces in the theatre; to prepare and 
publish rules and ordinances for the command of the army; to regulate and administer 
justice within it; to appoint subsidiary posts (such as a provost marshal) and brevets to 
its better function - to in all ways act as his sovereign's designated prime military 
plenipotentiary in the Low Countries. 13 
His senior subordinates were the Generals of Horse and Generals of Foot (typically 
referred to as generals of the infantry and the cavalry in foreign armies). Only four 
individuals held the rank of 'full general' during Marlborough's command in the Low 
11 National Archives (NA), State Papers (SP) 44/168 pp. 380-381. Order to prepare a bill to 
Marlborough as captain-general. Anne and Vernon. St James, 10 March 1702 N. S. For the actual 
bill, see War Office Papers (WO) 25/3207,14 March 1702 N. S. 
12 Raibeart E. Scouller, The Army of Queen Anne (Oxford, 1966), pp. 54-58. [Hereafter, 'Scouller'. ] 
Charles Clode had argued that the captain-general commanded-in-chief over all forces when 
the sovereign-the supreme commander of the army, from whom all officers held their 
commissions and, ultimately, authority-was absent. Scouller was more cautious, particularly 
on the relationship between a captain-general and commander-in-chief. Charles M. Clode, 
Military Forces of the Crown (London, 1869), vol. ii., pp. 256-257,690,694-695. 
13 NA, SP 84/574 pp. 23-24b and SP 44/168 pp. 355-358. Warrant to Marlborough as 
commander-in-chief in the Low Countries. William and Vernon. 1 June 1701 O. S. SP 84/574 pp. 
25-26b and SP 44/168 pp. 391-394. Warrant and orders to Marlborough as commander-in-chief 
in the Low Countries. Anne and Vernon. 9 March 1702 O. S. See Chapter VI. 
21 
Countries; and for much of the war in that theatre-the campaigns of 1702, most of 
1703,1708,1709 and 1710 -no English or British officer served in such a post. 14 The 
generals of the Foot and Horse were the paternal overseers of their branch of the 
service; when other general officers made dispositions for elements of the army, they 
would typically do so with reference to the general(s) of Foot and Horse concerned. On 
the march, a general of Foot might lead the infantry of a corps 15; In an order of battle 
they would be given oversight of a considerable body of soldiers relative to their 
competence, such as the infantry of a line of the army (in whole or in part), or a wing or 
more of cavalry. Scouller suggests that the generals of Foot and Horse were 'normally 
lieutenant-generals in rank', but this author has found no evidence of a concurrent 
toponomy. The rank of general of Foot or Horse exceeded the rank of lieutenant- 
general in all aspects (including pay and post on the establishment, forage allowance, 
the number of guards and aides-de-camp allowed and the salutes received in camp) 
rather than existing as a parallel distinction. 16 
Beneath the generals of the army were the Lieutenants-General and Majors-General. Each 
functioned much like his namesake in a company, troop or battalion, exercising similar 
duties but with regard to the army as a whole. The lieutenant-general in his original 
form functioned as a lieutenant, legate or second in command to the general-in-chief of 
an army. He was the first point of delegation, be it on the march, in camp or on the 
battlefield; ready to perform any subsidiary role or duty ordered. As the formulation of 
general officers evolved, the rank's pre-eminence diminished and its population grew - 
but incumbents still performed the same basic duties in the army. They commanded 
14 One of these was Marlborough himself, who was promoted General of Foot in 1701. The 
others were General of Foot Charles Churchill (1656-1714), General of Foot George Hamilton, 
Earl of Orkney (c. 1666-1737) and General of Horse Henry Lumley (c. 1658-1722). 
15 E. g. British Library (BL), Stowe MSS 481, ff. 7b-9: Michael Richards' diary, 19 to 30 June 1705 
N. S. 
16 Scouller, pp. 52-53. The unqualified title general developed as an abbreviation of rank of 
colonel general. As a contemporary source noted: "Sometimes there are Colonels-General of 
Horse, Foot and Dragoons, whose Authority extends over each of these Bodies. " A Military 
Dictionary Explaining All Difficult Terms in Martial Discipline, Fortification and Gunnery (Third 
Edition, London, 1708). Though there was no General of Dragoons in the army, Charles Ross was 
promoted Colonel-General of Dragoons in 1711. This rank lacked the authority and remuneration 
of a general of Horse or Dragoons, but held a similar position of pre-eminence within its branch 
of service. 
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detachments and oversaw sections of its order of battle as required by the general-in- 
chief. 17 
Similarly, majors-general reflected the duties of the battalion major or sergeant-major. 
A major provided the 'medium of communication from commander to unit', receiving 
and distributing orders, and overseeing its dispositions, drill and exercise. Of the field 
officers, he possessed the greatest tactical responsibility; his was a more technical, 
functional role than that of the lieutenant-colonel or colonel, whose leadership was 
typically moral (or proprietorial). This distinction to some degree persisted into the 
ranks of general officers, as shall be discussed later in the thesis. Majors-general would 
be assigned commands as necessary, typically falling under the aegis of a lieutenant- 
general if the overall command was large enough 18 
Outside of the army itself, with its lines and wings, the brigade was the only supra- 
regimental, tactical body that might approach a degree of semi-permanency on 
campaign. Composed of a variable number of battalions of Foot, or of squadrons of 
Horse or Dragoons, brigades were not permanent military institutions; but neither 
were they wholly ephemeral. A brigade could gain a semblance of identity and 
continuity over a campaign if it experienced few changes in its roster. It was 
commanded by a Brigadier or Brigadier-General. A distinction was occasionally made 
between the brigadier and the other general officers. Whilst a brigadier might be 
termed a general officer in various establishments and sources, in others he would be 
set apart, with a major-general being the lowest ranked specimen of general officer. 19 
In Marlborough's army, the lieutenants-general, majors-general and brigadiers were 
associated with a particular branch of the service - Horse, Foot or Dragoons-rather 
17 Scouller, p. 61. The first lieutenants-general in the standing army appeared in 1679, when 
James II created three lieutenants-general "over all our Forces, as well Horse as Foot"; but the 
rank had been used in Ireland (166Z 1674) and the Low Countries (1673). Walton, p. 618. 
18 Scouller, p. 66. Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason (London, 1987), 
pp. 70-71. 
19 This distinction should be treated with caution, as it was far from pervasive and usage could 
be inconsistent at best. In some cases, both forms could occur in the same document. (See, for 
example BL, Add. MSS 23642, ff. 27-27b and KP 1(i)/64: order for the limitation of baggage. 7 
July 1708 N. S. ) The Board of General Officers, which originally comprised all officers above 
field rank, was later split into a superior board (composed of majors-general and above) and an 
inferior board (composed of brigadiers). See Chapter VI. 
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than'of the Army' (though this was not always apparent in the nomenclature). While a 
senior general officer leading a detachment on campaign, on the march or in garrison 
might command a mixed force of infantry and cavalry, his authority in the army as a 
whole was typically limited to his arm. Table A. 1 (p. 261) lists the general officers that 
served on the establishment of the forces the Low Countries under Marlborough. 
Assisting the commander-in-chief and the general officers were the staff officers of the 
army (Table A. 2; p. 272). Although the commander of an early modern army took a 
much greater, personal role in the direction and regulation of the campaign than his 
descendents did, these staff officers played an important role: "good, unobtrusive 
administrative staff work was one of Marlborough's outstanding successes. "20 The two 
principal staff officers in the army were the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster- 
General. Both posts drew a pay-allowance of 10s. per day and were accompanied by a 
brevet of colonel of Horse or Foot for the incumbent, if he did not hold that rank 
already - though this did not preclude an individual rising to the rank of general 
officer while still exercising the staff post. 21 
The adjutant-general is the least well documented of the two. In one paper on the Duke 
of Marlborough's field-administration, the adjutant-general receives two sentences 22 In 
essence, the adjutant-general acted for his general-in-chief in much the same way that a 
battalion adjutant acted for a field officer, "relieving him of the more laborious details 
of his duties and forming the medium of communication with the troops on any matter 
of discipline generally or of tactical movements. After Thomas Meredyth left the post 
in 1704, the adjutant-general was always one of Marlborough's aides-de-camp 23 
20 ScouIler, p. 54. 
21 E. g. NA, SP 44/168 p. 351. Brevet for colonel of Horse to Thomas Meredyth, Esq. William and 
Vernon. Hampton Court, 1 June 1701 O. S. SP 44/168 p. 352. Commission of adjutant-general to 
same. William and Vernon. Hampton Court, 1 June 1701 O. S. William Cadogan (c. 1671/2- 
1726), Marlborough's quartermaster-general throughout his command in the War of the 
Spanish Succession, rose to the rank of lieutenant-general. 
22 Raibeart E. Scouller, 'Marlborough's administration in the field', Army Quarterly, 95 (1968), 
197-208; 96 (1968), 102-113. 
23 Walton, p. 623. The post was first added to the standing army in 1673. One served with 
Marlborough throughout the duke's campaigns. Meredyth's successors, Henry Durell and 
Metcalfe Graham, were both aides-de-camp to the duke prior to, and during, their period of 
office as adjutant-general. The post in this period was notably different to its namesake of the 
later 18th century. Houlding, Fit for Service, pp. 155-6. 
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The quartermaster-general was the principal operational staff officer of the army. His 
duties were considerable and a discussion of the nature and extent of his role in the 
army forms much of the basis of Chapter VII. It shall suffice here to say that the 
quartermaster-general was responsible, in whole or in part, for routing, supplying and 
quartering the troops engaged on the campaign or in winter quarters (often directing 
such activities in person) and providing the necessary reconnaissance and intelligence 
pursuant to the execution of such. He was aided in his duties by a Deputy 
Quartermaster-General (also termed Assistant Quartermaster-General or Lieutenant 
Quartermaster-General), who drew 5s. a day in pay. 24 
The office of quartermaster-general throughout Marlborough's campaigns in the Low 
Countries was held by William Cadogan, an officer often mentioned in the same breath 
as Adam de Cardonnel, personal and military Secretary to the Commander-in-Giief. 
Cardonnel was the principal personal and administrative aide to the duke in the Low 
Countries; an incredible volume of correspondence-public and private-and 
intelligence on political, diplomatic, economic and military matters passed through his 
hands. Though Cardonnel did not take any role in directing the strategic or operational 
affairs of the army, Marlborough's orders and warrants were usually written and 
issued by his secretary, in the commander-in-chief's name. The secretary drew 10s. per 
day as pay upon the establishment, but received numerous further payments on 
account of the commissions and contracts he counter-signed for Marlborough? s 
Confusingly, Henry Watkins, who served as Judge-Advocate or Deputy Judge-Advocate in 
the Low Countries was also often referred to as 'secretary to the commander-in-chief', 
or even 'secretary at war to Her Majesty's forces in the Low Countries'. He certainly 
served as the duke's Latin secretary and fulfilled a variety of administrative roles from 
his office at the Hague; but as deputy judge-advocate he acted as Marlborough's legal 
counsel, with powers to regulate the general courts-martial of the army according to 
24 For a useful discussion on the antecedents of the quartermaster-general and his duties (such 
as its relation to the earlier offices of scoutmaster-general and harbinger, see Walton, pp. 621-627. 
25 Scouller, p. 67. Cardonnel had been Chief Clerk at the War Office and served has secretary to 
Marlborough in the Nine Years War; but when the (then) earl went to the Low Countries in 
1701, he was accompanied by Richard Warre. Cardonnel soon replaced him. Dictionary of 
National Biography [hereafter D. N. B. ]. Henry Snyder (ed. ), The Marlborough-Godolphin 
Correspondence, (Oxford, 1975), vol. i, pp. xxx, 56 n. 2. [Hereafter 'Snyder'. ] 
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the Mutiny Acts and the Articles of War, attending the meetings himself when 
possible. Watkins' pay as deputy judge-advocate was 10s. daily; his expenses as 
Marlborough's secretary at the Hague were considerably greater. Watkins was often 
allowed leave over the winter and appointed a deputy in his place. 26 
The Provost Marshal joined the deputy judge-advocate in overseeing the discipline of 
the army. It was his duty to police both the camp and its environs, and the line of the 
army on the march, apprehending all manner of deserters, plunderers and other 
transgressors, which he would place in his custody - ready to be brought before the 
general courts-martial of the army, of which he would announce and manage the 
logistics. The provost marshal was paid 12s. a day for himself and "his two men", but 
received considerable fees from the sutlers and traders that accompanied the army, on 
account of his regulating their practices in the camp. 
Other officers included the Wagonmaster-General, who ruled over the baggage of the 
army as his personal fief27-none were to question his regulation on the line of march; 
those that did were liable to be severely punished and any errant wagons plundered 
on the spot-and the Deputy Paymasters of the army in the Low Countries. Subordinate 
to the Paymaster-General and Paymaster to the Forces Abroad, in England, these 
individuals formed the continental end of the financial chain that stretched across the 
North Sea to London. By virtue of public and private credit they provided the army 
with its pay and other extraordinary sums as needed. There had originally been one 
deputy paymaster in the Low Countries - Benjamin Sweet, at Amsterdam; but in 1706 
he was joined by a colleague, Henry Cartwright, who operated from Antwerp. The 
regulation of these two individuals was never entirely clear and a at times considerable 
level discord existed between Sweet and Cartwright. Both initially received an 
allowance of 12s. 6d. a day, with expenses claimed on account - though this was later 
increased to £3 p. d. in pay, with a further 20s. daily in expenses. In addition, each was 
liable to receive a variable percentage on the monies they paid out to the regiments 28 
26 BL, Add. MSS 61371, f. 135: order allowing six months' leave for Watkins. 4 November 1706 
N. S. See also ibid., ff. 206b: order dated at the Hague, 11 November 1707 N. S. 
27 The wagonmaster-general received 7s. 6d. daily for himself and his assistant. 
28 For further discussion of the financial agencies and misdemeanours of the paymasters and 
their accomplices in the Low Countries, see Chapter IV. 
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Two sets of junior staff officers completed the military-administrative establishment of 
the army in the Low Countries. The first grouping was of the Majors of Brigade, or 
Brigade-Majors. These individuals were regimental officers who were seconded, 
typically upon the petition of a general officer, to serve in the sole staff posting that 
attended each brigade. They acted as the link between the officer commanding the 
brigade (typically a brigadier) and the battalions or squadrons that comprised it; in 
essence, they served as the brigadier's aide-de-camp, albeit with a more defined role 
(given the semi-permanent nature of the brigade, relative to any temporary command 
issued to a lieutenant- or major-general). 29 
Brigades-major were linked to individual brigadiers or brigades for the course of a 
campaign, and thus an arm of service, which reflected their own military experience 
and regimental history. Their remuneration varied. In 1702, each received £91.10s. for 
their service on the campaign (i. e. 5s. each p. d. over the calendar year); for the period 
1703 to 1706 they were paid £100 each (10s. p. d. for 200 days); from 1707 they drew the 
typical staff officer's pay upon the establishment -10s. a day over the calendar year. A 
list of those that served in the Low Countries under Marlborough appears in Table A. 3 
(p. 275). 30 
Aides-de-Camp were the perquisite of all general officers of the rank of major-general 
and above, typically chosen "on account of family connexion or personal friendship" as 
opposed to any conspicuous statement of military merit. 31 These officers served as 
aides and liaisons in all matters, both military and private. Though a general was 
allowed a certain number of aides-de-camp on the establishment, a senior officer- 
especially the commander-in-chief-might be accompanied by any number of 
unofficial aides (particularly volunteers that were 'people of quality') that had no place 
on the establishment, but still possessed the aide-de-camp's dignity on account of their 
29 Walton, p. 627; Scouller, p. 66. 
30 BL, Add. MSS 61369, f. 110b-111; Add. MSS 61370, ff. 70b, 179b; Add. MSS 61371, ff. 45,129b- 
130. 
31 Walton, p. 628. There were exceptions: In the early years of the war, before he was promoted 
to the rank of general officer on the establishment, Cadogan possessed at least one adjutant as 
quartermaster-general. BL, Add. MSS 61370, f. 83b: warrant to pay Cadogan £82.5s. from 
Contingencies, to make up the pay of his staff officers on the Establishment of Ireland to that of 
the Establishment of Her Majesty's said forces in the Low Countries, with an allowance for an 
adjutant to 25 December 1704. 
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commander's patronage. Furthermore, any officer that was tasked with a particular 
duty on the behalf of the commander-in-chief might be referred to as an aide-de-camp, 
as occurred with Colonel Michael Richards in 1705.32 
Known aides-de-camp to the general officers are listed in Table A. 4 (p. 280). An aide- 
de-camp filling a post allowed on the establishment typically received 10s. per day or a 
fixed sum for their 'service during the campaign . Later in the war, the numbers of 
aides allowed the general officers were as follows: commander-in-chief, 6; generals of 
Foot or Horse, 3; lieutenants-general, 2; and majors-general, 1. Until 1707, however, 
there was considerable variation. Promotions frequently outpaced the establishments 
allowed by Parliament; as a general might not always receive pay according to his 
rank, he was also not assured of receiving a proportionable number aides-de-camp. 
In 1702 Marlborough, as commander-in-chief, received the full allowance of 10s. p. d. 
for two aides-de-camp (James Bringfield and Henry Durell) and partial sums for four 
more. This fell to three in 1703, before rising to four in 1704 and 1705 (two at 10s. per 
day for 365 days and two at £100 "for the like service during the campaign"). From 
1707 onwards, Marlborough was allowed six aides-de-camp, each drawing 10s. a day 
for the calendar year, amounting to £1098 in total. The numbers allowed his generals 
varied. Prior to 1707, each aide-de-camp was paid 10s. a day for 200 days a year. In 
1702, Marlborough's brother, Charles, had two aides-de-camp as a lieutenant-general; 
Majors-General Cutts, Lumley, Orkney and Ingoldsby possessed one each. Yet in 1703, 
though Churchill retained two, his fellow lieutenants-general Cutts and Lumley, 
received pay for one each. For 1704, General of Foot Churchill and Lieutenants-General 
Cutts and Lumley were allowed two each, Lieutenant-General Ingoldsby one; and 
Majors-General Withers and Wood shared the pay of a single aide-de-camp on the 
establishment between them. There was no mention of the Earl of Orkney's aide(s)-de- 
camp at all. By 1707 there was a degree of regularity, with the officers serving being 
allowed a number of aides on the establishment according to their actual rank. 33 
32 Murray, ii, p. 184: Marlborough to the Bishop of Raab, camp at Vlierbeck, 21 July 1705 N. S. 
33 BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 111,114b.; Add. MSS 61370, ff. 69b, 74b-75,87-87b, 176b, 177; Add. 
MSS 61371, ff. 50-51b, 52,129-129b, 130-130b, 207b, 208-208b; Add. MSS 61372, ff. 95b-96,107b- 
108,146b, 148,150,256-257b; Add. MSS 61373, ff. 43,52b. The bill for aides-de-camp of one 
general of Foot, three lieutenants-general and five majors-general in 1707 came to £2555. 
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Over the course of the war, the numbers of general and staff officers serving in the Low 
Countries swelled considerably. The initial establishment, prior to the onset of 
operations in 1702, was that agreed with the States-General for the command of the 
twelve regiments of English Foot raised for their service. This body consisted of a 
lieutenant-general (at £4 p. d. ), two majors-general (E2 p. d. each), two brigadiers (30s. 
p. d. each), a quartermaster-general (10 s. p. d. ), deputy quartermaster-general (5s. p. d. ), 
four aides-de-camp (10s. p. d. each), two majors of brigade (ditto), a secretary to the 
lieutenant-general (ditto), a provost marshal (5s. p. d. ) and four men (2s. 6d. p. d. each), 
and a wagonmaster (3s. p. d. ). This establishment amounted to £6469.12s. 6d. yearly. 34 
Marlborough's initial warrant to authorise pay to the general officers for their service 
in the year 1702 followed this basic establishment (himself as commander-in-chief 
excepted), though an additional warrant provided for the promotion of two brigadiers 
to majors-general for six months of the campaign, and four brigadiers were forced to 
share the pay of one brigadier as listed on the establishment. 35 
In 1702, the total allowed to the general and staff officers of the English proportion of 
the 40,000 men -Marlborough as commander-in-chief included (£3650 p. a. )- 
amounted to £10,000.36 By way of comparison, the establishment of Danish general and 
staff officers in the service of England and the States-General ran as follows: two 
lieutenants-general (fl. 500 each p. m. ), two majors-general (fl. 250 each p. m. ), four 
adjutants-general (fl. 166: 13.25 each p. m. ), a 'first auditor' (fl. 75 p. m. ), a secretary (fl. 25 
p. m. ), provost marshal-general (fl. 60 p. m. ) and two men (fl. 16 each p. m. ), three 
'officers of justice' (fl. 16 each p. m. ), an executioner (fl. 32 p. m. ) and two men (fl. 16 
each p. m. ). This body oversaw a force of 12,520 soldiers; the staff's total pay amounted 
34 BL, Add. MSS 61317, if. 63-64b, 65-66b, 67-72b: estimates for the charge to the States-General 
for the twelve regiments of Foot raised for their service, according to a treaty of 3 March 1677. 
12 May 1701 (0. S.? ). Under this scheme, the lieutenant-general was the commander-in-chief of 
the English forces. 
35 BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 109-109b: warrant for pay to general officers, 30 December 1701 to 25 
December 1702 (OS. ). The warrant listed a lieutenant-general (Churchill), two majors-general 
(Cutts and Lumley) and four brigadiers (Orkney, Ingoldsby, Wyndham; brigadiers Wood, 
Stanley and Hamilton shared the pay of the 'remaining' brigadier listed on the establishment). 
This establishment amounted £6254.12s. 6d. The warrant to make up Orkney's and Ingoldsby's 
pay from brigadiers to majors-general for six months of the campaign appears at Ibid, f. 112. 
The money needed was taken from the remainder of the £10,000 apportioned to the general and 
staff officers that was unused, as also from the Contingencies. 
36 BL, Add. MSS 61317, f. 107.24 January 1702 O. S. 
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to fl. 2639: 18 per month (or fl. 3695: 17 per six weeks, which was the typical period of 
account for the foreign troops in English pay) 37 
In 1704, the number of general officers allowed on the establishment of the 40,000 men 
was as follows: a commander-in-chief (£10 p. d. ), a general of the Foot (£6 p. d. ), three 
lieutenants-general (two of Foot, one of Horse), two majors-general (both of Foot) and 
five brigadiers (three for the Foot, two for the Horse and Dragoons). Including other 
staff officers, the total bill amounted to fA4.13s. 5d. daily, or £16302.10s. 10d. for the 
year. 38 By 1707, it had grown further - the estimates for the establishment of general 
and staff officers had risen to £19040.10d 39 
The dichotomy between the number and rank of officers serving in the field, and those 
allowed by Parliament on the establishment for the Low Countries, was particularly 
marked in 1709. Of the nine lieutenants-general serving in the army, only three - 
Lumley, Orkney and Withers-were supported upon the establishment in that rank, 
receiving the full £1460 p. a. each. Five further lieutenants-general-Wood, Ross, 
Argyll, Webb and Meredyth-were actually paid as majors-general (£730 p. a. ) upon 
the establishment, with the balance (another £730) to be paid from funds drawn from 
beyond the establishment. The remaining lieutenant-general, Cadogan, was paid as a 
brigadier (E547.10s. ) on the establishment, requiring a further £882.10s. to be found from 
other sources. This imbalance produced a knock-on effect among the other general 
officers. The army's majors-general-Temple, Stair, North and Grey and Wynne-were 
paid as brigadiers on the establishment; as was Brigadier Kellum. The other 
brigadiers-Primrose, Sabine, Lalo, Evans and Orrery-had, in effect, no place on the 
37 BL, Add. MSS 61317, f. 153: Establishment of Danes in Her Majesty's service. 25 December 
1702 (OS.? ). As another comparison, the establishment of the general and staff officers of the 
Prussians and Hessians of the 40,000 men, already provided for in Holland, came to 
£6363.12s. 6d. (Ibid, f. 113). 
38 BL, Add. MSS 61317, ff. 169-170b: establishment of the General and Staff Officers and 
Contingencies &c. on the Establishment of the 40,000,1704. The other staff officers comprised: 
an adjutant-general, quartermaster-general, secretary to the commander-in-chief and deputy 
judge-advocate, physician to the commander-in-chief and chirurgeon likewise (all at 10s. p. d. ); a 
deputy quartermaster-general (5s. p. d. ), deputy paymaster (12s. 6d. p. d. ), chaplain to the 
commander-in-chief (6s. 8d. p. d. ), wagonmaster-general and his assistant (7s. 1.5d. p. d. ), and a 
provost marshal and his two men (3s. p. d. ). In a scrawled memorandum, Cardonnel noted the 
branches of service of each of the general officers, according to the estimates laid before the 
House of Commons (Ibid, f. 171). 
39 B!., Add. MSS 61317, ff. 125-126b: estimate for the 40,000 men for 1707. 
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establishment whatsoever! Kellum excepted, these officers required significant 
amounts of money, beyond the totals voted by Parliament, to balance their pay. 4° 
The establishment for 1711 allowed for the commander-in-chief (with six aides-de- 
camp), a general of Foot (with three aides-de-camp), nine lieutenants-general (with two 
aides-de-camp each), five majors-general (with an aide-de-camp each), eight brigadiers 
and eight majors of brigade. These posts, together with those of the other staff officers 
(quartermaster-general, adjutant-general, etc. ), amounted to a charge of £36195.10d. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the charge resulting from the computation of the officers that 
actually served in the Low Countries and France in 1711 undershot this establishment 
by £1839. Although Lumley and Orkney were both promoted to the rank of general 
early in 1711, and drew pay accordingly, the shortfall in serving lieutenants-general 
and brigadiers, relative to those allowed on the establishment, suggested money to 
spare. But there was a catch. A further £7847.10s. was owed various officers notionally 
attached to the army in the Low Countries, but doing no service in the field 
whatsoever. These were Charles Churchill (£2737.10s. as a general of Foot, with three 
aides-de-camp), John Richmond Webb and Francis Palmes (£1825 each as a lieutenant- 
general with two aides-de-camp), the Earl of Orrery (£912.10s. as a major-general with 
an aide-de-camp) and Frederick Hamilton (£547.10s. as a brigadier) 41 
40 BL, Add. MSS 61317, f. 174: computation of the sums paid and to be paid to the General 
Officers and other serving in the Low Countries, 1709. This issue also affected the lesser staff 
officers that attended the army in relative proportion to the general officers: the aides-de-camp 
and majors of brigade. Of the eight majors of brigade employed in the Low Countries in 1709, 
six-Cathcart, Tetefolle, Whitney, Congreve, Hamilton and Ligonier-were catered for 
according to the establishment; two-Wolfe and Looker-were to be paid the pay of one 
brigade-major between them, and that drawn from beyond the establishment. Here the aides- 
de-camp and majors of brigade are highlighted as being paid upon the establishment; 
elsewhere, they appear under head of the £10,000 Contingencies (e. g. BL, Add. MSS 61369, 
f. 114b; Add. MSS 61370, ff. 69b, 176b, 177; Add. MSS 61371, ff. 50-51b, 129-129b-mention of 
Contingencies appears to cease in 1707). 
Lieutenants-General Lumley, Orkney and Withers received their two aides-de-camp's pay on 
the establishment; Wood, Ross, Argyll, Webb and Meredyth received pay for one aide-de-camp 
according to the establishment (i. e. as majors-general), with pay for the other to be drawn from 
elsewhere. Both Cadogan's aides-de-camp were paid beyond the establishment. As Majors- 
General Temple, Stair, North and Grey and Wynne received pay as but brigadiers upon the 
establishment, their aides-de-camp had to be paid from elsewhere. Marlborough and Churchill, 
and their aides-de-camp, were properly accounted for on the establishment. 
41 BL, Add. MSS 61317, ff. 176-177b: State of the Pay of the General Officers in the Low Countrys 
for the year 1711 (send to Mr Lowdes from the audit in September 1711). Withers, Wood, Ross, 
Cadogan, Stair, Temple and North and Grey were listed as serving as lieutenants-general; 
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This expansion in the English army was mirrored among the Allies as a whole. In an 
order of battle for the Allied army at the camp at Soignies, on 21 August 1707, the first 
line (26 brigades of Foot, Horse and Dragoons - only one of which did not have a 
brigadier listed) was overseen by a three generals (Tilly, Orange and Churchill), a 
dozen lieutenants-general and seventeen majors-general. The second line (22 brigades, 
each possessing a brigadier) possessed one general (Lottum), nine lieutenants-general 
and thirteen majors-general. The whole was commanded by Marlborough, with 
Ouwerkerk as his immediate lieutenant 42 
But by the latter stages of the war, it was not uncommon to find a near parity between 
the divisions of general officers. At Willemeau, on 2 July 1709, the British contingent 
with the Allied army consisted of but two brigades of Foot (comprising ten battalions; 
there were a further two from the Guards) and two of Horse (numbering thirteen 
squadrons) - out of a total strength of 65 battalions and 127 squadrons. Yet this fairly 
small corps was overseen by two lieutenants-general of Horse or Dragoons (Lumley 
and Ross), three lieutenants-general of Foot (Orkney, Webb and Meredyth), one major- 
general of Horse (Stair), one major-general of Foot (North and Grey), and three 
brigadiers (Sibourg of the Dragoons, and Evans and Lalo of the Foot)! 43 
Indeed, as of 9 July 1709 there were with Marlborough in the Low Countries four 
generals of cavalry (Tilly, the Hereditary Prince of Hesse, Albermarle and Bulow), four 
Primrose, Sabine, Evans, Kellum and Sibourg as majors-general. The brigadiers comprised 
Sutton, Durell, Russell and Morrison (serving for the full year, at £547.10s. each) and Preston, 
Panton and Napper (serving from 12 February 1711 O. S., at £484.10s. each). As the 
establishment allowed for eight brigadiers serving a full year, £736.10s. was left unspent on this 
head. A note in the margin states that Brigadiers Freke and Groves were to be paid £484.10s. 
each for their services-using these unspent funds and requiring a further £232.10s. from 
elsewhere. 
42 KP I(i)/52. Order of battle of the Allied army at the camp at Soignies, 21 August 1707 N. S. 
The British forces were placed on the extreme right of the first line. The British contingent 
provided five brigadiers, five majors-general, three lieutenants-general and one general of Foot. 
Running from the right to the centre, the brigades were commanded as follows: the Earl of Stair 
(4 Sqns of British and Irish dragoons); Palmes (11 Sqns of British Horse); then four battalions of 
Foot, with no brigadier annotated; Penk (18 Sqns of German Horse); Chanclos (4 Sqns of Horse); 
Mattha (6 Sqns of [Dutch? ] Horse); Meredyth (4 Bns of Foot); Temple (5 Bns of Foot); and North 
and Grey (5 Bns of Foot). The British and auxiliary Horse of the right wing of the first line lay 
under Lieutenants-General Count van der Nath, Billow and Lumley, and Majors-General 
Wood, Ross and Schulenburg; the Foot under Lieutenants-General Ingoldsby and Orkney, and 
Majors-General Argyll, Webb and Withers. 
43 KP I(i)/124. Order of battle of the Allied army at the camp at Willemeau, 2 July 1709 N. S. See 
also KP I(i)/127 for two copies. 
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generals of infantry (Lottum, Orange and Fagel), thirty-five lieutenants-general 
(eighteen of cavalry, seventeen of infantry), thirty-seven majors-general (twenty-one of 
cavalry, sixteen of cavalry) and thirty-eight brigadiers (sixteen of cavalry, twenty-two 
of infantry) 44 An actual order of battle at the camp at Flines, dated 25 April 1710, listed 
twenty-nine lieutenants-general, thirty-two majors-general and thirty-three 
brigadiers 45 
44 Murray, iv, p. 538: Marlborough to Villars, camp before Tournai, 9 July 1709 N. S. 
45 KP I(i)/186. Order of battle of the Allied army at the camp at Flines, 25 April 1710 N. S. 
Marlborough commanded the whole, with Tilly as his lieutenant. The first line was overseen by 
the Hereditary Prince of Hesse (Horse), the Prince of Orange (Foot) and Baron Billow (Horse); 
the second by the Earl of Albermarle (Horse), Fagel (Foot) and Anhalt-Dessau (Foot). 
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III 
The paradigm of the early modern officer: 
Life, career and duty 
What a young Officer is to do when he comes into the Army. 
Mien a Man has never been in an Army, when he comes into the Camp, he is in an 
Amazement, he hears a Language spoken, which till then was unknown to him and to which 
before he is accustomed, he must be some time in the Camp. The Guard of the Camp: the 
Piquet: The Guard of the Colours: The Orderly Guard: The Generals Guard: The Main 
Guard: The Ordinary Guard: And the Bivac, are new words to him.. 46 
The young officer was not helped by the proprietorial system in place in the army, 
which meant that common practice could vary considerably from regiment to 
regiment. In the winter of 1706/7, Ingoldsby had been exercising the battalion 
adjutants and non-commissioned officers in their duties. They were mightily pleased, 
he said, that Marlborough had thought fit to have all battalions regiment their 
evolutions and exercise in the same manner, for there had been little uniformity; there 
were even considerable differences in equipment: Argyll's regiment of Foot did not 
possess and pouches or slings for their ammunition, but carried a little cartouche box, 
which would not contain half the ammunition necessary for a day of action. Ingoldsby 
wrote that it was impossible to describe the disorder the battalions were in, for 
... not two Regamts Exercising a lik, nor anney one companney off Granadrs eable 
to Exercis with the Battalyone so that iff your Ldship had a mind to see the Line 
Exercise, all the Granadrs off the armey must have stood still, and not [two] 
Regamts eable to perfforum a like... 7 
If the freshly commissioned comet or ensign was faced with a bewildering complexity 
of regulations and geometrical evolutions-for which the armies of the time possessed 
46 The Perfection of Military Discipline After the Newest Method; As Practiced In England and Ireland, 
&c. Or, 71w Industrious Souldier's Golden Treasury of Knowledge in the Art of making War (London, 
1702), pp. 143-144. 
47 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 4447b: Ingoldsby to Marlborough, Ghent, 31 December 1706 N. S. 
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a particular fancy, in battle, camp and siege-for his own company or troop, then a 
staff officer like Richard King or John Armstrong (whose portfolios of responsibilities 
variably included company command, aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, 
engineer and officer of the artillery train, and assistant to the quartermaster-general) 
may have been particularly taxed. (Yet in 1706, Holcroft Blood, the senior engineer in 
English service and commander of the artillery train, humbly begged to be grated the 
command of a brigade for the following campaign, blithely asserting that the artillery 
really took up very little of his time! 48) 
In the Spring of 1704, King was appointed as an engineer to attend the artillery train in 
Holland, under the command of Holcroft Blood. His direction, from the principal 
officers of the Board of Ordnance, highlighted the duties expected in such a post. By a 
letter accompanying the instructions, dated 4 April 1704 O. S., King was to leave 
forthwith for Holland, 
... and on your arrivall there to attend 
[Colonel Blood], and employ your time and 
Skill in learning the Art and Business of an Engineer according to the inclosed 
Instructions, and to keep a Journall of your proceedings, to be laid before his Grace 
the Duke of Marlborough and the Board of Ordnance, and to be obedient to the 
Commands of your superior Officers as you will answer to the contrary. 49 
As the campaign was expected to open soon, King had relatively little time for 
preparation. The nature of the learning expected was explained in no small detail in his 
instructions: 
You are to use your utmost Endeavours to improve your Knowledge in all things 
belonging to an Engineer, and to render your Self capable in all respects for Majts. 
Service in that Art, to be well Skill'd in the Mathematicks, particularly in 
Stereometry, Altemetry, and Geodesic, to take Distances Hights Depths Surveys of 
Land Measures, of Solid Bodys, and to cut any part of Ground to a Proportion 
given, to be well skilled in all manner of ffoundations, in the Scantlings of all 
Timber and Stone, and of their severall Natures, and to be perfect in Architecture 
Civill and Military, and to have always by you the Descriptions or Modells of all 
manner of Engines useful] in ffortifications or Sieges to draw and designe the 
Scituation of any Place their due Prospects Uprights and Perspective, to know 
48 BL, Add. MSS 61309, if. 45-46b: Blood to Marlborough, Rotterdam, 9 April 1706 N. S. 
49 KP I(i)/ 1. Letter from the 'Office of Ordnance' to Richard King, 4 April 1704 O. S. 
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exactly the Rates of all Materialls for Building of Fortifications, thereby to judge of 
any Estimates propos d to you to examine 50 
Authors and publishers were quick to seize upon deficits in a new officer's knowledge. 
Various works were put out (some in new editions) for 1702, to take advantage of the 
coming campaign. Their merit was variable. Publications such as the aforementioned 
The Perfection of Military Discipline, The Compleat Gentleman Soldier, An epitome of the 
whole art of war, John Barker's 77w Treasury of Fortification, and A Military Dictionary 
could prove useful for the uninitiated 51 But, titles aside, actual treatises on the nature 
of warfare were noted by their absence. There was little in the way of the didactic upon 
the art of war, composed by an experienced military author with reference to past 
campaigns - to provide a literary apprenticeship to officers that had no formal training; 
to provide learning beyond the basic regulations. During this period, such an 
apprenticeship-the customs of war-was learned beside experienced officers in the 
field. 
The official regulations or drillbooks themselves were limited to the mechanics of the 
platoon, company, battalion, troop or squadron: which for the Foot amounted to the 
manual exercise, the platoon exercise, the evolutions, the firings and the manoeuvres. 
No new, full drillbooks were published during Anne's reign; instead, the army drew 
upon those issued at William's command, from the first new regulations of 1690, 
through to the largely similar The Exercise of the Foot... To which is added, the Exercise of 
the horse, grenadiers of horse, and dragoons, issued in Dublin in 1701. But there was further 
development in the field, however, as highlighted by the publication in 1708 of The new 
exercise of firelocks and bayonets; appointed by his Grace the Duke of Marlborough to be used 
by all the British forces... These had been adopted by Marlborough's forces while on 
50 KP I(i)/Z. "Instructions from the Board of Ordnance how to improve the Art of Engeneering", 
4 April 1702 O. S. 
sl John Barker, The treasury of fortification. Wherein that art is made intelligible to the meanest 
capacity; and the several methods of fortifying, according to the late most approved engineers in Europe, 
explained... To which is added, a new and compendious method tofortifie irregular places, compared with 
that generally made use of. (London, 1707); The Compleat Gentleman Soldier: or, A Treatise of Military 
Discipline, Fortifications and Gunnery. In Three Parts. (London, 1702); An epitome of the whole art of 
war, in two parts. 71w first of military discipline... the second of fortification and gunnery (London, 
1692); A military dictionary. Explaining all difficult terms in martial discipline, fortification, and 
gunnery... By an officer. (London, 1702); The Perfection of Military Discipline After the Newest 
Method; As Practiced In England and Ireland, &c. Or, The Industrious Souldier's Golden Treasury of 
Knowledge in the Art of making War (London, 1690; fourth edition, 1702). 
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campaign, and were spread elsewhere by the likes of Captain Robert Parker, who was 
summoned by Ingoldsby to Ireland to train the soldiers in the 'Flanders discipline. 
Similar instructions were reissued by Orkney at Ghent, in 1711.52 
If finding one's own edition of a particular work was difficult, there was only one thing 
for it to painstakingly hand-copy as much as possible. King's own papers contain a 
home-made copy, bound with a pin, of The Maxims or general Rules which are observed in 
the Modern Fortifications, together with a like transcription of Mr Vane's Observations on 
Powder, and the small, hand-copied sixteen-page booklet, Les Calibres et les Noms des 
Peices que l'on fondoit annieement. 53 Nor did he neglect his company duties: among his 
possessions was a neatly copied piece of paper describing the various evolutions of 
discipline that a sentinel of the Foot would make in giving fire, or fixing his bayonet54; 
together with a far scruffier, much-folded piece marked only 'Exercise', as might befit 
an aide memoire stuffed in an officer's pocket on parade! 55 
Not all officers were so conscientious. Charles Churchill, the illegitimate son of the 
Marlborough's similarly named brother, "professed never having read a whole book 
through in his life, and his letters were so ill wrote and so ill spelled" -a trait he may 
have inherited from his father, who possessed one of the least refined hands -"that Sir 
Robert Walpole used to keep them unread till he saw him, and then he often could not 
read them himself. "- Others tried, but struggled. John Pitt, long-time aide to the 
commander-in-chief, remarked (not wholly remorsefully) that he had left a little primer 
on arithmetic in Henry Watkins' rooms at the Hague. He continued: 
I ffind it harde to goe to Schoole but necessity [? perforce] &I have a master heere 
one Captaine Cartwright who sayes will make a proffitient in two dayes with my 
owne Industry hope in a few more may make as darke a Lanthorne as himselfe... 7 
52 For the evolution of these regulations, see Houlding, Fit for Service, pp. 160-165,171-177. For 
Orkney's regulations, see BL Add. MSS 29477. 
53 KP I(i)/5a-c, 24 pp. Marked'1706' in pencil on the rear of 5c; KP I(i)/17,19. 
'4 KP I(i)/15. "The New Exercise of the ffirelock & Bayonet" (cover). "The Exercise of the 
ffirelock & Bayonet. Gant 1706" (document). 
55 KP I(i)/16. There are some expansions on certain evolutions, and occasional differences in 
terminology. 
56 The correspondence of Walpole, quoted in Romney Sedgewick, The House of Commons 1715- 
1754 (London 1970), vol. i, p. 552- 
57 BL, Add. MSS 38852, ff. 25-26b: John Pitt to Henry Watkins, Antwerp, 28 April 1707 N. S. 
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If Pitt's ingenuity in applied mathematics even approached his teacher's (whose 
peculations of army funds were considerable), he would have been assured a bountiful 
existence, now matter how dim his light. 
Nor were all officers so quick to learn the rudiments of warfare, as John Wolfe 
admitted in an apologetic petition to his commander-in-chief: 
... that your 
Graces petitioner being but a Younger Brother and Souldier of ffortune 
and not three months in the Armie which short time of a service I could not attaine 
unto the skill knowledge & experience of Marshall affaires, yet may it please your 
Grace your petitioner being willing and desioruse to serve my Queen and Country 
to the utmost of my power in order where to have laid out my small ffortune to 
purchase a Company for her Majesties service which my present want of 
experience in Marshall affaires hach given some of grater experience therein to 
impose on your petitioner in severall manner of wayes and Humbley conceive may 
have represented Matters to Your Grace to my great preiudice if not by your Graces 
great Wisdome knowledge and goodness considered. 
Which your petitioner most humbly prayes for your Graces pardon for whatever 
may be represented to your Grace amendment of all such dislike actions committed 
through my ignorance and want of knowledge whuch your petitioner will studdy 
as well to amend as to informe his Judgement for to performe his duty in all 
respects of obedience to command and Marshall Discipline craveing your Graces 
ffavour to this my Humble petition which as in Duty bound 58 
But it appeared the military life was not one for John Wolfe. A later petition, of Captain 
Daniel Woollet of the Coldstream Guards, begged leave to purchase Wolfe's captaincy 
in Leigh's -a plan amenable to young Wolfe. Woollet had served for seventeen years 
in the guards, but his regiment was stuck in England and he desired service in the seats 
of war abroad. There is no record of this purchase being made, but the guardsman did 
get his wish; unfortunately, the only further reference to a Daniel Woollet is to a 
lieutenant-colonel in Blood's regiment of Foot, who was killed at Almanza. 59 
King might perhaps have been interested in the suggestion of two ingenious 
gentlemen, who forwarded their plans for the better prosecution of the war to the 
Duke of Marlborough. One gentleman proposed "A new invention for borning of 
58 BL, Add. MSS 61297, ff. 174-175b: petition of John Wolfe, captain in Leigh's regiment of Foot. 
[1704 marked in pencil. ] 
59 Dalton, v, p. 99; vi, p. 366. For Wolfes commission, see also BL, Add. MSS 61298, ff. 5-6b. 
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Cities, and Ships, also for defending and taking of fortifications. " His device was a 
chemical preparation, 
... a feuer of that force that it distroys any thing, melts al Metals knowen so sure it fals opan it, it distrois stones, timber, ['tis] of that quality, that if two, or free drops 
fals opan any limb of a man, and not Cut of within the space of five minutes that 
man mus deay, and al the art of the Worelt Cannot Save him. 
This fire was distributed by an engine, ejected by the force of wind "drawen into the 
ingien with Matimatical instruments, " from which it "fals like a regen auf this 
Confinement, the Circumferance of Sexty and more foot. " Somewhat worryingly, 
considering its stated nature, the inventor claimed that it was "Vere proper abord a 
ship. " And if the Duke of Marlborough was not taken by the particular invention, the 
author had a 'blunderbos' that could throw 2.5-inch diamter grenades a distance of 
one-hundred yards. 60 Though the inventor's name is not mentioned in the proposal, it 
is possible that the individual was one William Powell. A warrant of 3 November 1710 
N. S. noted that "Whereas Mr William Powell has been at some Expence in preparing 
an Engine for Shooting Liquid Ffire which has not answer'd expectation... " 
Marlborough had nevertheless thought fit to allow him the sum of £20, in full 
satisfaction of his expenses! 61 
Mr George Taume was similarly alert to the ingenuities of warfare. Inspired by the 
example of the Romany's travelling wagons, he proposed an early modern Trojan 
horse: 
I apprehend & have bin told by a Master Workman yt a Waggon might be so 
[tarthed] or [covered] yt to all outward appearanse it might seem & pass for A Load 
of Hay: I am assured yt ye rommon travilling Waggons often bring from Gosport to 
London thirty Persons beside their lugage, yt their rommon louding is fourty 
hundred weight; & in ye summer they some times travill with three store hundred, 
the Waggons yt are of generall use in Kent seem to be equally strong &I apprehend 
that more then twenty Armed Men might easily & conveniently be lodged, 
conveied, & concealed, & might have more than room enough & liberty to breath in 
60 BL, Add. MSS 61339, ff. 248-249b: A new invention for borning Cities, and Ships, also for 
defending, and taking of fortifications. Anonymous. Undated. 
61 BL, Add. MSS 61372, f. 244: order to Colonels Pendlebury and Hopkey. Adam de Cardonnel 
by Marlborough's command. 3 November 1710 N. S. The £20 was charged to the Contingencies 
of the Train in the Low Countries. 
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y- cavity of one of these seeming loads of Hay since there might easily be continued 
a free passage for ye Eyre.. 62 
f*# 
Many general and staff officers in Marlborough's army, however, had already served 
their apprenticeship in the field. At the start of the first campaign, in 1702, the senior 
generals -Marlborough, Lieutenant-General Charles Churchill and Majors-General 
Lord Cutts, Henry Lumley, Richard Ingoldsby and the Earl of Orkney-had all seen 
considerable service in Ireland and Flanders under William. Of the five brigade 
commanders, only Hugh Wyndham had done duty as brigadier previously, but the 
new promotees-James Stanley, Cornelius Wood, Frederick Hamilton and Henry 
Withers-were experienced Williamite officers. In addition, both Ingoldsby and 
Withers had served as senior staff officers, having held the post of adjutant-general, 
and five out of the six majors of brigade held field rank in their own right -a 
proportion unmatched during the war. 63 
Some officers, like Hugh Caldwell (brigade-major for the Dragoons in 1704), had led a 
particularly eventful life. The son of Sir James Caldwell, Bt of Castle Caldwell in 
County Fermanagh, Hugh claimed to have raised the first troop to be mustered in 
Ireland for English service during the Williamite war, where he 'maintained a frontier 
next to the Irish army that lay before Londonderry' and defended Donegal Castle 
against Jacobite forces under the Duke of Berwick in 1689 - refusing to take a bribe of 
£1000 and the offer of a troop in Berwick's regiment to surrender his charge. If that was 
not enough, Caldwell later raised three companies of Foot and armed them at his own 
expense; the men were incorporated into Orkney's regiment and served throughout 
the war in Ireland. After the capture of Limerick, a dispute between Caldwell's father 
and Major-General Kirke led to his being broken by his colonel, Brigadier William 
Wolesley in a regimental reduction (notwithstanding Caldwell claiming to have the 
62 BL, Add. MSS 61339, if. 252-253b: A project from George Taume. Undated. 
63 Ingoldsby served as adjutant-general of Foot to the Duke of Schomberg in 1692, on his 
expedition to the French coast (Dalton, iii, p. 283); Withers was adjutant-general to William in 
Ireland (D. N. B. ). For the ranks of the majors of brigade, see Table 2.3. 
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eldest troop)'4 The Duke of Schomberg gave him a troop in his regiment, in which he 
continued to serve throughout the remainder of the war in Ireland, and in the Nine 
Years War and War of the Spanish Succession in the Low Countries, where he rose to 
the post of lieutenant-colonel and effective regimental commander. Caldwell was 
wounded at the storming of the Schellenberg (where he had his horse killed beneath 
him) and killed at the siege of Douai, in 1710.65 
Those chosen as staff officers came from a variety of backgrounds. Consider two of 
Marlborough's longest serving aides-de-camp, Henry Durell and Thomas Panton. 
Durell was the child of a learned Anglican clergyman, scholar and apologist; Panton s 
father was an infamous gambler, philanderer and rake: "There was no game but what 
he was an absolute artist at it, either upon the Square or Foul Play ... 
His chief game 
was hazard, and in one night at this play he won as many thousand pounds as 
purchased him an estate of above £1,500 a year. "66Though all Marlborough's aides-de- 
camp were favoured with a degree of patronage, those serving in posts allowed upon 
the establishment were of more humble birth. The likes of Sir James Chamberlain, Bt; 
John Murray, Marquess of Tullibardine; William de Nassau-Zuylenstein, Viscount 
Tunbridge; The Honourable James O'Hara, son of Baron Tyrawly; Charles Schomberg, 
Marquess of Harwich; and Algernon Seymour, Earl of Hertford that accompanied 
Marlborough as his aides did so as gentleman volunteers. 
Staff officers' proximity to the generals of the army, typically men of prestige could aid 
the progress of their careers. Of Marlborough's six aides-de-camp in 1702, all were 
promoted to the rank of general before the end of the war. Charles de Sibourg and 
William Evans were promoted brigadiers in 1708 and majors-general in 1710; Henry 
64 Caldwell's troop was one of those raised by Gustavus Hamilton, the governor of Enniskillen, 
for service under William. His troop was placed in the regiment of William Wolseley, and 
Caldwell's commission as captain was probably dated c. 20 June 1689 O. S. Woleseley's regiment 
initially consisted of no fewer than twenty-five troops; this was later cut to twelve in 1690, and 
six in 1691. It was in this last reduction that Caldwell was broken. Dalton, iii, p. 35. 
65 BL, Add. MSS 61284, ff. 159-160b: memorial of Captain Hugh Caldwell in the Royal Irish 
Dragoons commanded by Major-General Ross. Undated. Dalton, v, II, p. 7 n. 50. See also BL, 
Add. MSS 61163, ff. 75-76b: Orkney to Cardonnel, Maastricht, 7 May 1703 N. S. for Orkney's 
recommendation. 
66 John Durel (1625-1683): D. N. B. Thomas Panton (d. 1685): T. Lucas, Memoirs of the lives, 
intrigues, and comical adventures of the most famous gamesters and celebrated sharpers in the reigns of 
Qzarles II, James II, William III and Queen Anne (1714). Quoted in D. N. B. 
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Durell and Francis Godfrey were made brigadiers in 1710, Thomas Panton in 1711. The 
only exception, James Bringfield, had perished at Ramillies. Joseph Sabine, who served 
as a brigade-major in 1702 and 1703, was a brigadier by 1708 and a major-general by 
1710. 
When George Morgan, who had served for a dozen years in Ingoldsby's regiment of 
Foot, petitioned for a commission of major in the new levies, his candidature was 
supported by a wealth of prominent individuals: Thomas Mansell, Member for 
Glamorganshire and Comptroller of the Household to Queen Anne; Charles Churchill; 
Ingoldsby himself; Henry Withers; William Cadogan; and 'severall Welsh gentlemen. 
In the event Morgan, who had served as a major-of-brigade and sometime aide-de- 
camp to Ingoldsby, and was wounded at the battle of Blenheim, went one step better; 
he received a commission as lieutenant-colonel in Colonel Wynne 's newly raised 
regiment of Foot, dated 25 March 1705 O. S. 67 Yet such service was not a guarantee of 
preferment. When George Watkins, who had served as aide-de-camp to Charles 
Churchill for three whole campaigns, earnestly petitioned for a lieutenant-colonelcy in 
the new levies being raised, in view of various past hardships and a distinct lack of 
pay, his desires went unrequited 68 And succour could arrive rather late in an officer's 
career. circa 1708, Lieutenant John Looker (who would be a major of brigade in that 
year's campaign) petitioned that he had been serving in Schomberg's regiment of 
Dragoons since 1689 and was the eldest lieutenant that did duty there. 69 
Being a staff officer could only advance one's career so far; it was typically necessary to 
purchase a regiment-or at least command one in the field-to secure the prestige and 
standing in the army to rise to general rank. It is unsurprising, therefore that William 
Breton, who had served as a major of brigade to the Foot in 1702, declined the offer as 
67 BL, Add. MSS 61292, if. 3940b: memorial of Morgan to Cardonnel. Morgan stated that he had 
been made ensign 8 March 1688 OS. and captain of grenadiers 15 March 1694 O. S. Ibid, f. 38: 
testimonial of Thomas Mansell on behalf of Captain George Morgan, who desired to be made 
major. 28 February 1703/4 (this date would appear to be in error; 1704/5 is more probable). 
Ibid, ff. 41-42b: Ingoldsby to Cardonnel, London, 24 January 1704 O. S. By order of Marlborough, 
Cardonnel was to remind Marlborough that Morgan had been recommended for preference in 
the new levies. See also Add. MSS 61378, ff. 4b, 60. 
68 BL Add. MSS 61297, if. 52-53b: petition of George Watkins. After 1704, before 1708 (in pencil). 
69 BL, Add. MSS 61291, f. 60: petition of John Looker. [1708?, in pencil. ] Dalton's (v, II, p. 23 n. 7) 
earliest reference to Looker is as a cornet in this regiment, that commission being dated 22 
November 16% OS. 
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serving as Henry Withers' brigade-major for the campaign of 1703, wishing to remain 
at the head of Howe's regiment of Foot (of which he was the lieutenant-colonel 
commanding). Alexander Irwin, of Orkney's regiment, took the post instead, being 
Withers' subsequent choice. ° 
In the latter stages of the war, many of Marlborough's aides were thus clamouring for 
their regiments. Late in 1709, Metcalfe Graham was been languishing, ill, at Breda. He 
begged forgiveness for being unable to wait upon Marlborough, but nevertheless 
wondered if he might return to England: for Marlborough's wife had been 'so 
extremely good and generous' as to promise him a regiment, or equivalent! 71 Richard 
Molesworth, whose father, Robert (a former Member for Lostwithiel and East Retford, 
and later 1"t Viscount Molesworth) protested that his son's debts made him unable for 
the present to attend his duty abroad, while at the same time asking that Marlborough 
might grant his son leave to sell his company and purchase a regiment. n Some even 
wanted to have their cake and eat it. Henry Durell thought to decline a regiment that 
had been made available unless he was also made brigadier and allowed to keep his 
adjutant-general's post 73 
A vacant colonelcy attracted many hopefuls, and the success of one might be attended 
with attempts to satisfy those rebuffed. One such agreement was formulated when 
Lieutenant-General Thomas Meredyth took brief command of the Scots Fusiliers in 
1710. Colonel Robert Steame (being the eldest colonel in Flanders) had a 'reasonable 
pretense' to succeed him in his old regiment; but the post instead went to Windress. In 
order to give Steame satisfaction, Meredyth had agree to resign his governorship of 
Tymouth to the colonel, and by way of some recompense Windress (as well as some 
70 BL, Add. MSS 61287, ff. 37-38b: Withers to Cardonnel, camp near Maesdyck, 7 May 1703 N. S. 
Breton commanded Howe's regiment at Blenheim; he received a brevet of colonel on 2 August 
1704 OS. Dalton, v, p. 165; v, II, p. 49 n. 1. 
71 BL, Add. MSS 61313, if. 230-231b: Metcalfe Graham to Marlborough, Breda, 13 November 
1709 NS. 
72 BL, Add. MSS 61298, ff. 179-180b: Robert Molesworth to Marlborough, 31 March 1710 O. S. 
Richard had himself earlier petitioned Marlborough for his advancement, but his pretentions 
'proved such as were some way inconsistent with Marlborough's designs... ' Molesworth 
desired a regiment to aid in 'screening him from the injuries he receive[d] in his rank by 
younger officers buying regiments over his head... ' 
73 BE, Add. MSS 42176, if. 279-280b: Cardonnel to Watkins, Whitehall, 20 December 1709 O. S. 
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other officers that were preferred on this occasion) agreed to pay Meredyth £1800.74 
Even if successful, the new colonel might look to his fief only to discover a multitude of 
strings attached. George Macartney, who enjoyed Marlborough's support, protested 
that he had the naming of but one captain in his regiment, who was a relation of 
Lieutenant-General Ramsey. "All the rest are men of interest whom the Ministers of 
State have given. " These captains included two recommended by the Duke of 
Marlborough himself; one by the Duke of Argyll; one by the earls of Loudon and Stair; 
the nephew to the Earl of Stair himself; Lord Fincastle, the son of the Earl of Dunmore; 
one recommended by his father, Sir David Mairne; and one by a member of 
Parliament, to whom a company was promised in Scotland 75 
As the pre-eminent soldier in Queen Anne's army and commander-in-chief in 
Flanders, Marlborough possessed-until the very end of the war-a considerable 
autonomy and agency in appointing commissions, particularly with regard to brevets. 
Of the 217 brevets made in the Foot, Horse and Dragoons until 1 January 1707,129 
were made by Marlborough, often in the Low Countries. 76 Such a preponderance of 
influence in the hands of one soldier would make Marlborough liable to gratifying 
some and disaffecting others, as he juggled deserts, influence and his own prejudices. 
Marlborough displayed a bias towards those that served on campaign, particularly in 
Flanders?? In one letter to the gentlemen of the Board of Ordnance, he wrote that he 
was 
... apt to believe if [they] had seen and considered Brigadier Sabines memorial, 
which he might have shown you, you would not have thought it any hardship to 
oblige him to dispose of [Colonel Bennet's] company after having enjoyed it as a 
sinecure through the whole course and hottest of the war, now at a time when the 
regiment is employed at the siege, and reduced to two captains only to do the duty 
74 NA, SP 41/3/235. Cardonnel to Granville, Westminster, 14 February 1711 O. S. 
75 BL, Add. MSS 61298, ff. 41-42b: Macartney's list of officers to be laid before Marlborough. 
Undated. 
76 Dalton, v, pp. 165-7; vi, p. 199. 
77 Following the action of Wynendael in 1708, Marlborough wrote to Godolphin: "All her 
Majesty's subject has had the good fortune this campagne in all actions to distinguish 
themselves, so that I should not do them justice, if I did not beg the Queen that when this 
campagne shall be ended, that she will be pleased to make a promotion amongest the generals 
of this army only, which will be a mark of her favour and their merit. For hetherto, though 
almost all the action has been in this army, yett every generall has advanced equally with them, 
though two parts of three of them has not so much as served this warr. " Snyder, ii, pp. 1106- 
1107 n. 1108. 
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of the whole. For my part I think it a very great indulgence that he has been 
continued so long, while so many gentlemen have lost their lives doing his duty for 
him. 78 
One Marlborough's most famous clashes with Anne and the other influence bases in 
England accompanied the general promotion of 1710. This unprecedented order saw 
sixty-eight officers promoted to the rank of brigadier above; seventeen of those were 
serving in Marlborough's army in the Low Countries. 79 Though Marlborough had 
suggested that all colonels' commissions bearing the date of 1705 were eligible for 
promotion, he had earlier intimated to Robert Walpole, the Secretary at War, that it 
should have gone no further than 25 March 1705; Walpole told Anne that he thought 
this was Marlborough's wish. The queen mentioned Jack Hill, whose commission was 
dated 1705, but excluded on account of Marlborough's later proscription. Her Majesty 
did not insist on Hill's inclusion in the promotion, but did desire Walpole to query the 
matter. 80 Marlborough gave in. Protesting that though he thought his proscription of 
not going beyond 25 March 1705 was correct - otherwise too many would have 
'include a much greater number than are proper for the service, or that do realy expect 
it'--he resigned himself to going a step further, including the four colonels Walpole 
had mentioned: Hill, Sutton, Hobart, Ferrers. 81 
78 Murray, v, pp. 41-2: Marlborough to the Board of Ordnance, 5 June 1710 N. S. 
79 Promotion dated at St James, 1 January 1710 O. S. Dalton, vi, pp. 17-18. 
80 BL, Add. MSS 61133, ff. 196-197b: Walpole to Marlborough, Whitehall, 18 April 1710 O. S. 
81 BL, 'Add. MSS 61133, ff. 198-199b: Marlborough (Cardonnel) to Walpole, camp before Douai, 5 
May 1710 N. S. There is some confusion in this exchange of correspondence, on account of 
antedated commissions. Marlborough had asked that 'all such major generals as have their 
commissions dated in the years 1708/9 and such brigadiers as are dated in the years 1706/7 and 
all the colonells dated 1705 may have their regular promotions' (a letter of Marlborough to 
Walpole, 24 April 1710 N. S.; quoted in Snyder, iii, p. 1461 n. 6-it is this letter that Walpole's 
reply, above, acknowledges). Marlborough's own intentions pursuant to those requirements, 
however, excluded some apparently qualified officers. The duke had intended that the 
promotion of lieutenants-general stopped at Temple and Stair-there being some disputes 
between majors-general and brigadiers regarding seniority; this excluded North and Grey, 
whose commissions as brigadier and major-general were identically dated (an error 
Marlborough himself noticed, "his rank aswell as his service deserving that encouragment"). 
For the promotion of brigadiers to majors-general, Marlborough had earlier intimated to 
Walpole that the promotion should go no further than Evans. Walpole queried this, for he 
presumed that Marlborough meant to include Sibourg and Kellum-who were serving with 
Marlborough-in this category; Marlborough, somewhat clumsily and contradictorily wrote 
that Walpole had the right of it, and that the promotion should go no further than Evans. Evans, 
Sibourg and Kellum all bore commissions as brigadiers dated 1 January 1707 O. S. 
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While the disappointment of opponents and promotion of friends might seem a 
sensible tactic, it could prove counter-productive. Secretary of State the Earl of 
Nottingham, writing to Lord Cutts in January 1703, noted that the most he could 
feasibly obtain on the major-general's behalf-and the utmost that some friends of 
other prospective promotees would suffer-was to hasten the promotion of all his 
peers, rather attempt to promote Cutts alone and thus allow his path to be retarded by 
their various arguments and challenges 82 As the war wore on, and Marlborough's rein 
over promotions within his army diminished, he found himself presented with 
significant changes authored by Anne without his knowledge, as in the case of Charles 
Ross, who in May 1711 (having not yet joined the army) begged leave to acquaint 
Marlborough with the fact that the Queen had been pleased to raise him to the rank of 
colonel-general of Dragoons, 'without any alteration as to [his] rank in the army' - 
which he hoped would have Marlborough's approbation. 83 
Anne's army was deeply politicised. Though officers possessed a burgeoning sense of 
military duty that was in part distinct from political persuasion, its nature varied 
considerably and was frequently coloured by personal beliefs. Of the fifty general 
officers that served under Marlborough over the period 1702-1711, six sat at some 
occasion as English or Scots representative peers in the Parliament of Westminster 
(Marlborough, Rivers, Orkney, Argyll, North and Grey and Stair; Orrery received his 
English title after he became envoy at Brussels and the Hague) and fifteen sat as 
Members of Parliament for an English constituency for a period of their service in the 
Low Countries. 8 In addition, various other individuals with the army represented 
constituencies, including Adam de Cardonnel (Southampton, 1701 to 1712); the aides- 
See also Snyder, iii, p. 1488 n. 1526: Marlborough to Sarah, before Douai, 19 May 1710 N. S.; and 
ibid., p. 1500 n. 1536: Godolphin to Marlborough, 19 May 1710 O. S. 
82 BL, Add. MSS 69380, ff. 1-2b: Nottingham to Cutts, 1 January 1703. 
83 For more on this subject, see Chapter VI. BL, Add. MSS 61315, ff. 56-57b: Ross to 
Marlborough, London, 11 May 1711 O. S. 
84 The parliamentary seats were as follows: William Cadogan, New Woodstock 1705-1716; Charles 
Churchill, Weymouth and Melcombe Regis 1701-1710; John, ist Baron Cutts of Gowry (in the 
peerage of Ireland), Cambridgeshire 1689-1702, Newport on the Isle of Tight 1702-1707; Thomas 
Erle, Wareham 1701-1718; Francis Godfrey, St Mawes 1705-1710; John Hill, Lostwithiel 1710-1713; 
Henry Lumley, Sussex 1701,1702-1705; Thomas Meredyth, Midhurst 1709-1710; Francis Palmes, 
West Looe 1707-1708; The Honourable Charles Ross, Ross-shire 1710-1722; The Honourable James 
Stanley, Lancashire, 1690-1702; Richard Sutton, Newark 1708-1710; Sir Richard Temple, 4th 
Baronet, Buckingham 1697-1702,1708-1713, Buckinghamshire 1704-1708; John Richmond Webb, 
Ludgershall 1695-1698,1699-1705,1706-1713; Henry Withers, Queenborough 1708-1710. 
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de-camp Alexander Abercrombie (representative Member for Scotland, 1707-1708, 
Banffshire 1708-1727), William Nassau de Zuylenstein, Viscount Tunbridge (briefly for 
Steyning in 1708, before succeeding to the earldom of Rochford) and Algernon 
Seymour, Earl of Hertford (Marlborough 1705-1708, Northumberland 1708-1722); and 
regimental colonels such as William Kerr (Berwick upon Tweed, 1710-1713), John, 
Viscount Mordaunt (Chippenham, 1701-1705,1705-1708) and Thomas Stringer (Clitheroe, 
1698-1706). These men were not simply military functionaries, serving the State; they 
were political actors with a vested interest and engagement in the direction of State 
policy. 
Attaching these officers to notions of party and faction -to Court and Country, Whig 
and Tory -is difficult. The labels could vary in character as the whims and interests of 
the generals did; officers like Charles Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough and John 
Campbell, Duke of Argyll could make fairly drastic changes in loyalty in a short space 
of time. Many of the senior officers -Marlborough himself, Churchill, Lumley, 
Orkney-might be called mild Tories in the very broadest sense, but the army in the 
Low Countries never possessed truly strident Tories to the extent that it featured 
staunch Whigs. Lords Orrery and North and Grey were certainly Tories, as were John 
Richmond Webb and Charles Ross. Yet Webb was a moderate who did not vote for the 
Tack in 1704, and his estrangement with Marlborough, accentuated by the affair of 
Wynendael, came relatively late; and Ross, the 'Cunning Scotchman', "[seemed] to 
gave shown little interest in politics prior to 1708" before developing into a prominent 
Tory and opponent of Marlborough in the duke's censure. 65 
Whigs were more prominent among the low and middle-ranked generals (and some 
colonels). William Cadogan, Francis Palmes, Thomas Meredyth, George Macartney, Sir 
Richard Temple Bt -a stalwart of the Kit-Cat Club-Francis Godfrey and Thomas 
Stringer all possessed strong whiggish views. Temple was an established country 
squire in his own right, but the likes of Cadogan, Palmes and Meredyth all owed their 
parliamentary seats to Marlburian patronage 86 William Cadogan was returned as one 
85 Hayton et al. (eds), HoC, v, pp. 816-819 (Webb); ibid., 307-310 (Ross). BL, Add. MSS 61321, ff. 
245-246b. 1716/17. List of officers that were dismissed in the late reign ad the persons that 
succeeded them. 
86 On Temple, see Hayton et al. (eds), HoC, v, pp. 128-129 and D. N. B. 
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of two members for the Oxfordshire borough of Woodstock on 11 May 1705 O. S. 
Marlborough had hoped that Cadogan would bring support to the duke's position in 
England, yet Cadogan was hardly a distinguished or particularly active member of the 
House in the period 1705-11. Even for the winter sessions his military and political 
duties in the Low Countries often precluded his effective attendance, with his 'honesty 
and corage to speak truth' 87 
The political alliances and disputes in England and Scotland had an important effect 
upon the relationships within the army in the Low Countries. Marlborough, ever 
attempting to appear the urbane, apolitical statesman and manager tried to distance 
himself from much of the fraction, to variable effect. When Cadogan, towing the 
Marlburian line, protested: 
As to what relates to Partys in England I have ever avoided speaking to my Lord 
Duke on that Subject, and I allways found his Grace declined as much as he could 
medling in any Domestique matters, or disposal of Civil Employments, Confining 
himself to the business of the war wholly, or such Forreign affairs as have a 
Relation and connexion with it 88 
His old friend Thomas Wentworth, Lord Raby was hardly in agreement, scoffing: 
... you must give me leave as a 
friend to tell you, that I believe you laugh at me, 
when you say that his Grace does not meddle in any domestick matters, or disposal 
of Civil employt. for I believe all England as well as my Self are assured of the 
Contrary... 9 
87 On Marlborough's desire to secure Cadogan's election, see Snyder, i, nos. 430 & 438, pp. 417-8 
& 426-7. The Duke desired to secure the Borough, in which his royally granted manor lay. It had 
typically been a Tory stronghold, with Lord Abingdon, the previous local patron having backed 
the Tory cause and suffered through it. The election was thus of considerable importance to 
Marlborough and the government: see Snyder, i, p. 417, n. 1. 
Cadogan was re-elected for Woodstock on 7/18 October 1710, and along with Stanhope was 
much desired to attend Parliament that winter by Marlborough: '39 [Marlborough] shall this 
Winter expect more assistance in 87 [the House of Commons] from 197 [Cadogan] and 202 
[Stanhope] then from any other numbers... So that I do earnestly desire that those two men may 
be chose preferable to all others... ' for 'These are two men that are both honest and brave, and 
39 can relye on their speaking truth. ' Snyder, iii, nos. 1645,1646 & 1650, pp. 1590-2 & 1595-6. 
But with Cadogan's duties at The Hague and Brussels this was not always possible: as 
Marlborough would write to Godolphin, 'I shall send over all the Parliament men before I leave 
the army, except Cadogan, who can not well come before me. ' Snyder, i, no. 519, p. 503 (9/20 
October 1705). 
88 BL, Add. MSS 22196, If. 194-197b: Cadogan to Raby, Brussels, 12 March 1709 N. S. 
89 BL, Add. MSS 22196, If. 198-199b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 26 March 1709 N. S. 
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The factions in the army increased throughout the war, catalysed by the deeply 
partisan ministries of 1708 (Whig) and 1710 (Tory). Family connections were no 
guarantee against rumour and strife - Charles Churchill assured his brother that any 
man who insinuated the General of Foot had a disinclination to serve with 
Marlborough in the next campaign "Lies Like a Villen, " for Charles would ever love 
his brother and rather serve under him than any man breathing. 90 Raby noted that he 
was mightily sorry his friend, Lord Windsor, had lost his regiment; his first inclination 
was that if was down to politics, the colonel being a 'violent Tory' - which would have 
made him, Raby believed, the first military officer to be put out on account of party91 
As James Taylor at the Treasury confided to Henry Watkins in August 1710: 
I am very sorry to hear that ffaction is crept into the Camp as well as at home. I 
pray God avert the Evills that hang over us and give us a good peace at last 92 
One of the most notable disagreements was that between Marlborough and Lords 
Argyll and Orrery. Arising from out of a combination of personality clashes, political 
differences, and perceptions of personal and familial slights, the conflict simmered for 
a while before both Argyll and Orrery left the army - the former taking the command 
in Spain and the latter the post of envoy and plenipotentiary at Brussels and the 
Hague. Argyll's new command restored a necessary element of concordance to the 
army. Henry Watkins wrote that he had heartily wished-as Marlborough did-that 
Argyll departed to Iberia, where there was as much glory as he could desire; and that 
when he had 'gained himself a good stock of reputation' perhaps he would not envy 
theirs in Flanders. 93 
90 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 174-175b: Charles Churchill to Marlborough, London, 17 April 1705 
O. S. 
91 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 75-76b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 31 May 1707 N. S. 
92 BL, Add. MSS 33273, ff. 53-54b: James Taylor to Henry Watkins, Whitehall, 1 August 1710 
O. S. 
93 BL, Add. MSS 33273, f. 104: draft of a letter from Henry Watkins to Richard Sutton, c. 1711. 
Both Archibald Hamilton and John Ligonier, who had served as brigade-majors under 
Marlborough in the Low Countries (Hamilton for five campaigns; Ligonier for three), left their 
posts in 1711. The accompanied the Duke of Argyll to Spain, attending him as majors of brigade 
in that theatre. BL, Add. MSS 61372, f. 289: order for leave to allow Archibald Hamilton (of 
Orkney's) and John Ligonier (of Lord North and Grey's) leave to attend Argyll in Spain. Adam 
de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. The Hague, 8 April 1711 N. S. They were to be 
allowed on the musters of their regiments for a period of 12 months. Their commissions as 
brigade-majors for Spain were dated 3 March 1711 O. S. (Dalton, vi, p. 182). 
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Subtle differences existed in the tenor of Argyll's and Orrery's differences with their 
commander in chief. Argyll, a vibrant, rising force in both the army and British politics, 
possessed a greater sense of propriety towards his opponents, for all his self- 
confidence. Orrery could be particularly contemptuous, driven and vindictive; he 
sarcastically referred to Marlborough as the 'Vicar-General' and desired that Her 
Majesty would send himself and Orrery a letter saying they could excuse themselves 
from the army, for: 
The Duke of Argyll and I have yet had but very little correspondence with 
[Marlborough], and we have no inclination to have any with him for the future, 
further than the duty of our posts obliges us to; but it is the custom for all officers 
when they quit the camp to ask his leave, which is a ceremony we would willingly 
omit if we could} 
Argyll had likewise resolved "to serve, that is to suffer, out this campaign but never to 
serve another under the Duke of Marlborough. "Marlborough was similarly dismissive, 
noting that though Charles Ross, who had come over to the continent with Orkney, 
Argyll and Orrery, had been with him those past three days, the others had "not made 
the same dilligence, so that I know not where thay are, nor do I much care, considering 
the temper the last two are in at this time. " Yet he would make them do their duty, so 
the service did not suffer. Writing to Orrery in April 1711, Marlborough had somewhat 
tartly informed the general: 
You are hereby directed and requir'd to remain with the Regiment under Your 
Command in Quarters at Gand, and to continue to do the usual duty of that 
Garrison untill further Order. 95 
Marlborough's resentfulness of Argyll was so public that none conversed with the Scot 
unless they were 'angry' with the commander-in-chief themselves. % When Her 
Majesty's leave for Argyll and Orrery to depart the camp -without the commander-in- 
94 HMC, 52, Portland MSS, iv, pp. 544-545: Orrery to Harley, camp near Douai, 21 June 1710 
N. S. 1710. Argyll was not as wholly for Sacheverell's acquittal as Orrery was, believing that the 
minister had behaved improperly and deserved censure, despite the political issues behind the 
scandal. Ibid., pp. 537-538: Orrery to Harley, 14? March 1710. 
95 BL, Add. MSS 61372, f. 293: Marlborough to Orrery, Tournai, 28 April 1711 N. S. 
96 HMC, 52, Portland MSS, iv, pp. 548-549: Argyll to Harley, 17 July 1710 N. S. Snyder, iii, pp. 
1465-1466 n. 1502: Marlborough to Godolphin, Flines 28 April 1710 N. S. See also the letters of 
Marlborough to Godolphin and Sarah of 8 and 29 May 1710 N. S. (Snyder, iii, pp. 1474,1499- 
1500). 
50 
chief's position-came through, Marlborough was astonished: "This is so very 
extraordinary a step, that even the Duke of Argile came to me yesterday to assure me 
that he had made no applications, and that when he should desire to for England he 
should apply to me for my leave. " It is doubtful that Argyll could have been so 
unaware of Orrery's scheme, however. 97 
Other disagreements were not so public or violent. Marlborough's relationship with 
Cutts could be difficult on occasion; the commander-in-chief could be critical of his 
lieutenant and had some agency in the latter's leaving the army and taking up the post 
of commander-in-chief in Ireland. It is possible that this was in part born out of 
altruism, given Cutts' considerable financial difficulties, but the baron's sister, Joanna 
Cutts, took it particularly 11198 
Cutts died in 1707. (Upon hearing a false rumour of his passing, in 1706, Marlborough 
had waspishly quipped that he hoped Her Majesty would not be hasty in engaging 
herself for his employment. ) Unmarried, Joanna's own financial situation was enmired 
with that of her brother. Her petitions for royal favour ran with a certain amount of 
weariness, formality - even brusqueness. 99 She protested that her brother's passage to 
Ireland "a very unwilling act of obedience and submission to those commands that 
sent him. "1OO 
Joanna Cutts' anger at the slights - real or perceived - to her situation and her brother's 
memory hardened into a particularly vituperative form. In a draft of a letter to Cutts' 
old friend, Colonel Dudley (a former governor of the Isle of Wight), she wrote: 
... soon after your departure for New england, the designe the Duke of Marlborough had to Ruin [Cutts] began to appear visible to all his friends, who by 
97 Snyder, iii, pp. 1637-1638 n. 1704: Marlborough to Godolphin, before Aire, 4 October 1710 
N. S. 
98 Snyder, iii, p. 291 n. 301: Marlborough to Godolphin, Ruremond, 10 May 1704 N. S.; ibid., pp. 
313-314 n. 325: Marlborough to Sarah, camp at Gardach, 8 June 1704 N. S. For Cutts' financial 
difficulties, see D. N. B. His post in Ireland was said to be worth £6000 a year. Hayton et al (eds), 
HoC, iii, p. 820. 
99 Snyder, ii, pp. 621-622 n. 629: Marlborough to Godolphin, Helchin, 22 July 1706 N. S. BL, Add. 
MSS 69380, ff. 162-163b: [Joanna] Cutts to Cardonnel, Pollard Street, 14 July 1708 O. S. 
100 BL, Add. MSS 69380, ff. 176-177b: memorial to the Lord High Treasurer of Mrs Cutts' 
pretentions, [14 May 1714 O. S. ] 
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that treachery and flattery which his Grace excells in he kept him from believing it a 
great while. 
In the Campaigne of [1702] the success of the Seiges of Huy, Venlo Ruremond, 
Leige being intirely owing to his Conduct, Gained him so much Reputation that the 
designe was a while suspended tho All that year all possible difficultys were put 
upon him the Pension the King Allow'd him till his losses were made up and which 
I believe you may Remember was promised him should be Continued, was struck 
off, his Arrear of that And the Contingent mony due to him at the Kings death 
Refused him. 
But Cutts resolved, according to his sister, to dispute nothing and remain a servant to 
Queen and Country, for he discerned that 
... the Duke was as little a friend to Either as to him ... Afterwards [i. e. after Cutts' death] the Duke of Marleboro to Conceal his Villeiny Raisd innumerable Slanders 
on his memory. 102 
Those officers that enjoyed Marlborough's particular patronage increasingly drew the 
ire of others. Major James Cranstoun of the Cameronians, who was no critic of 
Marlborough himself, was dismissive of such as the Irishmen Cadogan, Palmes and 
Meredyth, who were "men of little service and experience. " John Drummond, the Scots 
merchant, went further, stating that Cadogan was "hated as all the Irish favourites 
are. " "Blame and Envy are the only Fruits I have gathered out of the Post I am in, " 
Cadogan lamented 102 
William Cadogan was central to the dispute over John Richmond Webb's victory at 
Wynendael in 1708, when an erroneous report in the Gazette mistakenly granted the 
laurels to Cadogan, "to whom the Success of this Day was said to have been (tho' 
falsely) imputed, through the Partiality of a certain very Great Man. " Webb never 
forgave Marlborough and his Whig friends for the unintentional slight; he embarked 
upon such a course self-valediction that even Argyll, upon hearing Webb regail the 
company of how many wounds he had received that day, supposedly retorted: "What 
101 BL, Add. MSS 69380, ff. 182-183b: [Joanna Cutts] to Colonel Dudley, Somerset House, 28 May 
1714 O. S. Draft. 
102 HMC, 52, Portland MSS, p. 255: Major James Cranstoun to Robert Cunningham, camp at 
Herenthals, 1 October 1705. Ibid., pp. 572-573: Drummond to Harley, Amsterdam, 2 September 
1710 N. S. BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 194-197b: Cadogan to Raby, Brussels, 12 March 1709 N. S. 
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a pity, my dear general, that one of them was not in your tongue. You would then have 
left to others the task of celebrating your victory! "103 
Webb's action was rewarded by a vote of thanks to the general in the House of 
Commons, on 13 December 1708 O. S., which was proposed "not so much out of any 
reall kindness to him, but that one of their leaders might take that handle to show as 
much malice as he could to [Marlborough]. "104The same might be imputed of the 
dismissal of Thomas Meredyth, George Macartney and Philip Honeywood two years 
later. Late in 1710, all three had supposedly drunk to the "destruction to the present 
Ministry, and dressing up a hat on a stick, and calling it Harley; then drinking a glass 
with one hand, and discharging a pistol with the other at the maukin, wishing it were 
Harley himself; and a hundred other such pretty tricks, as inflaming their soldiers, and 
foreign Ministers, against the late changes at Court. " The officers were forced to 
dispose of their regiments at knock-down prices. 105It was said that Charles Ross 
"always when they begun these sort of healths left the company, he's reckoned a 
cunning Scotchman. "106 
103 Hare, op. cit., pp. 148-52. Webb, considerably outnumbered, had held off the force of La 
Motte, allowing the convoys from Ostend to pass. Cadogan had arrived with a considerable 
part of cavalry, and no doubt influenced the French view of the broader operational situation, 
but the success had been Webb's. See Churchill, ii, pp. 447-51. The mistaken dispatch emanated 
from the Landgravial Prince of Hesse-Cassel, and came via the United Provinces. For his part, 
Marlborough was entirely recognisant of Webb (Murray, iv, pp. 242-5, letters to Webb and 
Sunderland), if also giving of Cadogan a little credit (Snyder, ii, no. 1108, pp. 1106-7). Webb 
returned to England: 'One of the reasons of sending Webb over was to prevent a quarrel 
between him and Cadogan, and that the latter may no be deprived of the second place of 
honour' wrote one correspondent of Robert Harley; HMC 52, Portland MSS., iv, p. 507: Lewis to 
Harley, 7 October [O. S. ] 1708. On Argyll's comment, see William Montagu, Court and Society 
, 
from Elizabeth to Anne (London, 1864), ii, pp. 380-381. 
104 Snyder, ii, p. 1175 n. 1186: Godolphin to Marlborough, 14 December 1708 O. S. 
ios The officers were dismissed on 8 November 1710 O. S. (BL, Add. MSS 61321, ff. 245-246b), 
after the notorious incident of their (supposedly) drinking to the destruction of the Tory 
ministry. Jonathan Swift, Journal to Stella. Letter 11, London, 9 December 1710 O. S. Luttrell, Brief 
Historical Relation, vi, p. 664. The officers protested that they had done nought but drunk the 
health of their commander-in-chief and confusion to his enemies, a common procedure among 
armies, 'though it happened at the time to be equivocal'; see also Thomas Lediard, The Life of 
John, Duke of Marlborough, Prince of the Roman Empire, 2 volumes (2nd edition, London, 1743): i, 
p. 237. 
106 Another anecdote suggested that the toasts were drunk at Cadogan's house-though there 
was too little evidence to proceed against him-and that upon hearing the toast Ross "flew out 
of the company in a passion. " James Cartwright (ed. ), The Wentworth Papers, 1705-1739 (London, 
1883), pp. 162,164. 
53 
Marlborough's chaplain, Francis Hare, did not seem to be particularly close to 
Cadogan; indeed, their characters were somewhat different, to say the least. When 
Hare heard that Cadogan was in Lille, his curiosity spurred him to think of learning 
any news of the army; but the chaplain-general lamented that he was not in such good 
graces with the Irishman was Watkins was, and thus had little inclination at that time 
to make a visit. When Hare heard that Cadogan had complained, on account of the 
chaplain's 'melancholy letters' from Cardonnel's bedside, he was dismissive in his 
response 107 
One of the most interesting series of letters is that between Cadogan and Thomas 
Wentworth, Baron Raby. The two were friends in their youth in Ireland and continued 
a correspondence throughout the War of the Spanish Succession. At the beginning of 
the war, Raby was in the ascendancy; he was the peer and ambassador to the court of 
the King in Prussia at Berlin, while Cadogan was but a brevet colonel and newly 
appointed quartermaster-general. Over the years, the correspondence would be 
marked by subtle reflections upon the changing fortunes and influence of each, as 
Raby's career (both as a statesman and army officer) to some extent stultified in Berlin, 
while Cadogan's flourished under Marlborough's immanent patronage. Occasional 
elements of discord arose, as in the case of their respective regiments. Raby's was sent 
to Portugal, despite his protestations, while squadrons of Cadogan's attended the army 
in the Low Countries. 108 As Raby noted: 
... Ross will be flourishing in a little while at the Head of the Scoth & Irish Dragoons 
where he may reign dispotickly without Controale now all the English are turnd 
out of his Bregarde. I must confess it Stickes in my Stomach that my poort Regmt. 
was turned away to make room for his two damd troops, but believe me sincerely I 
am glad you have the satisfaction of having your whole Regmt. with you, for I don't 
much value what I suffer when it is with my friends advantage, nor do I believe 
you had any hand in gitting my Regmt. removed to make way for others, if you had 
any such thoughts I know you are generous enough to have told me.. 109 
Raby was not alone in suspecting the quartermaster-general's agency in this, but 
Cadogan protested his innocence, claiming that both Lumley and Cardonnel could 
107 BL, Add. MSS 33225, ff. 56-57b: Hare to Watkins, Lille, 10 August 1710 N. S. Ibid, If. 58-59b: 
ditto, 11 August 1710 N. S. 
108 BL, Add. MSS 22196, If. 5-6b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 4 September 1703 N. S. 
109 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 13-14b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 4 March 1704 N. S. 
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'clear him'. 110 Raby held no especial grudge and seemed glad when Cadogan was 
made plenipotentiary in room of George Stepney. "' Yet Cadogan's commission to 
conclude the treaty for the augmentation with the Prussian troops was a source of 
particular ire, and reflected the differing momentums of their careers. Raby seemed 
fine on the surface, making the usual protestations of joy and friendship; but added: 
... entre nous, you must own that it will hereafter look odd to the world, that I who have been here six years [at Berlin], have not had the signing of one Treaty. 112 
It is clear that Raby was unhappy with his progress with respect to Cadogan, despite 
his protestations of happiness at his friend's fortune: 
... &I find you think I was a little piqued (tho you don't say so) that you was 
appointed to Sign that treaty; wch. really naturely belong'd to me to Sign; but I once 
more protest to you I was not, & should not have been the least concernd had you 
Sign'd it, but as I take you for a true friend I will tell you plainly, that all my design 
& aime is to let my Lord Duke know, I see when I am past by & neglected, but 
being tis by his Grace I will [reassure? ] I think he has some reasons I do not know, 
then that he does it not of the least ill to me... but must own to you I see something 
in my fate, that seems to bar all my hopes of his Graces gaving the goodness to do 
something for me? 13 
By the end of the war, Cadogan's letters had grown more formal and infrequent, as 
Raby well noted: 
I flattered myself when you was made Minister, I shou'd have heard oftener from 
you, being then I had a sort of call to it, & being you used often to favour me with 
your letters before, but as marriage making a certain pleasure as duty takes intirely 
of the pleasure it wou'd have ben otherways it has fared ever so, with yr writings 
Since we were wedded into the Ministry tho I will still flatter myself, that yr 
friendship is as form to me as ever - being as I have always merited the 
continuation of it.. 114 
*** 
Not all officers could call upon a long friendship to ameliorate disagreements. The 
antipathy of a senior officer was a dangerous thing. Captain William Garvin of the Earl 
110 Ibid., ff. 15-16b: Cadogan to Raby, London, 14 March 1704 O. S. 
112 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 99-100b: Raby to Cadogan, 1 November 1707 N. S. 
112 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 190-193b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 9 March 1709 N. S. 
113 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 206-207b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 9 April 1709 N. S. 
114 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 214-215b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 3 May 1710 N. S. 
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of Orrery's regiment of Foot incurred his colonel's wrath to such a degree that at a 
court-martial he was accused on three separate charges by the earl, which included the 
keeping of false musters and cowardice at the siege of Ath. One cannot say for certain 
that these charges were manufactured; but it is clear that Orrery pursued his 
subordinate with a particular level of vindictiveness. The court sat on 19 and 20 July 
1707 (nine months after the siege of Ath) and one charge even related to events in 1705, 
when Thomas Stringer still held the regiment. That particular accusation related to a 
quarrel between Garvin and Lieutenant William Gargrave: a deponent noted that 
Gargrave had pursed the accused into a captain's tent, where he abused him and broke 
his sword over his head. Garvin's crime? That-in an army that hardly approved of 
duelling-he did not demand satisfaction for this slight. Gargrave appeared to be 
slightly confused by the re-examination of the issue; he had reconciled with Garvin at 
Stringer's urging, and heard no more on the issue until Orrery had questioned him two 
years later! Garvin was sentenced to be broken for the false returns, and declared unfit 
for service; for his cowardice at Ath he was sentenced to death. The court 
recommended mercy on the latter issue, and Marlborough respited Garvin's 
sentence. 115 
Orrery was similarly (and to all appearances, more justifiably) driven in the case of 
John Platt, of his lordship's own regiment. Platt, by several accounts, had been a serial 
absentee, but Orrery could not resist adding, "as a particular inducement to his Grace 
to consent to his Tryal, " that he'd had the regiment, he'd "observ'd that this Captain's 
Behaviour [had] been remarkably disrespectful to all his Superior Officers. " Orrery 
concluded: 
'Tis now, I think, time to convince Him that there is such a thing as Military 
Discipline by making Him an Example of its Severity, lest by a larger Connivance 
He shou'd grow into a kind of Precedent for others to misbehave Wth Hopes of 
Impunity. 116 
Woe betide the officer that sought to bring a case against his superiors. Ensign Henry 
Fletcher of Webb's regiment of Foot, complaining of various injustices and hardships 
115 BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 162b-166: proceedings of a general court-martial at the camp at 
Meldert, 19 and 20 July 1707 N. S., the Hon. Colonel George Preston presiding. 
116 BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 31-32b: Orrery to [Cardonnel? ], Brussels, 14 May 1711 N. S. For the 
notes of evidence from Orrery, his brevet colonel and brevet lieutenant-colonel, see ff. 33-38b. 
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put upon him by Webb, and Colonel Richard Sutton in his absence, delivered a petition 
to Marlborough, asking for redress. The court, having heard the testimonies of Webb, 
Sutton and Fletcher, was not amused. Not only was the petition decreed groundless, 
but Ensign Fletcher was found guilty of acting contrary to the 61st Article of War and 
sentenced to three months' suspension. 117 
Disagreements between officers on campaign not infrequently broke out into physical 
violence, though duels were strictly forbidden in the army. The 38th Article of War 
stated: 
No soldier or officer shall use any reproachful or provoking speech or act to 
another upon pain of imprisonment, and of asking Pardon of the person offended; 
as also of such further punishment as a Court-Martial shall think fit. Nor shall any 
officer or soldier presume to send a challenge to another officer or soldier to fight a 
duel; neither shall any soldier or officer upbraid another for refusing a challenge: 
and we do acquit and discharge all men that have quarrels offered, or challenge 
made to them, of all disgrace or opinion of disadvantage since they byt do the 
duties of soldiers who ought to subject themselves to discipline, and they that 
provoke them shall be proceeded against as breakers of discipline, and enemies to 
out Service 118 
The union of the gentleman officer's sense of honour with the insensibilities of drink 
could be a dangerous combination, as the dispute between Captain Fry Vickeridge of 
Godfrey's and the late Captain Robert Bridges of Orkney's showed. Vickeridge killed 
Bridges in a duel, the cause of which is wholly transparent, being the unhappy end to 
successive bouts of drunken reconciliation and antagonism. The resulting court-martial 
examined the circumstances. Vickeridge, Bridges, Major Thomas Parsons and Ensign 
Shuckborough Whitney of Godfrey's, Captain Richard Molesworth of Orkney's and 
Lieutenant Florence Kane of Rowe's of Godfrey's had been drinking 'to some excess' in 
the accused's tent, when Molesworth, considerably the worse for ware, vomited and in 
a drunken attempt to leave the company drew his sword and appeared to strike 
Vickeridge on the head. Despite this contretemps, Vickeridge and Molesworth "seem'd 
to be in perfect friendship. " Yet Bridges, in insisting upon the improbability of 
117 BL, Add. MSS 38853, f. 128. General court-martial held at the camp at Roeselare, 16 & 17 
October 1708 N. S., by Marlborough's order, Colonel Andrew Hamilton presiding. 
118 Walton, p. 813, quoting the 1692 Articles of War. This article remained constant, with little 
alteration, during this period. 
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Molesworth having injured Vickeridge, stoked some quarrel with accused, which 
simmered over the hours following. 
On two occasions the company left the tent in some anger, but motions to a duel were 
stopped by their comrades and all returned to the tent to imbibe further. Tiredness and 
inebriation proved no barrier on the third occasion, as Vickeridge and Bridges met 
with swords two hundred yards from the Quarter Guard - which, also being of 
Godfrey's regiment of Foot and seeing a field officer with the drunken company, had 
initially left the officers alone, believing there would be no mischief. Besides Whitney, 
the other officers called as witnesses to the act were of little use. Major Parsons said 
that he had drunk "to such excess, that he [was] utterly ignorant of what passt. " (A 
fellow officer bore witness to this fact, stating that Parsons entered his tent a little after 
the Reveille was beaten, told him of the mischief that had occurred, "but was so very 
drunk he could not gather any circumstances from what he said. ") Molesworth 
claimed "that he fell asleep for some time" and missed much of the dispute. 
A more sober Sergeant John Biggs of Ferguson's saw the denouement of the quarrel, 
seeing Vickeridge and four other officers 
... go over a Hedge, that the Deceased kissed an Officer, then turn'd about and drew his Sword, the Prisoner having stood some time before with his Sword drawn, that 
they made passes at each other, and presently fell to the ground, the Prisoner first 
and the Deceased upon him. 
Vickeridge was found quilty of fighting with and killing Bridges, in breach of the 
Articles of War, and sentenced to death - though mercy was recommended, in 
consideration of Bridges' antagonisms. Both Parsons and Molesworth had been 
confined in the aftermath of the duel; they were acquitted of any part in it. But Parsons, 
"being a Field Officer and having not prevented the quarrel, " was sentenced to be 
suspended at Marlborough's pleasure. 119 
A fatal duel at least precluded a continuation of the animosity between its participants 
(if not their friends and patrons); a conflict in which neither party found satisfaction 
could simmer, furthering the discord within a regiment or army. John Scot, a 
119 BL, Add. MSS 61336, if. 8-11b: proceedings of a general court-martial held at the camp at 
Elst, 16 June 1705 N. S., Brigadier Webb presiding. 
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chirurgeon's mate in the Foot Guards, testified on the matter of a duel between Captain 
(and Lieutenant) John Jefferson and Ensign Thomas Woodcock of the same corps, 
occasioned 
... upon a dispute about the Reckoning [whereupon] Capt: Jefferson told Ens: 
Woodcock dam him he ly'd, that thereupon Ens: Woodcock rose up, told Capt: 
Jefferson he was a Vilain and a Rascal, hit him a slap on the face, then jumpt back 
and drew his Sword which was seized by One of the Company, that the Company 
advised them to agree, and that the Captain of the Main Guard was sent for, and 
having examin'd the matter, the Prisoners gave their Parole of Honour that no more 
should come of it. 
This did not particularly count for much, as not long afterwards both went to fight in 
an adjacent meadow. The fight was halted by other officers, the only wounds 
appearing to be to the gentlemen's temperament and pride (Woodcock: "Damme I 
have done that Rascals business, I have disarmed him, broke his sword over his head 
and thrown it away. " Jefferson: "You have us'd me like a Rascal, and I will use You as 
such. " Woodcock: "Damme, you are not able, for You could not make One pass at me. 
Damme, I have us'd You as You ought to be and will use every one so that meddles 
with me. ") 
In starting the duel, Jefferson was found guilty of acting contrary to Articles of War 
and sentenced to be suspended for one muster; upon being restored he was to be 
severely reprimanded by the commandant at the head of the battalion, before the 
officers. Considering the 'great provocation' Woodcock faced, the court sentenced him 
to just a reprimand. It was clear that the antagonism between the two remained, and it 
is unsurprising that neither enjoyed a long career in the Guards. Jefferson was out the 
regiment by 1708 (an officer of the same name received a commission as a lieutenant in 
Hill's regiment of Foot in 1711); no further mention can be found of Woodcock. 12° 
Violent disagreements between officers or soldiers did not always run to anything so 
formulaic as a duel. In 1703, the wagorunaster-general Giles Spicer was involved in a 
disagreement with a sutler. Spicer's testimony ran as follows: 
120 BL, Add. MSS 61336, proceedings of a court-martial of the Foot Guards held at the camp at 
Tirlemont, 12 September 1705 N. S., Lieutenant-Colonel John Maurice presiding. Dalton, v, II, p. 
31 n. 17; vi, p. 79. 
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One John Jackeson a pretended sutler, meets mee a Wednesday last ye 18 of Augt 
1703 old stile in Huy, where I was with Lt. General Churchill, & told mee, if I did 
not pay him his money, I owyed him hee would have my Life or I should his, ye Lt 
Genl being behine mee, I went on, being a horse backe, & tooke noe notice of him. 
On Thursday morning, ye 19 of August 1703 old stile, hee meets mee at ye Generall 
gate a Coming out of ye quarters, and told mee if I did not pay him his money, hee 
would make mee, & yt hee had petitioned Mr Cardinall. I went into ye Coffee Tent 
where was Capt. Stephenedge Capt. Lewis Capt. Inkeings Capt. Ball Capt. Roney & 
Ensigne Smith. I told him very civilly yt if I owyed him any thing, on my own 
account, I would pay him, & hee would goe to Mr. Cardinall & Let him apoint any 
Genttleman to Examine ye Buseness, & if hee should say I owyed him any thing, I 
would pay him, hee goes out of ye Tent, & calls mee all, ye Rogues, & villains in ye 
world among all ye people, upon weh I went out, wth this kane he Sees, mee coming 
hee meets mee halfe way wth an oaken great sticke, I recd ye blow upon my arme & 
closed into him & strucke up his heels & caused ye gard to take him prisnorr & 
acquaint my Lord Cuts wth it & hee ordered him to the [Provosts], but as soone as I 
had Closed with him hee [twists] his hands into my haire & says god dame you I 
will murther you, upon which theses Genttlemen came & Loosed his hands. 121 
For his part, Jackson claimed that Spicer had given his word on account of money lent 
(and goods entrusted) by him to the wagonmaster-general in the previous campaign. 
The sutler had lost his carts and horses, and needed funds to pay his debts. In his initial 
testimony, he claimed that Spicer did "a solt [i. e. assault] me barbaosly" and "mack 
him self plantif for my one [own] Mords and for a solting of me and my wife being big 
with Child att that Time put me to a Stret againe and now is brout to bed in ye provos 
marchall and have nothing in to [the subsistence] our selfes but ye Charite of good 
pepell. "122 
The restoration of an officer's honour after a dispute might involve its own peculiar 
brand of officerial corporal punishment. The Board of General Officers, adjudicating on 
a dispute between Captain Gabriel Crepigny and Mr Caulfield, the son of the Viscount 
Charlemont (which itself had occurred while the Board was hearing testimony on a 
complaint between Charlemont and the Earl of Peterborough), found as follows: 
121 BL, Add. MSS 38848, If. 175-176b: written testimony of Giles Spicer, c. 18 August 1703 [in 
pencil]. 
122 BL, Add. MSS 38848, ff. 177-178b: written testimony of John Jackson, directed "To ye Right 
honourablle Lord Judge of ye Court and ye Right Honorobabell bench of ye Court Marchall. " 
See also f. 178, for a petition of similar content. 
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That the said Mr Caulfield having struck Capt. Crepigny in the Guard-Chamber 
with a Cane, during the Time the General Officers were sitting, the least thing the 
said Mr. Caulfield can do, to Repair so great an Injury and Affront to a Gentleman's 
Honour, is, in the said Guard Chamber, during the sitting of the Board, on his 
Knees, to ask pardon of Capt. Crepigny, who is at the same time to gave a Cane in 
his Hand, with Liberty to use it, as he pleases. 123 
The dignities and safeguards due to officers on campaign and in garrison were 
carefully regulated by rank. General officers were accorded various compliments and 
salutes according to their rank. The general-in-chief of the English forces, or the Field 
Marshal of their Dutch allies, would receive a full salute from the officers and the 
quarter guard, which would beat a march; furthermore all the army would turn out 
without its arms on the general's passing. A full general of the Foot or the Horse could 
expect a march beat to their passage by the quarter guard, who would turn out with 
rested arms, and to be saluted by all their subordinate officers, excepting colonels. A 
lieutenant-general was to be saluted by all officers -colonels, lieutenant-colonels and 
the colours excepted-and might expect three ruffles of the drums as they passed, 
unless they were in the field or the camp, when a march might be beaten. Majors- 
general were to be saluted by no officers, but would be honoured by a couple of ruffles 
on the drums in camp or garrison. A brigadier could expect only rested arms in 
response to his passing; a colonel or other commanding officer but shouldered arms 124 
None of the above officers could expect the honour of a salute by the cannon, which 
was reserved to the captain-general of the British forces alone of the generality, on his 
123 NA, WO 71/1, p. 160. Thursday 5 May 1708 O. S. Crepigny was attended by discord, it 
seems. Later, on 16 February 1712 O. S., the Board considered another case. Crepigny, 
"Employed in Recruiting the said Regt. [Gorge's] the last Year, And that being at Wigan in 
Lancashire a that Service, he mett There with a very barbarous Treatmt. from the People who 
had gathered Themselves together in a Tumultuous Manner to hinder his carrying off his 
Recruits; And Assaulting him with Stones, he had One of his Ribs Broke, and Rec'd Sev'. 
Bruises, for which he has lain long under the care of Surgeons & Physicians, And been Obliged 
to an Expensive journey to the Bath in Order to his Recovery; by all which he is reduced to very 
great Necessity & Straits, And is so much in Debt as to be Rendered unable to Subsist, without 
Some Speedy Relief. " 
Crepigny and Sir Roger Bradshaigh, the M. P. for Wigan, could not apprehend the principal 
actors of "said Riott", so could gain no recompense on that account. The Board therefore 
thought that Crepigny was a "Fitt Object" of Her Majesty's compassion, deserving leave to sell 
his company to discharge his debts, and might receive further aid as thought fit. He had served 
28 years in the army, 22 of them as a captain. 
124 BL, Stowe MSS 481, ff. 117,145b, 152. Compliments for the general officers. For a similar note 
of military honours, see Kane, Camp Discipline, p. 8. 
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entering or leaving the camp or garrison. 125On occasion, these honours would 
forborne. At the siege of Menin, the soldiers were under orders to take no "Notice of 
the Gens. in the Trenches" -whether not to distract the men to the tasks at hand, or to 
inform the enemy of the generals' presence. 126 
When encamped, officers would be allowed the following guards. Two separate 
schemes are listed in the regulations detailed in Stowe MS 481, and presented in Table 
3.1: a list of 'Camp Guards of Foot', and a note of the 'Orderly Guards' allowed among 
the British troops. By their quarters' actual door, full generals and lieutenants-general 
were allowed a sergeant and two sentinels; majors-general two sentinels; and 
brigadiers but one sentinel. Any general officer who held the colonelcy of a regiment 
would be allowed to take his guards from it, were it present with the army. Those that 
did not were allowed to take their guards from any other regiment in the line. In 
addition, a lieutenant and twenty-five men to disposed to provide a guard to the 
sutlers at the headquarters. 127 
125 BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 118. The source mentions the captain-general, rather than commander- 
in-chief. Whenever the captain-general entered into any garrison, the eldest regiment present 
was to form his guard: ibid, f. 124b. On an example of a salute by the cannon at Antwerp and 
Ghent in 1708, see SP 87/4 f. 26: Cardonnel to [Tilson], Ghent, 9 May 1708 N. S. At Ghent, 
Marlborough was also met some distance from the town by Lumley and the principal officers of 
the British troops in the garrison. The same honour was paid Ouwerkerk as Marlborough - see 
BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 4: camp journal, camp at Thys, 23 May 1703 N. S. 
126 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 64: camp journal, before Menin, 4 August 1706 N. S. 
127 BL, Stowe MSS 481, ff. 117,140b-141b. Stowe MSS 469, ff. 74-75b: undated general orders. 
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Table 3.1: Camp guards to be allowed and provided for by the Foot. 
Officer or corps Camp Guards' Orderly Guards 121 
Captain-General 'Body of Guards of Horse and Foot. ' 
1 captain, 2 subaltern., 3 , org eants, ýl) I . ulmltern, 2 sr'r,,, emit', 40 men c rr7 rl cal l oof 
mrn 
Lieutenant-General (of 
1 subaltern, 2 sergeants, 30 men 
1 subaltern, 1 sergeant, 30 men 
Foot) 
Major-L, r? Ueral (of Foot) I subaltern, I sergeant, 20 nun I sergeant, 20 mien 
Brigadier (of Foot) 1 sergeant, 12 men 1 sergeant, 14 men 
Artillery i captain, 2 subalterns, 4 sergeants, 114 
men 
Artillery Horses 1 captain, 
3 subalterns, 6 sergeants, 150 
men 
I ,( rg&'dnt, I2 nýrn; yin (\tld 1 tiul, altrrn, 
Provost (Marshal) I subaltern, 2 sergeants, 36 men I sergeant, 30 men when the Provost 
Marshal has prisoners 
Bread Wagons 1 subaltern, 2 sergeants, 36 men 1 subaltern, 1 sergeant, 20 men 
Wriýýliii, Ili uIý, uh, iltrrn, I 't'rgednt, 24 men 
Guides 3 sergeants, 30 men 
W 1,11,11 (te the 7 men 
tu nina,, der-in-tIijet) 
Judge-Advocate f7 men 
AilmtaiiI-Generai I sergeint, 12 men 
1 sergeant, 10 men in addition to any 
Quartermaster-General according to his quality as a general 
officer 
trc. I ý, ul-wIt rn, I sert; e. ii t, 27, Hirn 
12s BL, Stowe MSS481, f. 151b: camp guards for the Foot. Undated. 
129 BL, Stowe MSS 481, ff. 140-141b: orderly guards. Undated. 
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The general officers' baggage was also regulated by rank. Conscious of the 
considerable trappings that accompanied the general officers on the campaign, the 
army occasionally issued orders to limit the number of vehicles that such officers might 
employ on the march, and thus any potential hindrance to the army's movement. An 
order of 7 July 1708 dictated that, after the heavy baggage of the army had been 
ordered away, the general officers and colonels might retain the following vehicles: a 
general of the Foot, three wagons and one coach; a lieutenant-general, two wagons and 
one coach; a major-general, likewise; a brigadier, one wagon and one coach; and a 
colonel, two wagons. While the general officers were permitted to retain their coaches 
within the line of march, their wagons were relegated to the train. 130 This was not 
unforeseen: earlier, on 26 February 1708, Lumley (the deputed commander-in-chief) 
had written to Marlborough, noting that he had recommended to the officers of Foot 
that they made use of as few wheeled carriages; and the same to the Horse, with the 
addition that no chaises or caleches belonging to any under the degree of a general 
officer should travel with the squadrons - indeed, Lumley would have been glad if 
they were not used at all. 131 
*** 
As the campaigning season was heavily limited by the nature of the weather and the 
availability of fresh forage for the army's horses, its soldiers would spend much of the 
year in their winter quarters, in garrison. The degree to which officers stood their duty 
with them-as opposed to returning to England, Scotland or Ireland-varied. 
Recruiting officers were sent yearly (at least) to bring the regiments up to muster, and 
could provide a convenient permission of absence for those that wished to winter at 
home. The names of those granted extended leaves of absence were often eponymous 
indicators of patronage. In an order granting a leave of six months (over the winter of 
1703/4) to but a handful of officers in various regiments, the grantees included: Cornet 
Wentworth of Lord Raby's regiment; Ensign Alexander Hamilton of the Earl of 
Orkney's; Ensigns William Howe and Burlace Webb from Webb's; Ensigns James 
Howe and Edmond Webb from Howe's; Ensign Brook Bridges from Sir Matthew 
130 BL, Add. MSS 23642, ff. 27-27b: order for the limitation of baggage. 7 July 1708 N. S. See also 
KP I(i)/64 (the same order). 
131 BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 126-127b: Lumley to Orkney, Ghent, 26 February 1708 N. S. 
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Bridges'; Lieutenant John Ferguson from Ferguson s; and Captain Sabine and Henry 
Ingoldsby from Ingoldsby's. 132 General officers were allowed particular liberties, 
particularly those that were expected to sit in the Houses of Parliament. 
If it was no difficulty to prevail upon officers to return to the British Isles over the 
winter, the same could not be said of enticing them back again, to fill their posts with 
the army in Spring. William Blathwayt sent a letter to a baker's dozen of regimental 
colonels in 1702, noting that it was Her Majesty's pleasure that all officers were "to 
Repair forthwith to their Regiment upon pain of being respitted. "133 This tardiness did 
not diminish over the course of the war. In 1704, Cutts protested that his fellow 
generals, Orkney and Ingoldsby-'if not both'-ought to hasten their passage to the 
Low Countries; at least one of these (then) majors-general of Foot should have been 
with the army by the middle of March, at the latest. Neither of them, he continued 
... Cane in reason think it hard or make any hesitation after having had so much 
time one that side of the water but when your Grace orders any of them you'l 
please to doe it without speaking of relieving me or my coming over that will not 
have soe much weight as the present posture of affaires what is to be apprehended 
from the enimyes undertaking something before the Campagne. 134 
Writing at the end of April 1710, Secretary at War Granville lamented that many of the 
officers belonging to the army in Flanders tarried in London, notwithstanding the 
public notice given in the Gazette on 28 February. These officers were to depart for the 
continent by the 4 May, or face Her Majesty's highest displeasure and have their 
commissions immediately superceded. 135 As these orders came at the height of the 
tensions over the Sacheverell affair, Orrery saw it less as a call to duty than an attempt 
to manage the outcome of the minister's trial. He noted that Granville's order was "so 
extraordinary that I apprehend 'tis designed to send some people out of the way, as the 
132 BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 53-54b: orders granting 6-month leaves of absence to various officers. 
133 NA, WO 26/11 (1) p. 11: Blathwayt to Lumley, Wood, Wyndham, Orkney, Webb, Stewart, 
Granville, Stanley, Barrymore, Howe, Bridges, Ingoldsby and Hamilton. Whitehall, 27 April 
1702 O. S. 
134 BL, Add. MSS 69379, ff. 35-38b: Cutts to Marlborough, The Hague, 7 March 1704 N. S. 
135 NA, WO 26/12 p. 254: Granville to Mr Lewis at the Secretary of State's office, Whitehall, 23 
April 1711 O. S. This was actually an extension on the earlier imposed deadline of 25 March. BL, 
Add. MSS 33273, If. 27-28b: James Taylor to Henry Watkins, Whitehall, 7 March 1710 O. S. See 
also Snyder, iii, no. 1461, pp. 1425-7: Marlborough to Godolphin, The Hague, 28 February/11 
March 1710. 
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properest method to defeat the present scheme, " and hoped that Robert Harley would 
help him in obviating the ill consequences that might accompany strict compliance 
with the order. Orrery sought an exemption for himself and Argyll. 136 Godolphin, who 
saw both Argyll and Orkney (another latecomer to the army) at the House of Lords, 
was not confident that either would return to the continent with any rapidity. Argyll 
protested that he'd been sick, but would go by Friday's packet boat; Orkney, more 
diffident, seemed to agree with his fellow Scot, but the Lord Treasurer wryly 
questioned "whether either of them will make much hast. "137 
Other officers spent the winter in the Netherlands, Flanders or Brabant, as needs 
directed. Cadogan, in his duties as envoy and plenipotentiary, frequently wintered on 
the continent and gave a brief synopsis of the social scene at Brussels: 
Count Corneille is the Principal Fuckster and Oxenstern the Top Wit. My Lord 
Aylesbury a Shining Beau, and his Lady a celebrated [- ? ], not a woman but puts 
on as much red as Lady S ------- n. They play Deep and pay ill, and in short there is 
a tolerable deal of Scandal but no F ----- ng. Tho to do the women justice tis not 
their fault 18 
Cadogan appeared to enjoy a vigorous social life. Raby scolded him losing so much 'at 
play' as he had heard the quartermaster-general had done, thinking that his friend had 
"Shook off that passion, for in Ireland you gave me reason for your playing so much 
there that I am sure you gave not now. "139 He also enquired after Cadogan's 
... old mistress at Dublin, I hear she and 
her husband is now very poor, &a little 
mony would go further now with her, than fine Sayings, I suppose you have a 
correspondence from thence, & when you do me the Honour of another letter, I 
should be glad to hear how matters goes there. 
But is possible that this letter caught Cadogan during his courtship with his future 
bride, Margaretta Munter, for the quartermaster-general cautiously rejoindered: 
136 HMC, 52, Portland MSS, p. 537: Orrery to Harley, 14? March 1710 O. S. This particular letter 
relates to the earlier deadline of 25 March. 
137 Snyder, iii, pp. 1453-1454 n. 1490: Godolphin to Marlborough, 4 April 1710 O. S. 
138 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 129-133b: Cadogan to Raby, Brussels, 19 January 1708 N. S. 
139 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 99-100b: Raby to Cadogan, 1 November 1707 N. S. 
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Your Lordship in your letter speaks of your old mistress in Ireland, but I had much 
rather have news of some of the new ones you make att Berlin. 140 
And later: 
... the most sensible Part of the concern I have that my private Affairs hinder me from waiting on my Lord Duke to Berlin att the same time they prevent me from 
having the Pleasure and satisfaction of seeing your Lordship... but something since 
I have changed my condition, so very lately must be given to Decency and 
[Interest? ], I will not add Inclination since I am afraid your Lordship will hardly 
think that possible in the Holy State 141 
*** 
Early modern officers enjoyed a freedom of activity denied their successors, but the 
tempo of the campaign might necessitate the imposition of various restrictions. As the 
campaign of 1703 got underway in May, camp notices warned that any officers that 
had business at Maastricht or Liege should settle such affairs presently, and enjoy the 
security of the escort that would depart the camp the following moming. 142 Ten days 
later it was ordered that any private soldier travelling to Liege or Maastricht without a 
pass from the commanding officer of his regiment would be taken up and prosecuted 
as a deserter. 143 On the march to the Danube in 1704, commanding officers were given 
leave to dispatch two officers per corps to Heidelberg to buy necessities, where they 
might remain until the army came to meet them. 144 
The availability of the personal and corps funds that officers might use to purchase 
such necessities and entertainments varied. The other ranks of the army were paid as 
regularly as possible. Private soldiers and non-commissioned officers might receive as 
much as a fortnight or more's pay at a single time; on other occasions they were paid 
twice-weekly 145 Officers were not so lucky, particularly on those rarer occasions when 
140 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 5-6b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 4 September 1703 N. S. Ibid., ff. 7-Sb: 
Cadogan to Raby, St Gron, 20 September 1703 N. S. 
141 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 25-26b: Cadogan to Raby, Frankfurt, 15 November 1704 N. S. 
142 BL, Add. MSS 61404, if. 2-2b: camp journal, 15 May 1703 N. S. 
143 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 4b: camp journal, camp at Thys, 25 May 1703 N. S. 
144 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 191-191b: camp journal, 6 June 1704 N. S. 
145 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 6b: camp journal, camp at Haneffe, 4 June 1703 N. S. BL, Add. MSS 
61370, ff. 30-30b: order regulating the payment of the English dragoons on campaign. Adam de 
Cardonnel by Marlborough's order. Camp at Maastricht, 24 May 1703 N. S. The subsistence was 
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their charges were not paid on time, and they had to cover the difference by way of 
their own credit. In March 1704, Cutts noted that many officers complained of being in 
arrears of subsistence for their companies and regiments; this hindered them in making 
their own preparations for the campaign, having to advance so much money to their 
men. 146 
Richard King's credited subsistence as a captain of Foot for the period 23 April to 27 
June 1705 was paid in two instalments, on 21 May and 27 June. 147 Similarly, his 
subsistence for himself as captain and his three servants, for the period 10 July 1707 to 
17 March 1708, came to fl. 1095: 17: 2 (at fl. 112: 17: 20 per month). Of this, King received 
20 pattacoons (fl. 52) of this on 22 August 1707; 200 guilders on 3 September 1707; and 
a further 20 pistols (fl. 195) and 100 Dutch shillings (fl. 27: 10) on 12 September 1707. 
This amounted to less than half King's pay, though much of it was received in advance; 
the balance of fl. 541: 7: 2 was paid to the captain on 23 March 1708.1 48 
King's allowance as aide-de-camp to Cadogan in 1710 consisted of the usual £182.10s. 
p. a. (at 10s. per day, out of which was deducted £9.2s. 6d. poundage and 10s. for the 
Royal Hospital) and two-hundred days' forage at 12 stuivers a day (out of which was 
deducted fl. 12 poundage). The total came to fl. 2086: 3 Holland money. Of this, King 
received fl. 1170 in the form of 120 pistols from Cadogan directly, with the remainder 
paid by a bill on Sweet in Amsterdam. 149 If an officer was absent on campaign for an 
extended period, arrangements might even be made to satisfy a needy spouse: in June 
1707, Cardonnel drew a bill on Mr Le Bas, Marlborough's banker of Duke Street, to pay 
Mrs Elizabeth Spicer £10 on her wagonmaster-general husband's account'5° 
set at 12 st. p. d. for dragoon and horse together, without further abatement. When subsisting on 
forage, without the aid of magazines, 3 st. was to be deducted for remounting costs; and a 
further 1.5 st. a day from each corporal, drummer, trumpet and private during the campaign for 
such camp necessisities as were not furnished from off-reckonings (for which each soldier was 
to be accounted at the end of the campaign). 2 st. was deducted monthly for the chirurgeons. 
The remainder was to be paid to each NCO and soldier twice weekly, on Monday and 
Thursday, deducting what may have been received in bread. 
146 BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 3640b: Cutts to Marlborough, The Hague, 15 March 1704 N. S. 
147 KP I(i)/18. Company accounts, 23 April to 22 October 1705 (inclusive) O. S. 
148 KP I(i)/58. Captain King's Abstract of his own subsistence. 23 March 1708 O. S. 
149 Kp I(i)/98. An account of my Aide de Camps Pay for the Year 1710. In addition to the poundage, 
King paid a further 0.5% on his pay to the paymaster. 
150 BL, Add. MSS 61413, f. 172: bill. 
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General officers presented an even more extreme case, being paid according to 
establishments agreed by Parliament. These establishments could lag quite badly 
behind the actual compositions of generals serving in the field, with several officers 
accepting the dignity and seniority of rank on the full understanding that they could 
not easily expect its due remuneration. Marlborough highlighted this situation to Raby 
in a letter of 21 February 1709 N. S., when he wrote: 
Mr. Palmes has no manner of allowance as a general officer, and Mr. Wood and Mr. 
Ross, with several others, are obliged to serve on less pay than their characters [i. e. 
rank] would allow them. 151 
Warrants authorising pay for the previous campaign were typically issued by 
Marlborough as commander-in-chief in the Low Countries in November or December. 
Until then, a general was expected to live upon his personal credit. This could present 
particular problems to less wealthy officers: in 1703, Cutts was only able to attend the 
army in the field by virtue of a loan from a 'monied friend'. 152 And a general's salary 
alone was thought inadequate to sustain his dignity and comfort in the field. As 
Ingoldsby wrote to his commander-in-chief in 1705, pretending claims to a post of 
Master of Ordnance recently vacated by Lord Mountalexander: 
Your Grace has been pleas'd to express your self so Sensible of my being the only 
Lieut Genl that has no additional entertainment to Support the extraord'nary 
expences of our Campaigns... 153 
Ingoldsby, who commanded the garrison at Ghent, complained of the great expense he 
had been at since his arrival, and "the Impossabillity off supporttinge so publicke an 
Expenc, out off my poor privat ffortune"; especially as Marlborough had commanded 
him to maintain a 'good correspondence' with the people, which could not be done 
"without a little hospitallitey. "154 
151 Murray, iv, pp. 451-452: Marlborough to Raby, The Hague, 21 February 1709 N. S. Another, 
earlier example related to the rank of Withers and Wood in 1705. The establishment at the time 
allowed but one major-general of Horse and two of Foot. BL, Add. MSS 42176, ff. 101-102b: 
Cardonnel to Watkins, Frankfurt, 2 November 1705 N. S. 
152 BL, Add. MSS 61162, if. 14-15b: Cutts to Marlborough, The Hague, 2 June 1703 N. S. 
153 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 14-15b: Ingoldsby to Marlborough, Dublin, 20 March 1705 O. S. 
154 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 24-29b: Ingoldsby to Marlborough, Ghent, 12 November 1706 N. S. 
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A central expense was the provision of horses and their forage: an early modern 
general or staff officer was expected to keep a considerable stable. The charge of a good 
horse could be considerable; a decent trooper's horse might cost £20, while a dragoon's 
would amount to £15, or £10 for "A good squat Dragoon Horse from 14, to 14 hands & 
lh high" secured at the cheapest rates from Ireland 155 Hugh Caldwell, later a major of 
brigade, had to outlay £115 of his own funds to replace ten horses of his troop, which 
had been lost through the 'stress of weather' on the voyage of Ross's regiment of 
dragoons to Holland in 1702. His basic pay as a captain of dragoons was £146 p. a. 156 
Dry forage-a supply of hay, straw and/or oats from a magazine-was provided 
during times of little or no grazing, such as during winter quarters or at a siege. A 
typical allowance for the year would amount to 200 days' worth of forage for each 
horse. 157 A ration of forage was 'the Day's Allowance for a Horse'. In the Low 
Countries it typically amounted to fifteen pounds of hay (with another five pounds of 
straw, on occasion) and a variable measurement of oats. 158 The standard allowance of 
forage for a general or staff officer, be it for winter quarters or another occasion, was as 
follows: general of Foot or Horse - 40 rations p. d.; lieutenant-general - 30 rations p. d.; 
major-general - 24 rations p. d.; brigadier - 12 rations p. d.; quartermaster-general -6 rations 
p. d.; deputy paymaster -6 rations p. d.; deputy judge-advocate -4 rations p. d.; 
wagonmaster-general -2 rations p. d.; provost marshal -3 rations p. d.; aide-de-camp -4 
155 NA, WO 30/89 (1) p. 31.21 January 1712 O. S. Noted an account from Cardonnel, given by 
Lun-dey's direction, of the horses lost or killed in the previous campaign. The values are those 
the horses were rated at. NA, SP 41/3/41. Proposals for the cheaper and easier furnishing of 
horses from Ireland. London, 19 July 1704 O. S. 
156 BL, Add. MSS 61301, If. 31-32b: petition of Hugh Caldwell to Marlborough. Undated. 
Including servants' pay and forage money, Caldwell's income from the army would have 
amounted to £274.4s. 6d. a year. He humbly begged Marlborough to be allowed a couple of 
horses from Raby's dragoons, who were to leave their mounts in England before departing for 
Portugal. 
157 E. g. BL, Add. MSS 61371, f. 207: regulation of the forage to be allowed and paid for 200 days' 
Winter Quarters for one year commencing 26 December 1706 and ending 25 December 1707. 
Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. The Hague, 6 November 1707 N. S. Add. MSS 
61372, f. 255b: regulation for forage during Winter Quarters, 26 December 1709 to 25 December 
1710. 
158 A Military Dictionary (1708). BL, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 203-206: warrant to pay John Hudson 
and Francis Heymans for forage supplied at the siege of Douai. BL, Add. MSS 61333, ff. 137- 
139b: conditions agreed by Cadogan and the Field Deputies for the provision of forage to the 
Danes. Camp at Asche, 24 October 1707 N. S. 
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rations p. d.; major of brigade -3 rations p. d 159 The adjutant-general did not usually 
receive forage for winter quarters with the rest of the general and staff officers; he 
received an allowance as an aide-de-camp alone. 160 Adjutants-general did on occasion 
receive a forage allowance, however, such as at the siege of Douai, where both Henry 
Durell and Metcalfe Graham (who "acted as Adjutant General") received an allowance 
in that post. 161 
At the siege of Douai in 1710, the general and staff officers of the army received 60107 
rations of forage-42,484 rations of which were over and above the amount allowed 
them! By the original contract, the officers were accounted for 47 days' forage (the siege 
itself lasted 63 days, from 23 April to 25 June). Many officers' accounts exceeded such 
amounts by as much 100% or more. Lieutenant-General Lumley received 1786 rations 
for himself and his two aides-de-camp, and a further 1976 rations on top; his colleague, 
Orkney, received a further 1774 rations over and above his normal allowance. Cadogan 
received, on his own account, far more than any other officer: 1786 rations as a 
lieutenant-general, 282 rations as quartermaster-general, 940 rations for the guides 
under his oversight; to this total of 3008 rations was added a further 3422 received 
beyond the allowance -a total of over 40 tonnes of hay alone. He was not alone in 
being taxed by the rigors of the siege: his deputy, John Armstrong, received 376 rations 
on account and 1094 beyond it 162 
The junior staff officers also exceeded their original allowance. The seven majors of 
brigade consumed a third again as much - amounting, in effect, to the provision of an 
extra horse for each during the siege. Of the dozen aides-de-camp to Marlborough 
listed in the account, eight received more forage than allowed upon the original 
contract; two of them, Lord Harwich and Lieutenant-Colonel Richard King, receiving 
159 See, for example, HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8 passim and BL, Add. MSS 61369-61373 ditto. 
160 BL, Add. MSS 61370, f. 180: forage rations for the general and staff officers, 1704. 
161 BL, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 241-242: notes on forage received by general officers at the siege of 
Douai from M. Pangaert. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. Camp before Aire, 
3 November 1710 N. S. 
162 BL, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 241-242: notes on forage received by general officers at the siege of 
Douai from M. Pangaert. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. Camp before Aire, 
3 November 1710 N. S. Armstrong's allowance was eight rations per day - this most probably 
combines four rations as an aide-de-camp and four as deputy quartermaster-general. 
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almost their initial allowance again, in addition. 163 As often occurred, Her Majesty was 
to pay an advance of 6.5 stuivers per ration agreed in the contract; the remaining 6 
stuivers was to be charged to those who received it, Brydges and his deputies paying 
the sum to Pangaert upon the contractor providing receipts for its delivery. That 
delivered over and above the contract received no advance from Her Majesty, but was 
to be accounted by Brydges in full and placed on the officers' accounts. IM 
As the army coalesced in the Spring of 1711, further stores of forage were delivered to 
the general officers and their corps, on their march and at the camp near Douai. A 
brigadier typically received less than one-thousand rations; a major-general one to two- 
thousand. General of the Foot Orkney received 4108 rations. But by far the greatest 
recipient was Cadogan, who received 8265 rations -a sum that exceeded even his 
commander-in-chief and patron, Marlborough, who took by 7652 rations. 165 
Those that did not receive such an allowance, accounted for by the army's paymasters, 
were put to considerable expense. Writing c. 1706, Deputy Quartermaster-General 
Alexander Spotswood earnestly petitioned Marlborough for financial redress, lest he 
be forced to resign his post. Not only had this officer been for some years denied the 
warrant necessary to act in his duties as deputy quartermaster-general-a somewhat 
vital role in the army, admittedly-encouraging all manner of obstructions from the 
officious and pedantic; but he had also been denied a basic financial remuneration 
necessary to his post: the forage allowance. Richard King, as an aide-de-camp to 
Cadogan, was allowed this necessity upon the establishment; the deputy 
quartermaster-general, nominally King's senior in such duties, was not. As Spotswood 
lamented: 
... 
I here humbly represent how my indefatiguable Labours during four Campains 
in the Lt. Quartr. Master General's Employment have turn'd to no other account 
than to run me in Debt beyond the Value of the Company, Wch I serv'd Ten Tears to 
obtain. 
163 Ibid. The aides were allowed 188 rations each: Lord Harwich received 182 rations over the 
allowance, King 187 rations. 
164 Ibid. 
165 BL, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 334: order to pay Pangaert for forage delivered from 16 April to 24 
May 1711 inclusive. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. Camp near Bouchain, 6 
October 1711 N. S. For Pangaert's accounts, see ff. 334b-335. Cardonnel received 1383 rations; 
Armstrong 900. 
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That the Cause is evident; seeing I have been necessitated to furnish & maintain all 
along upwards of a dozen horses, in order to discharge a Duty weh Brigadeer 
Cadogan can best inform how I have acquitted my Self of: whilst the whole 
consideration that I have hitherto had, has scarce amounted to 160 Pounds; & even 
without one Ration of Fourage allow'd me during the whole time. 
If that was not enough, Spotswood took the opportunity to beg that "for some 
encouragement in the interim, he may not be thought unworthy, after 13 years of 
service, of the title and rank" that usually accompanied the post of deputy 
quartermaster-general (i. e. lieutenant-colonel)? 66 
The forage allowances provide an estimate of the number of horses each general and 
staff officer was expected to maintain in the execution of his duties. They provided a 
considerable resource to the army in times of need. When planning the siege of 
Saarlouis, Marlborough had hoped to muster the extraordinary number of horses 
required--around 12,000 in total to move the Allied artillery from Trarbach; which 
would effectively amount to three thousand horses, if the trains were moved in four 
separate stages-by requisitioning them from the army. Each of the army's eighty 
battalions and one-hundred squadrons would give ten horses each (and no sutlers' 
horses were to be forcibly taken by their regiments to serve in this capacity! ); the 
remainder would be supplied by the artillery and the general officers. The generals of 
Horse and Foot would give twenty each; lieutenants-general, ten; majors-general, six; 
and brigadiers, four. 167 This plan appeared to meet with little approval; later 
Marlborough was drawing up various projects to draw the 3000 horses from the allied 
Rhineland states of Mainz, Trier, Cologne and the Palatinate, and various local villages. 
In any event, these plans were to no effect, as the operation was cancelled. 168 
Marlborough's stable while on campaign was considerable. During the winter months, 
it fell under the care and duty of Mr Christian Versyle and Captain Daniel Coenen, 
themselves noted contractors of mounts to the army. For the period 29 October 1705 
166 BL, Add. MSS 61295, ff. 110-111b: memorial of Captain Spotswood to Marlborough. 
Undated. [c. 1706. ] On the issue of Spotswood's rank, see also the letter of Spotswood to his 
cousin, dated London, 15 March 1704 O. S., quoted in Cappon, 'Correspondence of Alexander 
Spotswood', p. 220. 
167 BL, Add. MSS 61335, ff. 32-33b: account of what the army was to furnish in horses, to draw 
the artillery for the siege of Saarlouis. 1705. 
168 BL, Add. MSS 61335, f. 34: project to supply 3000 horses for transporting the artillery and 
ammunition. 1705. 
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N. S. to 8 May 1706 N. S., they fed and stabled Marlborough's horses, and provided 
lodgings for the duke's own grooms, at Ijslemonde. Forty-three of Marlborough's 
horses were stabled there; at 6 stuivers of fodder a day, the bill for feeding this stable 
alone amounted to nearly 2500 guilders. A dozen of the duke's horses died that winter, 
including one ridden by his trumpeter. 169 
A later memorial listed Marlborough's stable as numbering eight riding horses (a 
'chestnut stone' from Colonel Lillingston; 'Snipe'; a ball stone horse from Godolphin; a 
barbary, also from Godolphin; 'Ffethersone'; a little barbary; a bay Turk from the 
Elector Palatine; and a grey Turk from Colonel Pendlebury); a black Spanish horse and 
a grey gelding; six servants' horses; and a welter of coach horses, including two new 
Prussian coach horses, three gray Romans, five bay Wittemburgers, two bay Palatines, 
ten assorted grey coach horses and a mare to draw the duke's chase. A further three of 
Marlborough's riding horses were invalids: the grey Turk from the Elector Palatine 
was lame, 'Merydeth' had floundered and 'Copenger' was blind. 170 Marlborough's 
horses were often named with an element of wit, and/or a nod to certain individuals: 
'Meredyth', 'Somerset', 'King of Prussia'. One might even assume that 'Cutts', who 
died at the camp at Tirlemont, was named on account of its temper. 171 
Marlborough's aides-de-camp were typically tasked with overseeing such parts of the 
duke's equipage, as well as receiving and expending various sums on their master's 
behalf. 172Cash and bills were usually collected by what appeared to be the most senior 
of Marlborough's aides-de-camp, the adjutant-general excepted. In 1703, for example, 
James Bringfield was issued with 1100 guilders in April, and a further 550 in October, 
on the account of Marlborough's pay as commander-in-chief. In April Bringfield also 
received a further 4300 guilders on account of the contingencies; and Cardonnel 1492: 1 
169 BL, Add. MSS 61335, ff. 49-50b: Versyle and Coenen's bill for keeping Marlborough's horses, 
mules and lodging for servants, 29 October 1705 N. S. to 8 May 1706 N. S. Marlborough paid fl. 
2535: 12 in satisfying this bill, 21 September 1706 N. S. Two of the duke's horses died 2 
November; one on 7 November 1705 N. S.; two on 27 November; four on the 9 and 10 December; 
one on 12 January 1706 N. S.; the trumpeter's horse on 20 January; and one coach horse on 30 
January 
170 BL, Add. MSS 61335, f. 51b: memorandum on Marlborough's horses. Confusingly, the 
memorandum gave a total of 30 horses, 7 mules and a further ten grey coach horses -which did 
not quite match the individual entries. 
in BL, Add. MSS 61335, f. 52b: memorandum on Marlborough's horses. 
172 BL, Add. MSS 74237 K, ff. 33-34b: Bringfield to Watkins, 6 February 1705 [O. S.? ] 
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guilders likewise. These patterns of disbursement continued; in 1705 Bringfield 
received various sums on Marlborough's accounts, including over 400 pistols for his 
use on the campaign. From later in 1706, it was John Pitt who received funds in 
Marlborough's name; in 1710, it was Mr Eaton. 173 Cash was even paid to Mrs Cadogan 
for the Duchess of Marlborough's use in the Netherlands. 174 
Although Marlborough's aides oversaw the purchase of many of life's comforts on the 
campaign, the duke also maintained a fair household of servants while in the field, 
many of local provenance. 175 An account of the wages due to Marlborough's servants 
for the campaign of 1710 included a confectioner, two manservants (Mr Daniell and Mr 
Arnauld), a baker, Mr Lovegrove of the duke's cellar, a sculleryman and Mr Leimbach, 
the a steward. 176 Throughout the war Marlborough also retained a body of trumpeters, 
typically numbering two, who were paid CO p. a. each. 177 Even Henry Watkins was 
tasked with helping oversee the duke's arrangements on occasion 178 
It was the duty of every senior officer to show hospitality to his peers. Richard 
Ingoldsby hoped that, if the commander-in-chief visited the forces besieging Ath, he 
173 BL, Add. MSS 61406, passim. See also, for example, Add. MSS 61135, ff. 35-36b: Marlborough 
to Sweet, The Hague, 16 November 1709 N. S. Marlborough ordered Sweet to give Captain Pitt 
fl. 600 on his account. 
174 BL, Add. MSS 61407, f. 117. 
175 Marlborough was particularly fond of his tea and chocolate. In one instance, Captain Pitt 
paid fl. 57 for tea and fl. 200 for chocolate on the duke's behalf (BL, Add. MSS 61407, f. 117. ). 
Other receipts include ten pounds of green tea at fl. 14 per pound, provided by Drummond (BL, 
Add. MSS 61348, f. 63: bill of John Drummond, Amsterdam, 8 November 1707 N. S. The total, 
including money for the boxes, came to fl. 144) and 54 pounds of chocolate at fl. 2 per pound 
(BL, Add. MSS 61348, f. 69.1708/9. See also ibid., ff. 84,93,101,113). For servants, see, for 
example, BL, Add. MSS 61348, f. 49: Les Gages Pour les Domestiques mentionee pour la 
campagne pour 223 Jours 1706. They included Arnauld Claude and William Daniell, who at 4 
Flemish shillings per day received £44.12s. Flemish money; Daniell Tephine, at a flat £40 
Flemish money per year; Henrie Barrat at 3 shillings per day and jean Halland at 2 shillings and 
6 sols per day. The total came to £220.8s. Flemish money. 
176 BL, Add. MSS 61348, f. 107: An account of the wages due to the following domestiques for 
the campaign 1710.23 January 1710/11. Puzzlingly, the cover makes reference to them being in 
England. 
177 BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 74,179; Add. MSS 61371, f. 46b; Add. MSS 61372, f. 42b. Their names 
were Joseph Williams, then John Conrad Richter from 1705; and John Vandemande (who was 
the only trumpeter mentioned for 1711). 
178 Upon landing with Marlborough at the Brill, in Rotterdam, Cardonnel wrote to Watkins on 
the matter of the duke's welcome and accommodations. Aides-de-camp Bringfield and Durell 
would have their usual rooms, Cardonnel supposed, but desired that Watkins would manage 
various minor matters, such making sure there was a good fire in the duke's room upon his 
arrival. BL, Add. MSS 42176, ff. 67-68b: Cardonnel to Watkins, Rotterdam, 29 January 1704 N. S. 
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would dine with him; he begged to know which other officers in the camp 
Marlborough would have for their company. 179 Marlborough was no exception and 
invited the general officers to dine with him on various occasions, such as the 
anniversary of the victory of Blenheim. 180 Supporting such a table and household was 
costly181 Marlborough expended fl. 2151: 7 on provisions at the Hague for the 1707 
campaign; by 1711, the sum had risen to fl. 5662: 4 (not including provisions for his 
yacht), and an account of wine bought in the same year included 142 bottles of Pierry, 
54 bottles of champagne and 14 bottles of burgundy. 182 Marlborough was not alone in 
stocking his cellar; general officers were allowed their wine free of custom, and on one 
occasion Richard Ingoldsby wondered if such kindness might be expanded to the 
regimental officers: 
My Lord severall of the officers who command Battallyons, have desiered me, to 
pass them a little wine ffor thayer one use, custom ffree, which I have reffus'd; your 
order, being onley in ffavour of the Genll: officers that stay heare, but iff your Grace 
thaught itt ffit, I believe itt would not be mutch, and Extremley pleas the officers 183 
*** 
179 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 22-23b: Ingoldsby to Marlborough, 28 September 1706 N. S. 
180 Snyder, ii, pp. 640-641 n. 647: Marlborough to Sarah, Helchin, 12 August 1706 N. S. 
181 Sample prices for provisions provided to the army run as follows: A bottle or flask of wine 
might cost 18 stuivers for the cheapest French wine, 30 stuivers for 'Sack' or Spanish wine, and 
32 stuivers for Champagne or Burgundy. Other beers and liquors were sold by the field 
measure (the volume of which is sadly unclear): 30 stuivers for Rhenish wine, 24 for a new 
Moselle or French white, 18 for various other sorts. French brandy was 36 stuivers per measure, 
gin 16. Best old strong beer was 5 st.; small beer 3 st. Bread ranged from 1 st. 6d. per pound to 3 
st. Best beef was 3Y or 4 st. per Antwerp or Cologne pound; lesser quality meat 3 st. Mutton 
was 41/2 or 31/2 st.; Veal 4 st. or 3 st.; pork 3 st.; bacon 6 st. The best Dutch cheese was 4 st. per 
pound, common cheese 21h st. (old) or 2 st. (new). Butter was 6 st. per pound, a field measure of 
salt cost 6 st., and soap was 4 st. per pound. BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 104-105b. Add. MSS 61370, 
ff. 28-28b. 
Prices recorded as being paid by the hospitals at Ghent and Brussels in 1707 included: mutton, 
veal and beef at 31/+ st. per pound; bread at 11/2 st. per loaf; beer at fl. 4: 10 (Ghent) or fl. 5: 5 
(Brussels) per barrel; cheese 4 st. a pound; sugar 10 st. a pound; eggs 50 st. per hundred (55 st. in 
Brussels); oatmeal at fl. 3: 10 per bushel; and butter 6 st. per pound. BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 
237b-252. In 1709 at Ghent, the prices had risen. Meat was now 4% st. per pound, bread 3 st. per 
loaf and beer fl. 10 a barrel. In Lille, the prices were even greater: 5 st. for a pound of meat, 4 st. 
for a loaf and i. 12 for a barrel of beer. Add. MSS 61372, ff. 180-185,186-188. 
182 BL, Add. MSS 61350 A. Mr Leimbachs accounts, 1707. There was also typically 5-600 
guilders disbursed weekly for his use, and a further fl. 2883 spent on servants' wages. Add. 
MSS 61348, f. 114: bill for Marlborough's wine, from Nicolas Joseph Poisson. Mons, 11 June 1711 
N. S. 
183 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 16-19b: Ingoldsby to Marlborough, Ghent, 5 January 1706 N. S. 
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General and staff officers did not lead a sheltered existence, and were frequently 
exposed to the risks of death and injury on campaign. Brigadier Archibald Row was 
killed at Blenheim, where Meredyth and Wood were injured, as were four of the seven 
majors of brigade. Webb received such wounds at Malplaquet that he was invalided 
out of active service. 184 A general officer that died whilst on campaign would usually 
have his general equipage (as opposed to any more personal items that might be 
returned to his family and estate) auctioned off before the army, typically before his 
own corps or at the headquarters. Notice would be given beforehand, for the benefit of 
prospective buyers. 185 
On the evening of 25 September 1709, William Cadogan had been present as the allied 
forces broke ground from the their lines of circumvallation and began to open trenches 
near the Port A Havre at Mons, an action in which Private John Marshall Deane noted 
that "the enemy did feirsely oppose them, and did beett our folkes 2 or 3 times from 
there works-but at length our folks beet them in again, and abundance of men was 
killed on both sides & likewise abundance wounded. " Cadogan was one of those 
wounded, while his aide-de-camp, Thomas Foxon, was killed. The Quartermaster- 
General had been injured by a musket ball to the neck -a wound of some seriousness 
to the fleshy Irishman, for as Marlborough noted to Godolphin: 'Thay can't find the 
ball, nor can the surjeans give any judgement til they have dressed him once or twice 
more. '186 
Those individuals that survived their wounds might continue in the service, though 
few examples of injury and subsequent perseverance could compare with the 
experience of Henry Gordon. Gordon had been a second lieutenant in the Scots 
Fusiliers when he lost "a legg & half of his thigh" at the battle of Blenheim. Undeterred 
by this grievous injury and its implications on his serving with the Foot, Gordon 
184 Dalton, v, II, pp. 1-2; vi, p. 299. Webb, D. N. B. 
ras BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 123b, 124b: camp journal. Note of Count Oxenstierna's equipage 
being sold following his death at Malplaquet. Several British officers' effects were also sold 
before the Duke's headquarters. 
186 Deane, op. cit., pp. 96-7. Snyder, iii, no. 1409, pp. 1376-7: Marlborough to Godolphin, Camp 
at Havre, 26 September 1709 N. S.. Marlborough also wrote a similar letter to Sarah (see n. 10 
below), and one to Secretary Boyle, see Murray, iv, pp. 605-6: Marlborough to Boyle, Camp at 
Havre, 26 September 1709 N. S. In a letter to Heinsius of the same date he hopefully commented 
'... as he has no ill scimptoms, I hope he will do well. "t Hoff, op. cit., no. 798, p. 467. 
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secured a commission as a cornet in the Earl of Stair's regiment of Dragoons - in which 
he served for five further campaigns, despite being "shott through the other legg at the 
Battle of Mons! 187 
A more common impediment to the senior officer, however, was illness. The health of 
Marlborough's general officers was not exceptional. Charles Churchill suffered a stroke 
in 1708, ending his military career, and gout was a common complaint of the period, 
laying out Francis Palmes at Westerwald in 1707 and Sir Thomas Erle at Ostend in 
1708188. Fevers were common on account of the climate. In 1705, Wood lay desperately 
ill at Breda, his recovery 'despaired off'189; while both Colonel Thomas Stringer and 
Brigadier Lord John Hay died in quick succession in the autumn of 1706, while a welter 
of officers and assistants were similarly stricken, including Richard Ingoldsby, the 
Earls of Albemarle and Orkney, Charles Ross, Thomas Meredyth and Adam de 
Cardonnel 190 Writing from the siege of Dendermonde, Meredyth noted that he was 
"very weak [and] not able to walk well without help but shall be as well as ever in a 
day or two, " but in the meantime was able "with a little help to be where [he] could be 
of use... "191 
In May 1708, Meredyth apologised to Marlborough for his delay in attending the army; 
he was then engaged in 'a very severe course' of medical treatment, which could 
continue for a fortnight longer. He claimed to be feeling the benefits already, and 
hoped to be quite well when the course had finished. 192 A few years earlier, the Earl of 
187 NA, WO 30/88 (3), p. 49. Petition of Cornet Henry Gordon to Her Majesty, asking for a 
yearly gratuity on account of his wounds. Granville and Brydges, Whitehall, 15 February 1711 
O. S. See also Dalton, v, p. 81; II, pp. 57,59 n. 29; and vi, p. 314. Gordon received at bounty of £22 
on the Blenheim Roll. 
188 Snyder, ii, pp. 915-916 n. 908: Marlborough to Godolphin, Helchin, 29 September 1707 N. S.; 
pp. 1100-1101 n. 1101: Marlborough to Godolphin, Lannoy, 24 September 1708 N. S. 
189 Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, v, p. 548: 10 May 1705 O. S. 
190 For Hay, see Murray, ii, p. 105: Marlborough to Harley, Helchin, 26 August 1706 N. S. Hay 
perished after being ill for near three weeks. For Stringer, see Snyder, ii, p. 662 n. 671: 
Marlborough to Godolphin, Villaine, 12 September 1706 N. S. On Ingoldsby's sickness, see BL, 
Add. MSS 61163, ff. 20-21b: Ingoldsby to Marlborough, Ghent, 24 July 1706 N. S. Snyder, ii, pp. 
635-637: Marlborough to Godolphin, Helchin, 9 August 1706 N. S and ibid., pp. 689-690: 
Marlborough to Godolphin, Gramets, 30 September (also contains note of Orkney's and Ross's 
illness). For Cardonnel, Snyder, ii, pp. 677-678 n. 686: Marlborough to Sarah, Gramets, 23 
September 1706 N. S. 
191 BL, Add. MSS 61163, If. 223-224b: Meredyth to Marlborough, Grimberg, 24 June 1706 N. S. 
192 BL, Add. MSS 61163, If. 229-230b: Meredyth to Marlborough, Chelsea, 4 May 1708 O. S. 
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Orkney took to the waters at Wiesbaden on the recommendation of Marlborough's 
surgeon, Dr Lawrence - though he was not confident they would cure him of "that 
violent sharpness" he had in his blood. 193 Orkney was one of the more frequent 
sufferers in the army. In 1705 it was an acute earache resulting from an abscess; a 
complaint so violent that it gave him "noe rest night nor day, " keeping the general at 
Aix-la-Chapelle; in 1711 it was a fever and pleurisy. 194 
In August 1710, Adam Cardonnel was struck down by a particularly debilitating 
illness. His company was kept by Dr Francis Hare, Marlborough's chaplain-general 
and one of the most voluble (and perhaps ingratiating) of correspondents. What 
followed was a series of over two-dozen letters addressed to Watkins, written by Hare 
at Cardonnel's sickbed in Lille, and containing the most minute, often hour-by-hour 
observations on the secretary's health over a fortnight and more. 195 
Cardonnel had been fatigued by his journey to Lille; a weariness that was not 
dissipated by a night's rest. As he deteriorated, developing a 'bilious fever, diverse 
physicians prescribed various remedies: a glyster (an enema), which appeared to work 
well; cordials (both with and without opium), which did not; -in a particularly 
apposite comment upon common medical science of the day, two doctors ventured in 
the early stages of Cardonnel's fever to bleed him; and if that didn't work, the 
physicians would be 'at a loss'. One evening, after Cardonnel had been feeling 
somewhat better, the doctors ordered him to take a 'blister between the shoulders' (i. e. 
a plaster, typically with Spanish flies, designed to raise a blister). To their surprise, he 
193 BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 89-90b: Orkney to Marlborough, Wiesbaden, 17 October 1704 N. S. 
194 BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 93-94b: Orkney to Marlborough, Aix-la-Chapelle, 18 May 1705 N. S. 
Add. MSS 61162, If. 113-114b: Orkney to Marlborough, London, 11 May 1711 O. S. 
195 BL, Add. MSS 33225, letters of Hare to Watkins: ff. 25-26b (Lille, 1 August 1710 N. S., 8 a. m. ); 
ff. 27-28b (ditto, 3 p. m., 4 p. m. ); ff. 29-30b (2 August, 3.30 p. m. ); ff. 31-32b (3 August); ff. 33-34b 
(4 August, noon); f. 35 (ditto); if. 36-37b (ditto, 8 p. m. ); if. 38-39b (5 August, 7 a. m. ); ff. 40-41b 
(ditto, 3 p. m. ); ff. 42-43b (6 August, 8 a. m. ); ff. 44-45b (ditto, 3 p. m. ); ff. 46-47b (7 August, 12 
o'clock); if. 48-49b (8 August, 7 a. m., 8 a. m., 9.30 a. m. ); ff. 50-51b (ditto, past 3 p. m. ); ff. 52-52b (9 
August, past 3 p. m. ); if. 56-57b (10 August, 3 p. m. ); ff. 58-59b (11 August, 3 p. m. ); ff. 60-61b (12 
August, past 3 p. m. ); if. 62-63b (13 August, 3 p. m. ); if. 64-65b (14 August, 2 p. m. ); if. 66-67b (15 
August, 2 p. m. ); if. 68-69b (16 August, afternoon); if. 70-71b (17 August, 12 o'clock); ff. 74-75b 
(18 August, 10 o'clock); ff. 76-77b (Ghent, 19 August, 6 o'clock); If. 88-89b (Ghent, 24 August, 
noon); ff. 104-105b (Ghent, 1 September). 
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was somewhat restless afterwards. 196 On the 4 August, Cardonnel was well enough to 
bid Hare to write a note on his behalf, to which he attached a scrawled signature: 
I am forbid to write, however I think it would bee to great a peice of 
uncharitableness not to let you & Mr Teale know, that I am much better than I was, 
when the last letters went away. I hope to write you both by the next post. 197 
By the 9 August, Hare ventured to believe that Cardonnel was out of danger; but a 
lengthy convalescence continued. A few days later, he was able to take the air, and 
salivating at the scent of roast beef. 198 Cardonnel then repaired to quarters at Ghent 
where, a month after he had first taken ill, Hare declared him fitter than he had been in 
the past five years, and could discover nothing wanting as to a perfect recovery but 
... 
[Raff? ] & Piquet, which he seems as yet to have no relish off, & `twould be ne'er 
the worse, if he had no more for the rest of the Campaign. 199 
Cardonnel had so long managed much of the bureaucracy of the army in the Low 
Countries that his illness was mirrored by a slight distemper the headquarters' affairs. 
Necessary papers and contracts required oversight, but Cardonnel was in no position 
to effect such, and was so delirious that any advice he might give was of unsure 
footing. Hare tried to aid in Cardonnel's affairs, but admitted that he could not 
distinguish between 'what [was] distemper and what [was] not' in the secretary's 
ramblings, and was hesitant to dispatch papers to the army or England in such 
circumstances. 200 
196 BL, Add. MSS 33225, ff. 38-39b: Hare to Watkins, Lille, 5 August 1710 N. S. 
197 BL, Add. MSS 33225, f. 35: Cardonnel (via Hare) to Watkins, Lille, 4 August 1710 N. S. 
198 BL, Add. MSS 33225, ff. 66-67b: Hare to Watkins, Lille, 15 August 1710 N. S. 
199 BL, Add. MSS 33225, ff. 104-105b: Hare to Watkins, Ghent, 1 September 1710 N. S. 
2M BL, Add. MSS 33225, ff. 31-32b: Hare to Watkins, Lille, 3 August 1710 N. S. 
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IV 
Logistics and larceny: 
Reconciling public and private enterprise 
"Cadogan being Quartermaster Generall gave him many opportunities 
to rob the poore Peisants & for the better Executeing thereof he 
Industerousely gave out by his assistants that it was don by order & 
for the use of the Genll. Which was very well known to the contrary by 
all that were neare the Generall. " 
Memorial of charges against Cadogan. Anonymous. 
The payment of Her Majesty's subject forces in the Low Countries, and the English 
portion of those foreign auxiliaries in English or joint Anglo-Dutch pay, was a 
convoluted process. The transfer of public funds and credit from London to the army 
lay in the hands of several individuals. The overall responsibility for the payment of 
the troops lay with the Paymaster to the Forces Abroad, a post held first by Charles Fox 
(23 December 1702 to 10 May 1705 O. S. ) and then James Brydges (10 May 1705 to 4 
September 1713 O. S. ). 201 The paymaster charged himself with all public moneys due to 
the army; a responsibility that was discharged by the pay of the soldiers and officers by 
his Deputy Paymaster(s), who served in the Low Countries. These deputies received 
credit by way of remittances from the Paymaster or other prominent individuals -the 
financier Sir Henry Furnese was prominent-or by drawing bills upon same. This 
credit was used to supply the army with money from local bankers and merchants. 
At the beginning of the war, the English retained one deputy paymaster in the 
Netherlands: Benjamin Sweet, who resided at Amsterdam. 202 Sweet was under 
201 There was also a Paymaster of the Forces, who handled matters prior to the creation of a 
separate post for the forces serving abroad. 
202 An idea of the duties of Sweet is provided by his expenses in the months prior to the onset of 
the war. Amounting to £226.18s. 41/2d, they included: four months' extraordinary charges for 
going express from England to the Hague to get vessels to disembark the forces, and several 
journeys to Sevenberg, Breda, the Hague and Amsterdam (£122); a large iron chest (£8.3.41/2d. ); 
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constant orders to pay what was ordered by a warrant or other direction from the 
duke, without any further order from Cardonnel or otherwise. 203 Sweet dealt with the 
solicitors and paymasters of the regiments, who were allowed a commission on all 
funds they secured for their corps, usually Y2% from their regiments. 204 When the army 
moved further from Sweet's base at Amsterdam, additional stages entered the process, 
as credit was provided at other towns and cities. On 1 July 1704, during the march to 
the Danube, Sweet informed Marlborough that the army would be successfully 
subsisted for two months from that day, on account of the bills that Cardonnel and 
drawn on Sweet, and the credit (over 300,000 guilders' worth) Sweet had and would 
send to Cardonnel on Frankfurt. Sweets correspondent in Frankfurt would account for 
such monies when and wheresoever Marlborough ordered them, much 'in the same 
manner, as M. Behagel does it'. Beside the specific credit obtained in Frankfurt, Sweet 
had also obtained a general credit for the army 'in all the great towns that they pass to 
supply them upon any exigences' 205 
Different centres of credit could offer different rates of exchange - which paymasters, 
merchants and bankers could exploit to bring profits by way of arbitrage. The conquest 
of much of the Southern Netherlands in 1706 provided a significant opportunity for 
this, given the difference in the rates of exchange of current money between Holland, 
and Brabant and Flanders. The Lord Treasurer, Sidney, Earl of Godolphin, had been 
made aware of the difference in exchange between Amsterdam and Antwerp by a 
banker from the last place, Jacobus de Koninck. In outlining the process of payment as 
he expected it to be managed (by bills drawn upon Antwerp, 'as was usual in the late 
war', with considerable sums remitted there in the manner of bills on Amsterdam, and 
the charge of an office at Rotterdam, and for fire, candle and other necessities (£20); sums paid 
by him for the loss in receiving bad money, and money received short in bags (£20); postage of 
letters and packets (£25); and books, paper, wax, pens etc. (£9.10s. ). BL, Add. MSS 61330, ff. 23- 
24b: note from Lowndes to Blathwayt, passing on a list of disbursements asked for by Sweet. 
Copy. Treasury Chambers, 3 February 1701/2 O. S. Blathwayt's acceptance of same, dated 
Whitehall, 18 March 1701/2 O. S. Later in the war, his expenses for like over a six-month period 
came to £357.7s. 6d. Ibid., ff. 34-35b: Sweet's petition for his expenses, 24 December 1704 to 23 
June 1705, "being in Proportion to what the Rt Honbie Lords of the Treasury thought fitt to allow 
him for three months, when the army was but 10,000 men. " 
20 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 1-2: Brydges to Cardonnel, Amsterdam, 7 September 1706 
N. S. 
204 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, ii, p. 177: Brydges to Cartwright, 17 March 1709 O. S. 
205 BL, Add. MSS 61135, ff. 20-21b: Sweet to Marlborough, Amsterdam, 1 July 1704 N. S. Isaac 
Behagel was a Dutch merchant, and the financial agent of the States General in Frankfurt. 
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actual specie transported from Dutch banks) he highlighted the way in which the 
exchange could be managed to the 'best advantage'. This exchange between Holland 
and Flanders had suffered since the last war: whereas the agio on the patacoon (or 
difference between the value of current and exchange money) had been R' 'i'Yo, it had 
since risen to 162/, %; such was the difference, that the local merchants anticipated a 
return to the earlier rate. 2°6 
Table 4.1: Rates of exchange between Holland and the Spanish Netherlands, 1706207 
Flemish specie and rate of exchange (in Dutch guilders) 
Ducatoon fl. 3 
Patacoon (or Crown) fl. 2: 8 
(Flemish) Shilling 6 st. 
Exchange money 
Gold: 
Sovereign fl. 15 
Guinea fl. 11: 3.5 
Pistol fl. 9 
Ducat fl. 5: 1 
Albertin fl. 6: 15 
Ducat , fl. 3: 10 
Patacoon (or Crown) fl. 2: 16 
(Flemish) Shilling 7 st. 
Gold: 
Current money Sovereign fl. 17: 10 
Guinea fl. 13: 1 
Pistol fl. 10: 10 
Ducat fl. 5: 18 
Albertin fl. 7: 17 
206 BL, Add. MSS 61134, ff. 94-95b: English translation of a letter from Jacobus de Koninck, 
Antwerp, 14 June 1706 N. S. Koninck noted that the exchange in London was 33 Flemish 
shillings and 3 or 4 pence to the Pound Sterling-hut the rate would fall, and that for 
Amsterdam rise, on account of the sums that would be paid to the army in Flanders. 
207 BL, Add. MSS 61134, ff. 96-97b: figures appended to a translation of a letter from M. de 
Coninck, Antwerp, 14 June 1706 N. S. 
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James Taylor, at the Treasury, wrote to Brydges with Godolphin's concerns regarding 
the exchange: the Lord Treasurer had found that a 'very great advance' -even 
allowing for charges in transportation and exchange-of not less than 9 or 10% to be 
made on sending specie from Holland to Flanders and Brabant. Godolphin desired that 
Brydges would immediately order Sweet (or another, if he was too busy) to Antwerp, 
to 'take all possible care that this Advantage be duly Accounted for. '208 Brydges, well 
aware of this difference, sought to obfuscate the matter by protesting the hardship the 
officers would feel if the advantage was made good to the public rather than 
themselves, not least because the "provisions an Liquors they have occasion of, are so 
dear in the Countrey. " 209 Godolphin was not moved, believing Brydges had 
misunderstood - "perhaps Wilfully" -his intentions; he was glad that any profit be 
shared proportionately, but not that it should be swallowed up "by particular officers, 
much less by any of the paymasters or the deputyes, " and was not impressed "with 
those who have taken such pains to misrepresent [his directions] to the officers and 
soldiers. "210 For his part, Marlborough was studiously ignorant, being "extreame glad 
of the derections [given]... for I do not understand the matter... " and simply wishing an 
equality of pay with the Dutch and anything else saved to the Public. 211 
An idea of the profits gained is presented by the merchant Francis Stratford's account 
for 1706. Out of the fl. 959,345: 1 passed to Stratford to pay the army, fl. 710,000 had 
been negotiated 'to advantage, giving a 2% profit to the interested parties: Stratford, 
Brydges, Adam de Cardonnel and William Cadogan. 212 This did not amount to much, 
but still excited anger in the army, which complained that while their Dutch colleagues 
received the Flemish shilling at just 6112 stuivers, they had it at 7 st. It gave 
Marlborough such a bad impression of Stratford, Cardonnel thought, "that it may 
'08 BL, Add. MSS 61134, If. 92-93b: Taylor to Brydges, Whitehall, 20 June 1706 O. S. Godolphin's 
interest was pricked by the letters of Marlborough and Coninck. 
209 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 115-116: Brydges to Godolphin, Amsterdam, 14 July 1706 
N. S. 
210 Snyder, ii, p. 625 no. 632: Godolphin to Marlborough, 16 July 1706 O. S. 
211 Snyder, ii, pp. 602-603 no. 613: Marlborough to Godolphin, Harlebeck, 8 July 1706 N. S.; pp. 
608-609 no. 618: Marlborough to Godolphin, camp at Helchin, 12 July 1706 N. S.; pp. 616-618: 
Marlborough to Godolphin, camp at Helchin, 19 July 1706 N. S. 
212 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, p. 101: Brydges to Cardonnel, 29 April 1707 [O. S. ] Stratford 
claimed 1%; Brydges was "fully resolv'd (as I have all along) not to share any part of it my self", 
so the remaining 1 ßo was split between Cardonnel and Cadogan. 
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break his measures entirely for the future. "213 Sweet himself was put out by such large 
sums of public money being in private - as opposed to his own - hands. Although 
Brydges and Cadogan had sought to calm the affair, protesting (disingenuously) that 
the army was content in the manner utilised, the secret of the 2 to 21/4% profit made on 
the exchange was out, and blew up into a full-blown row between the Paymaster and 
Sir Henry Furnese, whose own profits in the remittances were being diminished by the 
scheme. 214 Summing up the situation, Cadogan wrote: 
I shall say nothing more of the payments in this letter, but that Wee have had the 
Scandal without the joy hitherto and that I believe it might be order'd wee should 
have the Joy without the Scandal. 215 
There would be plenty of joy to come. 
Sir Henry had sought to send his own agent to Antwerp to manage the profit of the 
exchange, but Brydges acted quickly to prevent it. He sent to Antwerp his own choice, 
Captain Henry Cartwright, as a second deputy paymaster. 216 Views on Cartwright's 
arrival varied. Marlborough was annoyed that he'd not been consulted in the 
commission, but relented; Cartwright noted that Sweet said he was satisfied with his 
coming over, "but I am very sure his words did not agree with his thoughts. "217 
Cardonnel, surprisingly, seemed dismissive - that, or he was giving Watkins the lie 
when he said Cartwright was "... inter nos ... sent over cheifly 
for a riddance, pray 
advise our friend Mr Sweet not to [intermeddle] with him but let him go on his own 
way. "218 Stratford quickly introduced him to the usual mercantile suspects in matters 
213 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, p. 5: Cardonnel to Brydges, camp at Helchin, 20 July 1706 N. S. 
Stratford attempted a convoluted defence of his method - see ibid., pp. 6-7: Stratford to 
Brydges, "From the Great Camp", 23 July 1706 N. S. 
214 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 5-7: Brydges to Cadogan, 18 October O. S. Stowe 58, i, pp. 
100-101: Cadogan to Brydges, The Hague, 16 November 1706 N. S. Cadogan enclosed two 
signed papers from the general officers in the camp as a justification of the method. 
us HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 100-101: Cadogan to Brydges, The Hague, 16 November 
1706 N. S. 
216 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 64-66: Brydges to Drummond, 10/21 January 1707. Ibid., i, 
p. 4: Brydges to Sweet, 29 October 1706 [O. S. ]. The rate of payment was to remain fl. 10.15 
Holland money to the pound sterling, with the Flemish shilling paid at the rate of 61/2 stuivers. 
217 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 91-92: Cartwright to Brydges, The Hague, 8 November 1706 
[O. S. marked]. 
218 BL, Add. MSS 42176, ff. 157-158b: Cardonnel to Watkins, Whitehall, 10 December 1706 O. S. 
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of financial ingenuity, such as Abraham Romswinckel and the Scot, John 
Drummond219 
Undeterred by Brydges sending his creature to Antwerp, Sir Henry continued to remit 
to Antwerp in the same manner as he did to Amsterdam; and by giving bills for such 
sums on his agent, Koninck, sought by picking up private bills or buying specie, to 
transmit to Antwerp and make a considerable profit. Yet Brydges was sure he could 
secure these transactions at a more advantageous rate than Sir Henry and proceeded 
with his own experiment, into which Cartwright was swiftly inserted. Drummond and 
Romswinckel bought up specie in Holland, which was sent to the deputy paymaster at 
Antwerp with all secrecy, out of sight of Koninck and Sir Henry. 2° Cartwright's loose 
lips almost spoiled the scheme, when he let slip that he might take the whole 
remittance out of Sir Henry's hands, drawing on Brydges directly: "such a peece of 
indiscretion in you, " Brydges scolded, "that I am amaz'd at it, & you have almost 
spoil'd the whole design by it. "221 
Sweet had a whiff of the affair. His obstructions were minor at first: in December 1706, 
after Marlborough had decreed to Cartwright (in Sweet's hearing) that the army was to 
receive the pistol in Antwerp at the same rate as it was taken in Holland, Sweet 
signified the same to Ingoldsby and had a 'sworn broker of Amsterdam' send the 
general every week a summary of the exchange in Holland, 'for the better governance 
of the paymasters of each regiment'? Brydges disagreed; Marlborough had in fact 
since stated that the payments should continue as before and any advantage be 
accounted to the public. To diminish Sweet's capacity for further disruption, he gave 
the following reprimand: 
I can't forbear saying upon this occasion that I am sorry to see, you will mistake so 
grosly in matters of this nature, & run on out of peke to a particular person (as I 
presume) to do such acts as those wihtout consulting first all your freinds in 
England, but that you may not have any colour of doing the like again for want of 
219 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 101-103: Stratford to Brydges, The Hague, 19 November 
1706 [N. S. ] 
220 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 47-48: Brydges to Drummond, 22 November 1706 O. S.; p. 49: 
Brydges to Cartwright, 28 November 1706 O. S. 
221 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, p. 53: Brydges to Cartwright, undated [c. December 1706]. 
BL, Add. MSS 61406, f. 133 (rev. ): Sweet to Marlborough, Amsterdam, 3 December 1706 N. S. 
Add. MSS 61135, ff. 45-46b: Sweet to Ingoldsby (copy), Amsterdam, 3 December 1706 N. S. 
86 
Sufficient explanation from me I must acquaint you that you are not concern't in 
any wise to the take notice of any manner or rates the payments are made to the 
troops by Capt. Cartwright he will take their notes in Current mony of Holland 
which when you clear at the end of the two months they must allow being 
constantly & regularly transmitted by him to you, so that there will be no occasion 
at all of your entring into the detail of the prices at which the severall species are 
taken. 
The basic method, of buying specie at cheaper rates to send to Antwerp, while paying 
the army at a more expensive one, was continued into 1707. Cadogan privately agreed 
with Palmes and several other friends that their regiments took payments on his terms. 
He made a bargain with a Jew to provide 6000 Louis d'or and patacoons (£8000 in 
another estimate) each month at fl. 9: 10 and 51 st. Holland money respectively; given 
that the army was paid the Louis d'or fl. 9: 15, this was a clear profit. In order to carry to 
proceed with this method, a sum of 50-60,000 guilders had to be lodged in 
Romswinckel's hands to pay the Jews as the money came in. Cadogan was confident 
that they would turn £15-16,000 a month at 2%; a greater sum could not be managed 
easily, and would alarm Sir Henry Furnese. 224 Cartwright was in full accord with 
Cadogan and helped remove Brydges' objections to the plan. 
William Sloper, at the pay office in London, was brought into the scheme, which now 
included Brydges, Cadogan, Romswinckel and William Burroughs, Cadogan's 
secretary226 Sweet, however, proved a problem. He was not unaware of the enterprise; 
indeed, at the beginning he was tacitly involved, providing money to Romswinckel to 
buy up gold. Brydges even noted his desire to cut Romswinckel (and his 1/2% 
commission) out, as Sweet could readily fill his role to his advantage, but it was not to 
be. 227Sweet refused to pay the bills Cadogan gave on Romswinckel, unless they were 
charged to his own regiment. Romswinckel believed Sweet apprehended "the 
Management of these Sums by the Hands of the Brigadier to his Prejudice and 
223 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, p. 50: Brydges to Sweet, 3/14 December 1706. 
224 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 145-147: Cadogan to Brydges, The Hague, 23 April 1707 N. S. 
Ibid., pp. 147-149: Cadogan to Brydges, Antwerp, 28 April 1707 N. S.; pp. 155-157: Cartwright to 
Brydges, Antwerp, 28 April 1707 N. S. 
225 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 171-173: Cartwright to Brydges, Antwerp, 19 May 1707 N. S. 
226 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 99-100: Brydges to Cadogan, 28 April 1707 [O. S. ] 
227 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 137-139: Brydges to Cadogan, 26 May 1707 O. S.; pp. 135-136: 
Brydges to Sweet, 26 May 1707 O. S.; pp. 142-143: Brydges to Sweet, 29 May 1707 [O. S. ] 
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therefore will Study all that He can to Obstruct it" and Brydges ceases his attempts to 
bring Sweet into the method. 228 
An alternate scheme was raised by Cadogan, who suggested that Brydges could 
sideline Sweet by remitting money to his wife. Bills were remitted to Holland on 
Cartwright, who endorsed them and made them payable to Mrs Cadogan. 229 Poor 
Romswinckel, however, was still thought expendable. Burroughs, Brydges argued, 
could just as easily collect the money from the Jews instead, which would "go a good 
way in ye profitt. " Romswinckel was temporarily removed from the cabal. 23° The 
method was further modified in July, when the ongoing dispute between Sweet and 
the Baron Waleff (see below) caused Johan Hallungius-a close acquaintance of 
Brydges -to be appointed as WaIeff's regimental solicitor, giving Brydges a pretence to 
transfer funds on account of that regiment to aid the affair of buying gold. 231 The sums 
could prove considerable: when Hallungius asked Mrs Cadogan how much she 
needed every month, she replied that fl. 25,000 a week should suffice! 232 
Despite the early tribulations, the method seemed to have been set on a secure foot. To 
quote Brydges: 
I am very sensible the disappointments occasioned by Mr Sweet and some delays 
by [Romswinckel] have prov'd a great prejudice to the success of this Affaire and 
its becoming so advantageous as was expected; but ye method tis in at present in 
regard of Mr. Hallungius being made use of, to pay for ye Gold ... is such, that it 
228 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 192-193: Cadogan to Brydges, camp at Meldert, 6 June 1707 
N. S.; pp. 200-202: Romswinckel to Brydges, Amsterdam, 10 June 1707 [N. S. ]. Stowe 57, i, pp. 
159-160: Brydges to Cadogan, 18 June 1707 O. S. Romswinckel himself had thought it best if 
Sweet was brought as a full partner into the scheme. Stowe 58, i, pp. 209-210: Romswinckel to 
Brydges, Amsterdam, 17 June 1707 [N. S. ] 
229 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 192-193: Cadogan to Brydges, camp at Meldert, 6 June 1707 
N. S.;, ii, pp. 1-2: Cadogan to Brydges, camp at Meldert, 27 June 1707 N. S. 
230 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 137-139: Brydges to Cadogan, 26 May 1707 O. S.; pp. 149-150: 
Brydges to Cadogan, 4 June 1707 O. S.; pp. 194-195: Brydges to Romswinckel, 26 July 1707 O. S. 
In 1708, Cadogan was again negotiating with Romswinckel, much to the surprise of Brydges. 
Stowe 57, ii, p. 94: Brydges to Romswinckel, 22 October 1708 O. S. Stowe 58, iii, pp. 96-97: 
Romswinckel to Brydges, Amsterdam, 23 October 1708 [N. S. ] 
231 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 187-188: Brydges to Cadogan, 18/29 July 1707. Cadogan was 
in full agreement with the use of Hallungius. Stowe 58, ii, pp. 60-61: Cadogan to Brydges, 
Soignies, 15 August 1707 N. S. 
232 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, ii, pp. 69-73: Hallungius to Brydges, The Hague, 12/23 August 
1707. 
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may be carried on the rest of the Campagne Wth great east & in the winter the same, 
& next summer too... 33 
The affair continued successfully, with minor alterations, over the years 1707 and 1708. 
Brydges was glad that their being "concern'd in any manner of Proffit [was] so great a 
secret to every one. " Any opportunity to increase their profits was seized readily - 
when Stair's and Ross's dragoons desired to receive their payments from Cartwright, 
rather than Sweet, even though they were quartered at Gorcum in Holland, Brydges 
and his comrades were elated: this would allow another legitimate reason to provide 
credit to Cartwright, which could be used to buy specie. 235 Unfortunately for the 
conspirators, the plan came to nothing, as Ross and Stair subsequently changed their 
minds and asked for their subsistence to be paid by Sweet. Sweet would later hint at 
his knowledge of the profit at Antwerp and desired an account of it, as he did not think 
it reasonable that he should be a stranger to it - but his chance had gone. 237 
Cadogan's role with the Council of State at Brussels was invaluable, as when he used 
his authority Brussels to prevent an order postulated by the States of Holland for the 
alteration of the rate of exchange in Flanders, which would have destroyed the 
project 238 The quartermaster-general also used his power to put the payment of the 
Imperial soldiers on such a good foot, paying them six weeks in advance, that they 
allowed him a thousand crowns a year for the Foot (and the Horse in proportion) for 
prompt payment, which was deducted from the sums paid them. Cartwright's part in 
this enterprise was the five Brabant regiments, which would produce 1300 or 1500 a 
year. 239 Cartwright actually received -3% on the fl. 80,000 paid -a method that 
233 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 209-210: Brydges to Cadogan, 18 August 1707 O. S. 
B4 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, ii, pp. 1-2: Brydges to Cadogan, 5 December 1707 O. S. 
235 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, p. 258: Brydges to Cartwright, 25 November 1707 O. S. Stowe 57, 
ii, pp. 1-2: Brydges to Cadogan, 5 December 1707 N. S. Stowe 58, ii, pp. 156-157: Cartwright to 
Brydges, Antwerp, 28 November 1707 N. S. Ibid., Cadogan to Brydges, Antwerp, 28 November 
1707 N. S. 
HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, ii, pp. 5-7: Brydges to Cadogan, 24 December 1707 O. S. 
237 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, ii, pp. 91-92: Brydges to Sweet, 19 October 1708 O. S. 
238 HL, Stowe MSS Stowe 58, ii, pp. 158-160: Cadogan to Brydges, The Hague, 12 November 
1707 N. S. 
239 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, ii, pp. 196-199: Cartwright to Brydges, Antwerp, 19 January 1708 
N. S. 
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couldn't fail as long as Cadogan was in charge of affairs at Brussels. 240 There was little 
chance to secure profit on the exchange in 1709, but Cadogan's private account for 1708 
ran as follows: 
By exchange of fl. 600,000 brought from Holland to Antwerp fl. 11129 [1.85%] 
By exchange of fl. 72,500 brought from Lille to Antwerp fl. 5094 [7%] 
By profit on the Prussian and Danish forage, for money 
advanced to the undertakers fl. 1612: 16 
By exchange on the embarkation account fl. 21,745: 11 
By profit on money advanced to the Imperial troops fl. 11,692: 10 
By profit on money advanced to the Spanish troops fl. 19,500 
Total: f1.70773: 7 
Cadogan assigned Burroughs fl. 3600 for three years' charges, leaving fl. 67173: 17 to be 
split between himself, Brydges and the others. 241 Brydges declined to take a share in 
the fl. 11129 (he thought Cadogan deserved alone) and suggested a further fl. 5000 for 
Cartwright and fl. 10000 for Sloper, who remitted the money from England. This left fl. 
41044: 7 between himself and Cadogan, of which Brydges would take 20,000 guilders 
and leave the remainder to the Irishman. 242 Cadogan was apprehensive Cartwright 
would think his share too little, and was happy to satisfy him from his own portion, 
"since he has not only been instrumental in doing service as to the past, but may be so 
for the future. "243 
The tensions between Sweet and Cartwright escalated as the war continued. Each 
attempted to infringe upon the privileges of the other. Early in 1708 the deputy 
paymasters were ordered to pay a third of the money due to the British regiments in 
240 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, ii, pp. 222-223: Cartwright to Brydges, Antwerp, 8 March 1708 
N. S. 
241 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, v, pp. 65-67: Cadogan to Brydges, 19 December 1709 N. S. 
242 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, iii, pp. 139-140: Brydges to Cadogan, 6 January 1710 O. S. 
243 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, v, pp. 127-130: Cadogan to Brydges, Brussels, 17 February 1710 
N. S. Cartwright's share was later increased to 10,000 guilders. 
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Holland and two thirds in Flanders, a recipe for confusion. Cadogan and Cartwright 
were up in arms at the development, but Brydges calmed them, assuring the others 
that he would still be able to remit £10,000 a month to continue the enterprise. 244 
Brydges was at this time wholly in favour of Cartwright managing the entirety of the 
British regiments' subsistence; he prevailed upon Marlborough to order that, during 
the campaign, the whole subsistence of the soldiers would be issued by the deputy 
paymaster at Antwerp [the copy in Add. MSS 61371 had 'Amsterdam', which was then 
crossed out] - who when necessary could give bills upon the deputy paymaster at 
Amsterdam, for what was wanting in the subsistence in Holland, and likewise upon 
the pay office in England, for what was necessary there. 245 
The campaign of 1708 was particularly fraught in terms of supply. The French capture 
of Ghent and Bruges, and their blockade of the Scheldt, often reduced the army to great 
straits. Cardonnel could get no more than 2000 pistols at Courtrai (and that at 4%); 
Erle, at Ostend, managed to advance some, draw on Amsterdam or receiving specie 
itself from England 246 Any money transported was at risk from French parties, and 
Brydges entreated Cartwright to "take care to tun not ye least hazard, for ye loss of one 
advance would not be made up by ye profit of a war of much longer continuance than 
this is likely to be. "247 And if this was not clear enough, he later repeated: 
You must remember that you have my positive directions never to send any money 
(& I repeat them again in this) to ye Camp without directions from his Grace in 
writing by one of his Secretarys, in wch case if any misfortune should happen ye 
Publick will bear ye loss248 
244 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, ii, p. 200: Sweet's circular to the commanding officers, 
Amsterdam, 23 January 1708 [N. S. ]; p. 201: Cartwright to Brydges, The Hague, 3 February 1708 
N. S.; pp. 203-205: Cadogan to Brydges, The Hague, 3 February 1708 N. S. Stowe 57, ii, pp. 15-16: 
Brydges to Cadogan, 27 January 1708 O. S. 
245 BL, Add. MSS 61371, f. 260b: order regarding the payment of the troops. Adam de Cardonnel 
by Marlborough's command. Camp at Asch, 8 July 1708 N. S. 
246 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iii, p. 64: Cardonnel to Brydges, camp at Roncq, 8 October 1708 
[N. S. ]; pp. 75-76: Erle to Brydges, St Albert, 15 October 1708 N. S. and 23 October 1708 N. S.; pp. 
117-119: Erle to Brydges, Ostend, 11 November 1708 N. S. 
247 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, ii, pp. 23-34: Brydges to Cartwright, 14 March 1708 O. S. 
2413 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, ii, p. 31: Brydges to Cartwright, 21 May 1708 [O. S. ]. Cartwright 
himself was nearly captured with a considerable sum in 1710. Stowe 57, ii, pp. 70-71: Brydges to 
Cartwright, 10 September 1708 [O. S. ]. The paymasters were usually assigned escorts from the 
army and nearby towns. On one occasion Ross was ordered to dispatch twenty dragoons out of 
each of his two regiments, with officers in proportion, to convoy the paymaster to Ghent; thence 
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Brydges had actually protested that the money he had issued in the years 1705-1708, 
via remittances in bills to the Low Countries, or bills drawn upon him from thence, had 
not always produced the full fl. 10: 15 per pound sterling - though he continued to pay 
the army at that rate, despite the loss. Anne was happy to continue the payments on 
the same foot as before-at fl. 10: 15, "notwithstanding any variation that might happen 
on the Exchange upon the remittance thereof" -directing the auditors to allow such 
differences on Brydges' accounts; while encouraging the paymaster to seize what 
opportunities he might to make good the loss, by surcharging to himself any profits 
that might arise when the pound produced more than the set rate, or was gained by the 
agio on remittances to Antwerp. 249 
Despite the care taken in their designs, the likes of Cadogan and Brydges were open to 
the antagonisms of the army through their management, as when the army was 
angered at being forced to take the pistol at fl. 9: 15 (a 3% loss) in 1709. ° Sir Henry 
Furnese was angry at the sheer amount of money being drawn upon England, for it 
negated the commission he gained on the remittances he sent. Godolphin forbade such 
paymasters and merchants drawing any more, unless a letter was sent over in advance 
on what it was for, and the correspondents received subsequent directions from 
Brydges. Brydges cautioned Cartwright against letting slip the least knowledge of their 
schemes, for Sir Henry's malice was such that he'd make use "of it to all our 
prejudices. "251 
to return with the detachment of the garrison ordered to march to the army. BL, Add. MSS 
61372, f. 166: order to Lieutenant-General Charles Ross to provide a convoy to the paymaster. 
Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. Camp before Douai, 7 May 1710 N. S. See 
also ibid., f. 173b: order to give escorts for the paymasters. Adam de Cardonnel by 
Marlborough's command. Camp at Viler Brulin, 25 July 1710 N. S. and If. 176-177 (21 August 
1710 N. S. ) and 179b (21 September 1710 N. S. ). 
249 NA, WO 26/12, pp. 152-153. Warrant for regulating the rate of exchange for the payment of 
money in the Low Countries. Anne and Walpole. St James, 26 December 1708 N. S. This warrant 
also noted that the payment of the shilling in Flanders was at 61h stuivers, and the pistol at fl. 
9: 15. Brydges actually charged himself with £7051.15s. 33/4d. secured as a profit on the exchange 
of money remitted to Holland over the period 1705-1708. HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, ii, p. 140. 
250 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iii, p. 217: Sweet to Brydges, The Hague, 15 January 1709 [N. S. ]. 
Stowe 57, ii, pp. 151-152: Brydges to Sweet, 24 January 1709 O. S. 
ul HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iv, p. 105: Cardonnel to Lowndes [copy], camp before Tournai, 11 
July 1709 [N. S. ] Stowe 57, ii, pp. 228-230: Brydges to Sweet, 23 June 1709 O. S.; pp. 230-231: 
Brydges to Cartwright, 23 June 1709 O. S. Stowe 58, iv, Lowndes to Cardonnel, Whitehall, 24 
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Cartwright was typically the focus of the officers' discontent, not least on account of his 
poor working relationship with Sweet, which could rebound upon the army. When 
Cartwright was concerned by the rumoured opposition the Lords North and Grey, 
Argyll and Orkney in 1709, Brydges assured him that they made no complaint against 
him, but noted: 
I wish I could say ye same by other Officers, but ye misfortune of not having sent 
Mr. Sweet ye notes hath renndred him unable to settle their subsistence with them 
... [so] their mouthes are filld with [... ] talk of being hardly used that I think ye Town 
talks of nothing else, &I [doubt but] my Ld Treasr is not prevailed upon to put an 
end to ye office at Antwerp & rest it all again at Amsterdam. 252 
Cartwright could count upon the support of the clique within the headquarters, 
however - perhaps because they were as embroiled in the various schemes as he was. 
Cardonnel believed Cartwright acted "without reproach"; while Cadogan claimed the 
complaints against him were "Grounded on Malice or Mistake. "253 Later in the war, 
Cartwright described his commander-in-chief's own urbane approbation: 
... I presumed to acquaint his grace wth the great concerne I was in for liberty to Justifie my seife wch I could easely doe by the letters I receiv'd upon the Occasion 
His grace in a Wonderfull kind manner laying his hand on mine, told me I must not 
mind wt was said and bid me throw of all Concerne..? 54 
Brydges, however, was not convinced. Whatever his occasional exasperation or anger 
at Sweet, he never displayed the contempt to his deputy that coloured the letters of 
Cadogan, Cartwright or Hallungius. Even in 1709 he secretly considered putting an 
end to the office at Antwerp and putting all payments through Sweet's hands. 
Naturally, his thoughts were sweetened by the fact that his deputy at Amsterdam had 
made mention of the acknowledgements he might receive if gratified that office so. 255 
June 1709 [O. S. ] For a detailed account from Brydges upon how the dispute with Furnese arose, 
see his letter to Cardonnel of 23 June 1709 O. S., ibid., pp. 232-234. 
252 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iii, pp. 202-204: Cartwright to Brydges, Antwerp, 10 January 1708 
[N. S. ]. Stowe 57, ii, p. 155: Brydges to Cartwright, 28 January 1709 O. S. 
253 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iii, p. 228: Cardonnel to Brydges, Brussels, 4 February 1709 [N. S. ]; 
pp. 248-249: Cadogan to Brydges, Ostend, 9 March 1709 [N. S. ] 
254 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iii, pp. 156-158: Cartwright to Brydges, Antwerp, 17 December 
1708 [N. S. ] 
255 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, ii, p. 158: Brydges to Sweet, 3 February 1709 O. S.; Stowe 58, iii, pp. 
256-258: Sweet to Brydges, Amsterdam, 5 March 1709 [N. S. ] 
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No alteration was decided upon in 1709, but Sweet and Cartwright continued their 
discordant relationship. 
Cartwright was not alone in engendering the antipathy of others. Sweet was engaged 
in several long-running disputes during the war. The first was on account Etienne 
Cailleaud - an intelligencer also acting as a financial agent - who had been the solicitor 
of Baron Waleff's regiment before his bankruptcy. Cailleaud had allegedly used huge 
sums of public money, sometimes exceeding 400,000 guilders (granted irresponsibly, it 
was said, by Sweet), to buy gold. 256 Sweet took role as temporary solicitor-"a Little 
Sollicitor makes above a Thousand pounds per annum of a Regiment as I am 
informed" -but the dispute soon grew to include Waleff and Hallungius. 257 
Cailleaud had held fl. 60,000 of Her Majesty's money in his hands when he went 
bankrupt, which Sweet promptly charged to Waleff's regiment, to the baron's great 
anger. 258 There then proceeded a period of mutual antagonism, with Waleff refusing to 
have anything do with Sweet, appointing Hallungius as a new solicitor and desiring to 
receive his regiment's money from Brydges directly. Hallungius also grew tired of 
Sweet and desired to be free of his meddling: 
I am sorry that a person of so Considerable a Trust as Mr Sweet has so much 
Vanity, & Conceit as to discovr. his Poor Braines, and Plenty of Malice by instinct of 
Jealousy & hatred agt. Me; for by Anatomizing the whole Position, nothing but that 
will remaine in the bottom of it. 259 
HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 164-166: Brydges to Sweet, 24 June/4 July 1707. Stowe 58, i, 
pp. 217-219: Hallungius to Brydges, 12/24 June 1707; p. 253: declaration of Cailleaud, 
Rotterdam, 14 July 1707 [N. S] and pp. 253-260: Sweet to Brydges, Amsterdam, 12 July 1707 
[N. S. ] 
257 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 163-164: Sweet to Brydges, Amsterdam, 13 May 1707 N. S. 
Upon Sweet's being made solicitor, Brydges callously noted: "I am glad you did not pay him ye 
former Extraord: you 'l be able to negotiate now that matter with them your Self to both our 
advantages. " Stowe 57, i, pp. 103-104: Brydges to Sweet, 8 May 1707 O. S. 
2558 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 217-219: Hallungius to Brydges, 12/24 June 1707; p. 239: 
Cardonnel to Brydges, camp at Meldert, 7 July 1707 [N. S. ]; pp. 244-248: Hallungius to Brydges, 
The Hague, 1/12 July 1707. 
259 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, ii, pp. 179-182: Hallungius to Brydges, 20 December 1707 N. S.; iv, 
pp. 119-122: Hallungius to Brydges, The Hague, 8 July 1709 
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The dispute was finally fixed on 9 August 1708 N. S., though the animosity remained 260 
Sweet later wrote that he did not want "to order one farthing of Extraordinaries [for 
Waleff's regiment]. Let them behind. " And added: 
It has been always a pitifull Regt. & ye Baron was a poor beggin Baron when his 
Regt. was first rais'd. Since weh he has built a Pallace which none of his Ancestors 
ever saw ye like, & by relation of all ye Officers are grown rich & turn d Bankers-211 
Another dispute arose between Sweet and his fellow lodger, Bardeau, "French 
Scoundrell", over diverse financial issues. John Drummond acted as arbitrator in the 
matter and managed to secure a settlement. 262 Indeed, the Scot found the affair 
amusing - "They are a comical couple, " he noted - though his humour was not shared 
by Brydges. Bardeau had threatened to turn informer unless he was satisfied, and 
Brydges was angry that Sweet had been indiscreet enough to do others beside himself 
a great prejudice, given the delicacy of the accounts he managed for himself, his 
superior and the commander-in-chief. 263 
Cartwright continued to believe that the entirety of the British subsistence should flow 
through his office. In 1710 Brydges sent a deputation on this issue to Cardonnel, 
suggesting that such a resolution would be workable if Marlborough agreed; but 
Brydges was not that concerned if the duke did not, for Cartwright had "the 
misfortune not to be acceptable to the army, as I wish he was. "264 Sweet took the 
deputation badly, laying it at Cadogan's door, and Brydges confided to Cardonnel that 
if he had seen the letter Sweet wrote, "protesting what revenge he'd take of him for it, 
had you never so much been in ye spleen, I am confident you could not have forbore 
splitting your sids with laughter... "265 Cardonnel joked that if Brydges had seen the 
manner in which Sweet resented it, he would have thought him "fitter for Bedlam, 
260 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iii, pp. 7-8: Hallungius to Brydges, The Hague, 10 August 1708 
N. S. 
261 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, x, pp. 58-61: Sweet to Brydges, Amsterdam, 13 November 1711 
[N. S. ] 
262 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, iii, p. 22: Brydges to Bardeau, 23 August 1709 O. S.; iii, p. 32: 
Brydges to Drummond, 6 September 1709 O. S.; pp. 81-82: Brydges to Drummond, 10 October 
1709 O. S. Stowe 58, iv, pp. 234-235: Drummond to Brydges, Amsterdam, 4 October 1709 [N. S. ] 
263 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iv, pp. 182-183: Drummond to Brydges, Amsterdam, 10 
September 1709 [N. S. ]. Stowe 57, iii, pp. 30-31: Brydges to Sweet, 6 September 1709 O. S. 
264 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, iii, pp. 202-205: Brydges to Cadogan, 7 April 1710 O. S. 
265 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, iii, pp. 244-246: Brydges to Cardonnel, 6 May 1710 O. S. 
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than any other place. " But Marlborough put a stop to the matter and ordered both 
paymasters to keep a good correspondence. 266 
The following year the spectre of combining the two offices -only this time in the 
person of Cartwright-was raised again. Marlborough had no objection, being very 
much of the opinion that the service could never be carried on regularly in different 
hands. 267 Sweet caught wind of the proposal, and earnestly protested to Marlborough 
that 'the reasons which they pretend to a league for this' were frivolous, and of no 
weight; he also hinted at the 'great deal more' he could offer on the subject, to others' 
prejudice. 26 Later, Sweet gave an even more explicit threat, telling Cardonnel that 
Brydges should "not to think of removing him, & that he does not think it would be for 
yr. [Brydges'] interest. "269 Again, no alteration was made 27° 
As the war progressed, Brydges and Cadogan became more discerning in their 
peculations. They had each made a considerable sum and clearly did not wish to risk 
their positions and reputations unnecessarily. The buying up of gold to transport to the 
army was one of the first casualties of their caution; Cadogan ceased to have much 
interest in that transaction as early as 1709, perhaps influenced by the proximity of a 
potential peace. 271 Brydges found himself 'pretty easy' in his 'own little fortune . 272 Yet 
Cartwright, who had received little relative to a Brydges or Cadogan, was still eager to 
seek an advantage. An quip from Hallungius earlier in the war, describing another 
financial agent's joy at the continuation of the war, is apposite: 
266 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, v, pp. 260-262: Cardonnel to Brydges, before Douai, 8 May 1710 
[N. S. ] 
267 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, viii, pp. 205-209: Cardonnel to Brydges, camp at Lens, 24 June 
1711 [N. S. ] 
268 BL, Add. MSS 61135, ff. 47-48b: Sweet to Marlborough, Amsterdam, 25 June 1711 N. S. 
269 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, ix, pp. 122-123: Cardonnel to Brydges, camp near Bouchain, 17 
September 1711 [N. S] 
270 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, ix, pp. 114-115: Cardonnel to Brydges, camp before Bouchain, 14 
September 1711 [N. SJ; pp. 115-117: letter of Leathes, London, 2 August 1711 [O. S. ] 
271 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, pp. 248-249: Cadogan to Brydges, Ostend, 9 March 1709 [N. S. ]. 
Stowe 57, ii, pp. 184-185: Brydges to Cadogan, 29 March 1708 [sic; 1709] O. S. Davies, op. cit., p. 
30. 
272 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, v, pp. 162-164: Brydges to Cartwright, 8 August 1711 [O. S. j; vi, pp. 
61-62: Brydges to Cartwright, [16? October] 1711. Stowe 58, ix, pp. 141-143: Cartwright to 
Brydges, Antwerp, 31 August 1711 [N. S. ]; pp. 219-221: Cartwright to Brydges, Antwerp, 15 
October 1711 [N. S. J 
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Thus that the Prayers of one Mr. Petkum will be heard certainly, that the warr will 
continue; the reason of this Prayer is because he thinks not to have made that Profit 
by it he proposed to himself at the beginning. I do not question there are more of 
this mind? 73 
Brydges tried to dissuade Cartwright from the riskiest of enterprises: 
I am really wholly ignorant thereof, but am determined to be no ways concern d in 
any that can arise from bringing money from Holla. to Antwerp. I know it is so 
hazardous in many respects that I must desire you'! never think to pratice it. 
Instead, he advised his deputy that the greatest (and safest) advantage was to be had 
with the management of the forage contracts; but that was the perquisite of another. 274 
*** 
In addition to receiving pay (in cash or credit) for their service, the officers and 
regiments of the English army typically received an allowance of forage-hay, straw 
and oats-for their horses at various times, usually upon taking the field, investing a 
fortress and/or entering into winter quarters. The quantities involved could be 
considerable. 399,250 rations were delivered to English, Hanoverian and Prussian 
troops in Her Majesty's pay during the siege of Douai, each ration consisting of fifteen 
pounds of hay and three piccolins of oats. The whole, at 12.5 stuivers per ration, 
amounted to fl. 186600: 0.5.275 
As quartermaster-general of the English army in the Low Countries, Cadogan held 
considerable responsibility in the management of the forage, acting as a liaison 
between the army, commissaries, and various civilian contractors and providers. On 
occasion this would involve the direction of substantial forces in wide-ranging 
operations, as when Cadogan led a detachment as far as La Bassee in Artois to secure 
273 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, ii, pp. 92-94: Hallungius to Brydges, The Hague, 9 September 1707 
N. S. 
274 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, v, pp. 162-164: Brydges to Cartwright, 8 August 1711 [O. S. ]; vi, pp. 
61-62: Brydges to Cartwright, [16? October] 1711. Stowe 58, ix, pp. 141-143: Cartwright to 
Brydges, Antwerp, 31 August 1711 [N. S. ]; pp. 219-221: Cartwright to Brydges, Antwerp, 15 
October 1711 [N. S. ] 
275 BL, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 203-206: warrant to pay John Hudson and Francis Heymans for 
forage supplied at the siege of Douai. 
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what fodder it could. 276 At other times towns would provide forage 'voluntarily', albeit 
under threat of greater sanction. As the army grew lean during the siege of Bouchain in 
September 1711, Cadogan and Dopff were dispatched to Tournai to inquire if the 
environs would furnish any oats, "Otherways thay must expect to be foraged. " In 
November 1708 Cadogan asked Marlborough that the Commandant of Courtrai had 
orders to send what troops Captain King desired, "to execute those villages that dare 
not forthwith furnish their Quota according to the Repartition made by the Directors of 
the Chatillennie. "277 Yet much forage was provide civilly by providiteurs, with whom 
Cadogan might be authorised to contract with on the 'most reasonable terms, either 
separately or with the Deputies of the States General. 278 
As the war progressed and his influence increased, Cadogan took a greater part in 
these affairs. The Irishman was never shy in aggregating responsibility to himself and 
his offices, be it for the English forces or others. Whilst the English army remained his 
fief as its quartermaster-general, Cadogan often concerted with Field Deputies in 
arranging the forage of those foreign troops in joint Anglo-Dutch pay. In the autumn of 
1707, he, Ferdinand van Collen, Johan van Vrijbergen, Godard van Reede, Sicco van 
Goslinga and Adrian van Borssele279 drew up the contract for the provision of forage, 
by Pierre Pangaert and Martyn Robyns, to the four battalions, twenty-one squadrons 
and staff of the Danish forces in the service of Her Majesty and the United Provinces. 
This detailed contract settled the number of rations and place of delivery, as well as the 
276 La Bassee was a fortified town some fifty miles to the southwest of Marlborough's camp at 
Roeselare. Cadogan took 10 squadrons to join the 2000 horse and ten battalions already there. 
He could find supplies only for the remainder of the month, forcing Marlborough to send Lord 
Stairs to Dixmunde, to assault the French fort there and open a path to forage in that country. 
Snyder, ii, nos. 1146 (6 November 1708 N. S. ) & 1153 (16 November 1708 N. S. ), pp. 1140-1 & 
1145-7; Murray, iv, 297-9,301-2. 
277 In 1706 the States of Brabant proposed that they be allowed to deliver oats to the army to 
avoid foraging (Murray, iii, pp. 174-5). Snyder, iii, no. 1771, p. 1680: Marlborough to Godolphin, 
Bouchain, 21 September 1711 N. S.. BL, Blenheim Papers, Add. MSS. 61160, ff. 97-98. 
278 BL, Add. MSS 61372, f. 75b: authorisation for Cadogan, major-general and plenipotentiary at 
Brussels, to contract for forage. Oudenaarde, 27 November 1708 N. S. 
279 These were the five Field Deputies chosen by the States-General for 1707. Their 
responsibilities were as follows: Collen (Holland), Vrijbergen (Zeeland), Reede (Gelderland), 
Gosl. inga (Friesland) and Borssele (Raad van State). Borssele was more commonly known by his 
title, as the lord of Geldermalsen. 
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price of each ration. 280 Cadogan and the Field Deputies continued this joint 
arrangement of the forage for the Danish contingent in later years. 28l 
In the winter of 1708, Cadogan again co-operated with the Field Deputies in securing 
from Pangaert and Robyns 300,000 rations of hay and 500,000 rations of oats for the 
magazine at Terminde. The provisioners were to be exempt from all tolls and other 
charges dependent on their rights of entry, passage and exit, be it in Holland, Brabant 
or Flanders as well as the city where the magazine was constructed. 282 Rarely - English 
subject troops excepted - Cadogan would possess sole control in agreeing initial 
conditions for the provision of forage to a corps, as in the case of the Hanoverians in 
1709, whose rations were to be paid for by Queen Anne alone. All other contracts that 
involved the United Provinces in some financial manner, such as those for the majority 
of the auxiliary forces in Anglo-Dutch pay, would of necessity be sent to the Raad van 
State at the Hague, to examined and approved - whereupon Slingelandt might give his 
certification. 283 
20 BL, Add. MSS 61333, if. 137-139b: conditions agreed by Cadogan and the Field Deputies for 
the provision of forage to the Danes. Camp at Asche, 24 October 1707 N. S. See also Veenendaal, 
vi, p. 609 no. 1203: Goslinga to Heinsius, camp at Asch, 24 October 1707 N. S. Each ration was 
accounted at 7 sols in the current money of Holland; it consisted of 15 lbs of hay, 5 lbs of straw 
(both Brabant weight), and a ration of oats according to the 'Ghent sack' (which contained 24 
rations of same). If the Danish cavalry, infantry and staff paid 6 sols per ration, and the 
dragoons 5 sols, the surplus would be covered by the British Crown and the States-General. 
281 See, for example, BL, Add. MSS 61333, f. 150: copy of the resolutions of the Raad van State 
relating to the forage provided by Messrs Pangaert and Robyns to the Danish forces. As agreed 
by Cadogan and the Field Deputies, 4 January 1709 N. S. Checked at the Hague, 16 February 
1709 N. S.; signed by Slingelandt, 21 February 1709 N. S. Also Add. MSS 61334, If. 121-122b: a 
contract for the Danes made by the Field Deputies and Cadogan. May 1709. The price of each 
ration was higher than the previous year, on account of the great frost delaying transportation; 
the destruction of much forage in the field; and by the lateness of the season of the season when 
making the contract - Bruges where the Danes quartered, was not evacuated until January 1709. 
282 BL, Add. MSS 61333, ff. 168-169b: conditions agreed by Cadogan and the Field Deputies with 
Pangaert and Robyns for the provision of forage. Brussels, 8 December 1708 N. S. The agreement 
was signed by the two provisioners, Cadogan, Collen, Goslinga and Rechteren. Delivery was to 
commence 14 December 1708 N. S. Pangaert and Robyns were to be paid 7V sols current 
Holland money for each of the 300,000 rations of hay and oats, each of which comprised 15 
Brabant lbs of hay and oats according to the Ghent sack-here listed as containing 22, rather 
than 24, rations. The 200,000 further rations of oats alone were to charged at 3% sols per ration. 
It will thus be seen that they hay and oats each provided 50% of the usual ration's cost. 
283 BL, Add. MSS 61334, ff. 121-122b: minutes of contracts for forage signed by Cadogan. May 
1709. The contract for the Hanoverians was on the same terms as the previous year, 'not 
withstanding the lateness of the time it was made in, the Countrey's being ruin'd, and the great 
Frost'. See also Add. MSS 61372, ff. 258-260: note of warrants to pay for the forage of the 
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For the English part, these contracts were at least by the mid-late stages of the war the 
preserve of Cadogan. Cardonnel, for example, had relatively little involvement - and 
that only reluctantly. ("We have had many disputes together on this subject, " he noted, 
wryly. ) 284 Cadogan's deputies might play a role in overseeing lesser details, 
memoranda, capitulations and agreements--but their role was limited; it certainly did 
not extend to the formulation of the contracts themselves. In one example, Armstrong 
was ordered by Cadogan and Cardonnel to examine the pretentions of Pangaert and 
Robyns, who had presented a certificate to the headquarters detailing the funds still 
owed them by Her Majesty. 285 
Regiments would typically agree to pay the bulk of the price of forage, by assignations 
upon their paymasters and solicitors out of the funds made available to them; the 
remainder would be footed by State-Her Majesty and Parliament; or the States- 
General of the United Provinces. A proportion of this price would be paid in advance 
to the contractors by Her Majesty and the States-General, by way of their paymasters- 
general? 86 It was here that the possibilities for profit arose. 
In 1707, the money to be paid as the Queen's proportion of the forage allowed to the 
Prussians, for their winter quarters at Aix-la-Chapelle and the Pays de Cologne, was to 
be paid directly to the country itself. As the difference in exchange was '4% between 
these places and Amsterdam, Cadogan provided nearly the whole sum due himself, 
Hanoverian troops for the winter of 1709/1710, according to contracts made by Cadogan. The 
ration was contracted at 9.5 and 7 stuivers per ration, of which 6 stuivers (5 for dragoons) was 
to be paid by the Horse, Foot and General Staff, and the remainder by Her Majesty. 
284 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, viii, pp. 41-45: Cardonnel to Brydges, The Hague, 7 April 1711 
[N. S. ] 
285 E. g. BL, Add. MSS 61333, f. 192: recapitulation of the money owed Pangaert and Robyns for 
the forage delivered to the troops in 1709.18 December 1709 N. S. The provisioners claimed fl. 
128393: 6/ in current Holland money. By Armstrong's inquiries, he found that they had 
received on 27 April 1709 N. S., by eight letters of exchange sent by Cadogan upon Henry 
Cartwright, the sum of 52500 guilders; and further fl. 26845 by assignation on the latter in 
November. This left fl. 49047: 61/s remaining to be paid. 
296 BL, Add. MSS 61333, ff. 171-172: conditions for the provision of forage by Pangaert and 
Robyns, made with Cadogan and the Field Deputies. (c. 1708. ) Signed by Cadogan, Collen, 
Rechteren, Welvelde, Bussell and Geldermalsen. Contract for the provision of 350,000 rations of 
forage and oats; and 50,000 rations of oats with hay. Britain and the States would agree to pay 3 
1/2 sols a month in advance for each ration of forage to be delivered to the Foot and Horse, and 4 
Ih sols in advance for each ration due to the Dragoons. 
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providing a 'quick and certain gain'. 287 In addition, the Prussians allowed the Irishman 
a gratification of 3% on the sum forwarded for his services in securing the payment. 
Unfortunately for Cadogan, he could not contract in time with the other deputies, who 
went to Sweet and made their 'bargain' with him. 288 
Cadogan tried again the following winter. If Her Majesty's moiety for Prussian forage 
was remitted to Cartwright, he wrote in a memorial to Brydges, it could be managed so 
that 3 or 4% was allowed them by their advancing the payments one month - as the 
money was not stipulated in the treaty to be paid at Amsterdam, it could be paid 
elsewhere, possibly to further advantage. The same method could be applied for the 
Hanoverians and Danes. 289 But Brydges was somewhat tardy, again, in the 
management of the affair, and the undertakers to the Hanoverians and Danes raised 
the money on the credit of the contracts themselves. Only the deputies of Aix-Ia- 
Chapelle and the Pays de Limburg made an agreement with Cadogan, allowing him 
4% as long as they were paid by 1 March N. S. 290 
Brydges suggested that Cartwright take a greater interest in the management of the 
forage contracts, rather than the more hazardous attempts at arbitrage they had 
engaged in before. The deputy paymaster was indeed sensible of the advantages to be 
made on this head, but protested that any design toward this was "Sunk by the 
Gentleman [Cadogan] who Sign d the Contracts, who having a power & Strong 
pretensions, for drawing bills in that time of necessity, grasp'd the tout... " Of the fl. 
966,676: 2 which Cartwright paid upon the forage account, he never received the least 
present, from either Cadogan or the undertakers. 291 
Though it might appear as if the peculations of the likes of Brydges, Cadogan and 
others were committed without any regard to the nature of the sum brought to 
287 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, p. 131: Cadogan to Brydges, The Hague, 1 April 1707 N. S. 
288 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 145-147: Cadogan to Brydges, The Hague, 23 April 1707 N. S. 
Stowe 57, i, pp. 86-87: Brydges to Cadogan, 31 March 1707 [O. S. ] 
289 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, ii, pp. 160-161: Cadogan's memorial (enclosed with a letter of 13 
November 1707 N. S. ). On another occasion, Cadogan thought one corps would allow him 6% 
upon the advance on the forage contracts. Stowe 57, iii, pp. 159-162: Brydges to Cadogan, 18 
February 1710 O. S. 
290 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, ii, pp. 195-196: Cadogan to Brydges, Brussels, 9 January 1708 N. S. 
291 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, ix, pp. 141-143: Cartwright to Brydges, Antwerp, 31 August 1711 
[N. S. ] 
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account, there was a distinction made between what was termed ordinary expense - the 
payment of the men's (and, to a lesser degree, on account of their recourse to credit, 
officer's) subsistence; and other extraordinary payments, such various subsidies, 
reimbursements of sums expended in the campaign, and so on. Relatively little license 
was taken with the soldiers' pay, given the ill consequences of its delay; nobody 
thought the situation of the Hessian troops in Italy, whom the Landgrave had 
threatened to recall within ten days if the last of their ordinary pay was not delivered 
(they not being able to subsist otherwise), was a piece of good management. 292 
Extraordinaries, however, seemed to be viewed as a nicety, not a necessity; foreign 
princes could be lucky to be accounted with an element of these sums at all, never 
mind the full amount or whether it was on time. 
Payment might be received in the dreaded tallies (guarantees of credit upon future tax 
revenues, which were typically heavily discounted), or at a considerable discount. 293 
Francis Stratford, the merchant who had overseen the pay of the army in the early- 
middle years of the war managed to get the Prussian and Holsteiner corps to agree to 
sell their arrears to him at a 8% discount, not including the infamous '21/s%' due to 
Marlborough. 294 Earlier, Stratford had complained that the Danes had been so 
punctually paid in their extraordinaries that they weren't the least interested in his 
heavily discounted offer; but if Brydges could be prevailed upon to get the next quarter 
that fell due postponed a while, they might think better of it! 295 
The payments for the army's bread usually fell under the same ill category. In terms of 
logistical supply, the English war-effort in the Low Countries typically followed the 
lead of its Dutch ally. An agreement for the supply of bread to the army by Antonio 
Alvarez Machado, and Amsterdam merchant of Portuguese Jewish extraction, 
specified that the English would receive their provisions at the rates and conditions 
292 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 223-225: Stratford to Brydges, Amsterdam, 28 June 1707 
[N. S. ]. Hallungius took 1/2%for his services. 
293 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, v, pp. 262-263: Cadogan to Brydges, before Douai, 10 May 1710 
[N. S. ]. The forage contractor Pangaert agreed to receive tallies on account of what was still due 
to him; Cardonnel so sensible of his necessities and good services, that he lent him £3000. 
294 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 223-225: Stratford to Brydges, Amsterdam, 28 June 1707 
[N. S. ]; pp. 244-248: Hallungius to Brydges, The Hague, 1/2 July 1707. 
295 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, i, pp. 96-98: Stratford to Brydges, Amsterdam, 16 November 1706 
N. S. 
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contracted by the States-General of the United Provinces for their own soldiers296In 
one of the first contracts of the war, possessing twenty-one various articles, Antonio 
Alvares Machado was called upon to provide and maintain 350 wagons to carry bread, 
meal and grain for the army; each with a good wagoner and 'ffoure Strong and well 
fooded Horses 297 
A company of Foot might receive its bread every three or four days, with a single loaf 
expected to last a soldier for that amount of time. Rations were typically rated as half, 
whole, or three-quarter rations: for a company of 42 men, for example, a whole ration 
would be 42 loaves; a half ration 21 loaves. 298In one scheme, each loaf was to weigh 
three Brabant pounds and to be marked to prevent fraud; in another, a5 stuiver loaf 
might weigh as much as six Brabant pounds. 299 All accounts were to be made and 
settled within a fortnight of delivery; or three weeks at the latest. Machado and his 
executors were to bear the loss of any negligence caused through their underlings. In 
addition, Machado was to retain in the field 
... a sufficient Number of Persons of good Substance who may Answer and be Obliged in writing for the Performance of the Contents of this Contract... 
For the convenience of the army, bread might be delivered occasionally to the head of 
each brigade, and the train of artillery, to the respective regimental quartermasters or 
296 BL, Add. MSS 61333, ff. 121-126b: articles of agreement between Sidney Godolphin and 
Antonio Avlares Machado (on behalf of Queen Anne and Machado) for the supply of bread to 
the army, 4 March 1705 (O. S.? ) (copies, 21 March 1705). To provide provisions of rye for 
stocking Machado 's magazines, England was to advance the provisioner 100,000 guilders at fl. 
10: 15 per pound sterling. 
297 BL, Add. MSS 61333, ff. 113-115b: contract for Antonio Alvares Machado, 8 December 1701 
N. S. Ratified by the Dutch Raad van State. 'Englished' out of a printed paper in Dutch, 29 
December 1701. 
298 KP I(i)/20. Captain King's Bread-Note. 10 May 1706 to 27 October 1706. In the month of June, 
for example, King's company received eight deliveries (one half, the remainder whole), totalling 
3181/7. loaves. 
299 BL, Add. MSS 61333, ff. 121-126b: articles of agreement between Sidney Godolphin and 
Antonio Avlares Machado (on behalf of Queen Anne and Machado) for the supply of bread to 
the army, 4 March 1705 (O. S.? ) (copies, 21 March 1705). Add. MSS 61333, ff. 123-126b: copy of a 
treaty made for bread and forage to the Spanish cavalry. 29 May 1709 N. S. By cause of the 
uncertain price of grain, Castano obliged himself to deliver bread to the corps at the rate of 5 
sols per 6 lb loaf. The conditions, weights and measures followed those contracted with 
Cadogan earlier in the month (14 May). A list of contemporary weights with S. I. values is as 
follows: Hague lb, -470 g; Amsterdam lb, -494 g; Ghent lb, -430 g; Brabant lb, -472 g. 
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others appointed; Machado was to have a clerk stationed at each brigade, the train 
and/or the headquarters, with others as necessary to assist him. 300 
The bread contracts were central to the charges laid before Marlborough in 1711 and 
1712. Solomon de Medina testified that he that he gave Marlborough for his own use fl. 
265614: 14: 8 over the years 1707 to 1710, and a further 21,000 guilders for the year 1711 
thence far; the accounts of Antonio Alvarez Machado for the years 1702 to 1706, he 
suggested, beneficed Marlborough to a similar yearly magnitude. Medina also said 
that he had allowed the general officers the free use of twenty-two wagons each year, a 
dozen or so of which were taken by Marlborough. Cardonnel benefited too, taking 500 
ducats at the yearly sealing of the new contracts for his services; while Benjamin Sweet 
was allowed 1% on all sums he passed to Medina, theoretically on account of his 
prompt payment, though Medina rarely enjoyed hasty remuneration. 301 
Marlborough and Cardonnel were clear that the perquisites offered by the bread 
contractors being a 'constant practice', both during the campaign as in the preceding 
war, was to be emphasised as the central part of their defence. Watkins was asked, the 
minute he received one of Cardonnel's letters, to go express to the Hague, and 
endeavour 'by all means' to obtain the account books of the late Machado, and Pereira. 
But Cadogan, who took the errand, seemed to opiniatre, and it was all too late (if 
indeed they offered any chance of respite at aIl). 302 For his own part, Cardonnel 
protested, in a draught statement to be read to the House: 
But if every Campaigne from the first Day to the last; I am daily employ'd in 
procuring orders and Letters from the Generall for the Contractor's service, for 
Escourts for his Corn, Meal and Bread to, and from the Army, with other Services; 
and that I never Claim'd or received the least ffee from the Contractor, though I 
was at Charge in keeping my own Clerks, I hope if on these Considerations the 
Contractor freely made me a Present, the receiving of it for my daily care and Pains, 
300 BL, Add. MSS 61333, ff. 121-126b: articles of agreement between Sidney Godolphin and 
Antonio Avlares Machado (on behalf of Queen Anne and Machado) for the supply of bread to 
the army, 4 March 1705 (O. S.? ) (copies, 21 March 1705). 
301 BL, Add. MSS 33273, ff. 151-152b: testimony of Sir Solomon Medina, 6 December 1711. 
Cardonnel denied many of the charges against him. He admitted the gratuity, though stated 
that it was less than mentioned in the first three years. See BL, Add. MSS 42176, f. 347. HL, 
Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, v, pp. 162-164: Brydges to Cartwright, 8 August 1711 [O. S. ] 
302 BL, Add. MSS 42176, ff. 331-334b: Cardonnel to Watkins, Westminster, 24 December 1711 
O. S. Ibid., ff. 341-342b: Cardonnel to Watkins, Westminster, 8 January 1712 O. S. 
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will not be imputed to me as a Crime, which I humbly submitt to the favourable 
Construction of the House. 303 
The sums paid Marlborough on account of the bread contracts were dwarfed by those 
that accrued to his charge as a function of the 21/2% deducted from Her Majesty's 
portion of the ordinary and extraordinary pay of the foreign auxiliaries and the 
contingencies of the army. In general terms, this deduction was entirely above board, 
having been authorised by a royal warrant of 6 July 1702 O. S. that authorised 
... that there be reserved Two and a half per Cent out of all moneys payable to and for ye said [foreign] Troopes as well as for their pay and Entertainment as on any 
other accot: towards defraying such Extraordinary Contingent Expences relating to 
them as Cannot otherwise be provided for. 304 
It was in the expenditure of this 21/s%, however, that questions arise. Marlborough 
happily accounted for the 21/2% alongside the pay due to himself, aides-de-camp, 
personal physician and other servants in his books. 3° The accounts show that much of 
the 21/2% was lent to the States at a return of 4% p. a., being laid out in obligations on the 
province of Holland. The first loan was made on 1 May 1703 N. S., with f1.130,000 paid 
to the Receiver-General of the Province of Holland and West Friesland to secure 
twenty obligations of fl. 4000 and ten of fl. 5000. Further sums were lent as follows, all 
at 4%: fl. 32250 on 18 June 1703 N. S.; fl. 52750 on 20 November 1703 N. S.; fl. 53600 on 24 
September 1705 N. S.; fl. 20000 on 19 October 1705 N. S.; and fl. 33900 in February 1706 
N. S.. 306 
The interest one these was moderate. In the accounts for 1704, one year's interest at 4% 
p. a. on the fl. 130,000 of Dutch securities came to fl. 5200 (to 1 May 1704), with a further 
fl. 3400 to 20 November 1704. The 21/2% on the sums due the Danish, Hanoverian, 
Hessian, Prussian, Saxe-Gotha, Palatine and Holstein regiments, and Waleff's 
Dragoons, came to fl. 20716: 8 for the two month-period 25 June to 24 August 1704. 
Extended to the full year, 25 December 1703 to 23 December 1704, this deduction, 
303 BL, Add. MSS 42176, f. 347. 
304 BL, Add. MSS 33273, f. 149: warrant for the 2.5%. Anne, by Hedges. 6 July 1702 O. S. See also 
BL, Add. MSS 61406, if. 2b-3, for another copy. 
305 BL, Add. MSS 61406, passim. 
306 BL, Add. MSS 61406, If. 3b, 14b, 21b, 35b, 36b. Marlborough's accounts. 
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together with that on the foreign forces' extraordinaries and subsidies, came to fl. 
140,091: 8.307 
Taken as a whole, Marlborough's account was credited by Sweet with almost £30,000 
(fl. 293,113: 191/2) for the year 1704. This included his pay as commander-in-chief (£3650 
p. a.; which, after deductions for the Royal Hospital and poundage, came to £3457.10s., 
or fl. 37168: 2: 8 Holland money, at fl. 10: 15 per pound sterling), the above 21/z% from the 
auxiliary forces, the pay of his physician and chirurgeon, the balance of the £10,000 
Contingencies held for his use (£6857.2s. 6d., which came to fl. 73,712: 15), Solomon 
Abraham's benefice to the commander-in-chief (a note for fl. 18,000) and funds granted 
by warrant to the sick and wounded of the Danes (£1100, which was to be remitted to 
their chief officers). 308 
Near the end of the war, in 1710, the items resulting from Marlborough's pay as 
commander-in-chief (fl. 37168: 2) and the interest on the securities taken with the Dutch 
(fl. 20000 received from D'Ellemett and fl. 17860 from Slingelandt for the various 
securities) were dwarfed by the funds that 'passed through his hands' on account of 
the 21/2% (fl. 203398: 16.75) and the army's contingencies (fl. 98424: 2: 9). 3N Marlborough 
protested that all such expenditure and management was used in the public service, 
but there is all too little evidence to say how. 310 
The likes of Brydges and Sweet kept such delicate matter in private accounts. Sweet 
himself kept a book on account of the deductions he made on behalf of his superior as 
well as other sums brought to profit, which Brydges shared to varying degrees with 
307 BL, Add. MSS 61330, If. 26b-33: Marlborough's accounts as commander-in-chief, by Benjamin 
Sweet. The Hague, 20 December 1704 N. S. Cadogan would later invest Marlborough's interest 
on the States' securities in Dutch East India Bonds, at 4.5% interest. Add. MSS 61351, ff. 239- 
240b: account of the interest due from Cadogan on the interest money he received from the 
States on Marlborough's obligations. 
3 Ibid. Of Marlborough's pay as commander-in-chief, fl. 16575: 1 was disbursed by Sweet over 
the period 14 November 1703 to 15 December 1704; the balance was paid on 20 December 1704. 
Of the contingencies, £500 (fl. 5375) was paid to James Bringfield on 2 May 1704; the balance 
was paid as above. 
309 BL, Add. MSS 61406, f. 103; Add. MSS 61407, f. 2. These figures, accounted for 1710, also 
include a few elements of interest in 1711 and a couple of headings of extraordinaries dating 
back earlier (including a remittance from Mindelheim for 1709). 
310 BL, Add. MSS 33273, If. 147-148b: Marlborough (by Cardonnel) to the commissioners of 
accounts for the army. The Hague, 10 November 1711 N. S. Copy. 
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the deputy. In one example, pertaining their private account for the year 1707, Brydges 
himself told Sweet of the fl. 14,000 was split between Stratford and two persons "you 
may easily guess whom" [Cadogan and Cardonnel] on account of the money taken to 
the army in 1706. Beyond that, there remained in their account fl. 19655: 9, of which he 
hoped Sweet would take fl. 7655: 9, leaving the remainder for Brydges until he could 
find some way to dispose of it. A further fl. 500 was given as a present to Watkins, for 
his kindness in preparing warrants for payment 312 This private account also disbursed 
sums such as a yearly bill of fl. 5000 on Sweet to Cardonnel, on account of the 
gratifications made by foreign troops. 312 
Cardonnel knew that "Mr Sweets Accts himselfe wth my La. Duke for ye deductions he 
keeps a book of his Graces Accts and takes his hand to it from time to time. " 313 
Marlborough's money was carefully and discreetly handled; Brydges himself was 
never returned any account by Sweet with note of the deductions, and was careful to 
remit the duke his money directly into the bank, or manage the affair carefully with 
Marlborough's banker, Charles le Bas. 314 Sweet, whatever faults others might have 
apportioned to him, was firm in defence of Marlborough, noting somewhat 
ingenuously: 
I had rather dy then devulge it the humbu comm of accots will not get any advantige 
against the D. of Marlborough by tormenting of me; I am not to be frightend, Let 
them send me to Prison or where they please. 315 
*** 
311 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 129-130: Brydges to Sweet, 22 May 1707 O. S. These 
payments continued; see, for example, Stowe 57, ii, pp. 49-50: Brydges to Sweet, 14 July 1708 
O. S. 
312 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 133-134: Brydges to Cardonnel, 26 May 1707 O. S.; pp. 191- 
193: Brydges to Sweet, 28 August 1707 O. S. Sweet himself took a third of the gratifications as his 
share. 
313 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iv, pp. 148-149: Cardonnel to Brydges, camp before Tournai, 5 
August 1709 [N. S. ] 
314 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, v, pp. 88-89: Brydges to CardonneI, 9 June 1711 [O. S. ] BL, Add. 
MSS 61135, ff. 37-37b: Sweet to Marlborough, Amsterdam, 6 May 1710 N. S. Sweet noted that he 
would continue remitting Marlborough's money, as he received it every two months, into the 
bank-where it would always be ready for the duke's use. HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, iii, pp. 87- 
88: Brydges to Cardonnel, 14 October 1709 O. S. Stowe 58, iv, pp. 197-200: Cardonnel to Brydges, 
camp at Havre, 23 September 1709 [N. S. ]. Stowe 57, iii, pp. 56-57: Brydges to Cardonnel, 19 
September 1709 O. S. 
315 BL, Add. MSS 62526, ff. 84-85b: Sweet to Richard Hill, undated. C. 1712-1713. 
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A variety of other forms of personal enrichment existed. The simplest included gifts 
from the Crown or other individuals on account of services rendered. In February 1703, 
Cadogan was granted by Anne the sum of £175.4s. "in Consideration of the his 
Extraordinary Charge, Care and Pains in the Execution of his said Office of Quarter 
Master Genll. during the last Campagne. "316 A year later, he was given £182.10s. out of 
the wagon money-a sum equal to his pay as quartermaster-general, which he was 
warranted to receive later in the year-toward paying the 'extraordinary charge and 
expence' he had been obliged to incur in the performance of his duties as 
quartermaster-general 317 
Other gifts were altogether more valuable. When Cadogan protested that his recent 
marriage prevented his accompanying Marlborough to Berlin, Raby gently chided him 
with tales of the gifts received by the duke and Cardonnel. The duke later claimed that 
the King in Prussia had 'forced' a ring said to be worth £1000 upon him in 1707.318 
Cadogan himself received from the King in Prussia "the little Cross of his order" in 
1706 - which, Raby confided, he did not think was worthy of his acceptance unless it 
had a "good diamond fixed to it. " Grumbkow-whom Raby despised-had assured 
the ambassador that Cadogan was very desirous of the order (and, no doubt, the 
thousand ducats that were also dispatched); a fact the quartermaster-general not 
entirely convincingly protested, telling his friend that it 
... was a greater to surprise to me then to any body else when Gromkaw brought it 
me; I was so far from desiring it, that I never thought it. However I received it with 
all the Deference and Respect Imaginable and my Lord Duke has writt to the Queen 
for leave for me to wear it. I am told there is a thousand Ducats designed for me to 
buy a jewel as soon as the affair of the Winter Quarters is fully regulated. 
But his 'Deference and Respect' were not without limit, for the Irishman continued: 
316 BL, Add. MSS 61370, f. 2b: warrant to pay £175.4s. to Cadogan, court at St James, 9 February 
1703 O. S. After Sir Bevil Granville, Bt, who had lately been a colonel of Foot, was appointed 
governor of Barbados, he stood respited upon the musters of his late regiment his and his 
servants' pay for the period 1 August to 24 December 1702 O. S. Marlborough directed the 
paymaster-general to pay the sum to Cadogan, which Her Majesty was pleased to allow him. 
317 BL, Add. MSS 61370, f. 112: warrant to pay Cadogan £182.10s. Adam de Cardonnel by 
Marlborough's command. The Hague, 3 May 1704 N. S. 
318 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 27-28b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 29 November 1704 N. S. Snyder, ii, 
pp. 762-763 no. 774: Marlborough to Sarah, The Hague, 29 April 1707 N. S. 
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... 
but I cannot att the same time help telling your Lordship that there is hardly any 
of the little Princes in Germany who have Troops here, that have not acknowledged 
much more considerably the Services I have done them in the business of the 
Winter Quarters. Perhaps the Honour of this order sent me so to make up for 
everything else, and I will understand it so if it cannot be otherwise but I am 
persuaded your Lordship may find the King in one of his Generous fits and by 
hinting to him something of this kind encrease the Value of the Jewel intended 
me 319 
Raby raised the matter delicately with Friedrich, and received a promise that the 
thousand ducats would be doubled 320 When Grumbkow later brought Cadogan the 
cross with a diamond "of about threescore or Fourscore pounds value att the utmost, " 
he claimed to have accepted it with the same 'Deference and Respect' as if it had been 
worth five hundred 321 Cadogan appears to have borrowed a more expensive diamond 
from Brydges to make up for the paucity of the one he received as a present, but his 
tardiness in returning it enmired his friend in a difficult court case! 322 Still, Cadogan 
thought himself good value for his rewards: 
I assure your Lordship that for Waggons, Quarters, Forrage and carriages for their 
[the Prussians'] sick, they have more douceurs by my means than any Troops in the 
army, and I shall continue to act on the same foot notwithstanding tis uneasy to be 
allways prosecuted with unreasonable demands by People that think I am under an 
obligation to them in everything because of the present the King made me... 
he protested, not forgetting to remind Raby, by way of an aside, of what he perceived 
to be his present's diminished worth. 323 Graf Lottum, the Prussian general of infantry, 
assured the quartermaster-general that the king would very generously acknowledge 
the services he'd done the Prussian soldiery, but Cadogan was not alone in receiving 
319 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 37-40b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 23 October 1706 N. S. Ibid., If. 43- 
44b: 9 November 1706 N. S. and ff. 45-46b: Cadogan to Raby, The Hague, 12 November 1706 N. S. 
320 BL, Add. MSS 22196, If. 53-58b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 18 December 1706 N. S. Regarding 
Grumbkow, Raby wrote: "... I am not made Like the rest of the World & cant bring my Self to 
speak fair to a man I hate tho the Custome & Politick of the world will make [-] to bring my 
Self to it, but I must do him this Justice that he has done you a piece of Service here for as he 
loves to tattle & talk all he knows to make himself apear a great man here, he has told two or 
three times in publick company how you have quareld with Slingelandt about the quartering of 
the Kings troops. You are assured I hope, that I am too much your friend to Let Such an 
opportunity Slip of ading that to my reasons why they should ogment their acknowledgements 
to you for the Service you have done their troops ... 
but you know the man & how to use him: 
for silly as he is it is better to have such a Blockhead speak well of one then other ways. " 
321 BL, Add. MSS 22196, If. 77-80b: Cadogan to Raby, camp at Meldert, 16 June 1707 N. S. 
322 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, ii, pp. 5-7: Brydges to Cadogan, 24 December 1707 O. S. 
323 BL, Add. MSS 22196, If. 85-88b: Cadogan to Raby, camp at Meldert, 7 July 1707 N. S. 
109 
such rewards 324 Pierre de Montargues, the Prussian quartermaster-general, received an 
increase of 800 crowns in his appointments, in no small part through the 
recommendations of Cadogan and Raby to the Prussian court. In return, Raby hoped 
that Montargues would take to Cadogan a very nice horse from the King in Prussia's 
stables 325 
Another article of remuneration was the 'safeguard'. Safeguards, or promises to protect 
certain lands and properties from the depredations of the army, were not issued solely 
out a concern for the populace on account of enlightened generalship, or to preserve 
discipline in the name of military effectiveness; local dignitaries and municipalities 
were expected to pay for the privilege. Such sums were the perquisite of the 
commander-in-chief of any Anglo-Dutch army. If the army possessed an officer 
bearing the rank of field marshal (such as Ouwerkerk) in addition to the General-in- 
Chief, the safeguards were issued under both signatures. The generals' secretaries 
would every month account for all the monies they'd collected under this head, and 
share them between their masters. 326 
Safeguards could be assigned in conjunction with others. The comte d'Avelin also 
corresponded with Marlborough's staff on the matter of safeguards, enclosing a list of 
prospective places and their masters and thanking Richard King for those already 
dispatched. (He also took care enough to send Cadogan his deepest respects. )327 Later 
Avelin even asked for four or five blank safeguards, so that he could regulate them 
himself. 328 In 1709, Cadogan had promised the comte de Coppigny that he would 
exempt the villages of Hoyck and Balar-which lay in the count's interest-from 
quartering troops or furnishing wagons, so hurriedly wrote to his subordinate, Richard 
King, telling him to appoint new villages for said purposes to cater for the march of the 
324 BL, Add. MSS 22196, if. 95-96b: Cadogan to Raby, camp at Helchin, 22 September 1707 N. S. 
325 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 155-156b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 3 March 1708 N. S. Ibid., If. 163- 
164b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 24 March 1708 N. S. 
326 BL, Add. MSS 61336, If. 240-241b (rough draft) & 242-243b (neat): Cardonnel's memorials on 
safeguards. Undated. Add. MSS 61338, If. 17-18b: Reglements pour la Campagne de 1704. In 
Cadogan's hand. For examples of safeguards given, see Add. MSS 61369, ff. 18-18b (English and 
French); ff. 21-22b. 
327 KP 1(1)/65: Comte d'Avelin to Richard King, Lille, 8 July 1708 N. S. 
328 KP I(i)/70: Comte d'Avelin to Richard King, 10 July 1708 N. S. 
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Palatine soldiers. 329 Others were altogether gentler affairs, as when John Laws, in 
Brussels, wrote to King, asking him to leave two villages near Brussels out of the routes 
appointed for the troops to march to their winter quarters, noting: 
I am employ'd in this Affair by so fair a Person, that I persuade myself, when You 
see her, Her thanks will be a sufficient Recompense for Your trouble, tho She 
granted You no other favour 330 
On occasion, this impetus-to remove the army from one's own, or friendly, 
territory-could be inverted; such as in situations arising on account of the 
troublesome interface between civic and ecclesiastic authority in early modern 
Germany. In 1705, the Bishop of Raab humbly begged that the regiment of auxiliary 
soldiers from Cologne, destined for Bonn, might instead be directed to their own city, 
"the burgers there growing troublesome and Very uru uly. "331 
Some officers attempted to extort funds from the local populace, in return for 
providing an effectual, temporary safeguard. On 19 October 1703, a general court- 
martial at Breda found Major John Stewart guilty of extortion. When offered ten pistols 
to not quarter his soldiers in Tilbourg, the major saw fit to haggle and drive the offer 
up, finally accepting twenty-five pistols from the burghers. The officers of the court 
recommended that Stewart paid back the entire sum, and be suspended from pay and 
employment for one year, and as much longer as Marlborough thought appropriate. 
The duke approved of the order for repayment, but remitted the sentence of 
suspension, directing that the major be restored to his post and command 332 
Cadogan's activities as plenipotentiary in the Southern Netherlands drew a similar 
amount of opprobrium from the Dutch on several occasions. His actions in 
329 KP I(i)/109: Cadogan to King, Brussels, 20 May 1709 N. S. 
330 KP I(i)/229: Laws to King, Brussels, 19 October 1710 N. S. 
331 BL, Add. MSS 61308, ff. 112-113b: Durell to Marlborough, Brielle, 21 July 1705 N. S. Christian 
August of Saxe-Zeitz (1666-1725) was, in addition to being the bishop of Raab (Györ) in 
Hungary, the provost of Cologne. As such, he played a considerable role in overseeing the 
archdiocese in the absence of the exiled pro-French Wittelsbach archbishop, Joseph Clemens. 
Marlborough, concerting with the Baron van Heiden, who commanded the soldiers of the 
Rhenish Circle, was happy to oblige. Murray, ii, p. 184: Marlborough to the Bishop of Raab, 
camp at Vlierbeck, 21 July 1705 N. S. 
332 BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 75b-77b: proceedings of a general court-martial held at Breda, 19 
October 1703 N. S., Colonel Holcroft Blood presiding. Marlborough's review of the sentence was 
dated at the Hague, 6 November 1703 N. S. 
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manipulating the forage and securing funds333, or of managing the affairs of the local 
councils to his political and financial advantage334, were keenly watched by the likes of 
his fellow member on the condominium, Johan van den Bergh, and others. Van den 
Bergh considered Cadogan the greatest thief in the army (and he was not alone); 
writing in March 1709, he noted that the quartermaster-general had supposedly had 
600k rixdollars or 15 tons of gold transferred to England by way of Antwerp bankers, 
so that all the safeguards, marches and orders for winter quarters no doubt brought in 
nice profits. Drummond himself noted "a terrible complaint" formed by Van den 
Bergh against Cadogan on account of financial matters; and when the Dutchman spoke 
to him about it he "got ill language" in return, which only exacerbated the dispute. 335 
In a brutal memorial on Cadogan s fiscal and moral probity, in the Duchess of 
Marlborough's possession and possibly by Sweet's hand, the Irishman was indicted 
with numerous charges. It touched upon his misunderstanding with Raby in 1703, over 
the destinations of their regiments (Cadogan had, "by his underhand dealing and 
invention of Lies" supposedly prevailed upon Marlborough to use his own Horse in 
Flanders, and ship Raby's dragoons to Portugal instead), and the Irishman s 
rapaciousness in the field, for 
Cadogan being Quartermaster Generall gave him many opportunities to rob the 
poore Peisants & for the better Executeing thereof he Industerousely gave out by 
his assistants that it was don by order & for the use of the Genil. Which was very 
well known to the contrary by all that were neare the Generall. 
His union with Francis Stratford ("a bankrupt merchant although not then publiquely 
known") in 1705, effected "to pillage the Armey" upon its march into Germany, by 
paying it with its 'own money: possessing little credit himself upon which to support 
the army, Stratford was believed to have drawn large sums in bills upon Sweet in 
Amsterdam, which funds he would then supply to the army at a healthy profit. These 
bills Sweet protested, Marlborough instead encouraging the colonels to draw upon the 
333 Veenendaal, vi, pp. 514-517 no. 1030: Van den Bergh to Heinsius, Brussels, 5 September 1707 
N. S. Ibid., pp. 597-599 no. 1182: Van den Bergh to Heinsius, Brussels, 17 October 1707 N. S. 
334 Ibid., vii, p. 290 no. 612: Catharina M. Westphalen to Heinsius, Brussels, 31 May 1708 N. S. 
Ibid., ix, pp. 470-472 no. 996: Philippe Francois de Meulemeester, Ghent, 1 December 1709 N. S. 
335 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iv, pp. 184-185: Drummond to Brydges, Amsterdam, 13 
September 1709 [N. S. ] 
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deputy paymaster directly, so that the Cadogan and Stratford were "frustrated... of 
their Desined Cheate". Later, Cadogan and his wife 
... fell into the ways of the Jews trading that is buying up of Gould in amsterdam at 
cheap rate and sending of it to the armey to the Camp to Impose it on the officers & 
sould, s at high rates, which was discovered and the armey Grew wary of them, and 
sent for their moneys to Amsterdam. 
And 
Besides Cadogan Robing of Countries &c he had an artfull way of Robing Genus in 
the day of Battel as Lt Gene webs Gloriouse action at winendall besides he did not 
spare the Comander in Cheife the D. of Marlborough, in atributeing to himselfe that 
all the won battles was in a Greate Measure owing to him; and this was 
Industerousely Insinuated both in towne and Country by his Creatures; whereas its 
well Known to the Countrary; that his Confused, puzeld head, was not, nor is not, 
able to Conduct an armey in action; but its beleived to the Contrary if he had been 
absent things had gon better by haveing an abler man to suply his post 336 
But Cadogan was nothing if not self-confident. He was confident of his ability to 
absolve himself of all charges, for 
... there is nothing pretended against me, but what I can very easily answer. I flatter 
my self that neither the States of Brabant or Flanders nor even any Town or 
Community here made the least complaint against me, if it were needful I can 
produce a great many letters from the States of those Provinces, to thank em for the 
exactness and care with which I executed the Duke of Marlboroughs commands to 
save and preserve the Country as much as possibl could. What they have suffered 
can only be computed to the misfortune of their scituation which made them the 
Seat of war and Scene of action during three Campagnes of the two greatest armys 
ever known... 
If in Endeavouring to doe what I thought my Duty under the before mentioned 
Difficultys, I may have disobliged some particular Persons that had other views, or 
if I opposed as far as was in my Power the trusting and employing such People as I 
know in the Duke of Anjou 's Interest, and under the influence of the Comte de 
Bergeik I hope their Charge will be thought of little weight and their accusations 
looked on as malice and particular Pique 337 
Malice or no, Cadogan emerged from the war in a position of considerable wealth. Like 
many of his peers, including his friend, Brydges, he had invested his money - to 
336 BL, Add. MSS 61351, ff. 241-242b: memorial of charges against Cadogan. Anonymous; 
undated. With Duchess of Marlborough's correspondence with Benjamin Sweet. 
337 NA, SP 87/4 ff. 619-626: Cadogan to [St John? ], camp at Warde, 25 May 1711 N. S. 
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varying effect. Investments rose and fell according to the fortunes of war and one 
might have thought that Cadogan's position in the army, and advance knowledge of its 
actions and objectives, could render a healthy profit. 338 All investments in London - 
particularly the bank -rose about 8% on news of the victory at Malplaquet, but fell 4% 
on that over the next couple of days. Likewise, on the passing of the French lines in 
1710, stocks in the capital rose by 3 or 4%x. 339 But although Cadogan had the luck to win 
6000 pistols at play, he proved a fairly poor judge of the ebb and flow of the War of the 
Spanish Succession. 340 He lost money on the failure of Toulon and failed to give 
Brydges any accurate predictions as to the state of the peace negotiations in order to 
purchase or dispose of bank and India stock at favourable rates 341 
Yet he did well enough to secure himself sizeable estates at Caversham, Berkshire and 
Oakley, Buckinghamshire (the latter being just twenty miles from his constituency at 
Woodstock, and amounting to £9450) and place £6000 into the Bank of England, which 
was to pay about 9 or 10% a year. 342 Not everybody profited so from the conflict; while 
some flourished, others foundered. Thomas Meredyth was said to have suffered 
considerably by the merchant Francis Stratford's "villanouse Bankrupt"; he had 
deposited £10,000-worth of blank orders and tallies in Stratford's hands, signed, ready 
to receive the interest upon their investment as it became due. Contemporary gossip 
placed Stratford's bankruptcy at the heart of the suicide of Sir Steven Evans, who hung 
himself, being broken in his debt for a considerable sum; and poor Meredyth and his 
wife, for the loss of that £10,000 "broke madm merediths hard and shortend the dayes 
of her husband, " as one commentator had been'Credibly Informed'. 343 
338 See, for example, HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, pp. 86-87: Brydges to Cadogan, 31 March 1707 
[O. S. ]; pp. 99-100: Brydges to Cadogan, 28 April 1707 [O. S. ]; pp. 104-106: Brydges to Cadogan, 8 
May 1707 [O. S. ]; pp. 149-150: Brydges to Cadogan, 4 June 1707 O. S.; pp. 187-188: Brydges to 
Cadogan, 18/29 July 1707; p. 207: Brydges to Cadogan, 3 August 1707 O. S. HL, Stowe MSS, 
Stowe 58, i, pp. 165-166: Cadogan to Brydges, Brussels, 15 May 1707 N. S. 
339 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, iii, p. 36: Brydges to Cardonnel, 9 September 1709 O. S.; pp. 218- 
219: Brydges to Cardonnel, 15 April 1710 O. S. 
340 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, i, p. 248: Brydges to Cadogan, 18 October 1707 [O. S. ] 
341 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 95-96b: Cadogan to Raby, camp at Helchin, 22 September 1707 N. S. 
HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, ii, p. 200: Brydges to Cadogan, 6 May 1709 [O. S. ]; p. 216: Brydges to 
Cardonnel, 3 June 1709 O. S. 
342 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 57, ii, p. 219: Brydges to Cardonnel, 6 June 1709 O. S. 
343 BL, Add. MSS 61351, ff. 241-242b: memorial of charges against Cadogan. Anonymous; 
undated. With Benjamin Sweet's papers. 
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By the end of the war, John Fury, so long the aptronymic scourge of the army's 
malcontents, sutlers and others, found himself in the unhappy position of the gaoler 
turned prisoner; lawman made debtor. Fury's change in fortunes followed 
Marlborough's removal from the head of the army. His numerous claims were 
highlighted in a lengthy petition to Henry Watkins, then secretary to Marlborough's 
successor, the Duke of Ormonde. Having been refused five-hundred guilders in 
lodgings money for the year 1710, Fury faced bills for the goods he'd purchased on that 
account, charged to him at the Board of General Officers appointed to inspect all 
accounts relating to the army - though erstwhile Provost Marshal protested that said 
sum had been accepted by the magistrates of Ghent. The Board further sentenced Fury 
to pay over four-hundred guilders' worth of bills exhibited against him by various 
sutlers. These had been the 'allowances' the sutlers had made to the Provost Marsh 
during the previous campaign (in the same manner, Fury protested, as they had done 
'all war hitherto') and which, he claimed, had always fallen short of what was his due. 
To satisfy the above debts, the Board stopped Fury's pay, seized his personal effects 
and, in the event that such should not suffice, ordered the Provost Marshal to be 
delivered up to the mercy of the town of Ghent. Fury, in no mind to be taken, fled that 
place for Ormonde's protection, having taken the care to leave individuals 'to tend his 
employ' in his absence. 3 The degree to which he received succour is unknown; but 
subsequent sources suggest he found little comfort. A year later he wrote to Watkins 
from the confinement of the Queen's Bench at Southwark: though his creditors had 
brought no case for the prosecution against him, he could not be discharged until the 
following term and owed upwards of £30 in debts for his subsistence there. Fury 
complained that he was 'much abused' in the sum, but forced to be silent to prevent 
being 'starved'. What little money he'd possessed had passed into the pockets of his 
attorneys and other necessesities, and the former Provost Marshal was reduced to 
begging what he felt his due, fearing that the his long confinement would 'in all 
probability end his life' 345 
344 BL, Add. MSS 38852, ff. 234-239b: petition of John Fury to Henry Watkins, 29 December 1712 
N. S. 
345 BL Add. MSS 38852, f. 297: John Fury to Henry Watkins, London, 2 December 1713 O. S. 
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V 
Communication and intelligence-gathering 
Outside of immanent, verbal interaction between officers and their aides -be it on the 
march, in camp or council, or on the field of battle itself (for which see Chapter VIII) - 
the sole form of communication to and from the army was by way of the written note, 
order, bulletin or letter, which would be delivered by a variety of agencies. The content 
of such dispatches ranged from secret intelligence and missives touching upon the 
critical management of public affairs, through to the most benign and unimportant 
articles of friendly correspondence-and frequently all parts in-between. The 
prosecution of the War of the Spanish Succession in the Low Countries was marked by 
several sets of correspondence between friends and acquaintances: from that of 
Marlborough and Godolphin (which transcended the functional discussions of a 
commander-in-chief with the Lord Treasurer); through the letters of the old friends 
William Cadogan, quartermaster-general, and Thomas Wentworth, Baron Raby, 
ambassador at Berlin; to those of Richard King, staff officer and aide to Cadogan, and 
William Willis, a financial agent and aide to Francis Palmes. 
The primary method of delivery of such letters was provided by the contemporary 
postal services. A central figure in the management of communication between 
England and the army in the Low Countries was Jacob van der Poel (d. 1715). A local 
dignitary in Brielle, the point of arrival of many ships bound for Holland, Van der Poel 
had served in a variety of posts in the town and province-including burgomaster in 
1707, on the Board of the Admiralty of Rotterdam ('of the Maze') from 1695 to 1698, in 
the Council of Holland from 1706 to 1708-and had held the position of postmaster at 
Brielle since 1680. Van der Poel thus brought considerable experience, and not a little 
political weight, to his role in overseeing the delivery of mail to and from the army. 
In 1702, at the very beginning of the war, Van der Poel wrote a memorial for 
Marlborough, helpfully summarising the methods practised in the previous war and 
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the possibilities for the future. In the Nine Years War, all the English mail addressed to 
Blathwayt (as secretary to William III, the commander-in-chief) had arrived at Brielle 
via packet boat; they were then sent express to the army-the cost of which was 
covered by the States. The overall charge for postage of Blathwayt's letters from 
England was accounted by the Dutch with commissioners Sir Robert Cotton, Bt and Sir 
Thomas Frankland, Bt at the Post Office in London, and paid by them. 346 
In 1702, however, the emphasis lay on the use of the 'ordinary' posts. Letters from 
England for the army left Brielle and were transported via the Hague -a notable 
detour. These letters then left the Hague via the ordinary post every Tuesday and 
Friday evening, around the time the letters from England typically arrived from Brielle; 
this created a potential for disruption. If the ordinary post had already left the Hague, 
the letters from England would be dispatched with any subsequent express sent to the 
army from the Hague. 
If Marlborough's packets-or any English mail-were dispatched directly from the 
Brielle, in the manner enjoyed by Blathwayt and bypassing the Hague, their postage 
would cost a third less and arrive sooner; though if it was agreed to send the packets 
from Brielle express to the army, the charge of each express would be 25 guilders. 
Marlborough's mail from the army to England could be sent to Van der Poel with the 
ordinary post, which left twice a week from the army; the posts always arrived at the 
Hague before the letters for England were sent from there to the Brielle, so there was 
no danger of them being delayed. 47 
As many letters might arrive at the Hague for Marlborough in his absence, it was 
proposed that they were passed to Jan Danckerts, the States-General's commissary of 
the Posts since 1688, who would be able to properly forward them to the then earl, 
wherever he might be. This, naturally, would occur at a charge, which might be 
346 Kenneth Ellis, The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1958), p. 7. Sir Robert Cotton, 
Bt (1669-1749), a moderate Tory M. P., was one of the two postmasters-general, until replaced by 
John Evelyn in 1710. Sir Thomas Frankland, Bt was a moderate Whig M. P. and served until 
1711. 
347 BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 1401-141b: Van der Poel's memorial on packets. Brielle, 13 June 1702 
N. S. 
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accounted with the commissioners of the Post Office in London, as was done in 
Blathwayt's time .w 
These postmasters were keen to offer advice, particularly if it directed more custom to 
their own posts. Letters from England to destinations in Germany, Italy, Switzerland 
and other places, for example, arrived at Brielle on the packet boats. The Holland 
couriers that carried the foreign mail departed from Amsterdam every Tuesday, Friday 
and Saturday. If the English letters arrived on these same days, as they typically did, 
this could present an efficacious transition; but quite often the post left Brielle for 
Amsterdam before the English letters had come in, causing the couriers to leave 
without the English mail. Such discrepancies in the alignment of the postal schedules 
could cause considerable delays in important correspondence; missing the post to Italy, 
which departed once a week at noon on Friday, would delay the English letters by 
eight days. 
Herman Clignet (1645-1721), the postmaster at Utrecht, was quick to point out the 
inadequacies of that system; not unsurprisingly, his solution involved routing the post 
through his own province. Letters routed from Brielle to Utrecht would suffer from 
few of these problems, and not miss any posts. Likewise, the letters from Germany, 
Italy and elsewhere to England might pass through Utrecht to Brielle in an ordinary 
post. Those letters that passed by Amsterdam were delayed from Wednesday morning 
(when they arrived) to Friday evening, when they were dispatched from thence to 
England via the Saturday morning packet boat at Brielle. If they instead travelled by 
way of Utrecht and Rotterdam to Brielle, they would, Clignet assured, arrive in time 
for the Wednesday packet boat for Harwich. 349 
There is no positive proof that Clignet's proposals were accepted; indeed, a later 
missive from Van der Poel did suggest that the English mail for Germany and other 
such places still went via The Hague or Amsterdam. Writing in April 1705, the 
postmaster at the Brielle made it clear that a great many problems remained in the 
effectual transport of mail. It was 'evident and notorious' that there had been in the 
M Ibid., ff. 138-139b. Memorandum, 11 May 1702 N. S. Unsigned. 
349 Ibid., ff. 142-143b: Demonstration from M. Clignet for the expedition of letters abroad. [1702 
in pencil. ] For a project expanding on these issues, see ibid., ff. 144-145b. The latter is not signed, 
but is obviously the work of Clignet or his clerk. 
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past year great interruptions and delays in the dispatch of the letters to and from 
England, by way of the ordinary posts. For Van der Poel, the solution again lay in the 
employment of expresses - which, naturally might be employed from Brielle and 
charged to that account. Letters arriving at Brielle might be sent by express to the army 
by way of Moerdijk; at the most it would take three and a half days for an express to 
reach Trier or the army on the Moselle. This would obviate the problem Clignet also 
described: that letters for Germany from England arriving at Brielle on Tuesday or 
Friday would frequently miss the connecting post to Holland, and be delayed there 
three days, until the next post 35° 
Van der Poel admitted that the charge of the expresses would be considerable, but 
optimistically suggested that the overall charge could be brought to such a moderate 
sum that it should not exceed the ordinary postage. 351 Even if the letters were to be sent 
by the ordinary post for most of the way, sending them by express to Moerdijk first 
would take but six hours, and save a great detour of the mail into Holland to the north. 
Letters from the army to England might then be transported in the same manner, 
arriving punctually at Brielle each Wednesday and Saturday, in time for the packet 
boat to England 352 
The early modem postal system was extensive, but variegated. While earliest stages in 
dispatch of letters from England were overseen by the Post Office (specifically the 
Foreign Office) to the packet boats at Harwich and Dover, the delivery of mail on the 
continent fell under the jurisdiction of various public and private agencies. Most of the 
Empire (with the exception of Hamburg, Brandenburg-Prussia and certain 
Westphalian duchies) fell under the Thum und Taxis monopoly. This included the 
Spanish Netherlands until 1700, when the Angevin seizure of the provinces placed the 
responsibility in the hands of Leon Pajot, who held the farm for the French post. When 
35° Ibid., ff. 148-149b: proposal regarding the dispatch of Marlborough's and others' letters from 
and for England, 1705. 
351 On BL, Add. MSS 61336, f. 149, two schemes for the cost of postage to the army are scrawled 
in a hand different to Van der Poel's. Unfortunately, it is not clear which scheme refers which 
prospect (the ordinary posts to and from Brielle, and the expresses to and from likewise). The 
first scheme accounted the postage of a single letter to the Moselle at 17 st. (9 st. to Brielle and 
beyond; 6 st. from Maastricht; and a further 2 st. from Trier to the army), a double at 24 st., and 
32 st. per ounce. The second scheme placed the postage of a single letter from Trier to Brielle at 
8 st., a double at 14 st. and the ounce at 20 st. 
352 Ibid. 
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the Grand Alliance conquered much of the Spanish Netherlands in 1706, following 
Ramillies, the role of director in the areas of Flanders and Brabant under Allied control 
was given to Francois Jaupain, who had previously been director-general for the 
Luxemburg posts 353 As an idea of the extent of the service in the Low Countries, in 
1706 the posts from Brussels departed as follows: 
There had been daily posts at 10 a. m. and 10 p. m. to Malines and Antwerp (though 
these had suffered in the war). Every day at 4 p. m. there were posts departing on 
routes to towns including Alost, Termonde, Oudenaarde, Ghent, Courtrai, Bruges, 
Ostend, Dunkirk, Lille, Menin, leper, Gravelines, Calais, Boulogne, Aire, Bethune, 
Douai, Arras and Amiens; at 11 p. m. that evening, they were dispatched to Namur, 
Wavre, Leuven, Tirlemont, Nivelles, Enghien, Ath, Mons, Valenciennes, Tournai, 
Bouchain, Paris and all France. 
Posts for Charleroi departed 11 p. m. Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday evenings. Those 
for Cologne, and the towns on the Demer (Aerschott, Diest, Rasselt, St Trond), and 
Meuse and its tributaries (Maastricht, Tongres, Huy, Liege, Limburg, Aix-la-Chapelle), 
left every Monday and Thursday at 11 p. m.; as did the couriers for Dusseldorf, Wesel, 
Münster, Koblenz, Mainz, Frankfurt, Augsburg and the rest of Germany. Posts for 
Luxemburg and Lorraine departed every Monday, Wednesday and Saturday at 11 
p. m.; those for Holland, Bremen and Hamburg every Wednesday and Sunday at the 
same time, and every Monday and Thursday in the morning. And thus the scheme 
continued 354 
The mail was carried to its destinations by couriers, typically described as postilions (or 
'post-boys', in English), who 'rode post' or drove a post chaise (a small, two-wheeled 
carriage). The term post itself was used to describe several things. It could mean a 
location where the couriers changed horses; a unit to measure the distance between 
two postal houses, and thus a basis for postal charges; and an office where the mail 
353 E. Vai116, 'De Post der Spaanse Nederlanden onder het opeenvolgende bestuur van Pajot, 
Pachter der Posterijen in Frankrijk en van Jaupain, Directeur-Generaal, 1701-1721', Tijdschrift der 
Belgische Posterijen, 1 (1951), pp. 13-16. Karl de Leeuw, 'The Black Chamber in the Dutch 
Republic during the War of the Spanish Succession and its Aftermath, 1707-1715', The Historical 
journal, vol. 42,1 (March, 1999), pp. 139,141-142. 
354 BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 152-153b: Departures of posts from Brussels. 1706. Printed, with 
annotations. 
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was dispatched and distributed 355 On occasion, the army more fully integrated itself 
into the existing civilian postal systems by establishing temporary post houses for its 
own utility, as in that set up at La Gorgue in 1711. All the officers and soldiers of the 
army-of whatever quality-were ordered not to touch the hay and oats stored there 
for the subsistence of the post-horses, nor to attempt to lodge there, or forcibly enter 
the house 356 After the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, the Allied army typically 
kept a Carolingian clerk of the posts within its body 3sß 
Individuals other than the postilions could typically take advantage of a network of 
posts and use its horses and/or chaises for a fee. An excellent example of an early 
modem postal system, its cost, frequency and dispositions, is provided by Michael 
Richards (1673-1722). Richards, an engineer by training, was the consummate military 
professional. He displayed keen powers of observation, with an eye for the utility of 
the information he collected. 
Following the successful passage of the Lines of Brabant in 1705, Richards was 
dispatched by Marlborough to Vienna, to give a report of the action to the Emperor. 
Leaving the camp at Vlierbeck on 20 July, he reached Vienna six days later, covering 
nearly three hundred leagues. Richards' rough diary lists his itinerary, together with 
various notes on the quality of the journey and the posts. The engineer then proceeded 
to make similar observations on his return journey to the army, which took a different 
route, passing through Bohemia. These are reproduced in Table AS (p. 288). 3% 
3,55 Anne Conchon, 'Cost Economics of Carrying the Mail by Postal Services and Messageries in 
France (Mid-17th Century - Late 18th Century), in Muriel Le Roux (ed. ), Post Offices of Europe, 
18th-21st Century: A Comparative History (Comit6 pour la histoire de La Poste, 2007), pp. 223-235. 
356 BL, Add. MSS 61372, f. 237b: order for the protection of the post house at La Gorgue. Adam 
de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. Camp before Aire, 11 October 1711 N. S. 
357 BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 150-151b: reasons to maintain the clerk of the posts of Charles III in 
the army of the Allies in the Low Countries. The clerk's presence had been agreed by 
Marlborough, and both the Field Deputies and deputies of the States-General at Brussels. The 
clerk was one of Jaupain's men. 
358 BL, Stowe MSS 481, ff. 71,78,80,81-81b, 84-84b. Richards' itinerary and notes are written on 
various separate pieces of paper, not necessarily in order. A hand-written schedule of the posts 
to Vienna from Frankfurt (minus Richards' diversion on the Danube) appears on ff. 70-70b. 
There were 20 post-stages to Regensburg from Frankfurt, and 26.5 from Regensburg to Vienna - 
the entire distance from the camp at Vlierbeck to Vienna was some 287 leagues. On the return, 
there were 29.5 stages from Vienna to Eger (at half a dollar or 15 grosches per man or horse), 
and 21 posts from Eger to Frankfurt (at a florin or 20 grosches per horse). 
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Richards diary shows the relentless daily progress involved in the dispatch of mails to 
their destinations; it also displays the difficulties that could attend it, such the 
inundations Richards experienced on 24 and 25 July. The army's correspondents 
frequently claimed of missing mails, or of several arriving together, as various events 
inflicted their vicissitudes upon the regularity of the postal systems - though some of 
these are understandable, as when Marlborough himself stopped the post at the camp 
for as long as a day, preventing the postilions from departing until he (or, more 
accurately, Cardonnel) had been able to complete his own letters for dispatch. 359 
Postal couriers were often retarded on account of the towns' gates being closed for the 
night - the regulation of which was the fief of the garrison commander. In 1709, the 
postmaster-general of Brabant's concerns over the delays were communicated by way 
of Marlborough to Lieutenant-General Wood, the commander at Ghent (a town of 
particular notoriety in this regard); similar missives were sent from the Council of State 
to the town magistrates. Wood protested that it was less to do with the actions of the 
garrison (who observed the same method with regard to the couriers as they had 
under Ingoldsby and Lumley in the past), but rather on account of level of the local 
watercourses -w 
The mail was particularly affected in the campaign of 1708, when the fluid situation in 
Flanders and Brabant meant that the Allied army's communications were stretched to 
breaking point as the French captured Ghent and Bruges, and besieged Brussels, and 
Marlborough and Eugene were pushed to various extremities in the siege of Lille. 361 
French posts on the Schelde delayed the Allied couriers to such an extent that Cadogan 
quipped that the arrival of any mail was 'by accident'. 362 Richard Molesworth was 
more measured when noted that his brother would no doubt see the "the strange 
incertainty and irregularity that attends the conveyance of our letters to and fro. "363 
359 Murray, ii, pp. 270-271: Marlborough to Harley, camp at Aerschot, 22 September 1705 N. S.; 
p. 272: Marlborough to Hedges, camp at Aerschot, 22 September 1705 N. S. 
360 For Marlborough's order to Wood, see Murray, iv, p. 441: Marlborough to Wood, Brussels, 
13 February 1709 N. S.; and BL, Add. MSS 61162, f. 177 (of the same date). 
361 Snyder, ii, pp. 1111-1112 no. 1113: Marlborough to Godolphin, [Roncq], 4 October 1708 N. S. 
362 KP I(i)/93. Copy of a letter from Cadogan to John Laws, regarding Wynendael. 20 October 
1708 N. S. 
30 BL, Add. MSS 61312, ff. 186-191b: Richard Molesworth to his brother [unclear which one], 
camp at Berleghem, 3 December 1708 N. S. 
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The French-engineered inundations by Leffinghem and Ostend hampered Allied 
communications with its one port in Flanders; a situation exacerbated, as Hallungius 
wrote to James Brydges, by the French using 
... flatt bottom d Vessells armed Wth. Canon, to Stop since the 8/19th all our Correspondence and getting of [Ammunition] from Ostend... 64 
Ostend itself had become available to the Allies in 1706, when it had capitulated after a 
twenty-day investment. The West Flanders port offered a new route through which the 
mail might be sent, though its adoption was a touch hesitant and in no way replaced 
the old method of sending the mail through Holland. Marlborough considered that the 
Ostend packet boat was the quickest way of sending mail between the theatre and 
England, but also the most dangerous; it would be judicious to also send copies of 
letters via Brielle. Indeed, for his part the duke was happy to sacrifice celerity for 
security and regularity, desiring that the Post Office dispatched all mail to the army by 
way of Holland, as a division between the two methods could lead to disruption. 365 
This was not the case later in 1708, however, when the French blockade along the 
Scheldt and the Bruges-Ghent canal rendered communication with Holland difficult, 
and Cardonnel had considered it safest to write by way of Ostend (though Godolphin 
had yet to miss a letter of Marlborough's sent via Brielle). 366 
The transport of mail between England and the continent-be it by Brielle or Ostend- 
was usually effected by packet boat, often convoyed by English and/or Dutch men-of- 
war. 367 Even a seemingly small, simple journey across North Sea from Brielle or 
Rotterdam to Harwich was at the mercy of the winds and the tides. Given that the 
wind was dominantly in the west (as evidenced by the many 'popish winds' that 
preceded the 'Protestant Wind' in 1688), the transport of mail from Holland to England 
364 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iii, p. 69: Hallungius to Brydges, The Hague, 24 October 1708 N. S. 
365 Snyder, i, pp. 629-630 no. 637: Godolphin to Marlborough, St James, 22 July 1706 O. S.; and 
pp. 635-637: Marlborough to Godolphin, Helchin, 9 August 1706 N. S. This was the first letter 
Godolphin ventured to send by the Ostend packet boat; he assured Marlborough that it would 
not hinder him from writing regularly by the old way, as well. See also Murray, ii, pp. 25,68; 
Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, vi, p. 67. 
366 Snyder, ii, pp. 1114-1115 no. 1117: Godolphin to Marlborough, Windsor, 27 September 1708 
O. S. 
367 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 189-190b: Charles Churchill to Marlborough, Rotterdam, 11 
November 1706 N. S. Churchill was set to depart to England aboard the William and Mary yacht, 
there being a convoy of two Dutch men-of-war departing the following day. 
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could face minor delays; yet the journey to Holland could also be attended by various 
inconveniencies, as Michael Richards' diary for the campaign of 1705 displays. 
On Wednesday 28 March 1705, the Duke of Marlborough arrived at Harwich. Two 
days later, Marlborough, the recruits and various other officers departed England 
under convoy, escorted by six men-of-war. Unfortunately, the tardiness of the 
enterprise meant that there was too little water to carry out the large escorts, and the 
vessels laid at anchor all night. The next day, Saturday 31 March, the contrary winds 
forced all to return to Harwich. On Sunday they sailed again, and by Monday they had 
reached the Dutch coast; but the wind failing, they were forced two anchor - except for 
two yachts (the Peregrine, upon which the Duke of Marlborough sailed, and the Sous 
Dike) which struck on the sands, but got off the following day. That Tuesday the duke 
arrived at Rotterdam at noon, before departing for the Hague - four days after he'd 
originally sailed. Marlborough's sea journey had not been a happy one, confiding to 
Sarah: "I have been so very sick, that my blood is as hote as if I were in a feavor, which 
makes my head eake extreamly... "368 
Both packet boats and postilions ran the risk of being taken by the enemy; the former 
particularly on account of the French privateers that operated out of Dunkirk. 369 To 
safeguard against the effects of the mail being taken, Allied correspondents in the field 
occasionally made use of ciphers. Those used by Marlborough typically substituted 
numbers for whole words (for prominent individuals and places) and individual letters 
(for spelling unforeseen or uncommon words) 370 One example of a cipher used on 
campaign, with Allied commanders and staff officers in the army, can be found in the 
correspondence of the duke with Dopff. This cipher was fairly simple: numbers 1 to 41 
were reserved for various individuals, entities and places (the last, 41, was the Baron 
de Weiser). Numbers 42-87 (the highest numeral in the example shown) described the 
alphabet, A-Y, with two consecutive numbers for each letter, in sequence. Thus 'E', for 
368 BL, Stowe MSS 469, ff. 1-2b: Michael Richards' diary for Flanders, 1705. Snyder, i, pp. 413- 
415, nos 424-427. 
369 For an example of a packet boat being taken, see Snyder, ii, p. 729 no. 737: Marlborough to 
Godolphin, The Hague, 16 November 1706 N. S. 
370 See Snyder, iii, Appendix I, for an excellent discussion of the ciphers used by Marlborough in 
his correspondence with Godolphin and others. These ciphers consisted wholly of number- 
word substitutions. 
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example, could be enciphered by 50 or 51; 'H' by 56 or 57, and so on. As befitted a 
cipher adopted by correspondence near totally continued in French, there was no 
cipher for'W3n 
On other occasions, correspondents took advantage of the travel plans of confidants 
(particularly military officers travelling in force, with an escort), who would deliver 
letters safe from the enemy, or the prying eyes of political opponents. In July 1707 
Marlborough delivered his letters to England by way of Brigadier George Macartney, 
which allowed him "more freedome [to write freely] than I darst do by the post" and 
Lumley. 372 Philip Honeywood, Macartney's partner in the infamous 'Damnation Club' 
who was carrying dispatches from Spain to England (via the Low Countries) offered a 
similar avenue a year later 373 Yet the common post could on occasion prove safer than 
the private messenger. Van der Poel's couriers were provided with passes governing 
their safe conduct, which a private messenger could not obtain without 'difficulty and 
loss of time'; the absence of which placed the deliverer at the mercy of the enemy. 374 
Passes were an important form of military and diplomatic protocol. Issued to both 
friendly and enemy individuals, by both armies, as well as local authorities and 
provinces375, they offered a level of civility amid the disruptions of war. They were 
issued within clear spatial and temporal limits. Allied passes to the individuals 
travelling to the army from England, and vice versa, might be for a fortnight at most 
and issued by way of local agents, such as Thomas Brown in Ostend 376 To modern 
371 BL, Add. MSS 61202, ff. 14b: Dopff to Marlborough, Dusseldorf, 4 December 1702 N. S. 
372 Snyder, ii, pp. 841-842 no. 845: Marlborough to Godolphin, Meldert, 18 July 1707 N. S. 
Macartney had attended Marlborough in the Low Countries after being released upon his 
parole, following Salamanca. BL, Add. MSS 61162, if. 123-123b: Lumley to Marlborough, 
London, 30 September 1707 O. S. 
373 Snyder, ii, p. 986 no. 989: Marlborough to Godolphin, [Bellingen], 28 May 1708 N. S. 
374 Murray, iii, p. 425: Marlborough to Harley, camp at Meldert, 20 June 1707 N. S. Harley had, 
Marlborough believed, forwarded one mail by way of a private messenger, who had not arrived 
at the camp. 
375 BL, Add. MSS 61308, ff. 44-45b: Blood to Marlborough, Rotterdam, 4 May 1705 N. S. Blood 
was reporting the progress of two vessels carrying Marlborough's baggage and the hospital to 
Koblenz, and thence Trier. The States of Gelderland had granted passports'very readily'. 
376 E. g. WO 26/11 (1), f. 42. Note of a pass given to Mr Samuel Noyes, chaplain to the Earl of 
Orkney's regiment, together with his servant Edward Grubb, to go to Holland, in force 14 days. 
Dated 29 March 1705. BL, Add. MSS 33273, ff. 127-128b: Richard Sutton to Henry Watkins, 
London, 18 September 1711 O. S. Sutton was returning to the continent, and desired that a pass 
would be sent to Brown at Ostend to speed his passage. 
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eyes, the issue of passes could appear particularly loose: passports were allowed to the 
French couriers that took potentially valuable letters and packets to their towns and 
forces in the Low Countries 377 Indeed, writing in January 1706, Ingoldsby made note of 
the 'unaccountable passes' the States-General (and their subsidiaries) gave, "to anney 
man that will but pay ffive or six Gillders ffor them, " and complained that as a result 
he was "Everry day pestor'd with people ffrom Lyle, Tourney, Mons, and all parts of 
Ffrance" expecting likewise 378 
Generals themselves were frequently possessed passes granted by their opponent. 
After leaving Brussels on 18 July 1708 to join the army, Marlborough happened upon a 
French party near the abbey of Beaupre, who `examined his pass very strictly'. That 
same day the duke's party passed through some part of the march of the enemy, when 
they passed the confederate army's flank. 379The most famous situation, however, 
occurred in 1702, when Marlborough, Geldermalsen and Obdam were travelling by 
boat on the Meuse. A small French party took advantage of their distracted escort 
(which had wandered too far from the riverbank) and boarded the boat. While Obdam 
and Geldermalsen had their passes, Marlborough did not. However, his attendant, 
William Gill, possessed an unused pass in duke's brother Charles' name, which he 
placed in Marlborough's hand, playing an amusing (and successful) masquerade-380 
Military officers were frequently used as more substantial envoys in addition to post- 
boys, adding a verbal addendum to any details contained on paper. Those thought 
worthy of the honour were dispatched post-haste with news of a victory in battle or 
siege. Colonel Thomas Panton, who carried Marlborough's dispatches express to 
London after the fall of Douai, alerted London of the affair four days before Watkins' 
letters had reached his correspondents in the capital. 38] Metcalfe Graham, who carried 
news of the victory at Maplaquet to England, landed at Harwich at noon and reached 
Windsor that same night; he delivered Marlborough's letters to the queen and 
377BL, Add. MSS 61369.19 September 1702 N. S. 
378 BL, Add. MSS 61163, if. 16-19b: Ingoldsby to Marlborough, Ghent, 5 January 1706 N. S. 
379 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 84: camp journal, 22 July 1708 N. S. 
380 A. J. Veenendaal (fils), De Briefwisseling van Anthonie Heinsius, 1702-1720 (The Hague, 1976- 
2001), i, p. 526 no. 1079: Athlone to Heinsius, 5 November 1702 N. S. Murray, i, pp. 54-55: 
Bulletin, The Hague, 7 November 1702. Gill received an annual pension of £50 for his quick- 
thinking, and was later made a commissary for the exchange of prisoners. 
381 BL, Add. MSS 33273, If. 35-36b: James Taylor to Henry Watkins, Whitehall, 30 June 1710 O. S. 
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Godolphin the following morning, before going to Sarah at Blenheim. He noted that in 
coming through London, he though he'd never escape the hands of the clamouring 
mob; Sir Thomas Franklin had to convey him out of his house through a vault. 82 
Others were not so lucky. When Sir Richard Temple, Bt, honoured with carrying the 
news of the fall of (the town of) Lille to England, arrived in London on 18 October, he 
found it was no surprise at all: Thomas Erle having already sent a courier to England 
with a copy of Marlborough's letter to the general. Though he did suggest, as a sheen 
to his slightly diminished pride, that it was not entirely unnecessary that somebody 
else arrived to give more detailed information 30 Unfortunately, that mission was not a 
triumph, either. Temple carried details of Marlborough and Eugene's various ideas 
and plans for the follow-up operations, which the duke dared not put in writing; but 
Godolphin dejectedly noted that Temple could not "answer hald the questions [he] 
could ask him. "384 
Other envoys were more successful. Cadogan would frequently welcome and escort 
dignitaries and generals to Marlborough's camp, greeting Baden in the march to the 
Danube in 1704, and both the Elector of Hanover and Prince Eugene in 1708. Not just 
mere pleasantries on Marlborough's behalf, these meetings provided means to 
informally and flatteringly pass on the views of the duke regarding the campaign, and 
perhaps begin a process of gentle education in the Marlburian strategy m5 Cadogan 
would again be dispatched to concert on Marlborough's behalf with the Margrave of 
Baden on two occasions between April and June 1705, to discuss operational matters, 
the Duke being "so Title satisfied with the notions [Baden] has for the opening the 
campagne, that I have resolved to send Collonel Cadogan to him. "386 
382 BL, Add. MSS 61313, ff. 189-190b: Metcalfe Graham to Marlborough, September 1709 O. S. 
383 BL, Add. MSS 61312, ff. 134-135b: Temple to Marlborough, London, 22 October 1708 O. S. 
[Cardonnel's annotation reads 27 October. ] 
384 Snyder, ii, p. 1128 no. 1132: Marlborough to Godolphin, [Roeselare], 24 October 1708 N. S. 
Ibid., p. 1133 no. 1138: Godolphin to Marlborough, [London], 19 October 1708 O. S. 
385 Cadogan greeted Baden at Eppingen in June 1704, and escorted him to the conference at 
Groß Heppach (Murray, i, pp. 306,309-10); he was also sent to escort the George of Hanover on 
10/21 June 1708 (Murray, iv, p. 71) and to meet Prince Eugene at Maastricht on 22 June/3 July 
1708 (Murray, iv, pp. 86-7,90-1,94-6). 
386 Cadogan had written to Baden's officers on Marlborough's behalf to discuss operations as 
early as that January (Murray, i, pp. 569-70): Marlborough had desired a two-pronged offensive 
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Cadogan was not always successful. His manner could not sway the Elector of 
Hanover from his refusal to send forces for Marlborough's planned expedition to 
relieve the Duke of Savoy, though Marlborough's use of his Quartermaster-General on 
this absolutely secret mission, "at a time in which he is so usefull to me" is indicative of 
the regard in which the commander-in-chief held both the planned enterprise and his 
aide 387 Cadogan's fellow Irishman and 'favourite', acted in a similar role; indeed, his 
military career morphed into a diplomatic one as the war wore on. 388 
Henry Durell, Marlborough's adjutant-general and senior aide-de-camp was also 
employed on these enterprises. In June 1705, as the duke's army was forced to leave its 
theatre of operations on the Moselle to attend to the growing danger on the Meuse, 
Durell was dispatched to the Imperial Court to concert with the Allies. If Marlborough 
had sent Durell with celerity in mind, he was disobliged by the temporarily invalided 
Prince Louis of Baden, who kept the adjutant-general waiting for three hours before 
granting him an audience. This delay lost Durell an entire night's riding, the gates 
being shut for the evening. He had greater luck at Vienna, where the long-time English 
envoy, George Stepney, managed to secure him an audience two hours after his 
morning arrival 389 
upon the upper Moselle; Baden preferred independent operations, with him threatening Alsace. 
Cadogan left The Hague on 18/29 April 1705 and returned to Maastricht on 1/12 May. 
Although Marlborough was confident that Cadogan had left Baden 'in a good disposition to act 
with his troops in concert with me, ' he was grimly aware that it might require the personal 
touch, and that Baden would not 'possatively resolve to march towardes the Moselle til I have 
the honour of being with him. ' Snyder, i, nos. 433 & 434, pp. 420-2; Murray, ii, pp. 16-17,21-8 
and 41-3. Marlborough was due to meet Prince Louis at Creutznach on 20 May, but the latter's 
illness delayed the conference and necessitated its siting at Ratstadt. Cadogan would find his 
own travel plans altered by Baden's circumstances in June 1705, when he was due to meet 
Baden at Birkenfeld, but was forced to track the Margrave down to the spa at Slangenbad. 
Murray, ii, pp. 101-2 & 113. 
387 Snyder, i, no. 540, pp. 521-2: Marlborough to Sarah, The Hague, 27 April 1706 N. S. The 
Elector was quite content in Marlborough's plan, but would not consent to the marching of his 
troops on such an enterprise, in which he was in good company, the Danes and Hessians 
likewise refusing to send their regiments. The planned march was thus abandoned. Murray, ii, 
pp. 498-9, and Snyder, i, nos. 539,540,542,544 & 547, pp. 520-5 & 528. 
388 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 133-134b: Cadogan to Raby, The Hague, 30 January 1708 N. S. Francis 
Palmes brought instructions to Cadogan on the matter of Her Majesty's intentions regarding 
Spain (upon which the States would resolve little until knowing Britain's final intentions), 
before travelling to the courts of Hanover, Vienna and then Turin. 
389 BL, Add. MSS 61308, ff. 83-84b: Durell to Marlborough, Frankfurt, 22 June 1705 N. S. Ibid., ff. 
93-94b: ditto, Vienna, 27 June 1705 N. S. Michael Richards, who also bore dispatches in the 
128 
Some journeys were altogether more eventful. Writing in 1709, Robert Walpole asked 
the Lord Treasurer to consider the petition of Lieutenant Andrew Pope. This officer 
had travelled express from Major-General Stanhope to Marlborough (among other 
officers and destinations). Arriving in Genoa, Pope delivered letters to Mr Chetwind, 
the British agent, and the admirals. He then set off for Germany, Flanders and England, 
carrying Stanhope 's packet for Cardonnel; a letter for Heinsius that the Dutch general, 
Belcastel, had asked to be delivered; the letters of Stanhope to individuals in Germany 
(including Raby in Berlin), which were to be left with Henry Davenant at Frankfurt; 
and letters to the Secretary of State in England, which were to be delivered upon taking 
his leave of Marlborough. All this mail was carefully warded by Pope, who took "care 
on his going Abroad to sling to the Bag of Letters, a Ball, or any thing to sink it in case 
of danger or being taken by the Enemy. " 
In his journey to the duke, Pope was taken prisoner by a French corporal and six 
soldiers bear Courtrai. He was escorted by the corporal and one soldier toward the 
Vendome, but somehow prevailed upon the non-commissioned officer to send his 
sentinel back - upon which he soon found an opportunity to turn the tables on his 
captor, seizing his own sword and pistols back from the corporal, and obliging the 
poor fellow to return his letters and follow him to Courtrai. Once there, Pope 
prudently obtained a guard for the next stage of his journey and delivered his charge 
to Marlborough safely. Walpole believed that his service and expenses in this duty 
warranted a reward of £200.390 
Mail was typically accounted under three headings: a 'Single' referred to a letter 
consisting of a single sheet of paper; a 'Double' was a letter comprising two sheets of 
paper; and parcels and packets of letters were charged by the 'Ounce'. The charge for 
delivering the letters would be a function of the above classifications and the distance 
they were carried. Despite Marlborough's armies' movements, however, there was no 
variation in the charge Van der Poel claimed from the duke for the delivery of his mail 
over the campaign: it remained constant at 8 st. for a single letter, 16 st. for a double 
aftermath of the crossing of the lines in Brabant, was similarly delayed by Baden and his 
'Company of Struting Comediens' -a sarcastic reference he later crossed out in his account of 
his journey. BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 82. 
390 NA, WO 30/88 (2), pp. 14-15: note of a petition from Robert Walpole to Godolphin, 21 
February 1709 O. S. 
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letter and 24 st. per ounce. In 1705, the account of the mail sent to Marlborough from 
Brielle, over the period 13 May 1705 to 28 November 1705, listed 93 single letters, 57 
double letters and packets totalling 763 ounces - all of which came to just under a 
thousand guilders. 391 
The charge rose over the following years, albeit not by a significant amount. From 14 
May 1706 to 26 October 1706, Marlborough received 86 single letters, 62 double letters 
and packets totalling 9191/2 ounces - the whole amounting to fl. 1187: 8 (or £107.19s. ) 392 
from 6 May 1709 to 30 October 1709,85 singles, 64 doubles and 926 ounces, of packets 
came to fl. 1196: 8 (or £108.14s. 6d. at fl. 11 per pound sterling). 393 The charge for 
Marlborough's final year of tenure (from 26 April to 5 November 1711) amounted to fl. 
1348 (or £121.12s. 8d. at fl. 11 per pound sterling), on account of 106 single letters, 57 
double letters and packets weighing 1050 ounces. 394 By way of comparison, a bill for 
the postage of letters from England to the army as a whole in 1703 came to fl. 
1073: 18395; and at the other end of the spectrum, Captain King's company paid fl. 1: 11 
on account of his commandant's charge for letters, over the period 23 October 1705 to 
22 April 1706. 
Henry Watkins, as Marlborough's factotum at The Hague, bore the brunt of much of 
the charge in the communications with the army. His expenses as secretary to 
Marlborough at the Hague in 1702 came to £269.10s. 1d., all to be charged under the 
head of Contingencies. This amount included £17.14s. on stationary bought at the 
Hague; £74.18s. paid to Van der Poel for the transport of letters from England to the 
391 BL, Add. MSS 61348, If. 44-45b: details of posts sent to Marlborough, 13 May 1705 N. S. to 28 
November 1705 N. S. By Jacob van der Poel. A single letter cost 8 stuivers, a double 16 stuivers 
and a packet 24 stuivers per ounce. The whole came to fl. 998: 8. Marlborough's first account, 
from his arrival in Holland (in July 1701) to 5 September 1701, ran to fl. 116: 11; that from 9 
September to 26 November of the same year came to fl. 459: 5. The whole bill, including various 
posts from Vienna, Hamburg and Breda, and 6 guilders of stationary, amounted to fl. 689: 07. 
Ibid., ff. 26-27: bills for posts received by Marlborough as envoy of England. 
392 Ibid., ff. 47-48b: account of posts sent to Marlborough in 1706. The charges remained the 
same. Cardonnel noted: "The Packets and Letters herein mention'd were brought from the Brill 
to the Army during the last Campagne. Hague the 20th Nov, 1706. " 
393 Ibid., f. 90: account of letters sent to Marlborough during the campaign. 1709. 
394 Ibid., ff. 117-118b: account of letters sent to Marlborough during the campaign. 1711. 
395 BL, Add. MSS 61370, f. 73: order to pay fl. 1073: 18 to Johann van der Poel out of 
Contingencies, for the postage of letters from England to the army. Adam de Cardonnel by 
Marlborough's command. The Hague, 5 November 1703 N. S. 
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army; £58.13s. for letters received at The Hague in the English post house; £8.14s. 10d. 
to a printer at The Hague as a 'gratuity' for prints; £1.10s. to the German post house at 
the Hague; £43.14s. 9d. to the postmasters of the States for the expresses and postage of 
letters from the Hague to the army during the campaign; and a further £52.18s. 
expended on more stationary and various other items of postage, such as extraordinary 
expresses. There was also £7.18s. that Watkins gave as a bounty to several sick and 
disabled soldiers, widows and French deserters; and £3.9s. 6d. given as a bounty to the 
shoulders who took enemy colours 396 
Watkins' expenses fluctuated as the war progressed. In 1704, Marlborough's march to 
the Danube increased the volume of mail passing through Germany; out of the fl. 
4787: 12 (£445.17s. 6d. at fl. 10: 15 to the pound) expenses incurred by Watkins that year, 
fl. 1190 was payable to Henry Davenant at Frankfurt on account of letters sent and 
received 397 In 1708 the charge ran to fl. 10350: 17 (L962.17s. 6d. ), which included: fl. 5600 
to Van der Poel for the postage of letters between the army and Brielle; R. 657: 13 to the 
English postmaster at the Hague; fl. 269: 2 to the German postmaster at the Hague; and 
fl. 3363: 2 for various stationary, extraordinary expresses and intelligence. 398 This then 
dropped over the next two years (fl. 8475: 10 in 1709 and fl. 8110: 17 in 1710399) before 
rising to fl. 8906: 7 (£828.10s. ) in 1711400 
The mail from England to Holland or Flanders brought a variety of news and 
intelligence to officers who were often as involved in the affairs at home as they were 
on campaign. James Craggs (senior) sent Marlborough confidential political reports; 
Cardonnel asked that he be informed every post of how the elections of 1708 (which 
secured the brief dominance of Whigs) progressed. 401 Lord Cutts desired the Gazette 
396 BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 116-116b: warrant to pay Watkins for his disbursement for the officer 
of the Secretary of the General. The Hague, 19 November 1702 N. S. 
397 BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 181-181b: Watkins' expenses for 1704. A further fl. 500 for this year 
was carried over to 1705; see Add. MSS 61371, ff. 73b-74. 
398 BL, Add. MSS 61372, f. 105b: Watkins' accounts for 1708. The Hague, 23 February 1709 N. S. 
For the warrant to pay these, from Marlborough, see ibid., f. 97, dated at The Hague, 23 
February 1709 N. S. 
399 Ibid., f. 144b: Watkins' expenses for 1709. The Hague, 7 November 1709 N. S. Ibid., f. 264: 
Watkins' accounts for 1710. The Hague, 24 December 1710 N. S. 
°° BL, Add. MSS 61373, ff. 44-44b: warrant to pay Watkins' expenses. Adam de Cardonnel by 
Marlborough's command. The Hague, 16 November 1711 N. S. 
401 NA, SP 87/4 f. 29: Cardonnel to Tilson, Brussels, 14 May 1708 N. S. 
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every post, together with "one of the best of the other printed papers, the votes, and 
what is commonly call'd the Whitehall letter. "402 His interest continued after he went to 
Ireland, as he asked his sister to write constantly, providing him with news of all 
... the State: Intreagues, Partys, Designs, and (in a Word) whatsoever comes under 
the head of secret, Or Cabinet: News. 
She was to write nothing but that which she had good grounds for; or to mention any 
doubts if they existed. In a passage that bears a counterpoint to the Duchess of 
Marlborough's own involvement in domestic politics, Cutts finished: 
And, if I may add one request more, it shall be, that you'l keep your Sentiments of 
publick affaires as much to your self as you can possibly; but by no means to say 
any thing of the Ministers and great men (you understand me) which may be 
misrepeated, or they may take ill; nor to declare with any Warmth for any Party; for 
which your Sex has a fair pretence. This, since it will let you into the Knowledge of 
more secrets, and be for my Interest, I hope you will not deny me; I have grounds 
for my request not so proper for a letter. 403 
Marlborough's headquarters received a considerable amount of political, diplomatic, 
strategic and operational intelligence. Much of this passed through the hands of the 
duke's secretary, Adam de Cardonnel. 404 Lucien Bely portrayed Cardonnel as 
Marlborough's bureau chief. 405; John Rule classed Cardonnel as one of his 'master 
spies', in so far as he was a 'paymaster and overseer' of a spy network406, though 
Cardonnel's role was less executive direction than subordinate direction and 
management. Similar claims are made, albeit far less accurately, on the part of William 
Cadogan. J. N. P. Watson calls the Irishman Marlborough's 'Chief of Intelligence'; James 
Falkner, in his Dictionary of National Biography entry, classes him as an unofficial 
'director of military intelligence'. Patricia Dickson also labelled Cadogan as being the 
402 BL, Add. MSS 69380, ff. 3-3b: Cutts to [Cardonnel? ], The Hague, 12 January 1703 N. S. 
Draft/copy. 
403 BL, Add. MSS 69380, Cutts to (Joanna] Cutts, Dublin, 18 October 1705 O. S. 
404 Snyder, ii, pp. 677-678 no. 686: Marlborough to Godolphin, Gramets, 23 September 1706 N. S. 
Marlborough was writing on the occasion of Cardonnel's severe illness, noting: "If he should 
dye it would be give me very great trouble, for all this business I have with the foraine courts 
goes thorow his hands. " 
405 Lucien Be1y, Espions et Ambassadeurs au Temps de Louis XIV (Paris, 1990), p. See also John 
Rule, 'Gathering Intelligence in the Age of Louis XIV, The International History Review, XIV, 4 
(November 1992), p. 737. 
4 Rule, op. cit., p. 739. 
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'Chief of Intelligence', making subsequent references to his 'Intelligence Department' 
and 'Intelligence Service. 407 
These labels are at best disingenuous, at worst false. Cadogan, in his position as 
quartermaster-general and plenipotentiary at Brussels and The Hague, oversaw the 
collection of a considerable amount of operational and strategic intelligence, but did 
not direct all such activities for the army. Many other officers, through their own sense 
of duty or orders from senior commanders, acted likewise. General officers were 
typically ordered to attend to matters of intelligence as part of their daily duties. Late 
in 1702, orders were dispatched to the officer commanding-in-chief with the dragoons 
to march into their garrison of Weert, where that officer would take command. They 
were ordered to send out parties, from time to time, towards Brey, Peer and 
Ruermonde, to observe the enemy and 'annoy' their own parties, giving Marlborough 
constant intelligence upon all that occurred. 408 
During the campaign of 1706 Marlborough would ask Cadogan and Brigadier 
Chanclos to send 'trusty people' to gain intelligence from Mons, Nivelles and the local 
lands, to which Cadogan replied that he would 
... take such measures with Monsr. Chanclos for intelligence that nothing shall pass 
att Mons or the Camp but what your Grace shall be forthwith informed of. Att my 
coming here my first care was to send two People I could rely on to Mons and Ath 
who are both returned this morning with an account that the Elector waited for the 
coming back of the Detachment from Dermond att Ath, and went from thence this 
morning to Mons. 
In this manner Cadogan frequently sent spies to gauge events in the enemy camp, to 
view their lines or to spy upon preparations in their towns. 410 Some spies would take 
407 J. N. P. Watson, Marlborough's Shadow: the life of the first Earl Cadogan (Barnsley, 2003). D. N. B. 
Patricia Dickson, 'Lieutenant General William Cadogar s Intelligence Service', Army Quarterly, 
108, part 2 (1979), p. 161. 
408 BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 74b-75: order for Ross or Hay or the officer in chief with the 
dragoons, to march to garrison. Camp at Asch, 9 September 1702 N. S. Order given by Adam de 
Cardonnel, by Marlborough's command. 
409 BL, Add. MSS 61160, if. 31-32b: Cadogan to Marlborough, Oudenaarde, 23 June 1706 N. S. 
410 E. g. for visiting an enemy camp, see BL, Blenheim Papers, Add. MSS. 61160, f. 1-1b: Cadogan 
to Marlborough, Camp at St. Gron, 24 September 1703 N. S. Cadogan had dispatched agents to 
view the lines from La Bass@e to Douai, and Douai to Valenciennes in April 1710 (ibid., f. 131), 
and a man to Tournai in November 1708 (ibid., f. 98). 
133 
the form of more permanent correspondents in enemy cities, and Cadogan would 
receive frequent letters from Dunkirk and Tournai in 1708, and could confidently state 
in February 1710 that he had "a person at Valentierines and another att Douay, who 
constantly transmitt me accounts of what is doing in that side, and your Grace may 
depend on being early informed of the Enemys Preparations. "411 
Others acted on their own initiative, sending the headquarters various articles of 
intelligence 412 In December 1703, James Ferguson excitedly informed Cardonnel that 
Yvoy, who commanded at Bosch, had shown the Scot his secret intelligence from 
France, with an account of the locations of the winter quarters of Villeroi's army, 
among other things. Ferguson begged the Dutchman to let him make a copy, to send to 
Marlborough; but Yvoy demurred, happy to retain the satisfaction of informing the 
duke himself. Ferguson professed no reason to doubt Yvoy's dilligence in this matter, 
thinking the Dutch general an honest man and a good officer, who professed himself 
very much Marlborough's servant. A covering letter to Marlborough's secretary would 
never go amiss, however. 413 
In the winter of 1706, when an English officer in Ghent had detained a postilion at the 
Antwerp Gate with several letters, he sent him to the governor, Ingoldsby. Finding a 
letter directed to the President of the Council of Hainault at Mons (which was still 
under French control), Ingoldsby tried a conceit to test the 'fidelity and care' of the 
Ghent postmaster: he sent the postilion with his letters to the post office, to judge its 
411 See ibid., ff. 52-52b, wherein Cadogan reports of divisions between the magistrates of Lille 
and Tournai and the French generals, and Snyder, iii, nos. 1260 (16 April 1709 N. S. ) & 1323 (24 
June 1709 NS. ), pp. 1241-2 & 1292-3. In June there was advice that James Stewart, the Old 
Pretender, had come to Villars' camp, and Godolphin thus hoped that Marlborough would 
'order Mr. Cadogan to renew his correspondence with that place [Dunkirk], that so wee might 
have timely notice of the enemy's designs: In actual fact, none were considered by the enemy 
until December 1709, and were then abandoned the following January. Ibid., p. 1233, n. 1. For 
1710, see BL, Add. MSS 61160, f. 129b. 
412 For example, BL, Add. MSS 61183, ff. 86-87b: Yvoy to Marlborough, Beuvey, 14 August 1710 
N. S. Details of enemy numbers between St Venant and Aire. Ibid, ff. 142-143b: Salisch to 
Marlborough, Liege, 9 April 1706 N. S. Note of the enemy's march with a large detachment 
towards Germany, consisting of 20 battalions and 30 or 32 squadrons. Add. MSS 61413, ff. 76- 
77b: Churchill to Cardonnel, Brussels, 12 August 1706 N. S. Charles Churchill wrote that the 
commandant of Brussels had just then received intelligence that the enemy had formed a camp 
at Bossu, consisting of 10,000 men and 25 guns, and were in the process of making a great 
magazine 
413 BL, Add. MSS 61413, ff. 17-18b: Ferguson to Cardonnel, Busch, 2 December 1703 N. S. 
134 
reaction. He was gratified when the postmaster-'a very honest man -returned the 
letter to Ingoldsby immediately, thinking it something to be brought to the governor's 
attention. Ingoldsby opened the letters himself, but upon finding some 'dark 
Expressions' and 'words like a cant In them' passed them on to Marlborough. 414 Some 
officers employed their own spies, or received information from 'Marlborough's 
friends' -a euphemism for allied spies writing from various enemy towns. 425 In 1706, 
Thomas Meredyth, on learning that the magistrates and burgers of Dendermonde were 
very much inclined to oblige the garrison to surrender, found a way to deliver a secret 
letter to the chief magistrate, informing him of the advantageous terms the town could 
expect 416 
The tenor of the campaign offered various opportunities for the gathering of useful 
information. An enemy's review of its army or a particular corps offered a chance to 
secure detailed intelligence on its order of battle and the numbers of battalions and 
squadrons it comprised 417 Parleys with the enemy might precipitate a brief cessation in 
conflict, but they did not do likewise for the gathering of intelligence; indeed, they 
often promoted it. After the battle of Ramillies in 1706, the Allies were occupied with 
attempting to secure various towns in Flanders and Brabant. Some capitulated quickly; 
others did not. Ostend prevaricated for a while, offering various hints of welcome and 
defiance (it finally surrendered on 9 July, after a three-week siege). Marlborough's 
letters to the governor of Ostend, delivered via Major-General Ross, were carried by a 
trumpet, as per usual. The trumpet, being entertained for three hours by the governor's 
servants while their master held counsel with lieutenants, was in an excellent position 
to gather local, human intelligence on the feelings of the populace and strength of the 
414 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 32-33b: Ingoldsby to Marlborough, Ghent, 11 p. m. 14 November 1706 
N. S. 
415 E. g. BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 176-177b: Charles Churchill to Marlborough, Brussels, 13 June 
1706 N. S. Ibid., ff. 178-179b: ditto, 23 June 1706 N. S. Churchill corresponded with this Allied spy 
in Mons, regarding French attempts at a surprise on Brussels in 1706. He promised to 
communicate with his brother daily. Ibid., ff 180-181b: ditto, 23 June 1706 N. S. Churchill 
communicated the intelligence with Hop. 
416 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 207-208b: Meredyth to Marlborough, Lebbeck, 12 June 1706 N. S. 
417 Snyder, ii, pp. 980-981 no. 984: Marlborough to Godolphin, [Brussels], 24 May 1708 N. S. 
Marlborough noted that the French would review their army that Saturday (26 May). 
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garrison; he was even spoken to by some of the chief magistrates themselves. 418 La 
Motte, the French commander at Ostend, himself confided with Lord North and Grey 
on the poor defence of the town, two days before it fell! 419 
Field intelligence might be gained by way of small detachments of regular soldiers. 
During the siege of Dendermonde, Meredyth was visited at 5 a. m. by 'some persons' 
who informed him that there was a strong body of the enemy at Alost. He was 
sceptical, but formed two small parties-each composed of an officer and six 
dragoons-and dispatched them to gather further information; both confirmed the 
initial intelligence, and brought back with them some peasants and a friar, who said 
the enemy amounted to a regiment of dragoons and some three-thousand Foot. 
Meredyth then took his own steps to act upon this intelligence, drawing in his outposts 
for security, warning other detachments nearby and marching with a body to make a 
defence at Bostrow. To continue observations of the French, Meredyth dispatched his 
major of brigade and an officer of Horse to different posts to monitor their advance 
guard. 420 The Allied forces managed to beat off the French in the 'insignificant' 
engagements that followed; they had ten or twelve wounded with small shot and one 
killed by French cannon. Meredyth blamed the surprise on the citizens of Alost, for 
failing to send intelligence of the enemy's march; he feared that the burgomaster who 
had promised him help in that regard was a rogue 421 
These parties were often led by a partisan. 4n A good partisan was "an able and cunning 
Soldier, well skill'd in commanding a Party, who knows the Country, and how to 
avoid Ambushes, and surprize the Enemy. " When Meredyth had intelligence from 
Churchill that the enemy had moved to Hal, he again sent two parties of six dragoons, 
418 BL, Add. MSS 61309, ff. 110-112b: Ross to Marlborough, Bruges, 6 June 1706 N. S. The 
intelligence suggested the enemy had seven battalions in Ostend (three French and four 
Spanish), with seven more along the canal and in Nieuwport. 
419 BL, Add. MSS 61312, ff. 231-232b: North and Grey to Marlborough, before Ghent, 31 
December 1708 N. S. 
420 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 211-212b: Meredyth to Marlborough, noon 21 June 1706 N. S. 
421 Ibid., ff. 213-214b: Meredyth to Marlborough, Bostrow, 21 June 1706 N. S. 
422 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 191-192b: Charles Churchill to Marlborough, Brussels, 31 May 1707 
N. S. Cutts noted that a partisan and his whole party had been taken 'by water'; Charles desired 
that Marlborough would secure the release of the partisan and the lieutenant of Wood's 
regiment of Horse that accompanied him. 
423 Military Dictionary (London, 1708 ed. ) 
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each led by a partisan, to Ath and Hal; but each returned this time without 'so much as 
hearing of a Frenchman' u4 Those soldiers that accompanied these individuals as a 
'partisan party' were often ordered to be 'lightly clothed', eschewing their normal 
uniforms. Upon returning from an expedition, partisans might be expected to make a 
report to the major-general of the day. 425 
Partisans might fall under the aegis of a particular commander, but also interacted 
with the army as a whole. On the night of 25 July 1705, Colonel William Evans liaised 
with a partisan of Ouwerkerk, who acquainted the English officer of the movements of 
several squadrons of French dragoons, which were threatening to intercept a convoy 
bound for Landen and beyond. Evans gave the partisan a horse, so he might advise 
Ouwerkerk immediately; upon his return, the partisan asked for a few more dragoons 
for his party, and returned to his duty. The convoy made it to its destination safely. 426 
In 1710, Panton himself directed a partisan to get intelligence regarding French designs 
from leper upon boats sent up the Lys 427 Johan Wijnand van Goor recommended that 
four particular partisans were taken into the service of Her Majesty and the States in 
1704. Each received three months' pay (the English portion of which was taken from 
Contingencies) for his service, equating to fl. 125 for one John Falk; fl. 100 for W. 
Goselken; and fl. 87: 10 each for Paulus Petrotri de Bansi and Jacobus Jungblunt. 428 
After occupation of Brussels in 1706, the post in the Allied-occupied southern 
Netherlands came under the control of Francois Jaupain. Furthermore, as a function of 
a deal made between himself and the previous controller, Pajot (who resided in 
Namur), Jaupain got control of all mail delivery between the French-occupied 
Netherlands and northern Europe. 429 Jaupain offered his services to Sunderland and 
Marlborough (and, secretly it seems, the Dutch), carefully opening and copying many 
of the letters, and sending the intercepts to the Black Chambers in London and The 
424 BL, Add. MSS 61163, if. 229-230b: Meredyth to Marlborough, Lebeck, 7 August 1706 N. S. 
40 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 88: camp journal, 6 August 1708 N. S. The party comprised two 
subalterns and a hundred men. Ibid., f. 117: camp journal, camp at Orchies, 23 August 1709 N. S. 
426 BL, Add. MSS 61308, ff. 118-119b: Colonel William Evans to Marlborough, Tirlemont, 25 July 
1705 NS. 
427 BL, Add. MSS 61314, ff. 46-47b: Thomas Panton to Marlborough, [Ghent], May 1710 N. S. 
428 BL, Add. MSS 61370, f. 178b: warrant for fl. 400 to four partisans. Maastricht, 3 May 1704 N. S. 
429 De Leeuw, op. cit., pp. 142-143. Vaille, op. cit., pp. 16-19. 
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Hague for decryption. 430Jaupain even accompanied Marlborough in the field in 1707 
and 1708, providing his services at the army headquarters, in an intelligence unit that 
collected information on enemy troop movements and provisioning. On 4 June 1708, 
Britain and the States-in the persons of Marlborough and Johan van den Bergh- 
authorised Jaupain to retain one or two 'couriers or postilions supernumerary' for the 
secret service during the war, whose expenses would be paid from the revenue of the 
posts 432 
This process could be remarkably proficient (Marlborough, Richard Molesworth was 
'credibly informed', had known of the French plan on Brussels at least six days before 
the army decamped from Roeselare432), but they was far from perfect. Marlborough 
and Cadogan and been somewhat indiscreet in their discussions regarding the 1708 
campaign, spurring the French into action. Jaupain intercepted a letter that spoke of a 
conspiracy in one of the Allied towns, but Marlborough and Cadogan would not 
initially countenance it. Both Ghent and Bruges fell to the initiative of the French 433 
Prior to the surprises that opened the 1708 campaign, the British had been worried by 
rumours of a Jacobite descent on Scotland from Dunkirk. Cadogan, from his posts at 
Ostend and Bruges, played a considerable role in organising the British response and 
gathering what news he could of the French plans 434 The quartermaster-general was 
not alone in this, with the likes of Lumley also providing their own intelligence 435 
430 BL, Add. MSS 61567: Jaupain to Sunderland, Brussels, 31 December 1706 N. S. De Leeuw, op. 
cit., pp. 143-144,150-151. 
431 BL, Add. MSS 61568, ff. 91-113. De Leeuw, op. cit., p. 142. Add. MSS 61371, ff. 252-252b: 
order to Francois Jaupain, director-general of the posts in Spanish Netherlands. Marlborough 
and Van den Bergh. Camp a Terbanck, 4 June 1708 N. S. 
432 BL, Add. MSS 61312, ff. 186-191b: Richard Molesworth to his brother [unclear which one], 
camp at Berleghem, 3 December 1708 N. S. See, for example, the letters of Marlborough to Erle 
and Chanclos, 20 November 1708 N. S.: Murray, iv, p. 315. 
433 A. J. Veenendaal (pPre), 'The Opening Phase of Marlborough's Campaign in 1708 in the 
Netherlands', History, 35 (1950), pp. 35,39-41. 
434 BL, Add. MSS 61160, ff. 62-64b (14 March 1708 N. S. ), 64-65b (20 March N. S. ), 66-68b (28 
March N. S. ) and 69-69b (2 April N. S. ), letters of Cadogan to Marlborough. See also NA, SP 
84/574 ff. 221-230b: extracts of Dayrolle's letters from the Hague, 17 February to 22 March 1708 
N. S. Intelligence relating to the intended invasion. SP 84/574 ff. 231-240b: further extracts from 
Cadogan and Dayrolle's letters on the invasion scare. 
435 BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 128-129b: Lumley to Marlborough, Ghent, 11 March 1708 N. S. Ibid., 
ff. 130-131b: ditto, 28 March 1708 N. S. 
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When the threat was renewed in the winter of 1709/1710, Cadogan was kept occupied 
at Brussels and The Hague. In his absence, much of the valuable work was carried out 
by his aide-de-camp, Richard King, who was at Bruges. King employed his own 
'intelligencers' and himself passed valuable intelligence to his superior, and also 
Marlborough, via Cardonnel, in London. Indeed, Cadogan, who approved very much 
of his aide's measures, later writing 
The Accounts you have transmitted are so Very clear and exact that they seem to 
leave no room for any further apprehending the Enemies have any Design of a 
Descent on foot. 
told King to communicate directly with both Secretary of State the Earl of Sunderland 
and Cardonnel, while the threat seemed real enough. 436 Cardonnel was the link 
through which much information passed; as deputed commander-in-chief in the 
winter of 1704/5, Cornelius Wood informed Marlborough that we would give an 
account every post of what occurred in the army - but as he understood how occupied 
the captain-general was, would do so most commonly by way of letters to the 
commander-in-chief's secretary. 437 
436 KP I(i)/147: Cardonnel to King, Whitehall, 20 December 1709 O. S. Cardonnel noted receipt 
of King's letters of 22 and 24 December N. S. KP 1(i)/148: Cadogan to King, Brussels, 25 
December 1709 N. S. 1(1' I(i)/151: Cadogan to King, Brussels, 1 January 1710 N. S. Cadogan 
informed King that, the threat having dissipated, he was no longer needed at Bruges and might 
leave when he saw fit. KP I(i)/153: Cardonnel to King, Whitehall, 10 January 1710 O. S. 
437 BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 152-153b: Wood to Marlborough, Breda, 11 January 1705 N. S. 
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VI 
Command, delegation and military decision 
making 
Until his dismissal on 30 December 1711 O. S., John Churchill, duke of Marlborough 
was Queen Anne's prime military plenipotentiary in the Low Countries. Initially 
promoted "Generall over all and singular Our Foot Forces, Employed, or to be 
Employed for Our Services'438 and commander-in-chief of the English contingent in 
Holland by William 111439, he was later advanced to the rank of Captain-General by 
Anne, who renewed the (then) earl's patent as her commander-in-chief in the Low 
Countries. ' The text of Marlborough's warrant as commander-in-chief highlights 
authority of the post. It encompassed the right to issue orders and regulations, 
4-18 NA, SP 44/168 p. 354. Warrant to Marlborough. William and Vernon. Hampton Court, 1 
June 1701 O. S. 
439 NA, SP 84/574 ff. 23-24b and SP 44/168 pp. 355-358. Warrant to Marlborough as 
commander-in-chief in the Low Countries. William and Vernon. 1 June 1701 O. S. The warrant 
appointed Marlborough to the "... command in chief of all Our Forces employed or to be 
employed by Us in the service of the States General of the United Provinces. For the better 
Government of Our said Forces during the continuance in that Service, We have thought fit, & 
by these Presents do authorise & empower You to prepare & publish such Rules & Ordinances 
as are fit to be observed by all Officers and Soldiers under your Command; as also to punish all 
Offenders & Transgressors against the same, according to the Nature of their Offences as they 
shall appear upon Tryal before a Court Martial, which We hereby give You Power & Authority 
to assemble as often as You shall see Occasion; to be composed of Field Officers & Captains 
only of Our said Army, whereof seven at least are to make a Quorum, who are to judge for all 
Crimes & offences against the said ordinances by a Majority of Voices, & according to their 
Judgement you are to cause sentence to be pronounced against the Person or Persons offending, 
as shall be thought fit, according to the true Intent & Meaning of the said Articles. " 
440 SP 84/574 ff. 25-26b and SP 44/168 pp. 391-394. Warrant and orders to Marlborough as 
commander-in-chief in the Low Countries. Anne and Vernon. 9 March 1702 O. S. This warrant 
authorised Marlborough to be "General, and Commander in Chief of all Our Forces aswell 
Horse, as Foot, which have, or shall be Sent to Holland, to be Employed in conjunction with the 
Troops of our Allies... " 
Marlborough was to "prepare and Publish such Rules and Ordinances as are fit to be observed 
by all Officers and Soldiers under your Command", punishing same by courts-martial, "We 
giving you power to Reprieve any Person under any Sentence, till our Pleasure be known. " 
See also SP 44/168 pp. 380-381: Direction to the Attorney or Solicitor-General to prepare a bill 
for Marlborough as captain-general. Anne and Vernon. St James, 10 March 1702 O. S. 
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administer military justice and issue promotions. It is this suite of dignities, rights and 
powers that formed the corpus from which elements might be delegated, by order and 
custom, to subordinate general and staff officers, and provided the mechanism by 
which supra-regimental control of the army functioned. All officers held their 
commissions from the queen, and Marlborough was her designated, immanent 
military legate. What could not be so easily delegated to his subordinates were the 
authority that attended Marlborough on account of office as captain-general, his 
position on the cabinet, his close friendship end excellent working relationship with 
the Lord Treasurer, Godolphin (until the latter's dismissal), and his elevated role in the 
direction of the workings of the Grand Alliance, among other things. 
From an English or British perspective, Marlborough's notional powers in the field-as 
opposed to his practise of them, which might be limited by a variety of political or 
diplomatic considerations -changed little. The earliest possible alteration lay in the 
commission by Anne of a Board of General Officers in London, in 1706, which was to 
... meet together for Redressing and Preventing as much as possible the great Abuses and Disorders that are frequently committed by Officers and Soldiers 
thereunto belonging [with particular emphasis on malpractices in recruiting] ... [unto which the General Officers were] to receive, hear and examine all 
Informations and Complaints that shall be brought before them of the 
Misbehaviour of any Officer or Soldier in Our Service; Or any Other Abuses of 
Irregularities ... committed as aforesaid 441 
While this body provided another court of inquiry or appeal that might be set against 
Marlborough's local administration of military justice as commander-in-chief-and his 
dignity as captain-general-it in truth proved little imposition on Marlborough's 
authority for much of the war; indeed, the cases the Board examined tended to 
minutiae and tedium, and removed several time-consuming articles (such as the 
441 NA, WO 71/1, pp. 1-2. Warrant of Her Majesty to institute a Board of General Officers, 
countersigned by Henry St John. St James, 9 February 1706 O. S. Three was to signify a quorum, 
and the eldest was to act as president. The Board was allowed to act for itself, or refer cases to a 
court-martial if proper. The first meeting was held on Wednesday morning, 20 February 1706 
O. S. Out of those who served under Marlborough in the Low Countries, Orkney, Withers, 
Hamilton, Hay and Meredyth were present. Later, on account of the meetings' previous 
irregularity, it was ordered that the Board met every Monday, Wednesday and Friday, weekly, 
consisting of seven general officers 'of the several degrees' by turns, relieved weekly - 
excluding those involved in regulating the clothing. WO 71/1, p. 123: circular letter to the 
general officers. Her Majesty, the Prince Consort and Marlborough. Whitehall, 23 February 1708 
O. S. 
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regulation of clothing) from his duties. 442 (In 1711, the Board was restructured into a 
'Superior Board', composed of general officers proper, of major-general and above; and 
an 'Inferior Board', comprising brigadiers. 443) One of the first significant acts of the 
Board was on the matter of promotions. Marlborough's commission as commander-in- 
chief had granted him the right to grant breveted promotions, thus: 
And that the respective Troops and CompYs. of Our said Forces may not be 
unsupply'd of Officers to Command them, whilst they are abroad in the said 
Service, We do give you Power and Authority in case of the Death, Removal by 
Sentence of a Court Martial, or the quitting of any of the present Officers of the said 
Forces, to supply the said Vacancies by such Persons as you shall make Choice of 
for that purpose, who are to be acknowledged, and to Command in their respective 
Stations, as if they had received Commissions from Us, and to continue in their said 
Employments till Our further Pleasure be known. 444 
Yet in 1708 Anne issued a royal prohibition against brevets, overseen by the Board: 
Whereas the Granting of Brevetts to Officers in Our Armys hath been found to be of 
ill Consequence and very Prejudicial to Our Service and hath created many and 
frequent Differences and Disputes among them, for Remedy whereof Wee are 
pleased hereby to Declare Our Royall Intention That from henceforth We will grant 
no Brevett to any Officer in Our Service. 
A will that was extended to the Generalissimo, captain-general and all her 
commanders-in-chief and other officers likewise; though the order received two 
notable exceptions in the positions of the adjutant-general and quartermaster-general 
of the army, which were by custom allowed the brevet of colonel -a practice that was 
442 A key duty was the regulation of clothing in the army, which Marlborough delegated to his 
general officers upon every opportunity. A series of boards of officers were set to see to the 
matter; the first. See NA WO 71/1, pp. 101-107,109-110,150-151,152-153,176-179,180-181,182- 
185,197-199,200-201,203-204,205,208-209,228-229 (Sir Temple, Bt actually sat on this board of 
21 February 1709 O. S.; a rarity for officers that typically served in the Low Countries after the 
first board, which included Orkney, Ingoldsby and Temple), 262-263,286-287; WO 71/2, p. 54; 
WO 72/1 (Bundle 1), 12,13,14,23,26. 
443 NA, WO 71/2, pp. 1-2. Three general officers would continue to constitute a quorum for the 
senior board, with the eldest presiding. The inferior board would comprise three or more 
brigadiers "actually in [Her Majesty's] service", appointed by the senior board, who would sit 
at least twice a week. The superior board possessed the power to refer matters regarding the 
recruiting service and other articles to courts-martial if necessary; or in the case of extraordinary 
occurrences, to make a report to the Committee of Council and general officers of the privy 
council, as such affairs happened. 
NA, SP 44/168 pp. 391-394. Warrant to Marlborough as commander-in-chief. Anne and 
Vernon. St James, 9 March 1702 O. S. 
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allowed to continue. 445 Marlborough himself was aware of the potential ill-use of the 
brevet, and supportive, so it was not the assault upon his rights that might be 
contended. The same could not be said for the next brand of senior military council 
convened in England, the 'Committee of Council' of the war office. 446 
A group that sat in Anne's absence, it consisted of a number of "lords of the committee 
of council" (i. e. the cabinet, in essence, of which Marlborough and James Butler, duke 
of Ormonde were members) and those general officers of the army that held the 
dignity of privy councillor - of which there were six in 1711: Meinhardt, duke of 
Schomberg; John Campbell, the duke of Argyll; George Hamilton, duke of Orkney; 
Charles Boyle, earl of Orrery; Richard Stanley, earl Rivers; and Thomas Earle. The 
board was designed as a more subtle Harleyite counter to Marlborough's authority; 
Orrery believed the Queen "should take back to herself a good deal of that power 
which she has given away to the several Commanding Officers in Chief" -particularly 
Marlborough-referring that which she did not deal with herself to those judged 
proper, which the earl suggested might compose a committee of the general officers in 
the privy council (as opposed to the existing Board of General Officers, which he 
thought tainted). His suggestion was the basis of the later creation . 447 
The central act of this committee was agreed on 11 April 1711 O. S., when a series of 
regulations were agreed by the Committee of Council and the general officers in the 
Privy Council; these were certified by Anne under her sign manual, becoming effective 
1 May 1711 O. S. in England, and abroad as of the time they were communicated to the 
army. The provisions were considerable: no general officer or any other officer that 
sold his commission, and was no longer in service, was in any instance to act as a 
445 NA, WO 71/1, p. 235: proclamation of Anne, countersigned by Robert Walpole. 12 July 1708 
O. S. Also SP 41/3/122. See, for example, NA, WO 71/2, pp. 72-73. "... it having been always the 
Practice to Allow the Rank of Colonel to the Adjutants Gen'. of the Army, Which Your Majtr. 
Has been lately Pleased to Declare Your Approbation of by Your Order of ye 7th Septr. last. " For 
which, see WO 72/1 (Bundle 1), 17: warrant allowing rank of colonel to the adjutants-general 
and quartermasters-general, in exception to the regulations prohibiting brevets. 7 September 
1711 O. S. WO 26/12 pp. 284-285,286. 
446 For an excellent discussion of this body, see Ivor F. Burton, "'The Committee of Council at 
the War-Office": an experiment in cabinet government under Anne', The Historical journal, iv, 1 
(1961), pp. 78-84. 
44" HMC, 53, Portland Manuscripts, iv, p. 605: Orrery to Harley, c. September 1710. Orrery went 
so far as suggesting Anne appointed the general officers afresh for each campaign, on the 
different establishments. Burton, 'Committee of Council', p. 81. 
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general or other officer, or rise in the Court; no further brigadiers would be promoted - 
instead the seniormost colonels would be ordered to act as brigadiers when necessary; 
the Board of General Officers was to consist of lieutenants-general and majors-general 
alone (a sub-board of brigadiers was appointed); and Anne's order of 12 July 1708 N. S. 
that forbade the issuing of brevets (and was widely ignored) should be strictly 
restated: Barring the last, these were notable intrusions into what had hitherto been 
Marlborough's dominion; but if the duke was disquietened by the existence and 
competence of the council, he found an unlikely ally in the secretary of state, Henry St 
John. St John helped Marlborough undermine several of committee's dictats, not least 
in securing necessary (as the duke viewed them) brigadiers' promotions. With St John's 
connivance, the committee atrophied, and nothing more was heard of its meetings after 
July 1711.449 
Despite his stymieing of the Committee of Council, Marlborough could not prevent his 
disgrace to more persistent and vigorous methods of attack. Upon his dismissal, and 
prior to Ormonde's appointment, the British army in the Low Countries had no single 
general-in-chief; rather, orders were dispatched to each branch of the service. Orkney 
as general of Foot in the absence of a commander-in-chief, received the authority to 
give orders for that arm as necessary, in preparation for the coming campaign. Lumley, 
as general of Horse, received like orders for his charge, with the additional 
requirement to give orders to Ross, who as Colonel-General of Dragoons was the 
senior officer of that service, and received his own order from Anne - albeit with the 
clause that he should act "with regard nevertheless to such Directions as you may 
receive from Our General of the Horse. "450 
448 BL, Add. MSS 61134, ff. 37-38b: Regulations agreed by the Committee of Council, War Office, 
11 April 1711 O. S. (see also NA, WO 26/12 pp. 281-283; SP 41/4 pp. 12,13). Add. MSS 61134, ff. 
35-36b: Granville to Marlborough, Whitehall, 1 May 1711 O. S. A letter stating that Anne had 
agreed to the regulations there sent, which were to be made public to the army in the Low 
Countries. Other provisions of these regulations included: no commissions were to be sold but 
by royal approbation, and no officer had leave to sell if he had served less than twenty years or 
been disabled in the service, unless there was an extraordinary occasion for it; no person under 
the age of sixteen was to have a commission - those under that age that already possessed 
commissions were to serve or be cashiered. 
449 Burton, 'Committee of Council', pp. 82-84. 
450 NA, WO 26/12 pp. 291-293. Orders to Lumley, Ross and Orkney. Anne and Lansdowne. St 
James, 1 January 1712 O. S. 
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In addition to his command over the English contingent in the Low Countries, 
Marlborough also held a degree of authority over the forces of the States General in the 
theatre, and by extension those of the auxiliary forces in Dutch, English and joint 
Anglo-Dutch pay--albeit with several important qualifications. In a secret resolution of 
the States General, dated 30 June 1702 N. S., it laid out a dozen articles governing the 
command and activity of the English and States' troops, to which Marlborough 
signified his approbation. Interestingly, while Marlborough's functional authority as a 
commander of English troops in the theatre derived from his warrant as commander- 
in-chief (see Chapter II), his authority as an Allied commander effectively came from 
his commission as captain-general, as it was in the captain-general's name-not 
Marlborough's, nor the commander-in-chief of the English soldiery then in the 
Netherlands -that the articles were composed. 451 
The resolution did not simply bind the Dutch to English command; rather, it provided 
for a mutuality of command, wherein Dutch soldiers could be expected to serve under 
English generals and vice versa, as necessity demanded. Marlborough was not 
explicitly named as a general-in-chief of the Anglo-Dutch battalia, though his pre- 
eminence in the theatre was implicit in certain articles. Any States' generals and 
regiments that were attached to his army were to fall under the duke's command; in 
his absence, the army would be commanded by highest-ranked general with the force, 
which effectively meant a derivation to Dutch command, as no English officer except 
Marlborough exceeded the rank of lieutenant-general, while the States possessed the 
generals Athlone, Ouwerkerk and Obdam. 452 
An added complication lay in the matter of the Dutch gedeputeerden to velde, or 'field 
deputies': a group of individuals, three to five in number, appointed by the States 
General on behalf of the provinces of the Netherlands and the Raad van State to 
provide an interface between the army and its political masters. 453 The secret resolution 
of 30 June provided little mention of the field deputies, other than a vague direction to 
451 Inventory States General no. 2347, ff. 270-272 - copied in't Hoff, pp. 609-611. 
452 Ibid. The reciprocal nature of command is highlighted in articles 1,2 and 10. Marlborough 
was expected to give all orders regarding the Dutch forces in his army to the senior Dutch 
general present, if the situation allowed, rather than commanding them directly. 
453 For a list of the field deputies in the war, see Wijn, viii, vol. 3, Appendix 37, pp. 368-369 and 
Snyder, iii, Appendix 2. 
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the effect that Marlborough would concert with them (and the senior general of the 
States' forces in the theatre) on the conduct of operations. The field deputies' own 
instructions, however, were more detailed, particularly on the issue of disputes 
between the English and Dutch commanders. The secret resolution of 30 June required 
Marlborough to entreat the advice of the senior general of the States with his army 
(who would in turn take the advice of his subordinate generals) , 
but understandably 
made no mention of how the army would act when the commanders were not in 
agreement. By their own instructions, the field deputies had powers to forbid the use 
of Dutch troops in any action they thought prejudicial to the States, and were to 
attempt to reconcile the parties in dispute; and, if that was impossible, to give such 
orders to the earl of Athlone (the Dutch general-in-chief) as they thought proper, while 
informing the Griffier of the States-General 454 The field deputies were not simply the 
obstructive, 'veritable political commissars' noted by some, they could as soon be 
staunch supporters of Marlborough and his strategy, as Lord Raby quipped: "... as 
Mas*. Van Collen does in the Councils of Warr, to say I am for wt ever Mylord Duke is 
for. "455 
No such agreement existed with the Imperial generals, and in a union with the armies 
of Eugene or Louis of Baden the nature of the command was agreed according to 
circumstance. Early in 1704, for example, Marlborough concerted with Count 
Sescherwind, an imperial envoy, on the operations for the following campaign. One of 
the issues covered was the issue of command if the armies joined. Baden had thought it 
proper that the parole would be given for the campaign by the Emperor (or his 
representative); or, if that would be a difficulty, by the Emperor on one day and Her 
Majesty on the next. Marlborough quite firmly agreed with the latter proposition, if he 
was to command his army in that theatre 456 
454 Concept van Instructie voor de Heeren Gedeputeerden to Velde. Secret Resolution of the 
States General, 7 July 1702 N. S. Wijn, viii, vol. 3, bl. 10, pp. 699-702. Article 8 noted the protocols 
to be followed in case of dispute between the generals. The Dutch 
455 Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander, p. 99. BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 53-58b: Raby to 
Cadogan, Berlin, 18 December 1706 N. S. 
456 BL, Add. MSS 61338, ff. 39-43b: memorial on the coming campaign, London, March 1704 N. S. 
See also Add. MSS 22196, ff. 9-12b: Cadogan to Raby, the Hague, 17 February 1704 N. S. 
Cadogan made it clear that the command for the ensuing campaign had not been absolutely 
determined. 
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Table 6.1: Derived commanders-in-chief of Her Majesty's forces in the Low 
Countries, 1701-1711457 
Date of warrant (N. S. ) Derived commander-in-chief 
[-; c. late 1701 ] [Major-General John, Lord Cutts] 
0 NOr't'1irhrr I, )2 Major General Juhe, Lord Cutts 
5 November 1703 Lieutenant-General Charles Churchill 
21 Orre,, il' r FV4 'Major-General Cornelius \1'00d 
22 October 1705 Brigadier Holcroft Blood 
[i. »11111(1111 I, Vu. ') [Major-GeWo dI I le nrv' Withers] ` 
4 November 1706 Lieutenant-General Richard Ingoldsby 
h . ý'ýýrrnt(ý<r 1707 Lieuten, unt-Grneril I Ivory I umlcv 
7 March 1709 Lieutenant-General Cornelius Wood 
1V 1709 Licutcnant-General William Cadog7n 
24 November 1710 Lieutenant-General Cornelius Wood 
13 November 1711 Lieutenant-General William Cadogan 
457 BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 117-117b: Orders to Lord Cutts and to the officer commanding in 
chief Her Majesty's forces for the time being. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. 
The Hague, 20 November 1702 N. S. Add. MSS 61370, if. 81b-82: orders to Charles Churchill as 
commander-in-chief in Marlborough's absence. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's order. 
The Hague, 5 November 1703 N. S. Ibid., if. 175-175b: orders to Wood as commander-in-chief in 
Marlborough's absence. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's order. The Hague, 21 December 
1704 N. S. Add. MSS 61371, If. 54b-55: instructions to Brigadier Blood, upon the command-in- 
chief of Her Majesty's forces in the Low Countries derived. Adam de Cardonnel by 
Marlborough's order. Camp at Brecht, 22 October 1705 N. S. Ibid., If. 119-119b: instructions for 
Richard Ingoldsby as commander-in-chief. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. 
Camp at Gislingen, 4 November 1706 N. S. Ibid., ff. 208b-209b: instructions to Lumley as 
commander-in-chief in Marlborough's absence. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's 
command. The Hague, 6 November 1707 N. S. Add. MSS 61372, If. 105-106b: instructions to 
Wood, upon whom command-in-chief derives. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's order. 
Bruges, 7 March 1709 N. S. Ibid., f. 149b: instructions to Cadogan, on command-in-chief deriving 
to him on Marlborough's absence. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's order. The Hague, 10 
November 1709 N. S. Ibid., f. 251b: instructions to Wood, to whom command-in-chief of Her 
Majesty's forces derives in Marlborough's absence. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's 
order. Brussels, 24 November 1710 N. S. Add. MSS 61373, If. 41-41b: instructions to Cadogan, 
commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's forces in Marlborough's absence. Adam de Cardonnel by 
Marlborough's order. The Hague, 13 November 1711 N. S. 
458 There is no order appointing Withers commander-in-chief in Marlborough's absence in the 
copybook covering this period, BL, Add. MSS 61371. There is an undated order, written at the 
Court at St James, c. January 1706 in BL, Add. MSS 61336, If. 216-217b (together with an order to 
appoint courts-martial, ibid., If. 218-219b). 
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When Marlborough was absent from the army in the Low Countries, he devolved the 
command-in-chief of the English or British forces upon another. This delegation was 
usually made in the winter, when many English, Scots and Irish officers returned to the 
British Isles upon the cessation of the campaign to attend to their own affairs (not least 
the winter session of Parliament). Marlborough's own offices-as envoy and 
plenipotentiary to the United Provinces, in addition to being commander-in-chief- 
meant that he frequently outstayed his subordinates in the Netherlands, reducing the 
pool of officers available. On most occasions it was bestowed upon trusted general 
officers of recognised capability or desire for the dignity, and a middling status in 
society (Cutts and Lumley, as the brother of the earl of Scarborough, excepted). Indeed 
Holcroft Blood, who was appointed in 1705, was but a brigadier, and a junior one at 
that. Only once did command devolve upon the seniormost general officer of the 
preceding campaign, when it was given to Charles Churchill in 1703, perhaps giving 
the lie to what Cutts' agent told the late general's sister, when he wrote: 
... for ye moment ye Duke went for England at ye End of the Campaign, 
Gen" 
Churchill (like one risen from ye Dead) Started up the next morning to reap all 
those advantages for having made a glorious Campaign (as he did every Summer) 
at Aix la Chapelle 459 
The duties expected of the commander-in-chief in Marlborough's absence were 
summarised in the warrant appointing him to his post; these orders were written in a 
form that could provide for further deputation, if necessary, such as in the absence or 
incapacity of the original addressee. The order given to Cutts, for example, for the 
winter of 1702/3, ran as follows: 
Whereas upon My Embarkation for England and during My absence, the 
Command in Chief of her Majestys Forces will derive to You, for Your better 
guidance therein, I have thought it for Her Majestys Service, to give You the 
following Instructions which You are Strictly to observe. Vizt: 
You are to keep a constant Correspondence with the Commanding Officers of Her 
Majestys Forces in the severall Garrisons, to give Orders that the Soldiers be kept in 
the Strictest Discipline, and to take Care that no Officer be absent from his 
Command except upon very urgent occasions. 
459 BL, Add. MSS 69380, ff. 174-175b: letter of Cutts' agent to [Joanna] Cutts, Basingstoke, 5 July 
17130. S. 
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And whereas it may be thought necessary to draw a Body of Troops together for 
annoying the Enemy during the Winter season, or to oppose any Designs they may 
have upon the Frontiers, You are upon Application from the States, to Order a 
proportionable Number of Her Majestys Forces both Horse and Foot, if it be 
necessary to March and joyn the Troops of the States where the Service may require 
and in such Case, You are to insist in the most decent manner, that Her Majestys 
Forces be furnisht by the States with the necessary Carriages and Forage for such 
expedition, and You are also to give Notice to the Troops that they do not at any 
time march out of their respective Garrisons without Orders in Writing from Your 
self or the Commander in Chief of Her Majestys Forces for the time being. 
And as I have already given Furlows to a competent Number of Officers of each 
Regiment of Horse, Foot and Dragoons, to repair to England and Scotland, for 
Recruits and other affairs of their Regiments, You are not to permit any more 
Officers to come over unless it be upon the greatest Emergency. 
Lastly You are to give Me a constant account of the State of Her Majestys Forces, 
and of all accidents that may happen for Her Majestys Information and such further 
Orders as the Service may require 460 
Minor variations could exist from year to year. In 1705, Blood had orders that the 
regimental officers were constant in exercising the men and had them fire as the 
weather permitted. He was also to review the regiments each month, ensuring that 
there remained with each a field officer, along with two officers (including a 
quartermaster) for each troop of Horse of Dragoons, and at least half the commissioned 
officers of a battalion of Foot; Blood gave monthly lists of the troops garrisoned in the 
Low Countries throughout the winter. 46! The conquest of much of the Southern 
Netherlands in 1706 caused the addition of a new clause, demanding that the army was 
respectful of the Catholic clergy of Flanders and Brabant. 462 
The article touching upon the forming of a detachment of soldiers in a time of necessity 
was one of the main issues of contention. Occasionally it was restated: even though 
460 BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 117-117b: Orders to Lord Cutts and to the officer commanding in 
chief Her Majesty's forces for the time being. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. 
The Hague, 20 November 1702 N. S. 
461 BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 54b-55. Add. MSS 61309, ff. 20-21b, 22-23b: Blood to Marlborough, 
Dort, 11 January 1706 N. S. The state of the forces in the Low Countries as of 11 January 1706 
N. S. was: five regiments of Horse and two of Dragoons (Lumley's, Wood's, Cadogan's, 
Wyndham s, Schomberg's; Hay's, Ross's), with 1684 effectives; and twenty battalions of Foot 
(Guards, two of Orkney's, Churchill's, Webb's, North and Grey's, Rows, Godfrey's, 
Ingoldsby's, Mordaunt's, Sabine's, Tatton's, Ferguson's, Meredyth's, Lalö s, Stringer's, Evans's, 
Farrington's, Temple's and Macartney's) with 9949 effectives. 
462 See, for example, ibid., ff. 119-119b and Add. MSS 61372, ff. 105-106b. 
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Cornelius Wood's standing orders as deputed commander-in-chief in 1710 provided 
for the eventuality of being called upon to draw a body of soldiers out of garrison, he 
still received a further, positive order on this issue from Marlborough, who had yet to 
leave The Hague. Wood was authorised and required upon any emergency to furnish a 
proportionable number of Her Majesty's forces under his command, to act in concert 
with the Earl of Albermarle (or the commander-in-chief of the States' forces in those 
parts at the time). 463 
Upon Cutts' leaving the army early in 1702, Ingoldsby was deputed in his place 
Marlborough had told Ingoldsby that he was to follow the commands of the Dutch 
commander, the Prince of Nassau-Saarbrücken, in whatever related to the English 
corps. Cutts did not demur, but felt the need to clarify that he was sure that 
Marlborough intended that any and all orders for the English were to be given to 
Ingoldsby, not the regiments directly, 
Because that would be yeilding a point that a Generall Officer could not justifie to 
the King, the Nation, or his own Honour. And an Accident might unfortunately 
happen at some time or other, which might ruin a Mans fortune and Reputation, if 
he preffered himself to be a Cypher at the Head of an English Army in a Foreign 
country. 
By way of an example, Cutts referred to a recent case wherein orders of march were 
sent directly to some of the Danish regiments, not the Prince of Württemberg, their 
commander - who complained to Nassau-Saarbriicken, the States-General and the 
Court of St James, indicating that if the episode was repeated, he would not be held 
responsible. Upon hearing this from Wurttemberg himself, Cutts noted he 
... carelessly [insinuated] to the States, and the Prince, that I was sure the same 
Regard at least would be had to the English; and they assured me, that no orders 
shall be given to the English, but through my hands, or the next Commander in 
Cheif in my absence. 44 
Previously, during the preparations for war in late 1701, Cutts had highlighted to a 
subordinate that, if he was ordered to march or make any detachment by the Dutch, he 
40 BL, Add. MSS 61372, f. 272b: orders for Lieutenant-General Wood. Adam de Cardonnel by 
Marlborough's command. The Hague, 31 December 1710 N. S. 
4" BL, Add. MSS 69379, packet 1, if. 7-10b: Cutts to Marlborough, The Hague, 10 January 1702 
N. S. 
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was to politely state his readiness to obey such an order, but to check with Cutts (as 
commander-in-chief) by express first - excepting the case of extraordinary necessity, in 
which case the commander's discretion, in light of Cutts' directions, would be 
required. 465 The secret resolution later adopted by the States-General on 30 June 1702 
was indistinct on this matter. Although it provided that, when joined in the field, 
English or Dutch troops would receive all orders by way of their general-in-chief with 
the army, there was no clear provision when dispersed in garrisons during the 
winter 466 While the early orders stated that a general was to mobilise garrisons on the 
application of the States-General themselves, later warrants mentioned specific 
commanders by name. In 1707 it was to be Ouwerkerk who would authorise any 
detachment; in 1709 and 1710 it was Eugene, who was implicitly referred to as 
'commander-in-chief' of the Allied forces in the Low Countries in Marlborough's 
absence; and in 1711 it was the earl of Albemarle 467 
The process might involve multiple stages, each with a different scheme of authority. 
In March 1711 Cornelius Wood oversaw the march of British detachments to be 
cantoned between the Scarpe and the Dyle, according to a route delivered by 
Marlborough. Like routes were also sent to the respective governors or commanders of 
the garrisons in Flanders and Brabant where any subject troops were quartered; Wood 
wrote to the respective commanders to ensure their compliance. 468Yet when these 
forces were, at the behest of Albermarle and Cadogan, augmented (by a further sixteen 
soldiers detached from each battalion in garrison, in Flanders, Brabant and Hainault), it 
was the comte de Tilly that would oversee the scheme's direction and to whom 
Marlborough wrote with the routes of march. The duke informed the commanders of 
the English and Hanoverian forces, so that they would be in a position to conform to 
Tilly's commands. Wood was but one of those officers. 469 
465 BL, Add. MSS 69379, ff. 197-198b: Cutts to [? An unnamed regimental commander], The 
Hague, 7 December 1701 N. S. 
466 See 't Hoff, p. 610, articles 6 and 12. 
467 BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 208b-209b. Add. MSS 61372, ff. 105-106b; f. 149b; f. 251b. Add. MSS 
61373, ff. 41-41b. 
468 BL, Add. MSS 61372, f. 283b: Marlborough to Wood, the Hague, 10 March 1711 N. S. 
469 BL, Add. MSS 61372, f. 288: Marlborough to Tilly, the Hague, 29 March 1711 N. S. Seven 
British battalions besides the Guards were not to provide any detachments; the regiment at 
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Deputed commanders oversaw a variety of duties. In December 1701, Cutts' duties as 
local commander-in-chief included a careful oversight of all the English corps in the 
Low Countries, in preparation for the impending conflict. All regiments were to be 
complete by 1 January 1702 O. S. Cutts attended a review in January and took an 
account of all the forces' arms and equipment, keeping himself informed of any 
alterations that had occurred since his last review (23 September 1701 N. S., for one 
battalion) according to a prescribed form; updates were to be sent to him weekly by 
every Monday's post, dating any alterations from Saturday to Saturday. 470 
Charles Churchill, who acted as commander-in-chief over the winter of 1703/4, was 
also tasked with overseeing the regulation of the clothing in the army in the Low 
Countries. He received from the colonels the patterns they desired for their regiments 
and inspected them with the assistance of other general officers as he saw fit. Those 
that met with his approval were marked with his seal; when the clothing was 
manufactured, examples were to be checked to ensure they matched the patterns. Only 
then would Churchill certify his approbation to the Comptroller of the Accounts of the 
Army, that he might report the same to the regimental paymasters who would then 
pay for it as the off-reckonings became due 4n 
Lumley, placed in temporary command while Marlborough journeyed to the Imperial 
Court at Vienna, faced a similar set of responsibilities regarding clothing - together 
with overseeing the dispatch of recruiting officers, musters, exact accounts of the 
stoppages to the Horse and Dragoons over the campaign (and the number of horses 
such would purchase) the sending of field officers to manage the embarkation of 
remounts, and so on. 472When he was deputed as commander over the winter of 
1707/8, his tenure saw the attempted Jacobite descent upon Scotland, and Lumley was 
Bruges was also to furnish nothing. Orders to Bttlow, Tarazena, Schulenburg and Württemberg 
relating to this augmentation follow on f. 288b. 
470 BL, Add. MSS 69379, ff. 197-198b: Cutts to [? An unnamed regimental commander], The 
Hague, 7 December 1701 N. S. 
471 BL, Add. MSS 61370, f. 85: order to Charles Churchill regarding clothing. Court at St James, 6 
January 1704 O. S. See also, ibid., ff. 108b-109,25 March 1704. 
472 BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 45-46: instructions for recruits and clothing of Her Majesty's Horse 
and Dragoons in the Low Countries. Adam de Cardonnel, by Marlborough's command. Camp 
at Brecht, 22 October 1705 N. S. 
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in a position to regulate with Brigadier Sabine and Cadogan the British battalions that 
were to embark to prevent the design. 473 
This derivation of command-in-chief could take precedence over any other seniority in 
rank. When Marlborough ordered Henry Lumley to Ghent, to take command of the 
British forces in those parts in accordance with his rank, he also commanded Lumley to 
"pursue such Orders & Instructions" as would be delivered to him by Richard 
Ingoldsby. Both were lieutenants-general, though Lumley was more senior. Ingoldsby 
had been deputed as commander-in-chief in Marlborough's absence the previous 
November; and although Marlborough was then in Holland, Ingoldsby retained a level 
of management 474 Its pathways of communication could also be somewhat awkward. 
When in 1703 Ingoldsby sought leave for a lieutenant of his regiment to return to 
England, on account of his health, it was to the acting commander-in-chief, Cutts, that 
his petition was addressed - if in a rather convoluted manner, going first by Cardonnel 
in London, who then asked Watkins at The Hague to speak to the lieutenant-general! 475 
These temporary commanders-in-chief were careful to absolve themselves of the most 
difficult decisions; theirs were typically minor choices and resolutions. Writing early in 
1703, after councils and conferences held in Marlborough's absence had directed minor 
detachments into Flanders and to the Moselle, Cutts assured the duke that, these aside, 
all things would be 'at liberty' upon his arrival in the Low Countries. Cutts had missed 
a conference of the deputies of the States-General on 9 March through illness, but was 
informed of its resolutions by Jacob Hop, the treasurer-general. The plan had been to 
order Coehoorn to attempt an operation in Flanders, if the engineer thought it 
practical; the States desired Cutts to make a detachment from the English troops to 
support the enterprise - whether to take part in the operation, or replace those Dutch 
troops that did (in their garrison at Bergen-op-Zoom). Cutts chose the latter, despite 
413 E. g. BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 128-129b: Lumley to Marlborough, Ghent, 11 March 1708 N. S. 
Ibid., ff. 130-131b: ditto, 28 March 1708 N. S. 
474 BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 144-144b: order to Henry Lumley. Adam de Cardonnel by 
Marlborough's command. The Hague, 19 April 1707 N. S. 
475 BL, Add. MSS 42176, ff. 61-62b: Cardonnel to Watkins, Whitehall, 7 December 1703 O. S. 
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Marlborough's earlier dictat that no English soldiers were to be sent there, on account 
of the oft-rampant sickness there. 476 
The order to take temporary command-in-chief over the English forces was 
accompanied by an order to appoint courts-martial. These orders were addressed to 
the named deputy, or the 'commander in chief with Her Majesty's forces in the Low 
Countries' in that individuals absence. They permitted the recipient, pursuant to the 
powers granted to Marlborough by virtue of his own commission as commander-in- 
chief under the Great Seal, the authority to appoint courts-martial as he thought fit; to 
order the judge-advocate or deputy judge-advocate to attend; and to require the 
provost marshal to summon all necessary to attend and give notice of the court's time 
and place, as chosen by the president. The sentence of the court would be reported to 
the deputed commander-in-chief for his approbation and directions 471 
On one occasion, orders to subordinate generals to appoint courts-martial were passed 
prior to Marlborough leaving the continent, or appointing a deputy. On 9 September 
1703 (two months before he was deputed as commander-in-chief in Marlborough's 
absence), Charles Churchill was given orders to appoint courts and review their 
sentences. (No mention was made to a particular branch of the service). The following 
day, Lumley was ordered likewise, but for the Horse and Dragoons alone. 478 
**ý 
Courts-martial, be they general or regimental, represented one example of collective 
decision-making in the army, a phenomenon present at various levels of command. 
476 BL, Add. MSS 69379, ff. 30-32b: Cutts to Marlborough, The Hague, 13 March 1703 N. S. Cutts 
stated that Flanders was just as sickly as Bergen-op-Zoom had been in the past, and that the 
latter was much healthier than it had been. 
477 BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 112b-113: order for holding courts-martial, to Lord Cutts, or the 
commander in chief with Her Majesty's forces in the Low Countries. The Hague, 12 November 
1702 N. S. For further orders to appoint courts-martial, directed to the derived commanders-in- 
chief, see: BL, Add. MSS 61370, If. 80b-81 (Churchill, 1703), 175b-176b (Wood, 1704); Add. MSS 
61371, If. 55b-56 (Blood, 1705), ff. 119b-120b (Ingoldsby, 1706), ff. 209b-210 (Lumley, 1707); Add. 
MSS 61372, ff. 106b-107 (Wood, 1709), f. 150 (Cadogan, 1709), f. 252 (Wood, 1710); Add. MSS 
61373, ff. 41b-42 (Cadogan, 1711). 
478 BL, Add. MSS 61370, if. 51b-52 (Charles Churchill) and 52-53b (Henry Lumley): orders 
allowing said generals to appoint courts-martial. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's 
command. Camp at St Trond, 9 and 10 September 1703 N. S. 
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Marlborough's warrant as a commander-in-chief authorised him to appoint general 
courts-martial for the army, and appoint the officers necessary to same: 
And for Execution of Justice in Our said Army, We do give you Authority to 
appoint a Provost Martial, to use, and Exercise that Office, as is usually practiced in 
the Law Martial. And Whereas We have appointed a Judge Advocate to attend the 
said Court Martial for the more orderly proceedings of the same, We do hereby 
give you power in case of Death, Sickness, or necessary absence of the said Judge 
Advocate to depute another Person, such as in your discretion you shall think fit to 
Execute the Said Office. 479 
In authorising a general court-martial, the commander-in-chief of the forces in the Low 
Countries would send an order to a field officer within the army, typically a colonel 
(who might also be a general officer). The recipient, who would be the president of the 
court, would then appoint a number of officers from local regiments, usually of the 
same branch of service as the accused. He would also appoint a guard to the provost 
martial, who would summon such as were called upon to give testimony. Finally, the 
president would authorise and require the court to examine all information by 
affidavit, and to give judgement and sentence according to the time-honoured Rules 
and Articles of War for the Better Government of Her Majesty's Forces in the Low 
Countries, and the Mutiny Act 48o The competence of the general court-martial was not 
always as 'general' as implied; if those charged with offences were common soldiers in 
the Foot Guards, for example, Adam de Cardonnel might ask that they were not tried 
under a commander's warrant, but held in custody until further orders were 
received 481 
479 NA, SP 44/168 pp. 391-394. Warrant to Marlborough as commander-in-chief. Anne and 
Vernon. St James, 9 March 1702 O. S. 
480 E . g. BL, Add MSS 61339, ff. 22-22b: order to Colonel Francis Palmes to hold a general court- 
martial, camp at Duikenburg, 20 July 1702 N. S. In this particular case, the court-martial was 
convened to try disorders committed by individuals in Lumley's and Wyndham's regiments of 
Horse; the officers of court were thus to be drawn from the four regiments of English Horse 
present in the camp. Add. MSS 61336, ff. 24-24b: order to form a court-martial for the Foot, 
given at the camp at Roeselare, 14 October 1708 N. S. For similar orders to the Artillery, and 
Horse and Dragoons, see ibid., ff. 25-25b and ff. 30-30b. 
481 BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 230-230b: order to hold courts-martial in three battalions of Foot 
under Major-General Murray in Flanders. Camp at Terbanck, 16 June 1708 N. S. 
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While there appears to have been no proscription against a court's president and 
members sitting on cases relating to their own regiment 482, cases involving 
commissioned officers typically utilised a board comprised of officers from different 
regiments. This proved particularly necessary at a rather confusing court-martial 
convened at the camp at Thys on 31 May 1703, with Sir Matthew Bridges presiding, 
Captain John Stewart of Lieutenant-General Stewart's regiment of Foot had been 
accused of killing Lieutenant-Colonel William Stewart of the same corps, in a duel 
occasioned by a spilt glass of punch. Among those giving evidence was a Lieutenant 
William Stewart, and although Captain John Stewart was acquitted, the court found 
that another Stewart, the major of the regiment, had been guilty of a 'great fault, 
misdemeanour and neglect of duty' in not preventing the duel. They sentenced him to 
be suspended during Marlborough's pleasure 483 
Courts might be ordered to sit frequently, especially in times of particular ill-discipline, 
be it real or feared. On 11 October 1706, Marlborough ordered that a 'standing' court- 
martial be appointed to meet a least four times a week, assembling at 8 a. m. and not 
adjourning until midday. 484 The rank of the members of the court would depend upon 
the rank of the accused; no officer, for example, would be judged by those of junior 
rank. 485 The deputy judge-advocate was responsible for the legal veracity and protocol 
of the court. Writing to John Ellis late in 1702, and hoping to forestall his future duties 
in this regard, deputy judge-advocate Henry Watkins quipped: 
482 See, for example n. 43 above and the court of Palmes, who presided over a case involving his 
own regiment (Wyndham's). 
483 BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 12-15: proceedings of a general court-martial held at the camp at 
Thys, 31 May 1703 N. S., Sir Matthew Bridges presiding. 
484 BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 111b-112 (regulations to prevent marauding) and 112b-113 (order to 
hold courts-martial). Adam de Cardonnel, by Marlborough's command. Camp at Gramez, 11 
October 1706 N. S. These courts would be presided over by colonels, and the board would 
consist of twelve other field officers or captains. 
485 BL, Add. MSS 61369, If. 32-33b: proceedings of a general court-martial, Colonel Howe 
presiding, camp at Overijssel, 20 July 1702 N. S. A lieutenant having been accused of cowardice 
in his duties, the court comprised six captains and six field officers. The lieutenant was wholly 
acquitted; his accuser, John Reading, was found guilt of casting aspersions against his officer, 
and sentenced to be picketed three times, at the head of each English brigade, for two hours 
each day and with his crime written on his breast. He was then discharged from the service. 
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I shall begin my circuit next week and hold my assizes at Breda and the Bosch 
which I hope will strike such a terror that I shall not frequently have occasion to 
remove from my residence [at The Hague]. 486 
At a court-martial presided over by the Earl of Barrymore, held at the camp at St Tron, 
18 September 1703, Henry Watkins kept tallies of the votes for guilt and innocence 
given by each officer of the court. In this single example, voting was anything but 
equivocal. For the first case, he carefully recorded nine 'guilties' before noting the 
verdict as unanimous; on another he got no further than eight. After that, Watkins 
simply denoted the final verdict 487 If the officially appointed deputy judge-advocate 
was not present -Watkins' terror or no-other officers might be appointed as a local 
deputy judge-advocate, for the purposes of a single general court-martial, with 
concomitant powers to summon witnesses and advise upon the time and location of 
the proceedings 488 In one example-on the march to the Danube, when the army was 
distant from its otherwise typical theatre of operations -the duke of Marlborough's 
chaplain stood in as a local judge-advocate, taking reports of crimes and evidence from 
parties in advance of the court-martial 489 
If a particular case involved more than one nationality, or soldiers from different 
branches of the service, then the composition of the court might reflect that. On 26 June 
1703, William Palmer presided over a court at the camp at Haneffe, consisting of 
twelve commissioned officers of the Dragoons - six of whom were English, and six 
foreign officers of corps in Her Majesty's pay. They met to adjudicate on a disturbance 
between Rowland Pickering of Colonel Featherstone's troop, who was acting as a 
safeguard, and two soldiers from Hessen-Homburg's regiment of Dragoons. 490 On 
486 Quoted in Hayton et al. (eds), HoC, v, p. 810. 
487 BL, Add. MSS 38853, ff. 95-97b: proceedings of a general court-martial held at the camp at St 
Tron, 18 September 1703 N. S. by Lord Cutts' order, the Earl of Barrymore presiding. Ff. 97-97b 
notes Watkins' notes of the officers' verdicts. 
488 BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 30b-31: order to Colonel Howe to hold a court-martial, relating to all 
troops in the Low Countries. Captain Andrew Hayes was authorised to act as deputy judge- 
advocate. Camp at Nijmegen, 24 June 1702 O. S. 
489 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 20b: camp journal, 12 June 1704 N. S. 
490 BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 24-24b: proceedings of a general court-martial held at the camp at 
Haneffe, 26 June 1703 N. S., William Palmer presiding. 
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another occasion, a fatal fight between a corporal in Orkney's regiment and a dragoon 
led to a board composed of both officers of Foot and Dragoons 491 
Indeed, the multinational composition of the army could raise questions on the issue of 
jurisdiction: the German and Danish auxiliaries in the army possessed their own 
conceptions and traditions of military justice, but were also subordinated to the 
Maritime Powers by virtue of their being in Dutch or joint Anglo-Dutch pay. The 
States-General decreed that corps solely in Dutch pay were to fall under the United 
Provinces' orders and directions relating to discipline; and for those regiments in joint 
pay, the regimens of England and Holland together-excepting when the treaties 
signed with the auxiliary nations specified otherwise. It was not the duty of the 
generals of the auxiliary forces to judge whether the orders of England and the United 
Provinces were contrary to their treaties (except in the case of very clear clauses to the 
contrary), and the Maritime Powers were to be responsible for all orders given in this 
regard. Foreign generals accused of disobedience were to be judged by a general court- 
martial of the army, and their princes were not to limit their subordination to England 
and the United Provinces by any secret orders. 
On the specific issue of courts-martial, the States noted that whereas most foreign corps 
had their own courts, "too great a weight and liberty [had] been allowed to the 
judicature of same, " - it was thus necessary to put them under a new method, viz: 
(i) that the general-in-chief of the combined army, as also the senior general of 
the States' forces (and vice versa, if the general-in-chief was Dutch) would 
be informed by way of the judge-advocate of all the excesses committed by 
the auxiliary soldiers; 
(ii) that such information was transmitted to the general-in-chief of the corps of 
which the complaints were made, within a limited time from which that 
corps would be obliged to see justice done and make a report thereof - and 
if this did not occur, the matter was to be settled by courts-martial of the 
army; 
491 BL, Add. MSS 61370, if. 24b-25. 
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(iii) that the foreign troops were obliged to see justice done according to the 
articles and military ordinances of Holland, and to no other laws and 
customs; 
(iv) that they were to produce the proceedings of such justice to the general 
from whom they received the complaint, for his approbation, before it was 
put into execution; 
(v) that they were not allowed to grant pardon or grace to offenders, since such 
a right should have been stipulated in their treaties; 
(vi) that as the forming of the army, all generals of the auxiliary forces would be 
notified that damages committed by their charges would be deducted out of 
the pay of their whole corps 492 
The proceedings of courts-martial under English jurisdiction were sent to the 
commander-in-chief for his approbation and confirmation of any sentences given, 
which would then be put into execution; or if they were mitigated in some manner, 
such as on account of a court's recommendation of mercy despite the sentence, the 
alterations would be returned to the court, which was to act accordingly. 493 On one 
occasion, the court was authorised to put its sentence into execution in advance, 
without receiving the commander-in-chief's confirmation. 494This was a distinct rarity 
and in no way normal practice. In one instance, Cutts wrote that he would have given 
powers to a court-martial to confirm its sentences themselves, but by his commission 
he was "not authorised to vest these Powers in any Person" besides himself 495 
492 BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 69-71b: Extract our of the Resolutions of the States General of the 18"h 
April 1704 Relating to the Subordination and Courts Martial of the Foreign Troops. For examples of 
the States' regulations, see ibid., If. 72-75b: Nader Ordre en Reglement (1704, 's Gravenhage) and 
If. 78-89b: Reglement Van de Hoogh Mog. Heeren Staten Generael der Vereenighde Nederlanden 
Outrent de Subordinatie, Kryghs-discipline, en verscheyde andere Poincten, dienende tot onder-houdinge 
van goede ordres in het Leger. 's Gravenhage. 
493 BL, Add. MSS 69380, If. 12-13b: Richard Sutton to Cutts, Breda, 19 February 1703 (N. S. ) 
494 BL, Add. MSS 61369, If. 30b-31: order to Colonel Howe to hold a court-martial, relating to all 
troops in the Low Countries. Camp at Nijmegen, 24 June 1702 O. S. 
495 BL, Add. MSS 69380, ff. 92-92b: letter of Cutts [to ?] enclosing marching orders, 20 March 
1701 [1704? ] N. S. Copy. 
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The power to remit a sentence of a court-martial, or offer a pardon to any individual 
sentenced, was the perquisite of the commander-in-chief, who possessed the power "to 
Reprieve any Person under any Sentence, " until Her Majesty's further pleasure was 
known. 4% This right extended to the deputed commanders-in-chief, as well as 
Marlborough, by virtue of the warrants the duke sent them. After the court-martial of 
two deserters, both condemned to death, Wood took the liberty to reprieve them, as 
was his right, but still explained his motives to Marlborough: 
... it being (with great submission) my opinion that mercy; weare any roome is left 
to excersise it; is much more acceptable to Heaven; then is the Rigorrous 
prosicutions of justice. 'tis almost three yeeres sence the one left his post by the 
Grave and has sence serv'd in a Colone Regiment 'tis nere time enough to have had 
his fault forgotten, the other left his Regiment at Daniwert, haveing lost a Horse a 
graseing and was fearfull of returneing to his Collors, and was taken workeing his 
trade by Rotterdam, wch circumstances dos somethinge mitigate his fault; I shu'd 
not, my Lord, have presumd to have made this representation, to your Grace, if I 
had not seene soe many profes of your Generous disposition you have given Joy to 
Europe in Shakeing of A Crowne, that longe has stood firmely fix'd on the Head of 
a Saucey Monarke - in giveing life to these pore wretches, you put them in the 
number of those millions of people that are bound to pray for your prosperity. 497 
Marlborough was noted for his willingness to show mercy. Some of the examples may 
seem perplexing to a modern mind. A dragoon in Ross's regiment, Simon Connard, 
was charged with resisting the sergeant of the guard, going so far as to threaten to 
shoot the non-commissioned officer with a pistol, which he held to his chest. 
Unsurprisingly, Connard was found guilty of transgressing the 17th Article of War and 
sentenced by the court to death. Yet, as happened not infrequently, the court 
represented that Connard had only recently arrived at the army; never having heard 
the Articles of War read out by his officers, he could hardly be found guilty of acting 
contrary to them! The court-martial thus recommended mercy, a recommendation with 
which Marlborough agreed 498 When John Franter had fallen out of his corps on the 
march, and a corporal made to order him back, the soldier pointed his firearm at the 
NCO and threatened to fire. A serious charge; but as Franter was a recruit and had 
not-by all appearances-had the Articles of War read to him, and had spend most of 
496 NA, SP 44/168 pp. 391-394. Warrant to Marlborough as commander-in-chief. Anne and 
Vernon. St James, 9 March 1702 O. S. 
497 BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 154-155b: Wood to Marlborough, Breda, 2 February 1705 N. S. 
498 BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 80b-81: proceedings of a court-martial, 1702. 
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his service sick in garrison and the field, the court was unanimously of the opinion that 
he be acquitted 499 
Marlborough rarely went against the courts' recommendations. A rare occasion related 
to a general court-martial held at Ghent in 1708, with Colonel Patrick Meade presiding. 
Two men were sentenced to death for desertion, for which the court could recommend 
no mercy; but as they were aware of Marlborough's willingness to save some when 
more than one man was condemned, they recommended that any pardon went to the 
first-time offender, who deserted on account of 'love for his family'. The other soldier 
was a serial deserter, who had changed his name 'to go on better in his wicked Trade'. 
Marlborough, however, was content to pardon both, on account of their long 
imprisonment and (their colonel) Lord North and Grey's representations. 500 
Others were not so lucky, despite their attempted ingenuity (or otherwise). Thomas 
Tenant, a deserter, was found in Maastricht clothed in the uniform of the Duke of 
Holstein-Ploen's regiment. At the time, Tenant said he did not particularly like the 
English service, and much preferred the Dutch. Later, he tried to explain the entire 
situation by saying that two Irishmen had gotten him rotten drunk and clothed him in 
his new uniform, and that he knew nothing of his new enlistment. No protestations of 
Jacobite bogeymen could save Tenant, however: he was sentenced to death. 501 
An officer in dereliction of his duty, such as one found guilty by a general or 
regimental court-martial, might be indefinitely suspended of his rank and pay, until 
the commanding officer or commander-in-chief was confident of his suitability to 
serve. Major Thomas Parsons, of Godfrey's regiment of Foot, had been found guilty at 
a general court-martial in on 16 June 1705, for failing to prevent a quarrel in which a 
fellow officer was killed. His sentence was to be suspended as Marlborough thought 
499 BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 12-14b: proceedings of a general court-martial held at the camp at 
Lien les Beguines, 8 July 1705 N. S., Sir Richard Temple, Bt presiding. 
500 BL, Add. MSS 38853, ff. 124-125: Marlborough's mercy was only signified 26 June 1708 N. S., 
more than three months after the original court-martial. 
501 BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 10lb-103. 
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fit; having petitioned the commander-in-chief in acknowledgement of his guilt, he was 
restored to his post and command less than two months later. 502 
In certain cases, it was considered necessary to avoid the matter of a court-martial at 
all, to forestall its possible consequences. Writing to Francis Palmes in 1707, 
Marlborough somewhat exasperatedly noted the behaviour of two comets, Strickland 
and Smith, in Palmes' regiment of Carabiniers: 
You know what scandal has been given, and what noise has been made on the like 
occasion before you left us, without any regular information or proof, but this is 
become so very public, and the proof so undeniable, that though I am in great 
straits what to do in the matter on account of their relations, yet I think myself 
obliged in honour and conscience not to suffer such persons to serve any longer in 
the army. I have forborne bringing them to a court-martial, forseeing the inevitable 
danger they would be in of losing their lives, or undergoing a worse punishment. I 
therefore desire you would consult with your friends in England, and let me know 
your opinion of what is fit to be done in a case of so extraordinary a nature. 503 
ý** 
Courts-martial were occasionally termed conseils de guerre or 'councils of war, a label 
we more readily associate meetings on the subject of strategy, operations or tactics, 
rather than military justice. Councils of war were the prime expression of the collective 
nature of military decision making in the period, particularly given the multinational 
context to the Allied prosecution of the war. 
Such meetings could be convened on a variety of subjects. In June 1703, Henry Lumley, 
the senior general of the English Horse in the Low Countries, appointed a council of 
the commanding officers of the regiments of Horse and Dragoons to debate certain 
issues relating the corps. The officers comprised Brigadier Cornelius Wood, Colonel 
Charles Ross, Lieutenant-Colonel William Palmer (of Lumley's), Lieutenant-Colonel 
Francis Palmes (of Wyndham's), Lieutenant-Colonel Owen Wynne (then of Ross's), 
Colonel Robert Killigrew (of Raby's), Lieutenant-Colonel John Fetherstone(halgh) (of 
502 BL, Add. MSS 38853, f. 120: order of Marlborough to Colonel Francis Godfrey, Camp at 
Meldert, 14 August 1705 N. S. 
503 Murray, iii, p. 616: Marlborough to Palmes, camp at Helchin, 10 October 1707 N. S. There is 
no trace of Cornet Smith in Dalton; Cornet Thomas Strickland had left the regiment by 1709. A 
Thomas Strickland received a captain's commission in the marines, dated 23 March 1708; he 
resigned his commission to another on 18 February 1710. Dalton, vi, pp. 121-123. 
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Wood's), Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Sibourg (of the Duke of Schomberg's), Major 
George Preston (of Viscount Teviot's) and Captain-Lieutenant James Fleming (of 
Cadogan's). 
The first point of order was whether the three regiments of Dragoons in the Low 
Countries (of which two were 'Royal') were to roll equally in their duties; the council 
was unanimous in the belief that they should. That considered, the officers debated 
discipline on the march. Relating that the 'Strangers' made it a custom to send such 
numbers of men with the baggage and quartermasters that they made a 'great 
Destruction' before the army came to camp, the officers suggested to Marlborough that 
he allowed a number from each regiment to accompany the baggage and 
quartermasters, and no more - which would be strictly enforced by the wagonmaster- 
general 504The duke was in complete agreement, rendering the council's suggestions 
into being by the order of 1 July 1703. w-5 
Of more critical import were the councils called to regulate the operations of the 
campaign. In January 1703, a conference of the Allied generals was called at Wesel, 
with a view to discussing such matters as the siege of Bonn. There was to be an 
Imperial general, a Prussian general, Athlone on behalf of the States, and Cutts for the 
English, if he desired. Marlborough had left Cutts no instructions by word or letter 
relating to his powers in councils or conferences to be held outside the United 
Provinces, so Cutts excused himself with all politeness (protesting that he could not 
leave the English soldiery, they having but one brigadier over them at the time). Cutts 
had no conception of Marlborough's plans for the following campaign, and did not 
wish to make a mistake. But the finer points of his reasoning are more interesting: 
This was the summe of what I gave them in answer, but I'll presume to tell your 
Grace more important reasons (if possible) that I had for declining my being at this 
Generall consultation. 
BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 63-64b: proceedings of a council of commanding officers of the Norse 
and Dragoons, appointed by Lumley. June 1703. 
505 BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 65-66b: order of Marlborough, relating to the baggage. Camp at 
Coursell, 1 July 1703 N. S. The limit was set at one man per troop or company, with a further 
sergeant or corporal for each regiment or battalion. 
163 
First, I had discover d privately being every day with some or other of the 
Ministers, that there was a design to draw me in, to let some of the Queens troops, 
either English or Lunembourg be employ'd in the Expeditions before mention'd, 
which could ruine them for the next Campagne, and in the next place my going 
thither, and being present in such a Council of War, if I should be outvoted by 
much a greater number, may run me upon a Dilemma, either that I must be forc'd 
[... ] most of the rest, which might occasion ill refl[... I in [... ] in some resolution 
which may be its consequence to be contrary to the Plan, which your Grace may 
possibly have projected for the ensuing Campagne which tho I don t know it I may 
possibly guess at by something, Comte Synsendorf let fall to me in private at Leige, 
and one thing confirms me that my Lord Athlone has some reason for my going to 
the Congress, more than he tells, me which is yt. Hee also never us'd to consult me, 
or communicate anything to me, was mighty pressing for my undertaking this 
journey, having employed [since] Monsieur Smettau and Geldermalsen to persuade 
me how much it would be for my Honour but I excus'd it... 
Cutts hoped Marlborough would approve of his actions; but if he did not, it would be 
too late to amend them. 506 This presents the conundrum of the council of war. If a 
general officer was absent, he could not exert the agency of himself or his corps; his 
authority in the decision-making process, and in influencing the conduct of his peers 
and the Allied armies as a whole, was thus diminished. But by the same token, his 
absence in no small way abrogated him of its resolutions; whereas if he had been 
present, and thus consented to be a participant in the process, he could be considered 
bound by the collegiate resolution, even if he disagreed. 
Another council, on 6 March 1703, Cutts attended. An initial meeting was summoned 
by the Dutch general of cavalry, the Baron van Obdam, and consisted of the 
lieutenants-general of the Allies present at the Hague. The generals debated a project 
for the coming camapign, authored by Obdam and Slangenburg. After an initial 
consultation, the participants resolved that they would meet again and give their 
opinions in writing, signed, the following morning (7 March). Cutts summarised the 
meeting, and the generals' views, as follows: 
Wee mett in a Chamber adjoining to the Chamber of Treves, and being late, 
Monsieur Opdam's secretary read every ones opinion, the Sume of wch is as 
followes 
Monsieur Salyche. That the upper Rhyne and Moselle ought to bee sustained, and 
Monsieur Overkirke Reinforced if occasion should require it. That the Infantry 
506 BL, Add. MSS 69379, ff. 24-27b: Cutts to Marlborough, The Hague, 30 January 1703 N. S. 
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should be lodged in places along the Mase and the Horse drawne out and 
Cantoned to make roome for them. That it was not Practicable to make any 
diversion of Consequence in Brabant or Fflanders. 
Count de Noyelles. To sustaine the Rhyne, secure the New Conquests; and make a 
diversion in Brabant and Fflandres. 
Lord Albemarle. That the Seige of Bon was necessary but not practicable as yet. 
That wee ought to forme an Army upon the Meuse, and make a Diversion in 
Brabant and Fflanders. 
Liut. Genall. Hagell. That the Generalls ought to be named for two Army's, one to 
bee formed upon the Meuse, and one att Bergen-op-Zoome; and that there should 
remaine troops enough to reinforce Monsieur Doverkirke. That an Artillery ought 
to bee formed for those two Armyes and got ready forthwith, that Boats should bee 
got together att Bergen-op-Zoome to Allarm the Enimy, and our troopes Assembled 
upon our ffrontiers. That the Seige of Bon was necessary but not Practicable yet. 
That wee ought to have a great Artillary at Wesel. That the Ballieux of the Plat Pay's 
of Brabant and Fflanders should be summoned to have Carts in a readiness the 
more to Allarm the Enimy in those parts. 
My own opinion (as I gave in writeing) was. That all necessary preparatifs should 
Immediately be made to forme an Army upon the Meuse, as sone as it might bee 
practicable. That the necessary preparations for a Seige be made Wth out 
determining Wch Seige, till we see the Effect of the present operations of Germany. 
That a Diversion may be made in Brabant or Fflanders, whilst, the necessary 
preparations for opening the Campagne are making; but that it bee made by 
detachment only, not by Entire Regimts wch detachmts must retume to their Garrisons 
before the opening of the Campagne. But this upon supposition that the 
Intelligence, weh the States has of the Enimyes weakness in Brabant and Fflanders 
bee certain. 
I concluded with a representation that he Majt s forces could not possibly march out 
of their Garrisons in intire Corps, till our Recruits, Cloaths, and officers are 
Arrived. 507 
No positive conclusion to the conference is recorded by Cutts; this is perhaps because 
he fell ill on the evening of the 8 March and was afflicted by a fever for thirty hours. 
Heinsius, however, noted that the proposals of some officers to support operations on 
507 BL, Add. MSS 69379, ff. 30-32b: Cutts to Marlborough, The Hague, 13 March 1703 N. S. 
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the Rhine and Moselle led to the detachment of ten battalions to the lines between 
Trarbach and Wissembourg. 508 
Not all forms of collective discussion were made with every participant present in 
person. Communications between the various civil and military officials on such 
matters would often take the form of a memorial delivered by post, framed in the style 
of question (or proposal) and response. A single officer, or body of officers acting in 
concert, might put their considerations and views in a memorandum, which would 
then be passed to their peers for comment. -509 These memoranda, typically with the 
initial authors' views copied on one half of the paper, and the respondents' next to 
them on the other half, would be circulated to the interested parties. 510 As an example, 
a typical question on a memorial composed in 1703 ran thus: 
6. What officers would compose the staff of the army to be sent to the Moselle? 
To which an answer ran: 
6. If the army on the Moselle was to act separately, it should have a general-in- 
chief, two lieutenants-general, four majors-general, eight brigadiers, a [Dutch] 
deputy, a commissary for the army's pay, an officer (or more) of artillery with a 
company of same, a quartermaster-general and his lieutenant, a wagonmaster 
and twenty conductors, a lieutenant of guides and ten guides, a commissary for 
supplies and forage, provost-marshal and executioner. 511 
Marlborough was not present at many of these initial meetings or discussion, but 
received copies 512 
508 Van't Hoff, no. 87, pp. 51-52: Heinsius to Marlborough, The Hague, 9 February 1703 N. S. 
509 E. g. BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 31-37b: Considerations of the Prince of Nassau, Dutch and Allied 
general, on the subject of present affairs. Camp before Kaiserert, 15 May 1702 N. S. This was 
responded to by Athlone and other generals under his command at the camp at Clarenbeck, 21 
May 1702 N. S. They agreed on some elements and made detailed comments on others. Add. 
MSS. 61337, ff. 38-46b. 
sio BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 83-83b: memorial on the subject of passing the Meuse, Overijssel, 22 
July 1702 N. S. This memorial contained seventeen points. Ff. 84-85b contains the above, copied 
in the right-hand column, with the thoughts of the respondents as annotations in the left-hand 
column. 
511 BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 178-178b. [1703.1 
sie E. g. BL, Add. MSS 61337, if. 59-60b: results of a council of war, The Hague, 25 June 1702 N. S. 
The generals were of the opinion that a considerable army was to be formed at Nijmegen; and 
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Relatively little is heard of the councils of war that produced happy, concordant 
resolutions in the War of the Spanish Succession; by contrast, those that were riven by 
discord gained an element of notoriety. One such event occurred in August 1703, when 
the Allied generals debated an opportunity to attack the French lines after they had 
finished the siege of Huy; others favoured an investment of Limburg. Initially the 
conference was to have consisted of those of lieutenant-general and above, but was 
expanded to include some majors-general of the army. 
Marlborough was for attacking the lines, for which he promoted several reasons: the 
weakness of the lines meant the French would have to defend them with a battle, of 
which the duke expected success, with the Allies possessing "the best Foot that can be 
seen" such that "wee noe ways doubt by the blessing of God to have a glorious Victory 
over them"; the diminution in the enemy's numbers (the French magazine at Namur 
would necessitate a large detachment for its security); the lack of forage on the Allied 
side of the lines, and between the Meuse and the Saar, which would promote moving 
into a new area of operations; and the French superiority in Germany and Italy 
required the Allies to justify themselves in the Low Countries and force France to recall 
troops from those critical theatres. The siege of Limburg, on the other hand, could be 
made by a detachment later. 
This statement was signed by Marlborough; Lieutenants-General Charles Churchill, 
Lord Cutts and Henry Lumley for the English; the generals commanding the 
Hanoverian soldiers-Lieutenants-General Carl von Somerfeldt, Cuno von Billow, the 
comte de Noyelle and Ernst August, duke of Brunswick-Luneburg; the Hessian 
commanders -Friedrich, hereditary prince of Hesse-Cassel, Heinrich Wilhelm von 
Spiegel zum Desenberg and Albrecht, baron von Tettau; and the Danish generals- 
Karl Rudolph, duke of Wurttemberg-Neustadt and Jobst von Scholten. 513 
two artilleries: one at Nijmegen or on the Meuse, the other at Bergen-op-Zoom. A copy of the 
above, in Cardonnel's hand, is at ff. 61-62b. 
513 A draft of the propositions advocated for the attack on the lines, made at the council of 
war-or indeed Marlborough's position noted beforehand-is contained in 8L, Add. MSS 
61337, ff. 183-186b. The final statement on the proposition is at ibid., ff. 187-188b. A copy 
appears in Murray, i, pp. 165-166 and Lamberty, ii, pp. 462-463. 
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Of a different opinion were other generals of the army: General Ouwerkerk; the earl of 
Albermarle; Major-General Nicolaas de Dompre; Lieutenant-General Daniel, baron van 
Dopff; the Prussian general Leopold, prince of Anhalt-Dessau; the Hanoverian major- 
general, Louis Saint-Paul des Estanges (often rendered 'St Pol'); Major-General Willem 
van Heukelum; Major-General Bengt, count Oxenstierna; and Rantzau 514 While they 
admitted that the attack on the lines was the most 'glorious' option, they tended to 
favour the siege of Limburg -albeit in a somewhat diffident manner: for a siege of that 
town was best effected while the season allowed it, and would both cover the lands of 
Jülich and Gelderland, and allow a consolidation of the Allies between the Meuse and 
the Rhine. 515 
Confusingly, the copy of the field deputies report on their generals' sentiments in the 
Blenheim Papers also listed Noyelle as a signatory (meaning he signed both opinions); 
but the transcription in Lamberty replaces the signatory of Noyelle with that of 
Slangenburg. Nevertheless, the distinction between the two modes of opinion on 
grounds of nationality is striking. There was a clear difference between the generals of 
the left (Dutch and auxiliary) and the right (English and auxiliary) wings of the army. 
Excepting Anhalt-Dessau, Saint-Paul and Rantzau, the auxiliary general shad sided 
with Marlborough. The degree of dispute, however, rendered an attempt on the lines 
void. 
While the duke urbanely noted that he was "heartely sorry that wee are not all of own 
opinion, those Generals which differ with us in opinion being Persons for whome wee 
have a great estime and honour ¬ec, " others were not so restrained. Cadogan, who 
(quite naturally) thought Marlborough's reasoning for the attack as being "so clear and 
514 It is difficult to discern whether this was the officer in Dutch and Hanoverian service, Detlev 
von Rantzau; or the Danish cavalry commander in Dutch service, Jurgen von Rantzau. Neither, 
incidentally, held the substantive rank of major-general until 1704. 
515 BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 189-190b: memorial of the deputies of the States-General on the 
conference held on 24 August 1703 N. S. Camp at Vignemont. A version (with slight differences) 
is printed in Lamberty, ii, pp. 464-465. A second, complimentary opinion to this was signed by 
the generals in the army under Claude-Frederic T'Serclaes, comte de Tilly: Major-General Baron 
Hompesch; Major-General Johan Theodoor, Baron van Friesheim; Gerhard, Graaf van der Nath 
and general Baar. Add. MSS 61337, ff. 195-196b: memorial for the States-General on the 
conference of 24 August 1703 N. S. Camp at Bridgrice, 25 August 1703 N. S. This is not printed by 
Lamberty. 
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convincing", muttered that most [sic] of the general officers were in agreement, while 
those 
... that cheifly oppose this undertaking are Slangenbergh Dopf and Dompre and the 
rest of the Dutch Genlps except Monsr. Overkirk [even though he signed the deputation 
arguing for the siege of Limburg]. Most of the Deputys here, particularly Mons. Hop 
and Witzen the Burgomaster of Amsterdam are extremely for it, and indeed the 
resolution and Vicour the Deputys show on all occasions were enough to put their 
Genriss. out of countenance if the were not equally incapable of shame as reason. 516 
A far more serious disagreement occurred two years later, following the passing of the 
Lines of Brabant. An attempt to cross the Dyle at Corbeck, on 29 July 1705, had ended 
in failure when the French brought their army to bear quickly enough that the 
enterprise was put in doubt. After a consultation with the generals, the operation was 
cancelled. Not all were of the same opinion, as the camp journal noted. But the 
anonymous author of the journal, a Briton, admitted: 
But what appears most certain is that the French Household & all the Bavarian and 
Liege Troops were come up behind the rising Ground on the other side of the River 
before we ffired a Cannon with Resolution to stay for us which must have cost us 
very dear had we pass'd with success 517 
The failure had put Marlborough out of temper. His letters in the immediate aftermath, 
to the States General and Harley, were polite enough, simply noting the decision to 
retire from the crossings and seeking to apportion no blame. 518 Two days later, 
however, the duke wrote a disgruntled missive to Heinsius, noting that if the mode of 
command in the army continued in its present form 
.., it will be impossible to attempt anything considerable with success or advantage, 
since councils of war must be called on every occasion, which entirely destroys the 
secrecy and dispatch upon which all great undertakings depend; and has 
unavoidably another very unhappy effect, for the private animosities between so 
many persons as have to be assembled being so great, and their inclinations and 
interests so different, as always to make one party oppose what the other advises, 
they consequently never agree. 
516 BL, Add. MSS 22196, If. 3-4b: Cadogan to Raby, camp before Huy, 27 August 1703 N. S. 
517 BL, Add. MSS 61404, If. 46b-47: camp journal, 29 July 1705 N. S. 
518 Murray, ii, pp. 194-195. 
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The duke desired to be able to act as he thought best, without being obliged to 
communicate his plans to his general officers further than he thought 'convenient'. 519 
But there was no alteration, for the matter was replayed with greater portent on 18 
August. 
Marlborough desired to attack the French lines along the River Yssche, and to that end 
had ordered a detachment, commanded by his brother, to move through the Forest of 
Soignies to threaten the enemy's flank and rear. The French had been forewarned, 
however and made various obstacles to his progress; it was unable to proceed and later 
called back. 520 Meanwhile, the duke could see advantageous nature of the enemy's post 
on the high ground above the other bank of the river, but still pressed for an attack. 
Other officers disagreed. Many appeared unaware of the orders given to Churchill; 
Slangenburg was particularly disconcerted that although Ouwerkerk's Foot had been 
formed into line of battle on arriving, those of Marlborough had not. Ouwerkerk's 
forces had been formed along the Yssche since the early morning, but it was 5 p. m. 
before any design was imparted to them, Slangenburg claimed 521 
A conference of the generals and field deputies was called. Slangenburg stated that it 
occurred between 5 and 6 p. m.; but in an extract of a letter written to Henry St John, 
the anonymous author claimed: "Twas betwixt 12 and 1 when ye Consultation began, 
but was 5 before it ended. "522 Slangenburg was discountenanced that he'd been called 
to give his thoughts on a design he'd not previously been made aware of, but agreed - 
passively-aggressively it seems -that he would help to put any design into execution, 
but make no other judgement; Tilly, Salisch and the Dutch lieutenants-general agreed 
likewise. Marlborough appeared to take issue with Slangenburg's temperament, for he 
pressed further, which only exacerbated the situation, with the generals stating that 
they would execute any orders given, but not be held responsible for the consequences. 
This spurred the field deputies into action. Noting their generals' reticence, they 
ordered them- twice - to give their true sentiments on the issue. 
519 Ibid., pp. 197-198: Marlborough to Heinsius, Meldert, 2 August 1703 N. S. 
520 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 49-49b: camp journal, 18 August 1705 N. S. 
521 BL, Add. MSS 61188, ff. 7-10b: narrative of Slangenburg's opposition to Marlborough at 
Overysche. Stowe MSS 748, ff. 37-41. An English copy and translation of Slangenburg's letter to 
Fagel. 
522 Ibid. KP I(i)/6: extract of a letter to St John, camp at Tirlemont, 31 August 1705 N. S. 
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The results were decisive. Many of the Dutch generals were against it; Slangenburg 
added that he had served nearly forty years and had never heard of such an attack 
proposed, not least when the generals had not had an opportunity to see the ground. 
After a further conference between Marlborough, Ouwerkerk and the field deputies, it 
was agreed to send Slangenburg, Tilly, Noyelle and Salisch to view the enemy's posts; 
Noyelle declined, but the others made their reconnaissance--the results of which were 
hardly surprising. Marlborough rode past this party without the least 
acknowledgement; Ouwerkerk was asleep when they attempted to make their report. 
Nothing came of the enterprise, and the army turned its attentions elsewhere. 5u 
The events at Overyssche are often held as an example of Dutch obstruction. The likes 
of Cranstoun and Parker made great play upon Slangenburg supposedly holding up 
the march of the English artillery until his own baggage had past by. 524 But senior 
English generals were also against the enterprise. Slangenburg noted that several of the 
'considerablest' generals of Marlborough's army had declared it impracticable, while 
the author of the camp journal conceded: "... & indeed few of our own Genfis were for it, 
the Ground being extremely Disadvantageous, & not at all what it had been 
represented to his Grace. "525 Orkney was a particular opponent. One writer noted that 
Slangenburg opposed the enterprise with 
... a great earnestness, as did likewise my Ld Orkney. The former my Ld Duke told 
when he urged a great Many difficulties in leading on ye 4 attacks that my Ld 
designed to give; but especially that he (Mr Slangenburg) was to Lead. That his 
Highness was so far from proposing anything he thought not very practicable, that 
he himself would lead on that attack that he said was attended with so many 
difficulties; and that he should have his Choice of the other three. This had no other 
effect on Monsr Slangenburg, than to make him a little less Noisy than he was 
before. Monsr Auverkerque & one or two of the Dutch Generals agreed with my Ld 
Duke in attacking the Enemy; as did Compt Noyelle and General Ingoldsby of 
ours 526 
523 BL, Add. MSS 61188, ff. 7-10b: narrative of Slangenburg's opposition to Marlborough at 
Overysche; ff. 11-28b: Slangenburg's memorial to the States-General. Stowe MSS 748, ff. 37-41. 
Wijn, VIII, i, pp. 620-625 and iii, pp. 771-772L letter of Schagen to Heinsius, 19 August 1705 N. S. 
524 HMC, 54, Portland MSS, iv, p. 254. Parker, Memoirs, pp. 107-108. 
525 BL, Stowe MSS 748, If. 37-41. Add. MSS 61404, If. 49-49b: camp journal, 18 August 1705 N. S. 
526 KP I(i)/6: extract of a letter to St John, camp at Tirlemont, 31 August 1705 N. S. 
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Slangenburg was also perplexed by the notion that Ouwerkerk was of the same 
opinion as Marlborough; rather, he thought his Field Marshal was in agreement with 
the Dutch generals, judging it to be 'a very difficult enterprise'. A similar confusion 
existed at Corbeck. 527 
Whatever the rights and wrongs of the situation, Marlborough was incensed. The 
situation grew worse when his castigatory letter to the States General was published 
and the Dutch retaliated with the publication of several letters from the army in 
defence 528 Charles Churchill, upon hearing of these and their supposed criticisms of 
his brother, sent Francis Palmes to Slangenburg as his second to demand satisfaction; 
but the Dutchman showed Palmes his letters, protesting his innocence, and the duel 
was averted. 529 With such dissent within the army, it was "little wonder, " as Het 
Staatsche Leger noted, "that the States by a resolution of 2 September instructed the field 
deputies to with all means promote unity among the generals. " Slingelandt himself 
wrote to Goslinga, inquiring further into the situation, and the degree to which the 
affair between Marlborough and Slangenburg affected the army. 53° 
Marlborough's complaints were perseverant enough that Slangenburg was eventually 
dismissed 531 But it aggravated his growing concern at the notion of councils of war 
into something bordering on contempt. When Earl Rivers was preparing for a planned 
descent upon the River Charente in France in 1706, Marlborough hoped that he would 
"make use of councells of warr but upon extraordinary occasion. "532 Likewise, the 
duke's desire to keep his plans close to his chest remained. Prior to the passing of the 
Scheldt in 1708, Marlborough, according to the opinions of Richard Molesworth, 
indulged the enemy in an extensive programme of deception and bluff. He ordered the 
transport of much forage from the camp to Courtrai and Menin; the dispatch of the 
527 BL, Stowe MSS 748, ff. 37-41. 
528 Murray, ii, pp. 223-224. HMC, 54, Portland MSS, iv, pp. 254-255. 
529 Ibid., p. 255. 
530 Wijn, VIII, 1, p. 631.; iii, p. 775: Slingelandt to Goslinga, The Hague, 5 September 1705. 
531 For Marlborough's initial letters, see n. 87 above, and 't Hoff, no. 324 p. 203: Marlborough to 
Heinsius, camp at Basse Wavre, 19 August 1705 N. S.; pp. 203-204: Marlborough to Slingelandt, 
19 August 1705 N. S.; p. 204: Marlborough to Slingelandt, Basse-Wavre, 21 August 1705 N. S.; no. 
327 p. 327: Marlborough to Heinsius, Corbais, 24 August 1705 N. S. On Slangenburg's dismissal, 
Wijn, VIII, iii, p. 781: Slangenburg to Heinsius, Maastricht, 28 September 1705 N. S. 
532 Snyder, ii, no. 621 p. 613: Marlborough to Godolphin, Helchin, 15 July 1706 N. S. 
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Dutch and English artillery to Menin; and sent quartermasters to Courtrai to secure 
lodgings for Marlborough and other officers of distinction. Indeed, as Molesworth was 
concerned, this deceit extended to many of the duke's own generals: 
This farce was so well managed that our whole army was imposed upon by it, and 
I'me confident all our Generalls except those few whom it was necessary to admitt 
into the bottom of the design, really thought it was intended (as was given out) to 
cantoone and refresh the army for a while. 533 
This analysis is of the form favoured by contemporary supporters of Marlborough and 
much of the historiography: a prescient, perfectly executed operation; a bluff that had 
been planned well in advance. Though there was no doubt that Marlborough saw the 
necessity of making a move to relieve Brussels534, there was considerable delay in its 
execution, not least on account of the heavy rains that rendered the roads to the Scheldt 
particularly difficult; a delay that had caused disquiet in Prince Eugene's army. 535 
*** 
The relations between the English, Germans and Dutch in the army could be marked 
by considerable prejudice. When discussing what he considered the necessity of 
dropping the distinction between wings in the army, Cadogan wrote that one should 
have thought that a recent misfortune "might convince those Herring sellers of the 
inconvenienceys which unavoidably attend a distinct right and left wing; which is in 
effect the making of a great body of men useless at best. "536 Whereas the Prussian, 
Grumbkow, would "outlye a Dutch Gazette and is no more capable of keeping a secret 
than a woman. "537 HoIcroft Blood wished that Marlborough "might act this sommer 
without the heavy Cloge of Deputyes and Generalls that your Grace is neither shure of 
their Courige nor their affections. "538 
But there could be sense amid the outrage. When, In 1707, Cadogan wrote: 
533 BL, Add. MSS 61312, ff. 186-191b: Richard Molesworth to his brother [unclear which one], 
camp at Berleghem, 3 December 1708 N. S. 
534 See, for example, the letter of Marlborough to Fagel, camp at Roeselare, 20 November 1708 
N. S. (Murray, iv, p. 316). 
535 Feldzüge, Series II, vol. 1, p. 470; Schulenburg, Leben, p. 373. 
536 BL, Add. MSS 22196, if. 9-12b: Cadogan to Raby, The Hague, 17 February 1704 N. S. 
537 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 69-70b: Cadogan to Raby, The Hague, 19 April 1707 N. S. 
538 BL, Add. MSS 61309, ff. 45-46b: Blood to Marlborough, Rotterdam, 9 April 1706 N. S. 
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You may imagine how uneasy 'tis to my Lord Duke to have been this three weeks 
att the head of the best Army that ever was with his hands tied, the Hopes he had 
by mild methods and Reason to bring up the Deputys to some vigorous resolution, 
induces him to suffer what Geldermalsen and Goslings instructed by their Genril9:, 
governed by their Fears, and mislead by false accounts of the Enemys strength have 
proposed as yet for the operations of the Campagne, but matters will not remain 
much longer on this Foot, for if my Lords representation in Holland, and his 
warmly pressing the Deputys att the Army to consent to our attaquing the Enemy 
in the Camp they now are, have no effect my Lord must in justice to himself let the 
world know when the fault lies, which he was willing to hide for the good of the 
common cause as long as there was hopes of it being mended 539 
Raby checked him, neatly encapsulating the concerns of the United Provinces, 
... however here is this to be said for the Hogen Mogens [i. e. States-General] that if 
you beat the french they retire behind their Strong Towns, weh will cost you the 
Summer to take, but if they [the French] should have the Good luck they had in 
Spain all Flanders & Brabant is lost at a Stroke for you... 
albeit adding that he was confident Marlborough would be victorious in a general 
engagement 54° 
In spite of such views, the working relationships of English and other Allied generals 
was usually effective, or at least no worse than between the English generals 
themselves. Disagreements tended to be minor. In November 1706, Ingoldsby, the 
garrison-commander at Ghent, protested at the imposition of over two regiments of 
Spanish troops upon his town by Ouwerkerk; the Dutch field marshal had politely 
informed Ingoldsby of his attention to send the corps - then sent them anyway, 
without waiting to receive any reply. The English general protested vehemently: the 
magistrates could not accommodate them in the town-they still wanted proper 
bedding for 4000 English soldiers-and the duke had said it was to be an English 
garrison, and left no orders whatsoever for the receipt of other formations, not least 
those that brought with them a gaggle of near nine-hundred women and six-hundred 
children (as reckoned by the town major). Defeated for that moment by Ouwerkerk in 
539 BL, Add. MSS 22196, If. 77-80b: Cadogan to Raby, camp at Meldert, 16 June 1707 N. S. 
540 BL, Add. MSS 22196, ff. 81-84b: Raby to Cadogan, Berlin, 25 June 1707 N. S. 
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this particular bout of logistical buck-passing, Ingoldsby begged Marlborough for 
instructions on how to act in the future. 541 
The 'general' nature of general officers' command, combined with the added element 
of a multinational army with a variety of masters and mistresses, provided a ready 
impediment to senior officers attempting to exercise their authority. A general officer 
of senior rank was given the dignity and deference due to his station - but not 
necessarily subordination, without positive orders from a recognised general-in-chief. 
Charles Churchill was literally stepping into his coach, ready to depart Brussels- 
which he had left under the command of Pascal, pursuant to Marlborough's orders - 
when he was confronted by a Dutch colonel, who protested that he would obey no 
orders other than those of Churchill, without further confirmation from the States- 
General 52 
To forestall such arguments, officers might receive a positive order from a general-in- 
chief to follow the directions of a specific subordinate. On one occasion the officers 
commanding the battalions of infantry at Ghent were ordered by Marlborough to 
follow what commands they received from him via Brigadier Cadogan the 
quartermaster-general, regarding their march to join the army; on another, Sir Thomas 
Prenderghast (or the officer-in-chief among the three battalions at Ghent) was told to 
observe the orders of Major-General Murray. M3 Though this would of course suffice in 
a given instance, it did lead to a culture that expected such orders to be given, and 
hardly promoted quick and unthinking subordination in those instances when they 
were not. 
541 BL, Add. MSS 61163, If. 34-37b & 38-39b: Ingoldsby to Marlborough, Ghent, 18 November 
1706 N. S.; order from King and Council of the same date. Marlborough's letter to Ouwerkerk on 
this matter was singularly non-committal; he represented Ingoldsby's concerns on this issue, 
but little more. Murray, iii, p. 334: Marlborough to Ouwerkerk, The Hague, 24 November 1706 
N. S. 
542 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 200-201b: Charles Churchill to Marlborough, Brussels, 11 September 
1707 N. S. 
543 BL, Add. MSS 61371, f. 87b: order for the officers of the battalions at Ghent. Adam de 
Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. Camp at Roeselare, 24 June 1706 N. S. Ibid., f. 227b: 
order to Sir Thomas Prenderghast (or the officer-in-chief with the three battalions at Ghent). 
Camp at Terbanck, 8 June 1708 N. S. 
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In August 1710, as General Schulenburg commanded the Allied siege of Bethune, he 
faced a modicum of resistance in his command from Lieutenant-General Ross. 
Although Ross lay under the local command of Schulenburg, he had received orders 
from Marlborough intimating that his corps (21 squadrons and 9 battalions) might be 
called back from the siege at short notice. In light of this, he had no desire to burden 
himself in the minutiae of the investing armies operations, such as sending 
detachments to man posts, which might hinder his retreat; indeed, he had even laid a 
couple of bridges over a local watercourse, in anticipation, to speed his retum. 544 
Marlborough did nothing to emphasise Ross's subordination to Schulenburg at the 
siege. Rather than commanding Ross to follow the general's orders, Marlborough 
asked that Schulenburg might instead send the list of posts designed for Ross's corps to 
secure to himself, so that he could send the necessary orders to the British general; and 
Ross himself he urged only to occupy those posts that were not at'too great a distance', 
and inconvenient. 545 
English generals themselves were engaged in the own squabbles over authority. In 
September 1703, as the English troops were preparing to enter their winter quarters, 
Marlborough's absence had devolved the command of such corps upon his brother, 
Charles Churchill, the senior lieutenant-general. Churchill himself then proceeded to 
pass the command to Lord Cutts, leaving him his 'general order'. Cutts was the 
seniormost general of the English Foot in the Low Countries, but also the eldest general 
officer in the army as a whole. As acting commander-in-chief, all orders for the army 
should have passed through his person-be they for the Horse, Foot or Dragoons- 
before the army separated; the contrary would be viewed as a hardship to him: 
Your Grace may firmly depend upon it, that I shall never make any ill use of my 
Power; nor be guilty of any thing in my Command or Behaviour, that the next 
Officer to me can be uneasy at. And as I never desire any thing in these cases, but 
SA4 BL, Add. MSS 61314, ff. 94-95b: Ross to Marlborough, near Bethune, 21 August 1710 N. S. 
M5 Ross had been ordered to observe the enemy, concerting with the generals of the siege to 
prevent a French relief, without being engaged in the detail of the siege itself. BL, Add. MSS 
61372, f. 175b: order to Lieutenant-General Ross. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's 
command. Camp at Viler Brulin, 19 August 1710 N. S. Murray, v, pp. 109-110. Letters of 
Marlborough to Schulenburg, 21 August 1710 N. S.; and Marlborough to Ross, camp at Viler 
Brulin, 22 August 1710 N. S. 
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what her Majesty's Commission literally intitles me to, so I never am wanting in my 
due I believe and Respect to any One that is my elder Officer. M6 
But, before he had left the army, Cardonnel had passed a separate order to Lieutenant- 
General Henry Lumley, who commanded the English Horse. M7 As Cardonnel rather 
exasperatedly complained to Watkins: 
We have rais'd a Devil that I am afraid it will not be easy for us to lay, and I was 
realy apprehensive of it when I desired two orders one for the Horse & one for the 
Foot, and you told me one to the Commander in Cheif would suffice, if they had 
had each of them one at that time, we should have heird no more of it, but now my 
Lord Cutts has writ a long Letter to my Lord Duke & another to my Self on that 
subject, expostulating the great hardship it would be upon him, if after the 
Command had devolv'd upon him from Lt Gen Churchill he should be distinguisht 
by another order being sent to Mr Lumley ... but now 'tis gone so far we must make it up as we can, in order whereto my Lord Duke writes to my Lord Cutts &I write 
to Mr Lumley not to make any use of the order sent him. 548 
A week later, the wounds continued to fester, with the headquarters receiving 'warm 
Letters' from both sides, but Cardonnel hoped that the anger would soon coo1.549In 
some circumstances, officers would seek to overcome or forestall conflict by turning on 
the charm. Marlborough could be famously urbane; the temper of the fiery Leopold of 
Anhalt-Dessau was once cooled by the duke's amity, with prince stating: "the 
ascendancy of that man is inconceivable. I was unable to utter an angry word; he 
totally disarmed me in an instant. " Cutts would neatly encapsulate the theory when, as 
temporary commander-in-chief, he desired that 
... all her Majesty's officers will act with that decency and temper as is suitable to 
the Duke of Marlborough's instructions to me... by which means we shall always 
make unreasonable people appear in the wrong and more easily carry our point 550 
An example of this occurred in the interactions with marquis of Tarazena in 1706. 
Tarazena had been the governor of Antwerp when Cadogan was dispatched to secure 
546 BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 16-17b: Cutts to Marlborough, camp at St Trond, 17 September 1703 
N. S. 
'47 BL, Add. MSS 42176, if. 35-36b: Cardonnel to Watkins, 16 September 1703 N. S. 
548 BL, Add. MSS 42176, ff. 37-38b: Cardonnel to Watkins, Camp at Werwick, 18 September 1703 
N. S. 
m9 BL, Add. MSS 42176, ff. 45-46b: Cardonnel to Watkins, 26 September 1703 N. S. 
550 Churchill, ii, p. 833. Historical Manuscripts Commission, 55, Frankland-Russell-Astley MSS., 
p. 153: Lord Cutts to Brigadier Ferguson, The Hague, 22 December 1703/2 January 1704. 
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the surrender of the place, which he helped achieve through being alert to the intrigues 
of the mixed Franco-Spanish garrison, and a little flattery of its governor. 551 This paid 
dividends when Tarazena was employed in directing the siege at Dendermonde. The 
marquis allowed Thomas Meredyth considerable autonomy in his operations before 
the town; perhaps because of-rather than despite -Marlborough's frequent 
reassertion that Meredyth was to be 'very observing' of the marquis' orders; that it 
would not be amiss to make Tarazena a compliment as soon as Marlborough's letter 
can to his hands; and that Meredyth was to 'take care to humour' him in everything he 
could do. 552 Cadogan, who would join the operations for a while, acted in a similar 
manner, acting as if only to give idle compliments to the marquis while his real duties 
involved taking an exact account of all that occurred, and how it might be improved. 553 
Rank was obviously critical in the interactions between general officers, but was 
complicated by the multiple component nationalities within the army. The English and 
Dutch managed their promotions with a degree of reciprocity, to prevent imbalance 
and discord. In 1706, Marlborough provisionally declared Webb major-general, and Sir 
Richard Temple, Bt and Lord Dalrymple brigadiers, "to preserve the rank of the 
English", after the Dutch had made a promotion of general officers. Later, ironically, 
Webb's promotion to lieutenant-general was retarded by the same measures the duke 
was "obliged, for the Queen's Service, to keep with the States Generall... [and] done 
551 Cadogan and six squadrons of horse had been dispatched on 1 June 1706 N. S. with letters to 
summon the garrison of Antwerp to surrender, and the various civic organisations to declare 
for Charles III. Murray, ii, pp. 545-6. For note of same, see also ibid, pp. 547-8; Hare, op. cit., pp. 
99-100; 't Hoff, no. 392, pp. 235-6; and Snyder, i, no. 574, pp. 557-8. The Marquis de Tarazena, 
guided by an officer in his employ, was eager to accept an honourable capitulation, for he felt 
he 'had been very ill used by the French, and that if they pretended to hold out the Town... he 
would show himself to be un Bon Espagnol. ' 
After an aborted attempt by the garrison to secure the Elector of Bavaria 's will in the matter, the 
garrison and town surrendered on 6 June N. S., the citadel a day later (Tarazena and Winterfeld 
having denied the French its use). The surrender was'entirely owing', as Cadogan would write, 
to the actions of Tarazena and the Walloon commander, Winterfeld, though special mention 
must be made of the elderly bishop, 'upwards of fourscore years old, [who] was very active in 
prompting the magistrates and other inhabitants to declare for their lawful sovereign [Charles 
1111, absolving those who made any scruple from the oaths they had taken. ' 
Cadogan and Marlborough's correspondence adequately illuminates the events: BL, Blenheim 
Papers, Add. MSS. 61160, ff. 7-18b (Cadogan to Marlborough, 2 to 6 June 1706 N. S. ); Murray, ii, 
pp. 555,558-9,563-6,571,577; and Wijn, VIII, ii, pp. 62-63. 
552 BL, Add. MSS 61163, ff. 213-214b, 223-224b: Meredyth to Marlborough, 21 & 24 June 1706 
N. S. Murray, ii, p. 584: Marlborough to Meredyth, camp at Aerzeele, 14 June 1706 N. S. 
553 Murray, ii, p. 624. BL, Blenheim Papers, Add. MSS. 61160, f. 37b-38. 
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with management with them... "554 In January 1703, Cutts begged that his commission 
as lieutenant-general might be dispatched with all haste, even if pay was not to be 
allowed on the establishment until a later date, such as the start of the campaign. He 
felt it was a disrespect to the English army to be without a general of that rank; that it 
would disconcert the English soldiers on account of their having but a major-general in 
command, while the other nations had lieutenants-general in the theatre, 
... with whom I cannot take upon me so much (where the interest of the English 
requires it) as if I had that Character, beside that if I had that Character they would 
not put more than a Ma: G: of their owne with me, and in all things, I should carry 
more weight for the good., 555 
Writing in the early years of the war, Captain Alexander Spotswood protested that he 
had served for nearly two years in the position of 'Lieutenant Quarter Master General', 
yet still had no commission to act in that role. This understandably caused him "many 
vexatious disputeds that tend[ed] to the questioning of his authority; whereby the 
service often suffer[ed] merely for his want of power to execute his office according to 
the Rules & Discipline of all services. "556 John Laws, for some time Cadogan's deputy 
and factotum at the Council of State in Brussels, was placed in a similar position. 
Though the local Low Countries dignitaries had been acquainted of his post, but his 
lack of proper credentials allowed little more than his attending the conferences and 
presenting Marlborough's and Cadogan s memorials; a state of affairs that would only 
worsen when the army moved further from Brussels, and the umbrella of its power in 
the political field diminished, and lessened Cadogan's frequent peregrinations. 557 
554 Snyder, ii, no. 671 p. 662: Marlborough to Godolphin, Villaine, 12 September 1706 N. S.; no. 
1118 p. 1116: Marlborough to Godolphin, Turhout, 8 October 1708 N. S. 
sss BL, Add. MSS 69379, ff. 24-27b: Cutts to Marlborough, The Hague, 30 January 1703 N. S. 
Cutts' commission as lieutenant-general was dated 11 February 1703 O. S. 
556 BL, Add. MSS 61295, ff. 108-109b: memorial of Captain Spotswood to Marlborough. 
Undated. [1706 in pencil -though this may be in error. Dalton carries no record of Spotswood's 
commission as deputy quartermaster-general; Spotswood first appears on Marlborough's 
warrants for the staff officers' pay in 1703, where he was allowed pay for the calendar year as 
deputy quartermaster-general (which might suggest the date of 1706 is in error, given the 
reference to 'near two years' service'). Spotswood was brevetted lieutenant-colonel on 1 January 
1706 O. S., a rank that might be expected to accompany a formal staff commission. Dalton, v, p. 
166. ] 
557 BL, Add. MSS 61311, ff. 165-166b: John Laws to Marlborough, Brussels, 26 June 1708 N. S. 
Naturally, Laws also begged that he might be given an allowance to cover his expenses in that 
role; which, typically, he had hitherto not been granted. 
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The orders to subordinate officers could often encompass a variety of acts and 
responsibilities. Brigadier James Ferguson, tasked with directing the march of a 
brigade of five regiments of Foot from southern Germany back to the Low Countries, 
in the aftermath of Blenheim, received an itemised list of seven instructions. These 
included his route of march and orders pertaining to such; orders relating to the French 
prisoners he was to escort from Mainz to Nijmegen, the progress of which he was to 
give exact accounts to both Marlborough and Slingelandt; instructions to examine the 
regiments upon his arrival in Holland, and order recruiting officers over to England 
and Scotland (who were to be back by 25 December, or face the severest penalties); a 
command to review the garrisons at Bosch and Breda; and standing orders to inform 
Marlborough frequently of all that occurred, so that the duke might dispatch further 
orders if required. 558 
They were typically attended with various sub-clauses, qualifications, conditions and 
advice. Colonel Ross, who was to command the march of two regiments of Dragoons 
and a squadron of Horse-together with various recruits that were within reach of his 
column (the officers of which were to observe his orders) and the English artillery, 
which Ross would meet en route-in a march from Overijssel to Grave, via Breda and 
Bois le Duc. On arriving in Breda, Ross was to meet with the local commissary, who 
had the necessary routes to continue his march; he was also to inform General Fagel, 
the governor of Grave, of his time of departure from Bois le Duc, so that the Dutchman 
would be able to give further orders or assistance if necessary. 559 Ross was later halted 
by a subsequent order, to await yet further directions. 560 
General officers might expect upon discharging a particular element of their duty - 
particularly the transfer of a charge to another officer-to receive an acquittance 
acknowledging such. In 1708, as the Allied army prepared for the siege of Lille, the 
-1-58 BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 140-141: instructions Brigadier James Ferguson. Adam de Cardonnel 
by Marlborough's command. Camp at Langcander, 11 September 1704 N. S. Ferguson's 
detachment consisted of one battalion from Orkney's, together with Rowe's, Churchill's, Lord 
North and Grey's and Meredyth's. 
559 BL, Add. MSS 61369, f. 29: order to march for dragoons and artillery. To Colonel Ross. Camp 
at Overijssel, 18 July 1702 N. S. For an order to Colonel Hopkey concerning the artillery, see 
ibid., f. 30. 
56° BL, Add. MSS 61369, f. 34b: order to Ross to remain at Bois le Duc until further orders, camp 
at Overijssel, 23 July 1702 N. S. The subsequent order to join the army (f. 37) was dated 27 July 
1702 N. S. 
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Dutch brigadier Maurits van Plettenberg was ordered to take charge of the horses and 
wagons that were to be delivered to Courtrai. Upon receiving these, he was give an 
acquittance to the providiteur before conducting them to Brussels, where he was to 
deliver them to Cadogan or one of the commissaries of the artillery, and receive a like 
acquittance 561 
If there were formations from two different branches of the service at a particular post 
or garrison, separate orders might be sent to the senior officer of each branch, even if 
one was of a higher rank. As the English forces made ready to march out of their 
garrisons in May 1706, two separate orders were sent to the garrison at Gorcum: one to 
Major-General Ross, for the two regiments of Dragoons; and one to Colonel Tatton, the 
senior colonel, for the two battalions of Foot. 562 Yet on other occasions, orders for both 
Horse and Foot (for example) were sent to a single general of either branch: to General 
Charles Churchill at Breda, Brigadier Cadogan at Heusden and Lieutenant-General the 
Earl of Orkney at Bosch 563 
Once the army had dispersed and marched to enter its winter quarters, subordinate 
generals were necessarily responsible for the conduct of their corps. Yet the actions and 
oversight expected of them were typically highlighted by their superiors, in their 
orders of march. Marlborough's commands-or indeed reminders-to the Hereditary 
Prince of Hesse late in 1705 included orders to: (i) put the quarters in a state of defence 
upon arrival, and see to the subsistence of the soldiers; (ii) establish a good 
communication between all the quarters, and to retain an officer close to him to aid 
such; (iii) order the commanders of the quarters to keep him informed of all things that 
occurred; (iv) have quarters commanders order peasants to repair the roads between 
the quarters, for ease of march and communication; (v) to make public in all quarters 
(at the head of each company) that it was the Alliance's intention that the soldiers 
conducted themselves with the greatest discipline, without committing the least 
disorder, and that misdemeanours would receive prompt punishment; (vi) render the 
officers responsible for the acts of their soldiers in all disorders, obliging them to make 
561 BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 259-259b: order for Brigadier Plettenburg. Adam de Cardonnel by 
Marlborough's command. Camp at Werwick, 1 August 1708 N. S. 
562 BL, Add. MSS 61371, f. 78b and 79: orders to Major-General Ross and Colonel Tatton. Adam 
de Cardonnel, by Marlborough's command. Maastricht, 5 May 1706 N. S. 
563 Ibid., ff. 78,79b. 
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prompt and entire restitution of any damages; and (vi) impede the passage of enemy 
Horse as much as possible - any officers or soldiers that seized horses passing through 
enemy territory would receive a reward. 
Others were allowed-or assumed-a degree of autonomy and initiative. After the 
battle of Ramillies in 1706, the operational situation was particularly fluid. A number 
of Flemish and Brabant towns lay open to the Allied army, by virtue of poor defences, 
small garrisons and the diminution of French power; various commanders and 
detachments made haste to secure the gains of 23 May. Charles Ross was tasked with 
taking Bruges, which he eventually prevailed upon to accept a garrison of a captain 
and fifty dragoons (the Foot, in the rush, still not having reached his command). He 
also thought it proper to take possession of nearby Damure, which had likewise been 
abandoned; he hoped Marlborough would pardon him if he'd acted amiss. 5 Given 
Bruges' proximity to Ostend, Ross also sought to increase his agency in the taking of 
that place, desiring that Marlborough's commands for the future for the area might be 
addressed to him. 56 
In 1703, as the main body of the army was encamped by St Trond while a detachment 
besieged Limburg, the Earl of Orkney reminded Marlborough that Henry Withers was 
the only brigadier of Foot present; so that if the duke wished to name any, it would be 
to the benefit of the service. Yet Orkney continued: 
... but I wish to God we had men that would make it ther business to mind the 
service, which is pretty raire amongst us. 
In the meantime, Orkney had placed the sixteen battalions of Foot into three brigades, 
and ordered the eldest colonels to take care of the details regarding them themselves. 567 
BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 47-48: orders for the Hereditary Prince of Hesse for winter quarters. 
Adam de Cardonnel, by Marlborough's command. Camp at Kalmthout, 25 October 1705 N. S. 
565 BL, Add. MSS 61309, ff. 92-93b: Ross to Marlborough, near Bruges, 2 June 1706 N. S. Ross 
correctly wrote 'June'; Cardonnel mistakenly noted 'May'. 
566 BL, Add. MSS 61309, ff. 102-104b: Ross to Marlborough, Bruges, 4 May 1706 N. S. Again, 
Cardonnel mistakenly wrote 'May' on the letter. Ross had been slightly put out that the officer 
commanding the two battalions of Foot sent to garrison the new conquests had no knowledge 
of Ross's being there -or, worse, had been ordered to take no notice. Needless to say, Ross 
acquainted them of his presence, so that they might take his own orders. 
567 BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 77-78b: Orkney to Marlborough, Maastricht, 10 May 1703 N. S. 
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VII 
Military management 
It is necessary to preface the following analysis on the manner in which the army 
regulated its affairs on campaign, be they in camp or on the march, with an 
introduction to two of the subject's most critical agencies: (i) the quartermaster-general; 
and (ii) the officers of the day. 
The quartermaster-general was arguably the most important staff officer in the English 
army in the Low Countries. Throughout Marlborough's tenure at the head of Queen 
Anne's forces on the continent, the post was held by William Cadogan (1671/2-1726), 
who was appointed to the post in 1701. There is considerable confusion over the nature 
of the post and the duties it entailed, within the paradigm of command as then existed. 
To quote Major Raibeart Scouller: 
Any such definition [of the Quartermaster-General's role]... is misleading as the 
title is to modern ears. Cadogan, for example, when we allow for the closer 
personal control of the battle [and by extension the campaign] exercised by the 
commander himself in those days, was certainly more approximate to a Chief of 
Staff than a Quartermaster-General as we know it m8 
And what 'staff'? Scouller highlighted the problem when he noted that "the 'General 
Staff as we know it today was practically non-existent. That was because of the much 
greater personal control the general himself kept over the minute-to-minute direction 
of the battle [and, again, by extension the campaign]"; while C. T. Atkinson wrote in his 
military biography of the Captain-General, "To say that Marlborough had to be his 
own Adjutant-General and Quarter-Master-General would hardly be an exaggeration, 
for while Cadogan held the post of Quarter-Master-General his duties were from the 
modem point of view rather those of the Chief of Staff. "569 
568 Scouller, p. 62. 
569 Ibid., p. 54; C. T. Atkinson, Marlborough and The Rise of the British Army (2nd Edition, London, 
1924), p. 499. 
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This obfuscates the issue somewhat; studies of early modern military practice have 
occasionally suffered through the application of military terminology, and in this case 
it is informative to let the officers of the time describe their own duties. Richard King, 
who for some time served as an aide-de-camp to Cadogan and assisted the Irishman in 
executing the numerous duties of his office, provided one of the most enlightening 
contemporary depictions of the role of the quartermaster-general-in conception, 
expectation and practice. King had been appointed as the quartermaster-general to Jack 
Hill's Canadian expedition, in 1711. Though his papers inevitably deal with many 
items specific to that ill-fated campaign, one item in particular shows the fruits of his 
learning in the Low Countries and illuminates the practices he would have learnt 
under the likes Cadogan, Dopff and Yvoy. Entitled Memoranda for me as Q. M. G. 570, this 
small, homemade octavo presumably served as an aide-memoire to King who, as 
shown previously, was notably diligent in preparing for duty. Its contents summarise 
the requirements of a quartermaster-general in series of succinct reminders. Many of its 
contents bear quoting in detail. 
Beginning with the maritime component of Hill's expedition, there are necessary notes 
on the oversight of naval expeditions: of how King should proportion the men and 
their provisions among the tonnage regulated by the government for their transport, 
after checking the soundness of the vessels; of how he should account for how many 
boats belonged to each transport, and the number of men they could carry in both 
rough and calm weather. To which were added the necessity of learning the signals 
used during the embarkation and voyage, and the need to "put the General in Mind 
that the Men may be order'd to take ashore with them two Days Provision. " 
It is in expectation of the events following disembarkation that his pamphlet becomes 
particularly relevant. Quebec was to be invested upon the day of the landing, if 
practical; King, as quartermaster-general, should himself take fifty men and 
reconnoitre all the avenues leading to the town, and post guards in the chief of them, 
until the main body of the expedition arrived and the investiture could be made 'in 
form'. Parties should always be sent to patrol the land flanking the route the expedition 
570 KP I(ii)/28, ff. 1-8b (5b-8b blank). It is also denoted as a memorandum for the AQMG, and 
marked'1711', in pencil. 
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marched; and care was to be taken that all such guards placed towards the country 
were posted in security, so as not to expose themselves to the "Embascades of the 
Indians", who were considered a dextrous and accomplished foe in their country. 
Particular care should be taken before the opening of the campaign, that the necessary 
proportions of provisions and forage might be provided to the expedition during its 
time in the field, "at such Places where neither the Enemy nor the Badness of the 
Season may prevent its being brought at all times conveniently to the Army. " And in 
case said body advanced or retired any distances from these magazines, proper 
measures were to be taken that the army was always supplied with bread. On the 
routes of march of the army, and their taking of quarters, King reminded himself: 
To See that the Routes by which the Troops are to march from their respective 
Quarters to the general Assembly of the Army may be so made that they may not 
interfere one with another: that the Troops may not be insulted on their March by 
the Enemy: & that there may be prepar'd for them what is necessary for their 
Support at the Several Places they are to encamp or cantoon at, without forraging 
or plundering the Country. 
To endeavour to have always good Intelligence of the Movements of the Enemy & 
to be perfectly inform'd of all the great Roads Planes & Places where an Army can 
March so as to be able to prevent surprises* [*note in margin: "make your Fourages 
with Security"]; & form an Order of March at all times either to march to or retreat 
from the Enemy. 
And in considering the most efficacious site for the camp: 
To make choice of such Places for encamping on, where both Men & Horses may 
have plenty of Water: & if possible where the Front & Flanks of the Army may be 
cover'd whether by Rivers, Morasses, Woods &c. 
To reconnoitre the Ground design'd for the Encampmt. sometime before the Army 
is to march into it: & to take particular care that the Roads & Ouvertures for the 
Army may be well made before it begins to march. For there's nothing more 
hazardous, or harasses an Army more than any Neglect of this. 
Finally, King highlighted the importance of foraging, and its direction under the 
quartermaster-general: 
Fouraging is one of the principal Duties of a Q. M. Generals Duty. On the Right 
Managemt. of it, the Horse is well provided for, without Danger or Fatigue: the 
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Foot much less harass'd in giving Escortes: the Country preserv'd from Ruin: & 
encourag'd to bring in the Provisions it affords: therefore he ought to make it his 
cheifest Application to be perfect in it: as to know well the Country: to proportion 
as near as possible the Quantity of Fourage he invests, to the Number of Horses 
which are to Fourage in it. To post the Guards in such Manner that they may equaly 
keep out of the Place distined to be fourag'd the Enemy: & in all the Fouragers: To 
take care, that the Road the Fouragers are to return to their camp by, be good & 
well guarded. 
A national contingent of any size in the Allied army possessed one or more 
quartermasters-general. As Cadogan fulfilled the role for the English forces, the Dutch 
were attended to by Daniel Wolf, Baron von Dopff (c. 1655-1723), a considerably 
experienced Palatine officer in Dutch service, who had been kwartiermeester-generaal of 
the States' army since 1694; and Frederik Thomas de Yvoy (1663-1719), who was 
promoted quartermaster-general of the Dutch cavalry in 1705.571 Pierre de (Peter von) 
Montargues (1660-1733) served as quartermaster-general to the Prussian corps serving 
with the confederate army. 
Each officer was assisted by one or more aides and/or deputies. In the English army in 
the Low Countries, there was one deputy quartermaster-general (which on occasion 
also termed assistant quartermaster-general or lieutenant-quartermaster-general), a 
post that was held first by Alexander Spotswood (1676-1740), then John Armstrong 
(1674-1742) during Marlborough's command. Later in his career, Cadogan was allowed 
one (as a major-general) or two (as a lieutenant-general) aides-de-camp on the 
establishment, according to his rank as a general officer; but there is evidence of him 
being allowed one or more adjutants on the establishments of Ireland and/or the forces 
in Low Countries prior to this. 572 
While the post of quartermaster-general was permanent, the various officers of the day 
were temporary appointments. As armies, particularly later in the war, possessed 
many officers of general rank, military custom dictated that on any given day a 
Sn Wijn, J. W. (ed. ), Het Staatsche Leger, vol. 8, Het Tijdperk van de Spaanse Successieoorlog, 1702- 
1715 (The Hague, 1959-64), d. iii, p. 427. Marlborough had great confidence in the Dutch staff 
officers, on one occasion writing that Yvoy had served with him in the capacity of 
quartermaster-general during the whole campaign, and acquitted his office with 'all the zeal 
and diligence that one can attend to of an officer of his merit', being distinguished in all 
occasions of service. BL, Add. MSS 61370, f. 168: certificate for Yvoy. Camp at Weissemburg, 11 
November 1704 N. S. 
572 BL, Add. MSS 61370, f. 83b. 
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number of them would be chosen to oversee the duties of the generality as a whole and 
act as an interface between their peers and the general-in-chief that commanded the 
army. 573 The camp journal preserved in the Blenheim Papers, which concerned itself 
with the diary and endeavours of the English Foot (and the larger corps of which those 
battalions might be a part), lists three general officers of the day: a lieutenant-general, a 
major-general and a brigadier - all commanders of infantry, drawn from a variety of 
national corps 574 Another source, considering the army as a whole but undated, stated 
that there was a lieutenant-general, major-general and brigadier of the day for each 
wing of Horse, and the like officers for the entire body of Foot573; while a series of 
proposed regulations drafted by Cadogan in 1704, there was to be a lieutenant-general, 
major-general and brigadier of the day for the infantry, and the same for all the 
cavalry. 576 
Interestingly, a summary of the practices commonly employed by the army in Flanders 
stated that each wing had for its picquet 'a lieutenant-general, major-general and 
brigadier for the day'. Indeed, the generals of the day provided a similar service and 
duty as the field officers in charge picquets (see below), but on a far larger scale. 577 
There were variations upon this method. On 24 June 1709, as Marlborough prepared - 
after an initial ruse involving leper and Bethune-to invest Tournai, it was ordered 
that, henceforth, a major-general and brigadier 'of each wing', with a lieutenant- 
general'of the whole army' would be on duty each day. At that time, the right wing of 
Marlborough's army consisted of British, Prussian and Hanoverian troops; the left 
wing, Dutch forces 578 On the 25 June, the general officers of the day by this new schema 
consisted of two Prussians (Lieutenant-General Albrecht, Graf Finck von Finckenstein 
and Brigadier Friedrich Wilhelm von Grumbkow), a Briton (Major-General Sir Richard 
573 General officers of the day were also a feature of, for example, the French and Imperial 
armies. In the French army, lieutenants-general could rotate daily command, and general 
officers of the day would oversee such operations as foraging. Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siecle, 
pp. 129 (quoting Belhomme, L'armee Francaise en 1690, pp. 185-6), 290,313,539. In the Imperial 
army, majors-general of the day would fulfill similar tasks. Lund, War for the Every Day, pp. 10, 
142. 
s74 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 1b: camp journal, camp at Hocht, 10 May 1703 N. S. 
575 BL, Stowe MSS 469, ff. 74-75b: undated general orders. 
576 BL, Add. MSS 61338, ff. 17-18b: Reglements pour la Campagne de 1704. In Cadogan's hand. 
577 BL, Stowe MSS 481, ff. 140b-141b. 
578 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 109b-110: camp journal, camp at the abbey of Loos, 24 June 1709 N. S. 
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Temple), a Dutchman (Johan Rabo van Keppel, the earl of Albemarle's younger 
brother) and a Swiss in Dutch service (Daniel Chambrier). 579 If such a large body 
dispersed, or made considerable detachments, this number would diminish: from 4 
September 1709, for example, the allied army split, as a large detachment of Horse was 
made under the Hereditary Prince of Hesse, and the left and right wings marched to 
different destinations. The right wing (which included the British Foot the camp 
journal detailed) reverted to appointing three general officers for the day 58° 
The general officers of the day were quite literally the 'first generals on call'. Small, 
planned enterprises requiring detachments from the army, or a wing, were often their 
perquisite; similarly, in time of emergency, they would typically command the first 
forces roused by way of reaction. On 16 August 1708, as Marlborough's army covered 
Eugene's nascent investment of Lille, Withers (the lieutenant-general of the day) was 
ordered with a detachment to take up posts from Pont-ä-Chin to Lannoy, to cover the 
march of a convoy of artillery leaving Menin for the siege. At the same time, he was 
also to forage. The following day, Orkney (also lieutenant-general of the day) was 
commanded to assemble with a party at the Pont d'Espieres, on the Scheldt, to engage 
in various works 51 In 1703, as his preparations for the siege of Limburg encountered 
difficulties on account of a lack of horses and wagons to draw the artillery and 
supplies, Marlborough wrote to all the generals of the right wing as a body, seeking 
aid. Cutts noted that General Scholten, as the lieutenant-general of the day, opened 
it 582 
579 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 110: camp journal, camp at the abbey of Loos, 25 June 1709 N. S. 
580 BL, Add. MSS 61404. 
581 BL, Add. MSS 61404, If. 89-89b: camp journal, 16 & 17 August 1708 N. S. Withers' detachment 
consisted of 3000 Foot and 1000 Horse, with a major-general and two brigadiers (none of which 
were 'of the day'). Orkney's party numbered 2600 Foot (400 without arms, ready to do work) 
under a major-general and two brigadiers of Foot (neither rolling for the day), and 1000 Horse 
under a major-general of same. This latter detachment was delayed, and only ordered the 
following night, when Orkney was no longer lieutenant-general of the day. For Wither's 
dispositions, see also KP I(i)/77: disposition to occupy the posts of Templeneuve and Lannoy 
and to cover the march of the artillery from Menin to the army before Lille. Made at Helchin, 16 
August 1708 N. S. Another order was made on 19 August (KP I(i)/79). 
582 BL, Add. MSS 61162, If. 16-17b: Cutts to Marlborough, camp at St Trond, 17 September 1703 
N. S. For Marlborough's letter, see Murray, i, p. 181: Marlborough to the generals of the right 
wing, camp at Robertmont, 16 September 1703 N. S. 
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Yet such officers did not exercise these duties exclusively. On 8 September 1708, while 
the covering army was encamped at Peronne, Marlborough was disturbed in his 
dining by accounts of enemy foraging parties passing close to his quarters. The duke 
ordered Major-General Webb to take the two closest battalions to hand (Howe's and 
Temple's), and drive the French off. Webb was accompanied by several digestif-seeking 
volunteers, including the Duke of Argyll. None of these individuals were general 
officers of that day (Table A. 6; p. 292); rather those to hand and, presumably, 
willing. 583 
In addition to the general officers of the day, there were in various instances mentions 
of a major of brigade of the day. This officer would receive all orders issued by senior 
officers (such as the general-in-chief, the general officers of the day and the generals of 
the Horse and Foot) and pass them to his colleagues, his fellow brigade-majors. The 
major of brigade for the day was to remain within the camp, and not stir from his tent 
'on any account' 
*** 
In his reconnoitring of the country to find a suitable site to encamp and/or secure 
intelligence of the enemy, the quartermaster-general would be accompanied by a 
detachment from the army thought sufficient for the mission's security. In June of 1709, 
as Marlborough sought openings to the French position from his camp at the Abbey of 
Loos, Cadogan and Dopff led a scouting and working party into the country. They 
were accompanied by 1300 men, who assembled at six o'clock in the morning by 
Hambourdin, led by a major-general, two colonels and other officers 'in proportion'. 
The party, accompanied by a great many local peasants, cut roads towards the lines of 
La Bassee, so that when the party returned to the camp that night, people believed they 
583 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 93b: camp journal, camp at Peronne, 8 September 1708 N. S. Webb 
found the enemy well posted in the hedges surrounding Chateau d'Evelin. He attacked, forcing 
the enemy into the castle; his attacks on that fortification were stalled when the advance 
brigades of the French army appeared. 
584 BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 151: instructions for the more speedy execution of orders. Undated. 
Confusingly, there is also the mention of a'brigade major of the day' for each brigade. BL, Add. 
MSS 61404, f. 57b: camp journal, 16 June 1706 N. S. 
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'designed going to the enemy that way'. 585 This exercise, however, had been but a ruse; 
having distracted Villars with these threats towards leper and the French left, the allies 
swung their armies about and marched with haste on the 26 and 27 June to invest 
Tournai. 586 
Given the needs of the army, suitable sites for an encampment were at a premium; it 
was a mutual desire on the behalf of Cadogan and his opposite numbers in the French 
army to occupy the well-sited land by the village of Ramillies that helped precipitate 
that battle. Cadogan was a fairly astute judge of the land and its operational utility. In 
the successful summer of 1706 he informed Marlborough that he had viewed "with 
great exactness the camp at Harlebeck which is extremely convenient in respect of 
Forrage and Water. Your Grace can best judge whether the Situation of it be not such 
as that the Siege of Ostend may be covered from thence as well as Rousselar, and your 
Grace would be more a partie att the same time to observe the Electors motion. "%7 
Leading parties in advance of or beyond the main body of the army placed the 
quartermasters-general at risk; within the space of a week in the autumn of 1706, three 
senior quartermasters were captured by the French - both Cadogan and Spotswood for 
English, and Yvoy for the Dutch! The French had taken advantage of the allies' siege of 
585 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 109b-110: camp journal, camp at the abbey of Loos, 23 & 24 June 1709 
N. S. Hare, op. cit., p. 18 mentioned an escort of 1200 Horse; Deane, op. cit., p. 80. Deane stated 
that Cadogan was accompanied by 4000 horse and foot on 24 June 1709, 'and at the same time 
he took severall thousands of bores [boers] of the countrey along with him to open the passages 
& make roads for our armyes marching in several columns. The left of our lines now running 
within a league of Tournay: This reconnaissance is the scene of the story that Cadogan 
disguised himself as a peasant to view the enemy lines (quoted in G. M. Trevelyan, England 
Under Queen Anne, 3 volumes (London, 1931-4), iii, p. 6; and Pearman, op. cit., p. 63) - it is 
possible he acted in this manner on 23 June, but on 24 June he certainly conducted the 
reconnaissance in force. 
586 Chandler, Marlborough, pp. 247-248. Cadogan and Dopff often performed their 
reconnaissance together. On 7 September 1709, for example, they reconnoitred the French 
advance upon the positions of the Hereditary Prince of Hesse, upon which advice the army was 
ordered to march, soon to precipitate the battle of Malplaquet. BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 118b-119: 
camp journal, camp at Havre, 7 September 1709 N. S. For further examples of joint 
reconnaissance, see Murray, iii, pp. 73 & 76; iv, pp. 514-5; iv, p. 570 (investigation of the river 
crossings near Hanon and Pont-ä-Vendin) and iv, p. 590 (marking the campsite for the army for 
the siege of Mons). 
587 BL, Add. MSS 61160, ff. 31-32b: Cadogan to Marlborough, Oudenaarde, 23 June 1706 N. S. 
Marlborough did not take up Cadogan's advice at that particular moment, and the siege of 
Ostend was prosecuted to its finish from the camp at Roeselare. However the army marched 
from there to Harlebeck on 17 July, halting at this good site until 10 August to facilitate the 
taking of Menin. See Deane, op. cit., p. 41. 
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Menin to sortie out two columns from Lille and Tournai, with a view to harassing 
those elements of Marlborough's army foraging. Cadogan was taken first, on 16 
August 1706. As Marlborough wrote to Sarah: 
An officer is this minut come to me to give an account of the forage we have made 
this day, and tels me that poor Cadogan is taken prisoner or killed, which gives me 
a great deal of uneasiness, for he loved me, and I could rely upon him. 588 
Such was Marlborough's unease that he desired to immediately send a trumpet to the 
French, for he could 'not be at quiet til [he] knew his fate. ' Early fears as to Cadogan's 
death proved unfounded; Marlborough opened his hitherto sealed letter to add with 
some relief to the duchess that Cadogan was 'a prisoner at Toumay and not wonded. ' 
The somewhat chastened Irishman managed to pen a quick note to Adam de 
Cardonnel, asking that his two servants, together with his clothes and linen, and one- 
hundred pistols, might be sent to Tournai. In the lower left-hand margin, he wrote a 
quick, but more personal and heartfelt expression of his relief: "I thank God I am very 
well. "589 Cadogan later explained the nature of his close shave in a letter to Raby: 
I was thrust by the Ground I endeavoured to stop into a Ditch on the right of the 
way we passed, with great difficulty I got out of it, and with greater good Fortune 
escaped falling into the Hussars hands who first came up with me. A little 
resistance I persuaded some few of the Dragoons I had before made, alight, and 
who could not get to their Horses, saved them and me, since it made us fall to the 
share of the French Carabiniers who followed their Hussars and Dragoons from 
whome wee met with Quarter and [civility saving] their taking my watch and 
mony. 590 
Marlborough managed to secure Cadogan's exchange with remarkable celerity; he was 
returned on his parole by the duc de Vendome on 19 August. 591 The very next day 
588 Snyder, ii, p. 645 n. 652: Marlborough to Sarah, Helchin, 16 August 1706 N. S. See also Coxe, i, 
pp. 451-2. 
589 BL, Add. MSS 61413, f. 78: Cadogan to Cardonnel, 16 August 1706 N. S. 
590 BL, Add. MSS 22168, ff. 33-34b: Cadogan to Raby, Helchin, 17 August 1706 N. S. 
591 Marlborough had endeavoured to exchange Cadogan with Torcy's brother, the chevalier de 
Croissy. As a match for Croissy had already been secured, Vendome suggested Lieutenant- 
General Pallavinci, a Savoyard in French service who had been taken at Ramillies -a measure 
to which the duke pushed the Field Deputies for their acceptance, stressing Cadogan's 
importance to him. Murray, iii, p. 87: Marlborough to comte de Gassy and the duc de Vendome, 
both dated 16 August 1706 N. S.; Snyder, ii, no. 654, pp. 646-7: Marlborough to Godolphin, 
Helchin, 19 August 1706 N. S. Murray, iii, p. 90: Marlborough to States' Deputies, Camp before 
Menin, 17 August 1706 N. S. 
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Cadogan went with Dopff to monitor the dispositions of the Dutch general Ernst 
Willem von Salisch; adherence to the spirit of the rules of war could be somewhat 
situational. 592 
On 22 August, a party of French hussars again attacked the Allied army's foraging 
parties. Alexander Spotswood, Cadogan's deputy, pursued the enemy with a small 
body of troops; but, going too far, he fell into a body of French Foot, 
who ffiring from the hedges kill'd his horse & took him Prisons 593 
Two days later, the Dutch quartermaster-general Yvoy was himself captured, 'within 
call' of a detachment that he was leading, which had been sent on a reconnaissance 594 
*** 
A suitable destination or objective having been decided, and a route composed, the 
army would be ordered to march. Marching orders would usually be dispatched from 
Marlborough's headquarters when the duke was in command, perhaps by the 
quartermaster-general himself, who would issue them to the general officers of the 
day. 595 In the case of detachments or garrisons separated from the army, the orders 
might be addressed to the senior general or field officer, who was often directed to 
follow subsequently the orders of the senior officer at his destinations%; or even issued 
by subordinate officers, who wrote marching orders drawing upon Marlborough's 
authority. 597 The orders for the army itself were usually composed and issued the 
evening or night before an army was due to leave its camp, ready to be executed the 
592 Murray, iii, pp. 92-3: Marlborough to Salisch, Helchin, 20 August 1706 N. S. 
593 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 76b: camp journal, 22 August 1706 N. S. The soldiers initially 
dispatched to cover the forages amounted to 350 men, with a major in command; a further 150 
marched with the foragers themselves. 
594 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 77: camp journal, 24 August 1706 N. S. Yvoy was captured again in 
1709 while exercising his duties. BL, Add. MSS 61183, ff. 84-85b: Yvoy to Marlborough, The 
Hague, 16 July 1709 N. S. 
595 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 95b: camp journal, camp at Langham, 17 September 1708 N. S. 
596 BL, Add. MSS 23642, ff. 18-19b: order of march for the Royal Regiment of Foot of Ireland, to 
march from Worcum to Breda. Marlborough, by Cardonnel's hand, to Ingoldsby or the officer 
commanding. The Hague, 5 May 1706 N. S. 
597 BL, Add. MSS 23642, ff. 16-17b: order from the Earl of Orkney to the officer commanding 
Godfrey's, Sutton's and Ingoldsby's regiments of Foot. Camp at Turenhout, 9 November 1705 
N. S. Orkney had received instructions from Marlborough to order the three regiments listed to 
march according to an annexed route. 
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following morning; each copy of the orders was typically numbered. 598 While the 
geographical itinerary of march would typically be prepared in advance, the specific 
dates by which formations were expected to reach certain towns and posts were often 
left blank - to be filled in at an appropriate time, pursuant to such issues as readiness, 
alarms and the weather. 59 
Marching orders followed a standard scheme. The General would be ordered beat at a 
given time; the Assembly would typically follow thirty minutes later; and the army 
would be ready to march a further half-an-hour after that. 600 The battalion and 
squadron quartermasters and their escorts would leave some time before the soldiers 
themselves, in order to prepare the site marked for the next camp. This vanguard 
would be commanded by the major-general of the day and the quartermaster- 
general 601 A typical order to march ran as follows: 
The Gen" at 4, half an hour after the Assembly and to March at 5. The Qr MasTs at 
the head of Woods ['s regiment] at 4. The Genfs Baggage to be at the Rear of the 
Train. The Baggage of the Lines to be ready at 4 and to wait till called for by the 
Baggage MasTGen". No Qua*- to be mark'd for any under a Brigadr. No soldier to 
stir out of his Rank as the Commanding Officer shall Answer. Two men of a Battn to 
be immediately at Coll. Cadogans to Guard the Waggons for the Foot. Marauders 
to be hang'd without mercy. No houses behind Regiments to be taken till the Qr 
Masr Gen" be acquainted when the Army comes to ground. No Soldier to stir from 
the camp without leave from his officer. 602 
It was expected that all officers 'kept their divisions' on the march, remaining in their 
posts and keeping their men in due order. The major of each regiment was tasked with 
ensuring that his company and troop officers brought their men up to the place of 
s98 E. g. KP I(i)/82. Order to march from the camp at Amongies to that at Helchin. Camp at 
Amongies, 23 August 1708 N. S. This is a neat copy, marked 'no. 14', of a draft order (KP 
I(i)/81). 
599 BL, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 143-143b: routes for the Hessian cavalry and infantry. Adam de 
Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. Brussels, 30 October 1709 N. S. The order stated that 
quartermaster-general Dopff would fill in the dates. See also KP I(i)/76: order of march to leave 
the camp at Helchin to go to that at Ath. Camp at Helchin, 12 August 1709 N. S. KP I(i)/173: 
order of march for tomorrow, from the camp at Avelgem to that at Ottignies. Avelgem, 15 April 
1710 N. S. KP I(i)/187: route for the Palatine troops from Maastricht to the army before Douai. 
Camp at Flines, 30 April 1710 N. S. Some locations were left blank, and no dates were indicated. 
600 BL, Add. MSS 61404: camp journal. Ad passim. 
601 BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 102-105b: memorial on the orders and dispositions of the armies for 
the impending campaign (1703). 
602 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 17: camp journal, camp at Castre, 19 May 1704 N. S. 
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encampment in proper order, and put those acting negligently under arrest. If he did 
not, then it was the duty of the major-general of the day to put this major himself 
under arrest. Furthermore, the orders of the day stated: 
If any Soldier is found 100 paces from his Regiment without an Officer with him he 
shall be taken up as a Marauder and punished with Death. This order to be 
published at the head of every regiment 603 
Various orders were made to promote discipline on the march. In May 1704 two 
officers of each brigade were commanded to patrol the flanks of their corps, to keep the 
men in order. 60 Later, this was increased to two officers of each regiment; and a further 
two parties of fifty men, each led by a captain, would keep post on the flanks as the 
brigadier of the day directed them. 605 
During Marlborough's army's march to the Danube in 1704, its passage through the 
allied regions of the Rhineland, Swabia and Franconia necessitated the strictest 
discipline. Continual orders were passed forbidding the cutting of corn or trees-606 On 8 
August, in anticipation of entering the lands of the Elector Palatine the next day, 
Marlborough ordered that nobody in the army was to burn or plunder on pain of 
death 607 On another occasion, four subalterns with thirty men each were ordered to 
march with the quartermasters on the way to the next camp. Spotswood, as deputy 
quartermaster-general, was to post them at villages on the line of march, to take up all 
marauders and stragglers they encountered 606 
Marlborough's march through the lines of Ne Plus Ultra in 1711 was organised with 
typical attention to detail. All the army's heavy baggage and sutlers were ordered to 
collect at the train of artillery by 4 p. m. on the afternoon of 4 August. The general 
officers of the day were to meet at Marlborough's quarters at 6 p. m.; Cadogan, who left 
603 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 9b: camp journal, notes on march discipline. 20 June 1703 N. S. This 
was a common stricture; see, for example, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 308-309b: orders against 
marauding. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. Camp at Lens, 15 June 1711 N. S. 
This order specified that no NCO, trooper, dragoon or foot soldier was to be one hundred paces 
from his corps on the march, on pain of death. 
604 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 17: camp journal, 21 May 1704 N. S. 
605 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 19b-20b: camp journal, 9 June 1704 N. S. 
606 E. g. BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 19-19b: camp journal, 6 June 1704 N. S. 
607 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 30: camp journal, camp at Santzelle, 8 August 1704 N. S. 
608 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 19b: camp journal, 7 June 1704 N. S. 
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to join with Hompesch before the main body of the army marched, had two captains 
and two hundred men with tools muster at his quarters at 5 p. m., where they received 
his own orders. 
At 6 p. m. the Retreat was beaten as per usual; the tents were struck as the evening grew 
and it was ordered that no more fires than ordinary were to be made in the camp, on 
pain of death. At 9 p. m., the Dutch and British artilleries departed -the Dutch, escorted 
by one hundred Horse, would head to Vitry, to make bridges over the Scarpe; the 
British, similarly escorted, would pass through Douai and make their bridges on the 
canal of Arleux, above Geulzin. 
At 10 p. m., the army was to march 'with all possible silence', the regiments in close 
order, with their supply horses marching on their flanks where the ground permitted; 
the general officers would be at their posts on the line, where they would find guides 
to conduct them. It would file off by the left on its march from Villers Brulin to Oisy-le- 
Verger: each wing in two columns, as then encamped, the first line on the right and the 
second on the left. The left wing would proceed pass by the villages of Servin and 
Carency on the left and thence march across the Scarpe, leaving the villages of 
Brebieres and Arleux on their left. The right wing would pass by Villers-au-Bois, 
Neuville St Vaast, Gavrelle and Vitry to their right, crossing the Scarpe between the last 
place and Brebieres 
Small detachments of soldiers or local peasants were frequently formed to help clear 
the roads, paths and passages of the countryside, to speed the passage of the army on 
the march. For the march of the army on 31 May 1703, a sergeant and twenty men of 
each regiment, with arms, were ordered to meet at the head of Ingoldsby's regiment of 
Foot at 3 a. m. for the 'making of ways'. These, together with a major from each 
regiment [brigade? ] who would be sent would supervise them, would then muster at 
the head of Webb's regiment at 4 a. m., where they would meet the Earl of Orkney and 
proceed with their duty 61o The majors of each regiment were on occasion expected to 
609 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 142-142b: camp journal, camp at Vilers Brulin, 4 August 1711 N. S. 
610 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 5b: camp journal, camp at Haneffe, 30 May 1703 N. S. 
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visit the nearby bridges and roads made by their charges, and organise the repair of 
any that were wanting or spoiled 611 
A peasantry forcibly corralled into service by a variety of civic and rural authorities 
was not necessarily the most reliable or diligent workforce; as the author of camp 
journal noted with some chagrin on one occasion: "we had 9000 Boors Order'd but not 
7000 ever appear'd & of those sevl. missing every minute. "612 Yet the rewards could be 
considerable, particularly depending on the season: daily rates of as much as 20 
stuivers existed, though those that shirked their 'duty' might be punished. Sergeants 
and other soldiers from the army were deployed to see the workers kept to the task at 
hand 613 
In 1704, a specific company of guides was formed for the purpose of aiding the army 
on its march and forage, and taking care to make and repair the roads and other 
passages. The company was commanded by a captain or conductor (paid 6s. p. d. ), 
aided by a quartermaster or corporal (4s. p. d. ). They would oversee ten guides, who 
were paid 2s. 3d. a day each, for themselves, their horses, clothing and accoutrements. 
A further 3s. 6d. a day was allowed the company to answer for whatever contingencies 
might arise. These sums were not accounted for as, for example, Contingencies, but 
stopped from the pay of the English regiments in the Low Countries (who consented to 
the deduction). 2s. was stopped from each squadron of Horse a day, 12d. from each 
squadron of dragoons, and 6d. from each battalion of Foot. The entire fund (£1.16s. 
p. d. ) was handled, perhaps unsurprisingly, by Cadogan, to be applied by him to the 
guides maintenance according to the directions he received. 614 Although the guides 
611 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 6: camp journal, camp at Haneffe, 1 June 1703 N. S. 
612 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 61b-62: camp journal, 24 July 1706 N. S. 
613 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 63: camp journal, 29 July 1706 N. S. By way of contrast, a private 
sentinel in the English Foot might make an additional 8 stuivers a day (in addition to their daily 
subsistence, which, depending on the local exchange and other stoppages, might amount to 5 or 
so stuivers) when engaged in such working parties as might be involved in making works or 
construction gabions and saucissons. Furthermore, each regiment would be paid 10 stuivers for 
every gabion constructed, though there was no requirement as to how such money would be 
accounted. 
614 BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff: 111-111b: deductions to furnish a body of guides during the 
campaign. The Hague, 28 April 1704 N. S. For the establishment of the company, see ibid., ff. 
111b-112 (same date). For an example of a deduction for these guides, out of a company's 
accounts, see KP I(i)/7. The deduction on this account (23 October 1705 to 22 April 1706 O. S. ) 
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were normally under the command of the quartermaster-general, they were on 
occasion under the orders of his aides and deputies. 615 
The baggage of the English army was the fief of the wagonmaster-general. 616 For most 
of the war this was Lieutenant-Colonel Giles Spicer. Spicer was unable to attend the 
army in the Spring of 1711, on account of his recent receipt of the governorship of 
Guernsey (which would require his attention for three months). He asked for a leave of 
absence for that time, assuring Marlborough that his two aides would be able to do his 
duty in his stead; but the situation was unworkable -a week later Spicer was 
recommending Hugh Pudsey as his replacement and Marlborough signed Pudsey's 
warrant to be wagonmaster-general at the camp at Werder on 1 June 1711 N. S. 617 
The wagonmaster-general oversaw the march of the baggage of both the army and its 
generals. 618 As an example, the marching orders of 1 September 1710 stated that Spicer 
was to marshal the grand baggage of the army upon the highlands of Houdain, before 
it marched off - that of the generals first, according to their rank, followed by that of 
the army, with the second line following the first, in the same order as the soldiers had 
been camped. It would be escorted by 200 Horse and 400 Foot, and all would carry two 
days' forage 619 
Each regiment would typically be allowed to send a small party of soldiers - such as a 
sergeant and ten men per battalion-to guard its baggage, "and no more as the 
Commanding Officer shall Answer [otherwise]. " The regimental baw (baggage) horses 
with the soldiers' tents would be carefully directed by the wagonmaster-general and 
amounted to fl. 2: 11. On typical duties, see KP I(i)/143. Order of march for the left wing on the 
26 October 1709, from the camp at Boussois to that at Roeux. Made on 25 October 1709 N. S. 
615 KP I(i)/226. Order of march, 3 September 1710 N. S. "Le Colonel King aura soin de les 
envoyer des Guides. " 
616 The train of artillery also had its own wagonmaster-general on the establishment of the 
Board of Ordnance. BL, Add. MSS 61369, f. 53b: order for Captain Charles Ball, wagonmaster- 
general and captain of the artificers in the English Train to fell wood in or adjoining the camp, 
to repair carriages. Adam de Cardonnel, by Marlborough's order. Camp at Peer, 9 August 1702 
N. S. See also Add. MSS 61370, f. 19b: order to Charles Ball, wagonmaster-general and captain of 
the artificers, to cut down wood for the train. 1703. Ball's warrant as 'Waggon-Master' to the 
Ordnance (at £100 p. a., paid quarterly) was dated 1 February 1703 O. S. WO 55/488 p. 41. 
617 BL, Add. MSS 61295, ff. 94-95b: Spicer to Marlborough, London, 17 April 1711 O. S. Ibid, ff. 
96-97b: Spicer to Marlborough, London, 24 April 1711 O. S. Dalton, vi, p. 183. 
618 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 23b: camp journal, 30 June 1704 N. S. 
619 KP I(i)/222. Order of march for the grand baggage. Rebreuve, 1 September 1710 N. S. 
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his assistants (on passing a bridge, for example, they might be ordered to keep to the 
left); and wheeled carriages prohibited from travelling at the head of a regiment . 6200n 
the march to the Danube, a typical order stated that the baw horses would march with 
a sergeant at the head of the battalion or regiment; while the sick would take post at 
the flank or the head of the regiment, likewise with a sergeant accompanying. Any 
sergeant who derelicted this duty would be broken. 621 
Within his own sphere of influence, the sheer autocracy of the wagonmaster-general 
compared favourably with any post in the army. Any officer or soldier that disobeyed 
the wagonmaster-general, or disputed his orders in regulating the march of the 
baggage, was to be severely punished, and his corps held accountable for any damages 
inflicted; wagons and carts that disrupted the regulated order-such as those of sutlers 
that were found within the march, or with or before the vanguard of the army -were 
liable to be plundered. 622No commanding officer was permitted to send any 
detachment to the head of the baggage to ensure that his passed preferentially, by 
force; all the baggage was to follow according to the ranks of the generals and corps of 
every nation 623The general officers themselves were called upon to give certificates to 
their domestic servants who conducted their baggage. 624 
One disturbance is highlighted in a court-martial held at the camp at Sutendal, on 23 
September 1702. Five individuals-David Moore, a sergeant in The Honourable James 
Stanley's regiment of Foot; David Graham and Henry Lyddal, servants to Hans 
Hamilton, the lieutenant-colonel of said regiment; Richard Bradley, a servant to Major 
Worden of likewise; and William Clark of Captain Freeman's company therein-were 
all accused of disobeying the wagonmaster-general and making a disturbance in the 
march of the baggage from the camp at Asch, earlier in the day. 
620 BL, Add. MSS 61404, If. lb-2: camp journal, camp at Hocht, 13 May 1703 N. S. Orders of 
march for the army. Add. MSS 23642, ff. 27-27b: order for the limitation of baggage. 7 July 1708 
N. S. 
621 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 19b-20b: camp journal, 9 June 1704 N. S. 
622 BL, Add. MSS 61336, If. 65-66b: order of Marlborough relating to the baggage. Camp at 
Coursell, 1 July 1703 N. S. Add. MSS 61404, If. 142-142b: camp journal, camp at Vilers Brulin, 4 
August 1711 N. S. Ibid, f. 9b: 21 June 1703 N. S. Add. MSS 23642, If. 27-27b: order for the 
limitation of baggage. 7 July 1708 N. S. 
623 BL, Add. MSS 23642, If. 27-27b: order for the limitation of baggage. 7 July 1708 N. S. For a 
similar order, see BL, Add. MSS 61336, if. 65-66b, dated 1 Ju17 1703 N. S. 
624 BL, Add. MSS 61404, if. 26b-27: camp journal, 20 July 1704 N. S. 
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The principal accusers were Colonel Spicer, the wagonmaster-general, and two of his 
English conductors, James Fleming and John Diggle. By their accounts, disagreements 
on the roads over the rights of way of the various carts, wagons and horses of the army 
could be violent affairs. Fleming testified that the disturbance began when Lyddal led 
his cart into the ranks of Major-General Ingoldsby's baggage; it was upon hearing this 
that Spicer sent his conductors to officiate, quickly following himself. Worden's 
servant, Bradley, was particularly violent, "laying about him with a flail", striking one 
of Ingoldsby's men on the nose and crying, "Damme lets knock them all 
down! "Graham, Hamilton's servant, struck the watchmaster of the guard with his 
halberd, before relenting and surrendering his weapon to the wagonmaster-general; 
Lyddal gave Spicer nought but'ill language'. 
Sergeant Moor, who accompanied Stanley's wagons, was found guilty on account of 
his failure to prevent disorder; he was broken. Graham, Lyddal and Clark were to ask 
the wagonmaster of Ingoldsby's regiment's pardon. Bradley, the instigator, was found 
guilty of a high misdemeanour and sentenced to be taken by the provost and whipped 
by his man at the head of the regiments to which the watchmaster and wagonmaster 
belonged, as well as his own regiment - all three punishments to occur in one day, 
with fifty stripes at each 625 
*** 
While the army was on still its march, the quartermasters would have preceded them 
to the site marked for the next camp. Each battalion or troop quartermaster would be 
accompanied by a number of aides from his regiment. For a battalion of Foot, this 
might typically consist of a sergeant, and a man from each company - the'camp colour 
men', each of whom was to carry a spade or hatchet taken from the train. 626 The 
quartermasters were to keep their charges in good discipline on the journey to the new 
camp site, ensuring that none straggled or marauded, be it on the march or upon 
625 BL, Add. MSS 61369, if. 89-90: proceedings of a court-martial held at the camp at Sutendal, 23 
September 1702 N. S., Lieutenant-Colonel Roger Elliot presiding. 
626 Aides to the battalion quartermasters. An order of 1711 specified that this was to amount to 
one man per company of Foot; for the Horse and Dragoons, these activities were carried out by 
the regimental and troop quartermasters alone. BL, Add. MSS 61372, If. 308-309b: orders against 
marauding. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. Camp at Lens, 15 June 1711 N. S. 
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arrival at their destination. 627 Occasionally, they were given help in this regard. An 
order of 1704 stated that a captain, lieutenant and ensign from every battalion were to 
accompany the quartermasters and their men each day, to answer for whatever abuses 
they might do and to keep such parties as accompanied the quartermasters in order. 628 
Later, in 1710, a similar order dispatched a major of each corps or nation and an officer 
of each regiment with the quartermasters, accompanied by 600 Horse. Of the two 
provosts-general in the army, one would accompany the quartermasters and the other 
the baggage 629 
When a quartermaster arrived at the ground, he was directed to his own battalion's or 
troop's place in the camp by the quartermaster-general or his deputies. It was the 
senior staff officers' duty to regulate the dispositions of the camp; none but the 
quartermaster-general or his deputies were to mark any quarters and any officer that 
did so besides might be broken. 63° Such stark ordinances were often repeated. In 1704, 
an order stated that no quarters were to be taken but for the general officers and the 
commanders of regiments; and these were to be marked by the quartermaster-general 
and his deputies. 631 These commands were not given idly: on 18 September 1705, at the 
camp at Montaigne, Captain John Pickering of the Foot Guards confined his lieutenant- 
colonel's servant for just such a marking of quarters; an act that escalated into a serious 
dispute between Lieutenant-Colonel James Dormer and the captain, the former killing 
the latter in a duel. 632 
The dispositions of the battalions and squadrons in an army's encampment would 
vary, but a typical placement (a 'true Distance') was as follows, provided the ground 
'affor'd it': 400 paces between each line of the army; 30 paces to be allowed to each 
squadron, with an interval of 20 paces between; and 100 paces for each battalion of 
627 BL Add. MSS 23642, f. 13: Orders for the (battalion) quartermaster, or his sergeant. 
628 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 21b-22: camp journal, 21 June 1704 N. S. 
629 KP I(i)/213. Order or march for 10 July 1710 N. S., to leave the camp at Henin Lietard to go to 
that at Neuville. See also KP I(i)/214. 
630 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 13: camp journal, 13 July 1703 N. S. 
631 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 19b-20b: camp journal, 9 June 1704 N. S. 
632 BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 33-35b: proceedings of a general court-martial held at the camp at 
Aarschot, 21 September 1705 N. S., Major-General Withers presiding. The court comprised six 
colonels and six lieutenant-colonels. Dormer was found not guilty. 
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Foot, with an interval of 40 paces in-between. 633 It would be the major-general of the 
day's responsibility to post guards at the camp and occupy the posts necessary for its 
security; to regulate any forage on the day they arrived in camp; and to decide with the 
quartermaster-general the villages the army would collect its straw from. 634 
Having been directed to his own ground, the quartermaster was to place any available 
sentinels on all the local houses, fishponds, trees, hedges, straw, fuel, forage and other 
items that were within his corps' limits - but not to stretch his lines irregularly, or alter 
the dispositions given him by the quartermaster-general, so as to bring into his 
encampment anything that was not 'justly due'. The ground having been marked, the 
men attending the baw horses carrying the battalions tents, and the men carrying the 
camp colours, ensured that the tents were laid in a proper placement, to be pitched by 
the main body of the battalion upon its arrival. The quartermaster would draw up a 
parade line to the front of the battalion's tents, and plant the camp colours upon it, as a 
guide for all. Sentinels were posted to dissuade other formations from marching across 
the battalion's ground and causing a disturbance. The quartermaster was also tasked 
with ensuring proper lines of communication and movement with adjacent corps and 
making the battalions 'houses of office' (latrines). 635 (If an army tarried for long in the 
same camp, the quartermaster was also to make sure that new latrines were cut every 
six days, while the old ones were carefully stopped up. 636) 
A quartermaster possessed many responsibilities. He 
... ought to be a honest careful man, exact at his Pen, & good accomptant very well 
skill'd in the Detail of a Regiment & ought constantly to know ever individual 
circumstance of a regiment as to Duty & finances. 637 
In garrison or in camp he was to see that the quarters were kept clean and ensure that 
all the battalion's equipage, tools, provisions and carriages were properly provided 
633 BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 138: orders for the encampment of the army. Undated. 
634 BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 102-105b: memorial on the orders and dispositions of the armies for 
the impending campaign (1703). 
635 BL, Add. MSS 23642, f. 13: orders for the quartermasters. Undated. 
636 BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 149: instructions for the quartermasters concerning their encampment. 
Another order assigned this duty to the major of each battalion. Add. MSS 61404, ff. 47-47b: 
camp journal, camp at Meldert, 1 August 1705 N. S. 
637 BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 146b: rules to be observed by all the quartermasters of the British Foot. 
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and distributed; an especial care was to be taken in ensuring that the bread and other 
provisions were wholesome and undamaged, and delivered on time - on 18 July 1704, 
for example, the regimental quartermasters were met at the cellars in front of 
D'Herleville's regiment, so that they might each receive three barrels of beer for their 
battalion 638 On all this a quartermaster was to keep exact accounts and return such as 
was not necessary or ordered, so that the regiment was not answerable. Duties were 
thus numerous, 
& whereas there is a great many things belonging to this imploy that cannot be 
recit'd here, & that happens without rule, ancient Customs, & the Custom of war 
must be follow'd, &a good understanding will make it easy. 639 
It was also the quartermaster's duty, or that of his sergeant, to see that the streets of the 
garrison town, or avenues of the encampment elsewhere, were swept clean and kept 
free of rubbish; all sutlers and butchers were to bury their waste every day, lest they 
suffer punishment as the regimental commanding officer thought fit. The speedy burial 
of all dead horses was also a duty of the quartermaster, and he was to ensure that no 
soldiers, sutlers, servants or others made to 'ease themselves' anywhere but in the 
latrines. On other occasions the quartermasters were tasked with reconnoitring for 
grass and straw in the vicinity of the encampment, informing their brigadier of what 
guard might suffice to keep any grazers safe 64i 
*** 
When the army was successfully encamped its general and staff officers would 
regulate the dispatch of receipt of orders. The orders of the day for the Foot (to use that 
branch of service as an example) would be issued at the appointed ('orderly') time at 
the general-in-chief's quarters, where the general officers of the day would be in 
attendance. The exact form could vary, but the general orders for the army might 
typically be received by the major-general of the day, who would then pass them on to 
the brigadier of the day, who would likewise distribute them to the majors of brigade 
638 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 26b: camp journal, 18 July 1704 N. S. 
639 Ibid. 
640 BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 149. 
641 BL, Stowe MSS 481, ff. 149b-150: orders for straw and fuel, grazing and foraging. 
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while himself overseeing the formation of any detachments made in the camp. 642 The 
majors of brigade would be accompanied by orderly sergeants, who could be 
dispatched with orders to various formations as necessary. "3 On other occasions the 
disposition might have been more complex, given the multinational composition of the 
army. A memorial c. 1703 suggested that each 'nationality' would receive its orders at 
the headquarters via its commanding general, who would then order all that was 
necessary in his corps; the major-general, who would also be at the general-in-chief's 
quarters when the orders of the day were given, was to regulate with each nation the 
fine details with regard to forage, escorts, guards etc. 644 
While the brigadier of the day and the majors of brigade attended their duties, the 
major-general of the day would visit the general(s) of the Foot, to see if that officer had 
any other orders for his own or other corps in the army. As a general of the infantry 
himself, Philipp Karl, Graf von Wylich und Lottum (1650-1719) possessed very keen 
ideas on where the rights and dignities due to such an officer lay in this system of 
organisation, and wrote a memorial to Marlborough on this subject in 1707. It is 
difficult to define the degree to which his observations reprised, or at most clarified, 
contemporary practice; or differed to a considerable degree from it. Nevertheless, it is 
instrumental to list Lottum's points in summary: 
(i) That it might please Marlborough to order the major-general of the day to 
give regularly the parole to the generals of infantry according to their 
seniority, and inform them of all the orders given. And when a general (of 
infantry) was present at the parole, the major-general of the day would order 
nothing without concerting with him; and at his absence in a case of 
necessity, such general officers of the day might make to execute all orders 
they received from the commanders-in-chief, but would immediately make 
an effort to share those orders with the general. 
(ii) That the major-general of the day would make a report of all that passed in 
the army on his day, the following day. 
642 BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 143. Method for the better dispatching in the distributing orders. 
Undated. 
643 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 56-56b: camp journal, camp at Alost, 30 May 1706 N. S. 
6" BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 102-105b: memorial on the orders and dispositions of the armies for 
the impending campaign (1703). 
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(iii) That if the general(s) of the infantry was incommoded, or otherwise 
impeded, which might oblige him to remain in his quarters, the major- 
general of the day would still send the parole to his house. 
(iv) That no detachment of infantry would be made out of the army, without 
orders dispatched directly from Marlborough or the Dutch Field Marshal to 
the general of infantry, who would then give the orders to the major-general 
of the day for the infantry regarding the battalions to be employed - 
although the exact details of the detachment would remain the 
responsibility of the generals of the diverse corps of the army. 
(v) That if there were two generals of infantry, each would have command of 
his line; and that each line would possess a major general of the day. 
(vi) That it would be good to define the honours which were due to the generals 
of infantry in the army. 
(vii) That the general of infantry, and the lieutenant-general and major-general of 
the day would inform Marlborough or the Field Marshal of any news or 
extraordinary arrivals, and appraise them on any affairs of import 
personally. 645 
Having received his orders, from whatever source, the major-general of the day would 
acquaint the lieutenant-general of the day with all that had been issued. Should any 
further orders be given, the major-general of the day would send them, with his aide- 
de-camp, to the major of brigade for the day - who was to remain in camp, and to be 
sure to at all times let the other officers know where he was to be found. The 
lieutenant-general of the day was also to keep an aide-de-camp close to hand, to 
dispatch any orders he might make to the majors of brigade, and to acquaint the 
general-in-chief and general of the Foot with the measures he might have taken. 646 
Usually, the lieutenant-general of the day was obliged to give an account to the 
general-in-chief of all orders he might make, before they were put into action; but in a 
case of emergency he might execute them immediately, while sending notice to his 
superior at the earliest convenient moment 647 
645 BL, Add. MSS 61231, ff. 108-109b: Lottum's memorial, camp at Soignies, 19 August 1707 N. S. 
646 BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 143. Method for the better dispatching in the distributing orders. 
Undated. 
647 BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 102-105b: memorial on the orders and dispositions of the armies for 
the impending campaign (1703). 
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To react better to the flow of information in the camp, formations would send orderlies 
to the various generals' quarters to receive orders and other information as required. 
One source suggests that each wing of Horse was to send an orderly cornet, and each 
brigadier of Foot an orderly sergeant, to the generals' quarters every day; while every 
brigade was to send an orderly sergeant to the General of Foot's quarters. 648 These 
orderly sergeants were expected to be "... good understanding Serjeants that can write 
well to wait orderly, & if occasion happens to carry verball messages. "649 The adjutant- 
general was tasked with keeping details of all the orders given, detachments made and 
any other matters that might pass in the army; it was also his role to decide upon any 
disputes that might arise in the exercise of duty, and to visit all the outposts frequently 
if possible, otherwise keeping close to the general-in-chief. 650 
To maintain good communications between each other, the general and staff officers of 
the day-particularly the major-general of the day and the brigadier of the day -were 
expected to keep their quarters very close to those of the majors of brigade, who were 
themselves to encamp together in the middle of the army, between the first and second 
lines. All the general officers' aides-de-camp were expected to know the location of the 
quarters of the majors of brigade, to deliver them as celeritously as possible they might 
be tasked to carry. 651 An order of 7 July 1708 stated that all majors-general, brigadiers 
and majors of brigade that were, or came 'to take the day', were to encamp in the rear 
of 'their brigade' 652 
ýýý 
Discipline with the camp was the province of the provosts-general or provost marshals 
of the army. John Fury fulfilled the post as provost marshal to the English forces, and 
his most remunerative duty was his oversight of the various sutlers, provisioners and 
traders that accompanied the army. He regulated the prices of their wares and checked 
the fairness of their weights and measures - and demanded a healthy compensation for 
648 BL, Stowe MSS 469, ff. 74-75b: undated general orders. 
649 BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 146. Rules tobe observed by the adjutants of the British Foot. 
650 BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 143. Method for the better dispatching in the distributing orders. 
Undated. 
651 BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 151: instructions for the more speedy execution of orders. Undated. BL, 
Stowe MSS 469, ff. 74-75b: undated general orders. 
652 BL, Add. MSS 23642, ff. 27-27b: camp orders, 7 July 1708 N. S. 
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the privilege. 653 Richard King's papers contain an extract from the Dutch regulations of 
order and discipline in army, which were adopted by the Allied army as a whole; 
articles 82 to 92 concerned the management of the army's sutlers, and the provost 
marshal's interactions with them. 
A battalion was to have no more than six sutlers; a squadron no more than four. Each 
was obliged to be provided with a written authorisation from the colonel or 
commanding officer of the regiment, and to follow the battalion or squadron for the 
whole campaign, "for which purpose they must provide themselves with a good 
Waggon or Cart drawn at least by two strong horses, " and encamp themselves behind 
their formation. All other sutlers or traders were to present themselves to the provost- 
general, who would grant them authorisations of admission to the army and camp 
with the generals' consent, directing them to the 'General Suttling Place. 
All sutlers, butchers and retailers bring or selling any provisions to the forces under 
English pay were subject to the 'inspection and direction' of the provost marshal, as 
noted. In one example, an order specified that sutlers found guilty of any offences were 
to be fined: 2 guilders for the first offence; 20 guilders for the second; and on the third 
the sutlers were to forfeit all their goods and wares, besides such further punishment 
as the nature of their offence might require. Of the goods forfeited, two thirds were to 
pass to the provost marshal himself, while the other third was to be put to 'charitable 
uses'. In addition, the provost marshal was to receive the 'usual fees' from the sutlers 
attending the forces in English pay, which comprised (and were not to exceed): 
(i) 3 stuivers for each tun of beer brought into the camp; 
653 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 12: camp journal, 6 July 1703 N. S. Ibid., f. 145-145b: camp journal, 
camp at Avesnes-le-Secq, 21 August 1711 N. S. In 1708, Marlborough ordered both Fury and 
Lieutenant John McQueen of Orkney's regiment to investigate the people who raised public 
tents at the army's headquarters, on account of the great disorders that occurred there daily, 
with various 'idle and debauched persons' making a nuisance of themselves to the 'great 
prejudice' of the army. The provost marshal and the lieutenant were to inform themselves of the 
character of all such individuals and report their findings to the duke, with an account of their 
behaviour. BL, Add. MSS 61371, f. 229b: order to Fury and Mr Macquin to enquire into the 
character of the persons allowed to keep public tents at the head quarters. Marlborough. Camp 
at Terbanck, 12 June 1708 N. S. 
654 KP 1(i)/9: Extract out of the Regulations of their High Mightinesses the States General of the United 
Netherlands concerning the Subordination, Military Discipline and several Points serving for the better 
maintaining of Good Orders in the Army. Concluded 15 March 1706. 
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(ii) 24 stuivers for each hogshead of wine; 
(iii) 48 stuivers for a hogshead of brandy or'distilled waters'; 
(iv) 4 duits for each bottle of wine; 
(v) The head of a calf or sheep slaughtered; 
(vi) The tongue of an ox or cow slaughtered; 
(vii) Half the head of a hog slaughtered; 
(viii) And so proportionately for all other sorts of goods. 
Furthermore, each sutler or trader who erected a tent anywhere in the camp was to pay 
3 stuivers a week to the provost-marshal in `place money'. (Confusingly, the 
regulations could vary with the ebb and flow of the campaign and the war. While an 
order of 12 July 1704 clearly stated that any sutler that refused to give the provost 
marshal his dues would be plundered, an order made later in the war, at the camp at 
Langharn on 17 September 1708, stated that neither the provost marshal nor the 
battalion majors or adjutants were to exact dues from those who sold provisions in the 
camp! 655) 
No other officer than the provost marshal of Her Majesty's forces was to demand any 
other pay or profits from the sutlers, except at the headquarters of the general-in-chief 
and the quarters of the general officers, where the like fees were to be received by the 
quartermasters or harbingers of the generals. Marlborough commanded the provost 
marshal to publish these conditions at the head of each regiment under English pay, 
accompanied by the sound of a trumpet or beat of a drum, so that none might 'pretend 
ignorance'. 656 
655 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 20b: camp journal, 12 June 1704 N. S. Ibid., f. 95b: camp journal, camp 
at Langham, 17 September 1708 N. S. 
656 BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 28-28b: order regulating the prices of provisions, in stuivers Holland 
money. Adam de Cardonnel, by Marlborough's order. Camp at Vorselaar, 11 July 1703 N. S. See 
also BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 104-105b: Rules and Orders for the better Government of the 
Suttlers and others bringing provisions to her Majesties Forces &c. The camp and date are left 
blank; the year was 1702. This example rates the penalty for the first offence at fl. 12, and that 
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Yet The provost marshal might choose on his own account to sell or farm out his 
perquisites to the regimental officers themselves. John Fury petitioned Marlborough on 
this very point: having obtained several douceurs from the sutlers and other 
provisioners 'for his care in keeping a due regulation of their wightes and measures', 
he had agreed to resign these benefices to the adjutants of the regiments in the army, 
for the fee of 2 pistols each campaign per regiment. The arrangement had worked well 
until that present campaign, when the adjutants denied the agreement; they believed 
that such sutlers' fees properly belonged to them anyway. Fury begged Marlborough 
to order that the old agreement be fairly discharged-indeed, Fury claimed that his 
claim upon the adjutants was less than if he had continued to collect the perquisites 
himself - or it would be impossible to support his post as provost marshal 657 
Fury was also responsible for the discipline of the soldiers, troopers and dragoons 
within the camp and its environs. The basic fundaments of military discipline were of 
course handled by the regimental officers, who saw to such trivialities as forbidding 
the sergeants or men to talk, smoke tobacco or make noise when the battalion was 
forming on parade; or making sure the men pitched their tents before they suffered 
them to sit and rest, or attend to any other business. 658 While in garrison, company 
officers visited the quarters of their men at least twice a week, ensuring that the 
grounds were tidy and that the soldiers men messed as they ought; no soldier was to 
appear outside his quarters after the taptoo, for example, nor be dressed slovenly or 
without his sword on the street 659 Above all, the soldiers were to offer no disrespect to 
the citizens of a town, nor take matters into their own hands: 
for the second at fl. 25. It also listed the provost marshal, as well as the quartermaster or 
harbinger of the generals, as being a beneficiary of the dues given at the headquarters - though 
the provost marshal's rank was subsequently crossed out. See also KP I(i)/9: Extract out of the 
Regulations of their High Mightinesses the States General of the United Netherlands concerning the 
Subordination, Military Discipline and several Points serving for the better maintaining of Good Orders 
in the Army. Concluded 15 March 1706. This specified a penalty of fl. 6 for each inspection by the 
provost-general of wares brought into the camp without the approbation of the Dutch clerk or 
comptroller-general of the provisions. 
657 BL, Add. MSS 61287, ff. 195-196b: petition of John Fury to Marlborough. Sadly, this petition 
is undated; the date of this disagreement cannot be positively identified. 
658 BL, Add. MSS 23642, f. 12: orders for the officers in camp. Undated. 
659 BL, Add. MSS 29447, f. 113-11b: directions for all the commanding officers of the British 
infantry, from the Earl of Orkney. Camp at Marchiennes, 23 October 1711 N. S. 
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If any dispute happens between a Soldier &a Burger - the Soldier is not to do 
himself justice, or give any Scurrillous Language or blows but complain to his 
Officer who is to represent it to ye Gen» MO 
But as a simmering pot of variably bored, tired, hungry and violent individuals, acts of 
ill-discipline were common, despite these measures. Marlborough and his fellow 
commanders (occasionally in conjunction with dignitaries6o1) issued numerous orders 
for the prevention of plundering and marauding by soldiers in camp or in garrison. 
Men were not to offer the least insult or injury to the populace, 
... by uncovering and pulling down their Houses, or Bairns, breaking into their Orchards, destroying their Gardens and Plantations, taking away their Poultrey, 
Horses, or any other Cattle whatsoever out of their Stables or Pastures, or any way 
Molest or Disturb the Suttlers and others bringing Provisions to the Army... 
under the penalty of immediate execution under martial law. 662 
An additional element of disorder was introduced in 1706, when the Protestant Dutch, 
English, Danish and German forces of Marlborough's army conquered much of the 
largely Catholic Southern Netherlands in the name of Charles III. An army of officers 
and men raised on a diet of anti-papist bigotry were expected to treat the Catholic 
populace, ecclesiastics and houses of worship as they would those of their co- 
religionists. Soldiers seized in a church outside the hours of divine service would be 
considered robbers, and suffer death; any that plundered a church or cloister would be 
hanged without mercy 663 
A central element in the prevention of crimes such as marauding was the principle of 
shared responsibility: officers and corps were frequently held responsible for the 
actions of their charges and fellow soldiers. A simple order, like that of 9 August 1704, 
which stated, "None to stir out of the camp, of their ranks, " was appended with the 
660 KP I(i)/13: Garrison orders for Capt. King. Ghent, 30 October 1706 O. S. 
661 E. g. BL, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 169b-170: order against marauding. Comte d'Avelin and Adam 
de Cardonnel, by Marlborough's command. Tournai, 23 June 1710 N. S. 
662 BL, Add. MSS 61336, if. 67-68b: order ageists straggling and marauding. Camp at Tielen, 6 
July 1703 N. S. 
663 BL, Add. MSS 23642, ff. 21b-22: printed order for preventing disorders. Cardonnel, by 
Marlborough's command. In English, printed in Brussels. 11 October 1706 N. S. Add. MSS 61372, 
ff. 308-309b: orders against marauding. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. 
Camp at Lens, 15 June 1711 N. S. 
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explicit addendum: "as the commanders will answer. "664 Anybody found with stolen 
goods was considered a robber unless they produced the true culprit immediately; not 
that it might guarantee clemency if that individual was a soldier of the army, as 
'receivers and buyers' were to be punished equally alongside the robbers themselves 
and suffer death. None were to pretend ignorance; commanding officers were 
answerable to such orders according to "their Intent & meaning", leaving little liberty. 
As it was recognised that such disorders "frequently happen[ed] by the negligence of 
officers", Marlborough declared that the officer to whose company or troop marauders 
belonged would be held liable for the damage committed, "and be obliged 
immediately to make restitution to the utmost Value. " On another occasion, the duke 
ordered that any officer who did not inform his superior immediately upon notice of 
stolen goods being brought into 'his province', or of disorders committed by the 
soldiers, would be cashiered 665 
A list of the contingent payments made by the Earl of Orrery's regiment of Foot over 
the period 8 May to 23 October 1707 included an item of fifty guilders, which had been 
paid by Benjamin Sweet to the priest at Bouterghauw, on account of the soldiers 
"plundering the Village. " Those close to the duke were not immune, as this following 
order, directed at Henry Durell, shows: 
Whereas the Inhabitants of the Village of Grenay in Artois, and the Sauvegarders 
appointed for their protection, have depos'd upon Both, that several soldiers of the 
Regiment under Your Command, together with some Dragoons of Brigadier 
Daudegries Regiment, did on the Twenty fourth of June last, in a violent manner, 
force into a House in the said Village, and, among many disorders committed there, 
did take away ffour Cows, & several Household Goods, valued at One hundred 
Patacoons, in Breach & Contempt of the Order read at the head of each Regiment 
for preventing maroding: I do hereby direct & require that You forthwith pay to the 
Inhabitants of the said Hundred Patacoons, or such part thereof as You can 
Compound, & that You Charge the Same to the pay, as well of the officers, as 
Soldiers of Your Regiment, for punishment for their remissness and for an Example 
664 E. g. BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 30: camp journal, camp at Hexhem, 9 August 1704 N. S. 
66513L, Add. MSS 23642, ff. 20-20b: order contra marauding, camp at Beaulieu, 27 May 1706 N. S. 
Add. MSS 61370, ff. 27-27b: order against straggling and marauding. Adam de Cardonnel by 
Marlborough's command. Camp at Tielen, 6 July 1703 N. S. Add. MSS 61371, f. 10: order against 
marauding. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. Camp at Elst, 8 June 1705 N. S. 
Ibid., if. 111b-112: regulations to prevent marauding. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's 
command. Camp at Gramez, 11 October 1706 N. S. Add. MSS 61372, ff. 308-309b: orders against 
marauding. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. Camp at Lens, 15 June 1711 N. S. 
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to deter others from the like offence & Breach of Orders; For which this shall be 
your Sufficient Warrant and Direction. 
Given at the Camp at Cote this Twenty Seventh day of July 1711. Marlborough. 
These prohibitions extended to the civilians of the army. Sutlers were forbidden to buy 
anything from marauders on pain of being treated as such themselves; the provost 
marshal was authorised to seize the horses, wagons, carts and goods of those who 
violated such an order, which were confiscated to 'his use'. 667 A woman 'taken up 
puting off false Coin or money' was ordered to be whipped at the head of the line, if 
she did not name her associates. 668 
Keeping the soldiers within the bounds of the camp was a prime concern. Rolls were 
taken frequently to ward against unlawful absence, albeit not always successfully. In 
May 1703, at the camp at Thys, the rolls were ordered to be taken punctually, three 
times a day. This did not appear to have the designed effect, as it was soon increased to 
four times a day, attended with various warnings on the penalties due to those that 
committed disorders. 669 One proscription of 1704 warned that any soldier found a mile 
from the camp was to be considered deserters; in 1711 another forbade any soldier to 
go a thousand paces from his camp or corps - offenders were to be hanged without 
mercy 670 On 30 June 1704, a particularly stark order was issued, affecting officers as 
well as other ranks: all personnel under the rank of general officer that did not 'lye in 
the camp' would be broken. Furthermore, the brigadiers were expected to be 'not 
above 500 paces' from their brigades. Such strictures applied to the march, too, 
666 BL, Add. MSS 61330, ff. 178-179b: order from Marlborough to Henry Durell, Brigadier, and 
Colonel. Camp at Cote, 27 July 1711 N. S. N. B. the cover to the order actually specifies the 
payment as 50 patacoons. 
667 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 10b: camp journal, 27 June 1703 N. S. Add. MSS 61372, ff. 308-309b: 
orders against marauding. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. Camp at Lens, 15 
June 1711 N. S. 
BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 19b: camp journal, camp at Heidelberg, 8 June 1704 N. S. 
669 BL, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 308-309b: orders against marauding. Adam de Cardonnel by 
Marlborough's command. Camp at Lens, 15 June 1711 N. S. Add. MSS 61404, ff. 3-3b: camp 
journal, camp at Thys, 20 May 1703 N. S. Ibid, f. 4b: camp at Thys, 26 May 1703 N. S. Ibid., f. 10b: 
27 June 1703 N. S. Ibid., f. 13: camp journal, 14 July 1703 N. S. 
670 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 21b: camp journal, 19 June 1704 N. S. Add. MSS 61372, ff. 308-309b: 
orders against marauding. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. Camp at Lens, 15 
June 1711 N. S. 
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whereupon every officer was expected to keep his place in the line and wear his 'livery 
clothes' (i. e. uniform, in so far as it existed). 67' 
Posts were occupied to prevent disorders and the passage of soldiers from the 
encampment into nearby towns, and the quarter and rear guards were ordered to be 
alert to the least evidence of marauding. 672 The majors of brigades were to report 
transgressors, such as those who attempted to leave the camp or broke other articles of 
discipline, while company officers might be ordered to visit the tents of their men at 
least three times a day - as well to know which men were absent as to discover stolen 
goods; all that had absented themselves without leave were to be made to run the 
gauntlet on their return. 673 
The main actor, however, remained the provost marshal. He would patrol with the 
guards distributed to him, making his rounds of the camp and its surroundings. The 
provost marshals or provosts-general of the various corps and armies were often 
authorised to render summary judgement and execution upon those transgressing 
orders against marauding and straggling. 674 Their authority would on occasion go 
beyond their particular corps: an order in June 1711 stated a provost who took 
transgressors from within his own corps was to render them to the heads of their 
squadrons and battalions, where they would be hanged; those that were not of their 
own corps were to be hanged on the spot, "to avoid the disputes and difficultys that 
might otherwise happen if they were brought to their own Corps". 675 
671 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 23b: camp journal, camp at Balmershoven, 30 June 1704 N. S. 
672 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 2b: camp journal, 16 May 1703 N. S. A captain, two subalterns, three 
sergeants and fifty men guarded the bridge on the camp's side of Tongres to prevent any 
soldiers crossing. Ibid., f. 5b: camp journal, camp at Haneffe, 30 May 1703 N. S. The guards were 
ordered to seize all soldiers that brought timber into the camp; no houses were to be pulled 
down on pain of death. 
673 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 30: camp journal, camp at Hexhem, 9 August 1704 N. S. Add. MSS 
61371, f. 10: order against marauding. Adam de Cardonnei by Marlborough's command. Camp 
at Elst, 8 June 1705 N. S. 
674 One order stated that those who robbed "any Boor or Subtler coming to the Camp shall be 
hang'd without Mercy. " BL, Add. MSS 61369, ff. 19-20 (Dutch), 20-20b. 7 July 1702 N. S. Add. 
MSS 61336, ff. 67-68b: order against straggling and marauding. Camp at Tielen, 6 July 1703 N. S. 
Add. MSS 61404, ff. 3-3b: camp journal, camp at Thys, 20 May 1703 N. S. 
675 BL, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 308-309b: orders against marauding. Adam de Cardonnel by 
Marlborough's command. Camp at Lens, 15 June 1711 N. S. 
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On 27 July 1703, there were fifty-six prisoners from the right wing at the provost's 
quarters charged with marauding. Most were apprehended by the provost marshal, 
with a sergeant and a guard of fifteen men. These soldiers had been taken while 
carrying such diverse items as: bottles of buttermilk; hogs, cows, calves and potatoes; a 
'Kettle said to be found in a Ditch'; pieces of hogsflesh; salt and fat; 'Garden stuffs'; 
dishes and linen; honey (some had also been stopped in the act of 'burning bees); 
meal; 'A baggfull of Boors Cloths'; and a cartload of household goods. A further eight 
men had been taken from the left wing: four with cows and four with twenty sheep 
(which they said they had been given by Danish troopers, who could not carry 
them). 676 
A few days later, some of these individuals were apparently brought to trial. Edward 
Dawkins, a drummer in Stewart's regiment of Foot who had been found a league from 
the camp, burning bees and stealing honey, was sentenced to death - but he was 
recommended for, and received, a pardon. Others faced a more capricious fate: Robert 
Carr and John Melmady, who had been found guilty of robbing a peasant, were 
sentenced to death; Marlborough ordered that they drew lots - one was to be 
pardoned, the other killed. Most received corporal punishments: three were to be tied 
to stakes and 'severely whipped' by the hand of the common hangman; others were 
sentenced to run the gauntlet; or returned to their regiments to answer for their being 
absent without leave, and punished 'according to their desert' 6n 
It was not just the soldiers of the army that might plunder the local populace; the 
situation could occur in reverse, with soldiers and sutlers the targets of local gangs of 
robbers, or even peasants. Gallus Kalger (a burger of Nijmegen and sutler attending 
the headquarters), John Holsinger (a sutler in Colonel Schmettau's regiment) and 
James Haygre (a dragoon and sutler in Colonel Benne's regiment) were travelling from 
Tirlemont to the camp with a wagon and two carts loaded with provisions, when they 
were "stopt and plunder'd" by a party of fifteen boers, three of whom carried firearms 
and the rest 'great sticks'. Haygre set about the bandits with a tent-pole, before he was 
676 BL, Add. MSS 38853, ff. 39-40: list of prisoners at the provosts for marauding, 27 July 1703 
N. S. 
677 BL, Add. MSS 61370, ff. 31b-33b: proceedings of a general court-martial held at the camp at 
Kalmthout, 30 and 31 July 1703 N. S., Colonel John White presiding. 
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hot in the arm (which he subsequently lost the use of); Holsinger was taken with the 
robbers to a local farm, where they at least allowed him the kindness of a glass of 
Kalgin's own wine while they drank from his bottles and divided the spoits. 678 
On other occasions, a more senior individual than the provost marshal might be called 
upon to investigate (and punish) disturbances, as when the Dutch quartermaster- 
general, Yvoy, was ordered to examine the disorders committed by the soldiers posted 
along the Moselle. Yvoy was given powers to punish those responsible and give orders 
to prevent such acts in the future; all were to submit themselves to his authority in this 
regard. 679 
The central form of military justice was the court-martial. Two forms of this court 
existed: the regimental court-martial and the general court-martial. The former could 
award corporal punishment if approved by the commanding officer, and largely 
concerned itself with intra-regimental matters such as the neglect of duty and disorders 
within quarters, as well as serving as a board of inquiry and arbitration between 
soldiers and officers, or soldiers and soldiers. 68° General courts-martial were appointed 
by virtue of a warrant issued on the part of Marlborough as commander-in-chief (or by 
the acting commander-in-chief in his absence) to senior officers, who would form and 
preside over the resulting court 681 These orders to hold courts-martial were typically 
specific, limited to a single occasion, but others constituted what were in effect 
standing courts: an order of 11 October 1706 stated that courts-martial were to meet at 
least four times a week, starting at 8 a. m. and not adjourning until 12 noon; deserters' 
sentences would be put into execution the following day. 682 
678 BL, Add. MSS 61336, ff. 19-20b. Camp at Tirlemont, 14 September 1705 N. S. The three sutlers 
claimed losses running to just over 1500 German florins. 
679 BL, Add. MSS 61371, f. 12: order to Yvoy to examine disorders. Adam de Cardonnel by 
Marlborough's command. Camp at Elst, 11 June 1705 N. S. 
60 Scouller, AQ 102, pp. 334-335. 
681 E. g. BL, Add. MSS 38853, f. 112: warrant from Marlborough to Sir Richard Temple, Bt, to 
hold a general court-martial at the camp at Lien les Beguines, dated 6 July 1705 N. S. The general 
court-martial was held at the camp two days later (ff. 114-116). In September 1703, three courts- 
martial were convened under Lord Cutts' orders: 18 September, the Earl of Barrymore 
presiding (ff. 95-97b); 27 September, Colonel Tatton presiding (ff. 99-101); and 29 September, the 
Earl of Barrymore presiding (ff. 103-105b). 
682 BL, Add. MSS 23642, ff. 21b-22: printed order for preventing disorders. Cardonnel, by 
Marlborough's command. In English, printed in Brussels. 11 October 1706 N. S. 
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The execution of sentence might occur in the camp, at the head of various regiments; or 
on the line of the army's march, as in a case in 1704, when two deserters, a robber and a 
purveyor of false money were put to death 'on the road'. 683 But justice was typically 
subservient to efficacy. The day before the battle of Blenheim, as the impending nature 
of action was explicit, every effort was made to secure the strength of the battalions. 
(No general officer, for example, was to keep more than six men on their guard and the 
regimental commanders were urge to let their corps march 'as strong as possible'. ) This 
desire was clear in the amnesty allowed to many of the army's transgressors: all 
prisoners at the Provosts' were to be pardoned, excepting those accused of murder or 
desertion. 
*** 
The security of the army's camp was discharged by its guards. There were various 
guards manned by the army in camp or garrison, often with conflicting terminology. In 
camp, the Camp Guard, Main Guard or Grand Guard would be the main guarantor of 
security consisting of a large detachment posted as the geography of the camp and its 
environs, and the position of the enemy, dictated. It is thus difficult to derive any 
consistent system for its use. The other guards, however, were more formulaic. 
Each regiment of Foot, for example, would have its own quarter guard, which would be 
posted directly to the front of the battalion's colours; this guard was never made by the 
army as a whole, but by each individual regiment, providing an extra ring of security 
to the camp. 685 The picquet-guard was 
... a body of men always to be ready with their arms in their 
hands to turnout in 
case of an alarm ... commanded not by the next officer on 
detail, but such as are 
appointed for Picquet ... [and] must march either to sustain outposts, 
forraging 
escorts or any other service ... 
Each regiment would provide a small party of soldiers as its own picquet; taken across 
the army as a whole, this would provide a moderate force under arms in emergencies. 
The picquets would be expected to wear their uniforms on whilst their duty, so that 
683 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 21: camp journal, 14 June 1704 N. S. 
684 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 30b: camp journal, camp at Munster, 12 August 1704 N. S. 
685 BL, Stowe 481, ff. 140b-141b: orderly guards. Undated. 
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they would appear as regular soldiers of the army and nothing else. 686 The exact form 
and command of picquets varied. By one scheme, each wing of Horse would have a 
colonel, lieutenant-colonel and a major commanding its picquets, with the same ranks 
to command the picquets of the entirety of the Foot. 687 In 1705, a camp order for the 
Foot listed the picquets' officers as comprising a colonel (who oversaw the picquets 
along the first line), a lieutenant-colonel (who did likewise for the second line), and a 
major, whose duty it was to pass reports from these officers to the major-general of the 
day. 688 It was duty of the generals of the day - and none other - to call out the picquet 
under arms, or to change or reinforce the camp guards and outposts upon an alarm, or 
intelligence of the enemy's movement. They would also post any picquet of Horse that 
was to be drawn out and patrol at night, before returning at daybreak. 689 The officers of 
the picquets would make their report the morning following their picquet.. 690 
Central to the security of the camp was the parole, or 'Word'. The parole was a word of 
security typically given by the general-in-chief; indeed, the very act of giving the 
parole symbolised a general's command over the army. The parole was changed daily; 
in the camp journal of the English Foot, the paroles noted were usually the names of 
towns and cities. Initially these were towns in the Low Countries, but from 25 May 
1704 Marlborough's the army switched to using English towns and cities for the 
686 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 7: camp journal, camp at Haneffe, 7 June 1703 N. S. 
687 BL, Stowe MSS 469, f. 74-75b: undated general orders. By an order given of 1704, when 
Marlborough's army joined that of Baden's, the picquets of the duke's army rolled for that 
formation alone. The lieutenant-colonel of the Marlburian picquet would do his duty ahead first 
line; the major would place himself to the rear of the second line. Each man of the picquet 
carried powder and ball for twenty-four shots. Add. MSS 61404, f. 23: camp journal, 28 June 
1704 N. S. 
688 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 39b: camp journal, camp at Elst and Perle, 12 June 1705 N. S. BL, 
Stowe MSS 469, ff. 74-75b: undated general orders. 
"9 BL, Add. MSS 61337, If. 102-105b: memorial on the orders and dispositions of the armies for 
the impending campaign (1703). Stowe MSS 481, If. 140b-141b. Stowe MSS 469, f. 74-75b: 
undated general orders. 
690 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 4b: camp journal, camp at Thys, 26 May 1703 N. S. According to the 
scheme presented in Stowe MSS 481, ff. 140b-141b, it was the duty of the colonel of the picquet 
of 'each nation' to make his report the following morning ('at the orderly time') at the general- 
in-chief's quarters. 
Complicating the issue was the daily officer of the'Rounds', who was occasionally recorded in 
addition to the three field officers of the picquets. BL, Add. MSS 61404, ad passim. 
Contrastingly, other sources mention the colonel of the picquet making the 'grand round', 
typically before midnight, accompanied by a sergeant and four men. Stowe MSS 481, If. 120-121, 
140b-141b. 
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parole. 691 Once Marlborough's army joined with that of Baden, two paroles began to be 
used: a town's name and a saint's name. 692 Similar patterns continued throughout the 
war. It is doubtful that Marlborough's critics in England would have been pleased to 
hear that, the day after such a sanguine battle as Malplaquet, the paroles issued for 12 
September had been St Jacques and Turin - in salute to the army's twin captains 693 
Without the camp, the security of the army was maintained by various posts appointed 
at key villages, river crossings and the like to secure the army's flank and its 
communications. In theory, the initial scheme for any outposts made by an army might 
be determined by the generals of the day, the quartermaster-general and the adjutant- 
general; it would then be passed to the generals of Horse and Foot, who would make 
any alterations as they thought appropriate. Once the locations of the posts, and the 
numbers of men and officers needed to secure them, were known, the lists would be 
passed to the major of brigade of the day of the corps that was to make the 
detachments. The major of brigade would form these parties, while the quartermaster- 
general would ensure that the guides conducted the detachments to these posts on at 
least the first occasion; and afterwards kept an orderly man with the major of brigade 
of the day; when a post was occupied, the officer in command there would send an 
'expert soldier' back to the major of brigade of the day, who would stay at the staff 
officer's tent for any orders, or serve as guides for parties of relief. Outposts sited a fair 
distance from the camp were typically relieved every eight days; care was taken that 
the adjutant-general, or the generals of the day, sent to all outposts the countersign for 
use by their patrols, in writing and sealed, carried by an orderly trooper. 694Detached 
officers, such as those commanding posts on the army or overseeing the sick and 
wounded, would make their reports to the major-general of the day 695 
*** 
691 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 17b- camp journal, 25 May 1704 N. S. 
692 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 23: camp at Geingen, 27 June 1704 N. S. 
693 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 120: camp journal. 'Jack' was a common diminution of John applied 
to Marlborough; Turin was the scene of Eugene's great triumph. 
694 BL, Stowe MSS 481, f. 140: general rules to be observed in an army about outposts and other 
guards, and also the methods used in the army of Flanders for regulating duties in general in 
the army. Outposts close to the main camp were to be relieved at 8 a. m. Stowe MSS 481, f. 143. 
Method for the better dispatching in the distributing orders. Undated. 
695 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 6b: camp journal, camp at Haneffe, 3 June 1703 N. S. 
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Foraging could be a particularly hazardous time for an army, when its elements were 
dispersed over a wide are of ground, without arms and under reduced discipline. 
Every attempt was made to safeguard the activity and prevent disorder (as much for 
the security of the army as the well-being of the local populace). A typical forage 
would involve two fundamental elements: the forage parties themselves, and a guard. 
The use of any wheeled carriages by the foragers would typically be forbidden. 6% The 
quartermaster(s)-general, in conjunction with the captain of guides, would usually be 
given the task of reconnoitring the ground near, or in advance of, an army's camp or 
line of march for suitable places for forage. Having collected such knowledge, it would 
be his duty to advise the general officers of the posts best occupied for the security of 
the enterprise 697 The dispositions for forage would then be settled by the lieutenants- 
and majors-general of the day, together with the quartermaster-general. Its execution 
would be directed by a lieutenant-general, major-general of brigadier 698 
A typical foraging expedition ran as follows. On 21 May 1703, an order was given in 
camp to signify that foraging parties would be sent out the following morning, to 
collect supplies for three days. A body of 800 Foot, under Brigadier Webb, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Hamilton and Major Meade, would form at the head of Orkney's first battalion 
at the time of 3 a. m. This party would then move to secure the avenues and posts 
necessary to protect the foragers. The foragers themselves would form later: each 
battalion would send a number from its ranks to the head of their respective brigades 
at 6 a. m; once mustered, each brigade's foragers would be drawn up at the head of the 
Hessian grenadiers by 7 a. m. An officer of each battalion, and a captain from each 
brigade, would accompany the followers, to ensure they did no excessive mischief. 699 
A few days later, a looser approach was prescribed: any brigades that needed forage 
might send an escort of their own with their forages, the escort not exceeding a captain, 
two subalterns and sixty men. 700 Another example had each regiment contributing one 
696 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 7-7b: camp journal, camp at Haneffe, 9 June 1703 N. S. 
697 BL, Stowe MSS 481, ff. 149b-150: orders for straw and fuel, grazing and forage. BL, Add. MSS 
61371, ff. 25-25b: order against marauding. 1705. 
6913 BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 102-105b: memorial on the orders and dispositions of the armies for 
the impending campaign (1703). 
699 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 3b: camp journal, camp at Thys, 21 May 1703 N. S. 
700 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 4: camp journal, camp at Thys, 24 May 1703 N. S. 
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man per tent to a foraging party, with the whole being covered by a detachment of 250 
men (commanded by a major, three captains, four lieutenants, four ensigns and twelve 
sergeants), who were also to respond to any disorders and ensure that the foragers 
entered no house or cemetery under any pretext whatsoever. Each regiment was to 
forage twice every eight days, grouped by nationality: the English on one day; the 
Danes and Hessians another; then the Dutch; and finally the Hanoverians. 701 
The foragers would not be allowed to march out of the camp until given orders by the 
general officers of the day. Guides would be send to each line of the army, to the 
parade grounds where the foragers mustered, to conduct them to place(s) of forage. 
The signal for their return would usually be the firing of three cannon. Any foragers 
found without the guards would be taken up as robbers and deserters, and punished 
accordingly. In times of particularly stringent discipline, as occasioned by recent 
abuses and other disorderly behaviour, the foragers' 'trusses and tents' might be 
searched to check if they had brought any plunder into the camp. 702 
Any forage collected was to be used for battalion subsistence only; it was not to be cut 
to be sold to any other party on pain of arrest, and the forage seized. 703 If an army was 
specifically ordered to plunder and maraud, it was suggested that one line alone was 
to engage in such activities at any given time, and only one man out of each tent in that 
line was to maraud; no others were to stir out of the camp or their duties on pain of 
death. 704 
A forage by the two lines of the right wing of Marlborough's army, to be made 2 July 
1706 in the fields between the villages of Sarren and Hautsamen, was disposed as 
follows. The escort would consist of a thousand Foot and 160 Horse. The majority (650 
Foot and 100 Horse) would be posted between the great guard on the right wing and 
701 BL, Add. MSS 61371, if. 25-25b: order against marauders, and for foraging. 1705. 
702 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 27b: camp journal, 25 July 1704 N. S. Stowe MSS 481, if. 149b-150: 
orders for straw and fuel, grazing and forage. BL, Add. MSS 61371, ff. 25-25b: order against 
marauding. 1705. Add. MSS 61404, f. 6: camp journal, camp at Haneffe, 31 May 1703 N. S. Stowe 
MSS 481, ff. 149b-150: orders for straw and fuel, grazing and forage. Add. MSS 61372, ff. 308- 
309b: orders against marauding. Adam de Cardonnel by Marlborough's command. Camp at 
Lens, 15 June 1711 N. S. 
703 BL, Add. MSS 61404, if. 7b-8: camp journal, camp at Haneffe, 11 June 1703 N. S. 
704 BL, Stowe MSS 481, ff. 149b-150: orders for straw and fuel, grazing and forage. 
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the village of Sarren, along the road, split into several groups; it would be so posted to 
deter enemy sorties from the Bois de Hulst, as well as to keep the foragers in check. 
The officers commanding the infantry would detach smaller parties to flanking posts, 
with outlying sentinels, to continue communications with each other; the officers 
commanding the cavalry would mount continuous patrols, so as to herd the forages 
within their proper bounds. The foragers themselves would muster at 5 a. m. (three 
hours after the escort had mustered) before General Wood's regiment of Horse and 
then march out, directed by the guards, the first line taking the lead. 705 Further 
examples of foraging expeditions exist in Richard King's papers. 706 
705 BL, Add. MSS 23642, ff. 23-24b: memorial of the forage to be made 2 July. Camp at Roeselare, 
30 June 1706 N. S. The forage escort comprised 2000 Foot and 200 Horse, which were posted as 
follows: 800 Foot to line the wood of Linthout, from the village of St Peters Woluwe until the 
high ground between Watermael and the abbey of Cambre; 300 Foot and more footmen 
between the said high ground and the abbey of Cambre; 500 Foot at the abbey of Cambre; 400 
Foot between the abbey, Itterbeck and the road from Brussels; 100 Horse on the high ground 
between Watermael and the abbey; and 100 Horse on the plain between the village of Crainhem 
and the wood of Linthout. The officers at the posts desired mentioned would take care to not let 
any foragers pass without escort. The infantry and cavalry that would muster that evening at 11 
pm behind the British dragoons camped on the right of the first line. The foragers themselves 
would gather at 5 am the following morning before their regiments, to march to the right of the 
first line. This copy of the order was one of several; it is marked 'no. 5'. 
706 E. g. KP I(i)/62. Dispositions for the Hanoverian and Prussian forage. 30 June 1708 N. S. 
220 
VIII 
Organized chaos or chaotic organization? 
Controlling the battlefield 
"I am exactly of your opinion that a Battle in Flanders 
would give much Satisfaction to Our People at home be the 
Even almost what it will; It must Some way or other turn to 
our Advantage ffor the English like nothing so well as 
Action & Blood for their Mony... " 
Letter of James Taylor to Henry Watkins, Horse Guards, 13 July 1711 O. S. 707 
That this provides the last (and least) chapter is a function of two issues. The first is 
that studies of tactical engagements dominate the historiography of the War of the 
Spanish Succession, not least the Anglophone and Marlburian corpus. This thesis has 
instead focused on the operational level of the war, and the various systems, customs 
and protocols used in the direction of the army. The second issue is that the skirmishes 
and battles of the war were in great part fluid, chaotic affairs. The primary mode of 
communication in a battle itself was verbal, of which no record remains other than 
anecdote. This reduces the amount of primary source material available. Furthermore, 
to this author's knowledge only one set of battle orders remains- for Malplaquet, in 
1709. Comparatively, a greater number of sources exist for the manner in which the 
armies prepared for the investment of enemy fortresses, and the systems they 
employed in the management of the subsequent siege. 
The Allied armies in the War of the Spanish Succession adopted a common form, 
typically composed of two or more lines, which might be organised into two wings, 
with infantry in the centre and the cavalry on the flanks. The fundamental building 
blocks of the army were its battalions of Foot and squadrons of Horse and/or 
Dragoons. The notional deployment drawn out in line of battle would be drawn out on 
707 BL, Add. MSS 33273, ff. 96-97b: James Taylor to Henry Watkins, Horse Guards, 13 July 1711 
O. S. 
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paper in an order of battle. The were carefully constructed, often with several iterations 
of work by diverse hands. The battalions and squadrons of the army would be 
distributed across a large sheet of paper, relative to their position in camp and/or the 
line of battle. Each battalion or squadron would first be sited by a provisional mark, 
such as a pinprick; later it would be covered by a quadrilateral, drawn in ink and often 
coloured by a light wash, to denote a specific corps or nationality, or simply provide a 
brighter aesthetic. These elements were bracketed according to their brigades, which, 
while not permanent entities, could achieve an element of longevity on the campaign. 
Further annotations might bracket brigades according to nationality or administrative 
heading (such as the English, Dutch or joint Anglo-Dutch establishments). 708 
A wisdom of the time was that when minor detachments were made from an army, 
they were often formed from small parcels of soldiers taken from multiple sources, 
rather than a single battalion, for example, being detached whole. Given an equal 
number of men, an army composed of a larger number of slightly smaller battalions 
was almost certainly thought preferable to that comprising a smaller number of larger 
battalions. Though never explicitly stated, this is borne out continuously in the manner 
in which the army managed its detachments. Major detachments designed to engage in 
operations were composed of entire battalions and squadrons. 
In one example, Cutts described the 'two battalions' needed at Ruermonde being made 
up of detachments from Hamilton's, Ingoldsby's and Marlborough's regiments of Foot; 
Meredyth's regiment, which supported this force, was to have its numbers made up by 
taking one hundred men apiece out of two detachments at Maastricht, or fifty men 
apiece out of four. Cutts also noted that Meredyth's regiment, being a newly formed 
corps, should be placed in a garrison where the 'exactness of the discipline' and a 
'number of good examples of old Regiments' would aid its military development. 
Each of these temporary battalions was to be commanded by a field officer, or the most 
senior captain. n° 
708 KP I(i)/3. Order of battle at the camp at Kinderkingen [9 July 1704 N. S. I. 
709 BL, Add. MSS 69380, ff. 92-92b: letter from Cutts [to ?] enclosing marching orders, 20 March 
1701 N. S. [1704? ] 
710 BL, Add. MSS 69380, ff. 94-94b: undated draft orders for the detachments. See ]bid., ff. 92- 
92b. 
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In 1709, a welter of small detachments were made out of the battalions for various 
duties. Lumley was ordered to detach 36 men out of each British battalion (the Foot 
Guards and two battalions on the Maes excepted), with officers proportionable, which 
were to be disposed in several places (including 500 at the castle at Ghent, 256 at 
Courtrai and 72 at Ostend). Pascal was to send 400 men from the garrison of Brussels to 
Louvain, and a further 50 out of each Spanish battalion to Leeuwe. Württemberg was 
to take 36 out of each Danish battalion, sending 124 to Courtrai and 100 to Ostend; and 
similar numbers were to be detached by Billow out of the Hanoverians (300 of which 
were to go to Lier, and 204 to Ath), the Hereditary Prince of Hesse out of the Hessians 
(to Oudenaarde), Schulenburg out of the Saxons (216 to Ath, 72 to Oudenaarde) and 
Lottum out of the Prussians (500 to Liege, 184 to Huy). The colonel commanding the 
regiment of Münster was likewise ordered to dispatch 36 men to Maastricht. 711 
By that year, the size of the Allied armies was considerable; so much so, that the 
prospect of joining both the Anglo-Dutch-auxiliary army under Marlborough (104 
battalions, 143 squadrons), and the Imperial army under Eugene (66 battalions, 140 
squadrons) was impractical. If a temporary combination of both forces was necessary, 
Eugene's corps would form the right wing (with both its wings of cavalry being 
deployed on the right), while Marlborough's formed the left (with all its cavalry 
deployed likewise); the two corps of infantry would join in the centre. Detachments for 
a siege would be made by each corps pro rata for the infantry; while the cavalry of one 
army or the other would be employed at the siege. 712 
The latter provision is central to understanding how forces were apportioned for a 
siege. To serve at a siege could be highly dangerous; no corps was to be exposed more 
than was its share - and those that did could even expect a healthy remuneration. At 
the siege of Menin, those grenadiers that formed the point of the attack were to be 
given a half-crown each; their sergeants a crown. 713 Before Lille, in 1708, the wounded 
Prince Eugene of Savoy supposedly gave out a thousand pistoles to encourage the 
soldiers, while on the evening of 22 August 1711, when the trenches were opened 
711 BL, Add. MSS 61372, ff. 115-116b: orders to detach out of battalions. Brussels, 11 June 1709 
N. S. 
712 BL, Add. MSS 61339, ff. 146-147b: memorial on the subject of the formation of the two 
armies, The Hague, 25 April 1709 N. S. 
713 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 67-68: camp journal, before Menin, 18 August 1706 N. S. 
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before Bouchain, the massed attack by 66 battalions of the army-37 of the right wing, 
29 of the left-was allowed as 'Sieging Duty' to the general officers, but not, 
unfortunately, the regiments. 714 
Prior to any investment, the forces detached to besiege an enemy town or fortress 
would be carefully computed and selected from the battalions and squadrons 
available. This provision was the very picture of ecumenicality, as all were expected to 
share its labours in due proportion. For the siege of Aire (6 September to 8 November 
1710 N. S. ), for example, the forty battalions required were drawn from the armies in 
ratio to the nations' commitments in a manner that might have taxed the less 
mathematically adept staff officer. Once the approximate demography of the army had 
been calculated, the fairest distribution was calculated to the last 146th and 148th . 715 
In all cases the numbers of battalions and squadrons, and the numbers and qualities of 
general officers commanding them, would be settled first, before specific corps and 
individuals were chosen. The computation of these exact repartitions might fall to a 
major of brigade or other staff officer - during the siege of Bouchain, August- 
September 1711, Major William Congreve was tasked with detailing the posture of the 
right wing of the army n6 
The other sieges of the War of the Spanish Succession in the Low Countries were 
similarly organised. At Huy in 1703, the besieging force drew eight battalions and six 
squadrons from Marlborough's army, and four battalions and four squadrons from 
Ouwerkerk's, to be commanded by Lieutenant-General Scholten, Major-General Wade 
714 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iii, pp. 28-29: Lalo to Brydges, before Lille, 24 September 1708 N. S. 
BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 145b: camp journal, camp at Avesnes-le-Secq, 22 August 1711 N. S. 
ns KP I(ii)/14. Undated. See also KP I(i)/223: Repartition for the siege of Aire and St Venant. 
1710. Eugene's army was to furnish 20 battalions and 15 squadrons (6 Bns and 2 Sqns for St 
Venant; 14 Bns and 13 Sqns for Aire); Marlborough's, 40 battalions and 30 squadrons (14 Bns 
and 4 Sgns for St Venant - of which each wing would give 7 Bns and 2 Sqns; 26 Bns and 26 Sqns 
for Aire - of which each wing would provide 13 Bns and 13 Sqns). For the right wing of 
Marlborough's army, this was settled as 3 English battalions, 2 Prussian battalions and 2 
Hanoverian battalions, 1 Prussian squadron and 1 Hanoverian squadron for St Venant; and 5 
English battalions, 5 Prussian battalions, 3 Hanoverian battalions, 3 English squadrons, 6 
Prussian squadrons and 4 Hanoverian squadrons for the siege of Aire. 
716 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 146: camp journal, 24 August 1711 N. S. The siege had been underway 
a little over a fortnight. 
224 
and Brigadier Meredith, with another brigadier for the Horse. 717 Seven years later, at 
Mons, the detachment was considerably larger and featured an inflated command 
structure: the Prince of Orange, accompanied by two lieutenants-general (Rantzau and 
Dönhoff), six majors-general and six brigadiers of Foot, commanding thirty battalions; 
and a lieutenant-general, two majors-general and three brigadiers of horse, 
commanding thirty squadrons n8 
For the siege of Bethune, 17 July to 29 August 1710 N. S., the repartition dictated that 
the right wing of Marlborough's army would supply eight battalions 719 and six 
squadrons, under the command of a lieutenant-general (the Prussian, Finck), a major- 
general720 (Gilbert Primrose) and two brigadiers (one of which was Orrery); while the 
left wing would provide nine battalions and six squadrons, under a similar 
complement of general officers. One lieutenant-general (emended from a major- 
general; Cornelius Wood) and a brigadier would command the above squadrons; a 
further six squadrons detached from Eugene's army, under the command of a major- 
general, would also be subordinate to Wood. The siege as a whole would consist of 
two attacks: one by the detachment from Marlborough's army, under General Fagel; 
the other by Eugene's forces, under General Schulenburg. 721 
The investing detachment at Bouchain consisted of twenty battalions under the orders 
of a General of Infantry, who would be aided by two lieutenants-general, four majors- 
general and four brigadiers of Foot. A force of twelve squadrons of cavalry, under a 
major-general and two brigadiers, provided mounted support. The generals would 
direct the soldiers from the point of muster to the siege; the general-in-chief would also 
have care to ensure that posts such as the village of Aubigny were occupied for the 
investing forces security, and to destroy nearby bridges over the Sansette and canal 
717 BL, Stowe MSS 469, f. 10: Michael Richards' diary, 6 July 1705 N. S. The reference to 'Wade' is 
confusing; it is certainly not the famous 'George Wade' who served on the Iberian peninsula. 
718 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 122: camp journal, camp at the abbey of Belian, 18 September 1709 
N. S. 
719 Three were British: Orrery's, Newtons and Evans's. 
'0 The camp journal (see n. 4, below) lists two majors-general. 
721 KP I(ii)/11. Undated. BL Add. MSS 61404, if. 132-132b: camp journal, 14 July 1710 N. S. 
Dispositions for the siege of Bethune. 
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from Arleux. Yvoy served as the quartermaster-general at the siege and was 
responsible for marking the lines of circumvallation. 722 
Some sieges called for multiple attacks, which were decided in the same manner. For 
the siege of Douai (23 April to 25 June 1710 N. S. ), the officers for the siege were 
determined on 1 May, a day before the battalions were chosen. Each of the two 
attacks-one on the right towards the Port de Grechin, under Leopold von Anhalt- 
Dessau; the other on the left towards the Port d'Ocre, under the Prince of Orange -was 
apportioned two lieutenants-general, four majors-general, four brigadiers and twenty 
battalions (half Dutch, a quarter British, a quarter Hanoverian). Orange's subordinates 
consisted of lieutenants-general Orkney and Dohna; majors-general Willem van 
Wassenaer, Johan Rabo van Keppel, Frederik Vegelin van Claerbergen and George 
Macartney; and Gilbert Primrose among the other brigadiers. 
The actual attacks mounted could be planned and disposed with the same degree of 
equality and fairness. 
The initial plans for the investment of Tournai dictated that Marlborough and Eugene 
would oversee the siege alternately; the three generals of Foot of the investing armies 
(Lottum, Fagel and Schulenburg) would each command one of the main attacks. 
Beneath the generals would be the investing battalions-of which the British would 
provide seven: two of Orkney's, and Argyll's, Temple's, Evans's, Meredyth's and 
Prenderghast's. The British would also provide two lieutenants-general (Withers and 
Argyll), one major-general (Temple) and two brigadiers (Primrose and Sabine). Of the 
other nationalities of the right wing of Marlborough's army, the Prussians would 
provide one lieutenant-general, major-general and brigadier; and the Hanoverians one 
brigadier. 724 While Argyll and Sabine would accompany Schulenburg's attack, Withers, 
Temple and Primrose would be under the Prussian, Lottum. They were joined by four 
M BL, Add. MSS 61339, if. 226-227b: disposition for the siege of Bouchain, 9 August 1711 N. S. 
7z BL, Add. MSS 61404, If. 127-127b: camp journal, before Douai, 3 May 1710 N. S. This 
disposition varies somewhat from that originally planned on 28 April, of which a copy is at KP 
I(i)/184 (dated 28 April 1710 N. S. ). The initial plan noted that the two attacks would comprise 
one of 30 battalions (commanded by a general of infantry, four lieutenants-general, four majors- 
general and four brigadiers) and one of 20 battalions (commanded by a lieutenant-general, four 
majors-general and four brigadiers). 
724 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 111-111b: camp journal, camp at Willemeau, 29 June 1709 N. S. 
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further Prussians (Lieutenant-General Finck, Major-General Dönhoff and Brigadiers 
Borch and Grambeau), three Dutch generals (Lieutenant-General Van Heiden and 
Major-General Vegelin) and one Hanoverian (Brigadier Gauvain). 
The sixty-two battalions detached for the siege were cycled according to a rota, over 
twelve nights of duty. Each battalion was to serve once in the first six nights, and once 
in the second six nights. For Lottum's attack this took the following form, with four 
battalions doing duty each night: an English, Danish, Saxon and Hessian battalion on 
the first night; an Imperial, Palatine, Württemberger and Dutch battalion on the second 
night; a Prussian, Danish, Saxon and Dutch battalion on the third night; an English, 
Hessian and two Dutch battalions on the fourth night; an English, Dutch and two 
Prussian battalions on the fifth night; and a Danish, Hessian and two Dutch battalions 
of the sixth night. This was truly multinational warfare. 
Not that the dispositions agreed were necessarily amicable to all participants. In the 
winter of 1708, Lottum, who commanded the Allied siege of Ghent, remonstrated with 
the Hereditary Prince of Hesse over his corps' endeavours in the enterprise. The 
Hessians had sent a battalion to take their nation's turn in the trenches; but for the 
'rude' work and other engineering preparations, the prince could find no relief. Lottum 
pressed for the five battalions of Hessians Marlborough had earmarked for the attack 
to set aside their issues and join his corps. 726 
A siege required a considerable amount of ordnance, ammunition and other materiel. 
Cardonnel's tally of the articles necessary for the siege of Huy in 1703 included 42 
pieces of cannon (30 of 24 lbs; 12 of 12 Ibs), 10 mortars with 10'howitzers', 15,000 24-lb 
cannon balls and 5,000 12-lb cannon balls, 2,500 bombs and 2,500 grenades for the 
howitzers, 3 or 4,000 grenades for the grenadiers, and 200,000 lbs of powder. 727 
Transporting such an arsenal was a mammoth task: for the proposed siege of Saarlouis, 
in 1705, it was estimated that 11,860 horses would be needed to draw the artillery from 
725 KP I(i)/125. Disposition for the attacks on the town and citadel of Tournai. 3 July 1709 N. S. 
The sixty-two battalions comprised as follows: 23 Dutch (18 from Marlborough's army, 5 from 
Eugene's), 7 English, 7 Prussian, 5 Hanoverian, 5 Palatine, 4 Hessian, 3 Imperial, 3 Danish, 3 
Saxon, 2 Württemberger. Though the orders often refer to 60 battalions, the individual 
components amount to 62. See also KP I(i)/128. 
726 BL, Add. MSS 61231, ff. 130-131b: Lottum to Marlborough, 28 December 1708 N. S. 
727 BL, Add. MSS 61337, ff. 181-182b: dispositions for the siege of Huy. [1703.1 
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Trarbach to the site of investment, allowing for a load of 300 lb per horse. The army 
could not supply such a number of beasts of burden, so multiple journeys would be 
required. A total of three thousand horses departing the army would need to make a 
total of four trips to Trarbach and back; at a dozen days per 'turn', this would require 
48 days' preparation to get the artillery ready for the siege. 728 
Such materiel was not always readily available. At Venlo, Menno van Coehoorn 
complained to his fellow engineer, Holcroft Blood, that the States' assurances and 
guarantees had left much to be desired. They had promised him eighty cannon and 
told him several times that everything had been dispatched, but he'd found only 
twenty-two guns complete, with the rest wanting carriages, or lying elsewhere within 
Flanders. He had but three-thousand tools, few bombs and little other ammunition. 
Opening the siege at that time was foolish; Blood, who'd originally thought that the 
delay might have been a caprice of Coehoorn s temper, was in complete agreement. 729 
Engineers themselves could be in short supply also, on account of the perils of the 
service. Writing of the siege of Lille, the merchant Jacob Hallungius noted that the 
besiegers wanted a master and some 'subaltern' engineers - for from the seventy-four 
that began the siege they had no more than fifteen able for service, the rest being 
casualties. 730 This perhaps renders Marlborough's criticisms of the previous week a 
little harsh, when he complained of the ill conduct and misbehaviour of the army's 
engineers, and their poor dealings with the commander of the siege, Prince Eugene. 3l 
728 BL, Add. MSS 61335, ff. 32-33b: account of the horses necessary to draw the artillery from 
Trarbach to Saarlouis. 1705. The exact requirements were calculated as follows: 80 cannon - 
2100 horses; 50,000 24 lb cannon balls, at 300 lb a horse - 4000 horses; powder - 2000 horses; ten 
great mortars - 170 horses; ten small mortars - 90 horses; 300 rounds for the big mortars - 1300 
horses; 500 rounds for the small mortars - 600 horses; 200,000 more charges of powder for bombs 
&c. - 700 horses; working tools - 100 horses; timber and iron, for constructing platforms - 300 
horses; ten thousand 6 lb bales - 200 horses; various small shot and grenades for the infantry - 
300 horses. 
The distance from Trier to Saarlouis was shorter: estimated at seven days per 'turn', or 28 days 
in total, if the artillery could be dispatched there by barge, for example. The operation was 
eventually cancelled due to an inability to co-ordinate with the Imperial forces. Snyder, i, no. 
462, pp. 447-448: Marlborough to Godolphin, Dreyborn, 24 June 1705 N. S. 
729 BL, Add. MSS 61306, ff. 35-36b: Blood to Marlborough, before Venlo, 28 August 1702 N. S. 
730 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iii, pp. 61-62: Hallungius to Brydges, The Hague, 5 October 1708 
[N. S. ] 
731 Snyder, ii, no. 1096 p. 1096: Marlborough to Godolphin, Sanguin, 17 September 1708 N. S.; no. 
1101 pp. 1100-1101: Marlborough to Godolphin, [Lannoy], 24 September 1708 N. S.; no. 1105 pp. 
228 
But whatever their capacities, engineers provided the most critical human resource at a 
siege, for no others understood the esoteric art of siegecraft, and the learning it 
entailed. Little wonder that in 1706, at the siege of Menin, the orders of the day for the 
army noted that "all the officers who Command the Work are to Obey the 
Engineers. "732 
A critical event in the progress of the siege-particularly with reference to the general 
officers of the army-was the 'breaking of ground', when the army began to cut its 
trenches - often under heavy fire. It was a dangerous time; Cadogan was struck by a 
musket ball in the neck when the army broke ground at Mons, on 25 September 1709, 
while aide-de-camp, Thomas Foxon, was mortally wounded. John Marshall Deane 
recorded that the "the enemy did feirsely oppose them, and did beett our folkes 2 or 3 
times from there works -but at length our folks beet them in againe, and abundance of 
men was killed on both sides & likewise abundance wounded. " n3 Henry St John 
remarked: 
I was very much concern !d to hear of Mr. Cadogan's wound, & surpris'd at ye 
occasion weh he recd it, Since I had imagined his employments & business very 
remote from that sort of service. 
As is not infrequently the case with St John, it is difficult to assess the degree of 
sarcasm with which he wrote. 
When breaking ground, the investing forces would supply a mixed number of men 
with tools and arms, the first to dig the trenches, the latter to cover them. At Ath in 
1706, Ouwerkerk's initial attacks at the opening of the trenches consisted of two 
prongs: each led by a major-general and brigadier, with 300 coverers, 600 workmen 
1104-1105: Marlborough to Godolphin, [Lannoy], 27 September 1708 N. S. Marlborough thought 
the engineers had communicated poorly with Eugene -who had been wounded -for when he 
told the prince that there was not powder or ball for above four days, Eugene was much 
surprised. 
732 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 66-66b: camp journal, before Menin, 13 August 1706 N. S. 
733 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 123: camp journal, camp at Havre, 25 September 1709 N. S. Snyder, iii, 
no. 1409 pp. 1376-7: Marlborough to Godolphin, camp at Havre, 26 September 1709 N. S. HL, 
Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iv, pp. 202-203: Cardonnel to Brydges, camp at Havre, 26 September 1709 
N. S. Deane, op. cit., pp. 96-97. 
734 HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 58, iv, pp. 237-238: St John to Brydges, Bucklebury, 6 October 1709 
O. S. 
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and two battalions to sustain them. A further two battalions and one-hundred horse 
were held as a reserve, and Lieutenant-General Ingoldsby commanded the whole. In 
order to deceive the enemy, a lieutenant and thirty men were ordered to make a 
diversion at the same place the French had attacked when they took the town, making 
a great deal of noise, harassing their pickets, and so on -a tactic that was wholly 
successful. 35 
At the siege of Douai, the enterprise involved the general officers of the day for 
Marlborough's besieging army, who reported to the Prince of Orange. Those appointed 
for 4 May-the Earl of Orkney, Major-General Wassenaer and Brigadier Primrose- 
commanded and supervised at the opening of the trenches that evening. Orkney left 
the attack at the break of day on 5 May, it being stated that lieutenants-general were 
not allowed to remain in the trenches (though they continued to visit them daily and 
review the works, in turn); he devolved his command upon Major-General Wassenaer. 
In the days following, the majors-general of the day of the besieging force commanded 
the trenches as their duty. They would be relieved each evening at 6 p. m., by their 
successor for that day. Involving the general officers of the day in trench-duty, 
however, deprived them to some degree of the freedom intended in their office. On 11 
May it was thus decided that generals not active in the trenches would thenceforth 
'take the orders for the day' 73v 
Similar modes of relief were put in place for the two attacks on Menin. The attack on 
the right was overseen by Lieutenant-General Schultz738 (sic), Major-General Eberfeldt 
and Brigadier Capo1739, and consisted of the Prussian Guards, and Slangenburg and 
Prince Charles' regiments of Foot; that on the left was commanded by the Earl of 
Orkney, Major-General Rantzau and Brigadier Amama740, with battalions from Webb's, 
Heukelom's and Rantzau's regiments of Foot. Once the ground had been successfully 
'35 KP I(i)/21. Part of Richard King's journal of the siege of Ath. 1706. See also I(i)/25 for a plan 
that accompanies King's description. 
736 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 127b: camp journal, before Douai, 4 May 1709 N. S. BL, Add. MSS 
61404, ff. 127b-128: camp journal, before Douai, 5 May 1709 N. S. 
737 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 128b: camp journal, before Douai, 11 May 1709 N. S. 
738 Most probably Scholten, the Danish lieutenant-general. 
739 Hercules de Capol (1642-1706). A physician, and since 1702 colonel of a regiment in Dutch 
service. He was killed at the siege of Menin. 
740 Joachim van Amama (1657-1720). A Dutch officer; brigadier since 1702. 
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broken and secured, the trenches that evening would be relieved by Majors-General 
Wecke and Vilat, and Brigadiers Swetiel and the Duke of Argyll741 
Graf Lottum's plans for the attack on Ghent provided for a regular relief of the men as 
well as the general officers. Five-hundred workmen, mustering at 3 p. m., would make 
an initial lodgement for the attack before the gate of St Pierre; they would be relieved 
the next day at 6 a. m. by four hundred others. A further three-hundred workmen 
would muster on the parade at 3 p. m., to aid the artillery; they would be relieved by 
one-hundred men at 6 a. m. the following morning. That next day, two-hundred men 
were also earmarked to rest for 24 hours, before assisting the cannoniers and the 
bombardiers in the heavy work. The majors of brigade were to give a list of the 
infantry officers commanding the workmen who were to aid the artillery, so that the 
officers of the latter could distinguish between the workmen under their control, and 
other soldiers; they were also to oversee the proper distribution of all the gabions and 
fascines that had been constructed. 742 During the siege of Bouchain, the three regiments 
that mounted the trenches daily were split between the right and left wings - two from 
one and one from the other, alternating daily, and cycling through the army. 743 
At Ghent, as at other sieges, general and staff officers were appointed to specific roles 
in the siege. Lottum chose three Generals of the Trenches for his enterprise -Lieutenant- 
General Fagel, Major-General the Duke of Argyll and Brigadier Grumeke-in much the 
same way as the general officers of the day served in that capacity for Orange, before 
Douai. 744Of particular import was the major of the trenches. At Menin, each of the two 
main attacks possessed its own major of the trenches: Major Berrs at General Sholts' 
attack; and Major Brockhausen745 at the Earl of Orkney's. Both officers were to post the 
covering forces, fifty paces in front of the workmen; each covering platoon would have 
741 BL, Add. MSS 61183, ff. 166-167b: Salisch to Marlborough, camp before Menin, 5 August 
1706 N. S. Veenendaal, Briefwisseling, v, no. 858 pp. 450-451: Salisch to Heinsius, camp before 
Menin, 5 August 1706 N. S. 
742 BL, Add. MSS 61231, ff. 132-133b: dispositions for the attack on Ghent, Camp at Swynaerde, 
28 December 1708 N. S. 
743 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 145b: camp journal, camp at Avesnes-le-Secq, 22 August 1711 N. S. 
744 BL, Add. MSS 61231, ff. 132-133b: dispositions for the attack on Ghent, Camp at Swynaerde, 
28 December 1708 N. S. 
745 Possibly Wolter Jan van Broekhuisen (1676-1732), a major in Keppel's Dutch regiment of 
Foot. 
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a small party deployed in front of it, and a single sentinel in point in advance of those, 
'on his belly'. 746 At Ghent, the majors of the trenches were also tasked with other minor 
details; while at Bouchain, the majors of the trenches would report to a brigadier, who 
was appointed to oversee the trenches each night. 747 
Lord Cutts' precipitous attack on the Fort of St Michel before Venlo, in 1702, provides 
an interesting counterpoint to some of the more methodical attacks noted above. While 
the initial design had been but to clear the covered way of the fort, so that the 
workmen could make their lodgement in security, Cutts entreated his officers to 
pursue the defenders if they thought fit, and let the attack play out as it would. Robert 
Parker, who would take part in the assault on the glacis, thought Cutts' orders "rash... 
contrary both to the rules of war, and the design of the thing. "748 
Cutts' initial command structure was inflated by a gamut of thrill-seekers. In addition 
to Brigadier Frederick Hamilton (leading the Royal Regiment of Ireland-to which 
Parker belonged-and Willem van Heukelom's regiment of Dutch Foot, together with 
172 grenadiers, 100 fusiliers and 300 workmen) and Colonel Holcroft Blood 
(commanding the engineers), his headquarters was weighed down with 'voluntiers of 
Distinction': men such as the George Hastings, the young earl of Huntingdon; John 
Campbell, later the duke of Argyll but then still the marquess of Lorne; the Prince 
d'Auvergne; John Dalrymple, then master of Stair; Sir Richard Temple, Bt; and Colonel 
John Richmond Webb. The Crown Prince of Hanover, the future George II, also passed 
the night with Cutts in the trenches before the attack, and then 'behaved with a great 
deal of gallantry'. 749 
The Salamander told his the grenadiers that, as soon as he saw fifty of their number 
atop the ravelin, he would sacrifice himself and all the troops to sustain them - and 
they should push on with all assurance if they found it possible to continue, promising 
various rewards in Her Majesty's name to those that distinguished themselves. And so, 
746 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 64: camp journal, before Menin, 4 August 1706 N. S. 
747 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 145b-146: camp journal, before Bouchain, 23 August 1711 N. S. Add. 
MSS 61231, ff. 128-129b: Lottum s dispositions for the attack before Ghent, 29 December 1708 
N. S. 
748 Parker, op. cit., p. 72. 
749 BL, Add. MSS 33273, ff. 13-14b: (Lord Cutts') relation of the attack on the Fort of St Michel, 18 
September 1702 N. S. 
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when the signal for the attack-the detonation of a tun of powder, and the discharge of 
all the cannon and mortars--was made, on rushed the soldiers, "like mad-men without 
fear or wit". The attack was a complete success, as the garrison was taken off-guard by 
the speed and ferocity of the assault and soon surrendered 7° 
Parker dismissively noted that Cutts did not leave the trenches until the attack was 
over, but the same could not be said for Holcroft Blood, who was, it seems, a willing 
accomplice; a kindred spirit. While it was supposed to be he who was to have the 
dignity and duty of securing the lodgement on the fort, he displayed no evident 
chagrin when Cutts changed the battle to his own tempo. Indeed, when the Blood saw 
that the major-general had 'quitted [the original] design'-to use Cutts' own neutral 
description of the affair-he "acted the Part of a good Officer charging with the Men 
Sword [in] Hand, & Killing an Officer of Granadiers who made a very vigorous 
Defence with his Party. "751 
Cutts' English soldiers suffered two captains and two lieutenants wounded; an ensign 
killed and three wounded; a sergeant killed and six wounded; and thirty soldiers killed 
and 132 wounded. His own aide-de-camp, Captain Rolas, and another English 
volunteer, Mr Cley, were killed on the spot. 752 
*** 
Set-piece battles were a good deal rarer than sieges in the War of the Spanish 
Succession in the Low Countries. The first major engagement that the English 
participated in, at Donauwörth on 2 July 1704, is particularly interesting as it involved, 
beyond Louis of Baden's conventional battalia, a picked force or special detachment of 
infantry drawn from Marlborough's army. This is what Deane referred to as the 
'Fforlorne Hope', consisting of '10 men of a company throughout the army'. 753 
Specifically, the orders called for the general officers of the day (the Dutchman 
Lieutenant-General Johan Wijnand van Goor, and the Hanoverian officers Major- 
7-'0 Ibid. Parker, op. cit., p. 73. Wijry VIII, i, pp. 158-160. 
751 BL, Add. MSS 33273, ff. 13-14b: (Cutts') relation of the attack of the Fort of St Michel, 18 
September 1702 N. S. 
752 BL, Add. MSS 33273, ff. 13-14b. 
7 Deane, Journal, pp. 6-8. 
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General de Luc and Brigadier Barthold von Bernsdorff), together with Brigadier 
Hulsen, six colonels, lieutenant-colonels and majors to lead a force comprised of 130 
men taken from each battalion (with two captains and other officers in proportion). 754 
Of the 130 men taken from each regiment, ten - the grenadiers - were to be armed with 
two grenades apiece from the train. The picked men were to be mustered at the head of 
their regiments by 2 a. m. on the morning of 2 July, and their march would be covered 
by 37 squadrons of cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant-General Lumley, three majors- 
general and three brigadiers 755 
In comparison, the other engagements of the war were largely conventional. 
Oudenaarde was in some ways an exception, as it was an 'encounter battle' and is 
particularly notable in the way in which it thrust the early, critical responsibility of 
prosecuting the engagement on a detachment that had been made to secure a crossing 
over the Scheldt, and was led by an experienced staff officer but tactical novice - 
Cadogan. Facing the rapidly rousing army of Burgundy and Vend6me, the 
quartermaster-general commanded an estimated sixteen battalions of foot (of which 
four were initially guarding the pontoon bridges), including Webb's, Ingoldsby's, 
Sabines, Meredith's, Orrery's and Evans' British battalions, and eight squadrons. 756 
754 The standard English battalion of Foot consisted of thirteen companies; hence Deane's 
reference to ten men per company - though the orders did not specify this. 
iss BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 23b: camp journal, camp at Amerlinge, 1 July 1704 N. S. See also Wijn, 
VIII, i, pp. 745-747: Relatie van d'attaquo op den Schellenberg and Murray, i, pp. 332-338. 
756 Sources for the size of Cadogan's initial command vary considerably: excluding ancillary 
forces, Hare (p. 140) notes that he possessed eight squadrons and sixteen battalions, and Coxe 
(ii, p. 255) agrees, mentioning '16 battalions, consisting of the brigades of Sabine, Plettenburg 
and Evans; and eight squadrons of the dragoons of Bulau, Leibregement [sic], and 
Schulemburg... and 32 pieces of artillery'; Deane (op. cit., pp. 58-9) '15 battalions of foot & 30 
squadrons of horse and 24 pieces of cannon'; Atkinson 'fifteen squadrons, twelve battalions, 
thirty-two guns (op. cit., p. 336), and is followed in this by Barnett (op. cit., p. 206); Trevelyan 'a 
dozen battalions chiefly of British infantry, and eight squadrons of Hanoverian dragoons' (ii, p. 
357); Chandler (Military Commander, p. 214), with '16 battalions, 8 squadrons, 32 regimental 
guns', follows Hare and Coxe, as do Frank Taylor (The Wars of Marlborough, 1702-1709 
(Oxford, 1921), 2 volumes: ii, p. 129) and Ivor F. Burton (The Captain-General (London, 1968), p. 
125). 
Mentions of twelve battalions can be reconciled with a confusion over the fact that Cadogan 
only initially took such a number into action (leaving four to guard the pontoons); 'fifteen' is 
near enough, and Chandler himself notes that'll battalions [of Cadogan's advanced guard] had 
advanced to the line of the River Diepenbeck' (rather than the expected twelve, following his 
numerical base; Military Commander, p. 214). It would seem that Deane's reference to thirty 
squadrons represents the combined forces of Rantzau's eight Hanoverian squadrons and 
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Cadogan may have had little experience in tactical command, but his staff duties 
appear to have provided him with a decent judgement of the applications of terrain 
and movement - qualities that can be at a premium in such an engagement. He reacted 
quickly to Vendöme's abandonment of Biron's outlying position at Eyne and Heurne, 
and secured these posts safely, his free left flank guarded by Rantzau's horse. 757 With 
the movements of Vendome and quiescence of Burgundy, Cadogan's dispositions were 
switched under Marlborough's guidance. As Natzmer's and Rantzau's horse moved to 
occupy the open ground by the Scheldt, north of Eyne and Heurne, the brigades of 
Cadogan would move to oppose the French foot in the broken ground by the 
Marollebeck and Diepenbeck, by the villages of Groenewald and Herlegem. His battle, 
though crucial to the success of the day, became little more than a protracted and 
desperate firefight amidst hedges, houses and defiles, against a French line superior in 
numbers. Yet his battalions held on, later under Eugene's oversight, as Marlborough 
first battled to save Cadogan's initially open left flank and then sent such timely 
reinforcements in Lottum and Lumley, and by the end of the evening regained the 
offensive as the Dutch presaged victory on the Allied left. 
The antithesis of Oudenaarde as a battle is that of Malplaquet, 11 September 1709, 
where the Allied and French armies had faced each other for one-and-a-half days 
before moving to a general engagement. This allowed the Allies plenty of time to 
consider their options in attacking the French positions; indeed the only surviving 
battle orders in the Blenheim Papers are those for the attacks at Malplaquet. It is 
instrumental to compare these against the recorded events of the day, but only briefly 
so - as the earliest Allied movements on 11 September are in complete concord with 
the orders as given. 
Three separate orders were given out the day prior to the battle: a disposition for the 
attack of the left wing, largely consisting of Dutch forces; a disposition for the attack of 
Natzmer's twenty Prussian squadrons, which were hurried forward at an early stage by 
Marlborough to give Cadogan further support; the 'fifteen squadrons' of Atkinson and Barnett 
are more problematic. 
757 Hare, op. cit., pp. 141-2. Vendome had come to reinforce Biron s detachment, but being 
informed (by a certain M. Puysegur) that Biron was fronted by a morass, he passed to the west, 
and at approximately 3pm Cadogan threw all of his battalions and squadrons into an attack. 
Three enemy battalions were captured, one destroyed by Rantzau's cavalry, and a further three 
put to flight. See Churchill, ii, pp. 361-5 and Deane, op. cit., p. 59. 
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the right wing, consisting of British and auxiliary formations; and a disposition for the 
attack of the largely Imperial army of Eugene., Each set of orders, copied by clerks, was 
numbered. Minor variations exist between some of the orders contained in the King 
Papers and the Blenheim Papers, but there is general uniformity of structure and 
content. 
The attack of the left wing, under the Prince of Orange, was to be prosecuted by the 
Dutch infantry. They were ordered to attack the French lines in front of the Wood of 
Tiry, using as many battalions as the terrain would allow, arranged in three or four 
lines. It would be the generals' duty to ensure the lines were properly spaced and not 
too close, such that a battalions would be able to pass to provide support to, or relieve, 
the attackers. The extreme left of the attack would be carried by five or six battalions, 
which were tasked with attacking the grenadiers that covered the French right flank, to 
the right of the Chausee Brunehaut; they would be supported to their right by a further 
six to eight battalions, who were to hold the enemy so that they could not reinforce 
their colleagues. 
The large-calibre guns would be placed in batteries to bombard the entrenchments of 
the enemy; the smaller cannon would march with the brigades, and be used as 
opportunities allowed. Once the infantry had forced the enemy from its trenches, it 
was not to enter into the plain beyond, but post itself to the rear of the French 
fortifications - where the generals would take care to make openings through which 
the cavalry could pass, so that Foot and Horse alike could then form themselves in 
mutual support on the plain. The generals would be partitioned among the formations; 
each was to take his post in the first, second, third and fourth lines. Twenty-one 
squadrons of cavalry, arrayed in two lines, would support the infantry attack; the 
remainder of the Horse would be posted in such a manner that they had the ability to 
move to the right or the left, or follow the first twenty-one squadrons to support the 
infantry in the plain. 758 
758 BL, Add. MSS 61339, ff. 158-159b: disposition for the attack of the left wing, 10 September 
1709 N. S. KP I(i)/84. Disposition for the attack of the left wing, made at Blaregnies, 10 
September 1709 N. S. 
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The initial attack of the right wing was to comprise eight British battalions commanded 
by the Duke of Argyll, which were to attack the French formations in the south-eastern 
reaches of the Wood of Sars. Argyll would be supported by a further eight Prussian 
battalions, who would in turn be sustained by six Hanoverian battalions. This entire 
thrust was to be commanded by the Prussian General of Infantry, Count Lottum. A 
major-general of both the Prussian and Hanoverian corps would march with this 
detachment. 
The remaining infantry of the right wing was ordered to advance to the left of Lottum's 
detachment, and to the right of the infantry of the left wing, assaulting the enemy 
entrenchments between the woods of Sars and Tiry. The generals were to take great 
care that no space was left between the infantry of the two wings, nor between 
Lottum's corps and the infantry to his left. 
The main body of the cavalry of the right wing was ordered to march in two columns 
(that of the first line on the right, and the second on the left), which would advance as 
the infantry cleared the enemy positions, ready to deploy upon the plain beyond. 
Thirty squadrons commanded by the Prince d'Auvergne would follow the infantry of 
the right wing in two columns, forming themselves to the left of the main body of 
cavalry on the plain. The attack would commence at the start of the day, if possible, 
and would be signalled by a discharge of all the British artillery, which would be 
responded to by all the Dutch artillery. 759 
Eugene's orders stated that his infantry was to form in three lines and attack the French 
positions in the Wood of Sars between the enemy's extreme left and its formations 
facing Lottum. The Imperial cavalry, in two columns, was to support Horse of 
759 BL, Add. MSS 61339, ff. 162-163b: disposition for the attack of the right wing, made at 
Blaregnies, 10 September 1709 N. S. 
Richard King's papers contain two orders for the attack of the right wing at Malplaquet. One 
(KP I(i)/85) is the same as that contained in the Blenheim Papers. The other (KP I(i)/83) notes 
several differences. Firstly, the battalions of Lottum's attack in this order were not split into 
lines by nationality; in this scheme, for example, Prussian battalions accompanied English 
soldiers in the first line (under Argyll), while Orrery's battalion was in the second line, The 
general officers commanding the first line were to be Lieutenant-General the Duke of Argyll, 
Major-General Tettau and Brigadier Cronne [the Crown Prince? ]; Lieutenant-General Webb, 
Major-General Ghoer and Brigadier du Bruil would command the second line; and Brigadiers 
Trusselle and Orrery would over see the third line. 
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Marlborough's army, forming itself to that body's right upon the plain beyond the 
entrenchments. Given the increased distance Eugene's army had to cover, its infantry 
was to begin its march an hour before the break of day. The detachment of two- 
thousand men under Count Dönhoff, from Mons, was to be posted on the right of the 
first line of Eugene's infantry. 760 
On the evening of 10 September, the Allied soldiers were ordered to pray at 4 a. m. the 
following morning for good success, and the orders were sent out-761 A thick fog 
enveloped the battlefield until 6 a. m., allowing the Allies to make their initial 
dispositions unnoted, though it was about 7 a. m. before the army marched to attack, 
and 8 a. m. before the battle began in earnest. 762 The earl of Orkney, who commanded 
the infantry to Lottum's left, fulfilled his role well, keeping his communications with 
the Prussian and sending two battalions (one of Guards, one of his own regiment) on 
his own initiative to secure the flank of the attack in the wood and defeat a French 
thrust that had sought to infiltrate there. 763 Though the Allies were ultimately 
successful, no amount of planning or careful orders could obviate the fact that theirs 
was a frontal attack upon an enemy that they had allowed to entrench for two days, 
with grim consequences. 
Orkney provides one of the most insightful commentaries on another battle, that of 
Blenheim on 13 August 1704. Although there are no battle orders for this engagement, 
the earl's letter to John, Lord Hervey in the aftermath of the battle provides an 
interesting depiction of the degree to which the general officers of the army concerted 
their actions outside of the influence of the general-in-chief, Marlborough. When 
Orkney and Ingoldsby moved their battalions of Foot to support the attacks of Cutts 
and Churchill on the village of Blenheim, they held a mini-conference in the field with 
the local cavalry commanders: Lumley, who led the Horse supporting Cutts' initial 
attack; and the hereditary prince of Hesse and Hompesch, who commanded the second 
line of cavalry in the centre. The generals agreed that while the Foot of Ingoldsby and 
760 BL, Add. MSS 61339, ff. 160-161b: disposition for the attack of the army of Eugene, made at 
Blaregnies, 10 September 1709 N. S. 
761 BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 119b: camp journal, on its arms at Blariginies, 10 September 1709 N. S. 
762 Ibid., if. 119b-120. H. H. E. Cra'ster (ed. ), 'Letters of the First Lord Orkney during 
Marlborough's Campaigns', English Historical Review, vol. 19, no. 74 (April 1904), 307-321; p. 318. 
763 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 119b-120. Cra'ster, p. 319. 
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Orkney assaulted the village, the Horse would secure their flank by engaging the 
enemy's cavalry. This done, and his troops deployed, Orkney then went to concert 
with Churchill, asking that the battalions of Cutts attacked at the same time as 
Orkney's and Ingoldsby's. All this was organised on the generals' own initiative, and 
proved a success. 764 
During and after the battle for the village of Blenheim the generals' aides-de-camp 
would prove of considerable import. Cutts' aide-de-camp, for example, would ride 
with dispatch to Lumley, to secure five squadrons of Horse to cover the Foot's flank; 
while the aide of Orkney would be employed in negotiating the surrender of the 
enemy corps inside Blenheim, and liaising with Cutts on that very matter. 765 Aides-de- 
camp would also play a significant part at the battle of Ramillies, on 23 May 1706, 
William Cadogan himself would find employment as a battlefield aide in the 
engagement, and some controversy. As the earl of Orkney's attack across the Nebel 
struggled on amid difficult terrain and considerable opposition-"a great deal of fire... 
both musquetry and canon; and indeed I think I never had more shot about my ears" - 
and was on the crux of gaining the villages of Offus and Autre-Eglise, he was attended 
by no fewer than ten aides-de-camp, sent to ask him to desist and retire, "for the horse 
could not sustain [him]". It was Cadogan that was seemingly dispatched as a final cog 
to engineer and explain the reasons for Orkney's retreat, for the aid of his formation 
and the larger picture. As Orkney explained: 
Cadogan came and told me it was impossible I could be sustained by the horse if 
we went on then, and since my Lord [Marlborough] could not attack everywhere, 
he would make the grand attack in the centre and try to pierce there, which, I bless 
God, succeeded. 766 
Though earl was hardly overjoyed at such an intervention-"I confess it vexed me to 
retire, " he wrote-he effected his retreat 'very well and in good order', and ultimately 
moved to support operations in the centre, to the victory of the Allies and his overall 
approbation. Yet not all officers welcomed the interference in the direction of affairs on 
the Allied right, and several speculated that it was not the captain-general's doing. The 
764 Cra'ster, pp. 308-309. 
765 Murray, i, p. 403. Cra'ster, pp. 310-311. 
766 Cra'ster, p. 315. 
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then Lieutenant-Colonel Cranstoun was clear in his view of events, flatly stating that 
"Brigadier Cadogan came with orders as he pretended from the Duke, and obliged 
[Lord Orkney] to retire. " Cranstoun was certain in his own mind that, had the Allied 
right been allowed to continue their attack, the consequences of victory would have 
been the sweeter. He thus lamented: 
It is suspected much the Duke really gave no orders to call Earl Orkney off, but that 
Cadogan having viewed the ground where we were to attack before at a distance, 
or perhaps rather relied too much on what is marked in his charts believed there 
was another ruisseau and morass betwixt us and the village of Offuz which would 
be impractible, and upon that took it upon him in my Lord Duke's name to call the 
troops back. 767 
Such an action did not endear Cadogan to several of the English and Scots officers 
engaged. Had Cadogan's increasing sense of his role in the Allied headquarters and 
personal inclinations exceeded his authority, admittedly with a view to adapting to the 
circumstances, but in a wholly mistaken manner? Marlborough expressed considerable 
umbrage at the mere thought of such a charge, not least through the assertion that his 
perquisites of command had been infringed. Writing to the junior (or 'northern') 
Secretary of State, Robert Harley, the duke irascibly noted of Cranstoun's mail, which 
had been made known to him: 
That part in which he mentions Cadogan, he is very much in the wrong, for if those 
troops had not been brought back they must have been cut to pieces-768 
The dismissiveness of the Duke's reply hints at the falsity of the claim, for such short 
exchanges were common outcomes of his privately expressed ire, all the clearer when 
referenced against Marlborough's tendency to construct more apologetically verbose 
and considered explanations for what might be considered his failures. 769 Marlborough 
767 HMC, 52, Portland MSS., iv, p. 186: Cranstoun to Cunningham, Camp at Roeselare, 21 June 
1706 N. S. 
768 Historical Manuscripts Commission, 58, Bath MSS., 1, p. 96: Marlborough to Harley, 30 
August 1706 N. S. 
769 It is commonly asserted that Cadogan was instrumental in forcing the retirement of Orkney's 
forces from across the little Gheete; certainly this is what is professed by the chagrined 
Cranstoun, and Cadogan is largely conflated with the ADCS (anywhere from two to eleven, 
variably including Cadogan himself; see also n. 77, below) in the various narratives of 
Trevelyan, Chandler and Taylor, among others. However, the grammar of Orkney's letter can 
be read as implying that Cadogan simply supplied a more cogent tactical explanation of the 
reasons for Orkney's retreat after the fact; certainly Atkinson (p. 290) takes this view -with 
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accurately saw in Cadogan great potential on the field of battle. The physical presence 
of Cadogan was considerable; popular memory, crystallised in the Dictionary of 
National Biography, depicts him as 'a big, burly Irishman', a picture attested to in the 
portrait, supposedly by Laguerre. Trevelyan would follow such in his affectionate 
references to the 'burly Irish giant' and 'gigantic Irishman'. Not all descriptors were so 
congenial. The Bishop Atterbury vexed considerable spleen when he later classed 
Cadogan as'A big, bad, bold, blustering, bloody, blundering booby. 770 
Cadogan was an astute psychological choice. Allied to his known familiarity and 
favour with the commander-in-chief, it was Cadogan's name that marked countless 
ordinances for forage, marching orders and quarters. He was one of the few of 
Marlborough's English headquarters staff directly and personally known to the 
commanders of the confederate army; his engagements at the Hague, and in Brussels, 
Vienna and Hanover, and his frequent appearance in correspondence, marked him out 
to the Dutch and auxiliary commanders of the army. A command issued from the lips 
of a proxy like Cadogan might be considered synonymous with a direct order from the 
captain-general himself. And this, to not a few officers of the army, was a problem. 
*** 
An analysis of the agency of general and staff officers in the War of the Spanish 
Succession can lead to contrary conclusions. It is clear that these individuals, often of 
considerable talents, bore a considerable burden in the lower-level direction and 
execution of the campaigns. To render them anonymous, to emphasise the role of the 
'Great Captains' at such officers' expense, renders an incomplete and inaccurate 
picture of the nature of military control. Yet, contrastingly, to over-emphasise the 
admittedly a little supposition-stating 'Back therefore Orkney came to the near side of the 
Gheete where Cadogan met him and explained that the horse were all needed for the main 
attack and so could not be spared to sustain him had he gone on. '. Such an analysis renders a 
little more transparent the processes of rumour of those officers opposed to 'Marlborough's 
favourite', but it must also be argued that such a linear reading of a note penned by an 
exhausted commander who had hardly eaten a morsel or drank of drop in forty-eight hours has 
its problems. 
770 DNB; Trevelyan, i, p. 316, and ii, p. 105. Bishop Atterbury described Cadogan thus to 
Alexander Pope, quoted from Walpole's Letters, DNB. 
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general and staff officers role to the detriment of an army commander leads to a 
similarly unsatisfactory picture. The more one analyses the actions and responsibilities 
of these military subordinates, the clearer the supreme responsibility of the general-in- 
chief becomes; far from denigrating the power of such captains, the analysis reinforces 
it. The central agent in directing Queen Anne's forces in the Low Countries remained 
its commander-in-chief, John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough. 
Central to this condition was the remarkable level of responsibility that could be placed 
upon individuals in an early modern army. This did not simply apply to 
Marlborough-who was commander-in-chief of a British army in the field and (with 
considerable qualifications) commander of a multi-national allied army, captain- 
general of much of Anne's land forces in a broader sense, Master-General of the 
Ordnance, ambassador extraordinary to the United Provinces, co-administrator of the 
Spanish Netherlands, Privy Councillor, politician and statesman, being at certain times 
something approaching a prime minister (particularly regarding the broader, foreign 
dimensions of state policy) who was a pre-eminent force in allied strategic planning 
and the conduct of the war-but also the likes of William Cadogan, who was himself a 
general officer, logistician, political administrator, diplomat and financial entrepreneur; 
while subordinates such as John Armstrong and Richard King were simultaneously 
army officers, engineers, logisticians, aides-de-camp and envoys. 
Such power was not easily-nor willingly, considering the mores of the period and the 
constant struggle for personal advancement many officers and statesmen waged - 
devolved. Though a sense of military identity and duty, distinct from social rank, was 
already fairly developed, 'quality' remained an important factor in the command of an 
early modem army. An English colonel of noble birth would dutifully follow the 
orders of a common-born brigadier or major-general, as the good of the service 
demanded; but Marlborough presided over an army of numerous princes and nobles, 
to whom the duke corresponded not simply as a military officer, but as a peer and 
statesman. That personal connexion remained important, not least on account of the 
duke's noted urbanity. Legates, known to be in good standing with the duke, could be 
useful intermediaries; but they could also be the subject of various jealousies and 
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antagonisms, as were occasionally visited on Cadogan, Thomas Meredyth, Francis 
Palmes and the other 'Irish favourites'. 
As a command-entity, therefore, Marlborough was irreplaceable. That is not intended 
as a trite comment on military greatness, real or perceived; merely to note that his 
portfolio of roles made him uniquely equipped to manage a campaign at multiple 
levels. Few officers, other than absolutist soldier-monarchs, have enjoyed such power. 
While this brought responsibility and privation, it also served to obviate interference 
from other sources. It is doubtful that any British officer could have replaced 
Marlborough in kind; not necessarily on account of personal talent, but by reason of 
the aggregate role the duke had in moulding allied strategic policy. 
Consolidating such powers in a centralised command structure could prove effective if 
an individual possessed the capability to use them; if he did not, it could prove 
destructive to the efficiency to the order and organisation of the army. Marlborough, 
and similarly burdened subordinates like Cadogan, both proved capable at managing 
their responsibilities. Though this was in part through natural energy and ability, it 
was aided by the presence of staff personnel, including Cadogan himself in the duke's 
case, who eased the burden. The senior staff apparatus of the British army under 
Marlborough was not new; it shared the same basic form as that used in the Nine 
Years' War. Nor were the roles marked by any great innovations: the adjutancy-general 
remained much of cipher, bearing little in common with the office it would become; 
and Cadogan s vigour and wide-ranging activities as quartermaster-general, noted in 
the historiography, were little different to those of Adolph von Wolf van Dopsch, who 
fulfilled a similarly expansive for William III in the previous warm 
If it lacked novelty, it possessed flexibility. Temporary, situation-dependent delegation 
of command was a central element to the direction of armies and detachments. After 
all, the very nature of general officers -senior officers with general authority within the 
army, as opposed to fixed responsibilities -was predicated upon this concept. Rank 
(and seniority of commission) conferred dignity and an element of authority, but real, 
functional authority over an element of the army came only when the commander-in- 
chief, the military plenipotentiary of the sovereign, invested a general officer with a 
171 Waddell, 'Administration', pp. 191-195. 
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specific role. While the seniormost general officers (typically full generals, in the 
campaigns) might be associated with a line or wing, or the Horse or Foot as a whole or 
in part, junior generals above the rank of brigadier had no army divisional commands 
to occupy them. Earlier in the war, the roles of general officers were clearer. Under the 
commander-in-chief in 1702, for example, there were two lieutenants-general - one for 
the Horse, and one for the Foot; each served as the duke's principal lieutenant for that 
arm. By the end, when the numbers of lieutenants-general and majors-general equalled 
those of brigadiers, the generality was little more than an unemployed mass with no 
defined day-to-day responsibility. 
The rise of a staff system, particularly at corps and divisional level, is recognised as 
being one of the elements in the emergence of the operational art of war. Claus Telp 
provides a cogent analysis of this development. The ability to divide one's forces into 
discrete (preferably all-arms) bodies that can operate independently yet provide 
mutual support when necessary, each with its own staff structure (which can both co- 
ordinate with the headquarters, and plan and act upon its own initiative), allows a 
greater level of flexibility than that provided by a 'unitary army'? 72 This structure did 
not exist under Marlborough in the Low Countries. The only semi-permanent 
organisation above the level of battalion or squadron, the brigade, possessed a 
permanent staff officer (the major of brigade). General officers of the day and 
detachment commanders at a strategic level, or local commanders at a tactical level, 
had no such apparatus to draw upon; their aides-de-camp temporarily fulfilled the 
role. 
This system as practised by the British and their allies in the Low Countries, though ill- 
defined, was successful to a certain degree during the War of the Spanish Succession. 
Allied armies made frequent use of detachments, multiple columns and separate lines 
of march, but there was nothing that might be equated with Telp's description of an 
operational level of warfare, marking the close transition of strategic manoeuvre into 
tactical advantage. Marlborough's ability to force a battle on an unwilling opponent 
was limited. This is not to say that manoeuvre did not contribute to each of the four 
TM Claus Telp, The evolution of operational art, 1740-1813: from Frederick the Great to Napoleon 
(London, 2005). 
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major battles (Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenaarde and Malpiaquet); rather that such 
manoeuvre was strategic, rather than the operational deployment of multiple force- 
components to force an engagement in favourable terms. These engagements could 
arise from a mutual willingness to fight, spurred by greater political-strategic 
considerations (Ramillies and, to an extent, Blenheim-though at the latter the Franco- 
Bavarian intentions must be the heavily qualified), or manoeuvres attending the 
investment or defence of a town, such as Oudenaarde or Mons (for Malplaquet). 
Marlborough, who often expressed a desire to engage in battle, is occasionally 
referenced as a John the Baptist figure; a forerunner to the more militarily adventurous 
generals of later, not least Napoleon. Military history revels in its structures and 
theories. Teleologies can abound; it is too easy to apply modernist interpretations to 
early modern phenomena, to the latter's detriment. After all, were not the basic 
components (Foot and Horse), weapon-systems (the portability and uniformity of 
artillery excepted) and media of communication much the same for Marlborough as 
they were a hundred years later? Yet many socio-political and economic, as well as 
military, foundations of later warfare were very different, as were the goals and 
strategies of the participants. The armies of Revolutionary France and Frederician 
Prussia sought battle out of strategic necessity; Marlborough merely recognised its 
potential efficacy. 
Naturally, the tripartite strategic-operational-tactical model of warfare mirrors the 
progression it grew to describe: the strategic imperatives to defeat the enemy, managed 
by the operational deployment of forces to secure a preferential tactical engagement. 
Destruction of Louis XIV's France in this form was hardly an option; rather, the allied 
belligerents adopted a variety of strategies. It was in prosecuting those in the field that 
the armies of the late-17th and early-181h centuries engaged in a continual process of 
empirical development. Telp describes (in his two-component model, regarding the 
conduct of war prior to what he considers to be the full development of the operational 
art) 'strategy' as the 
art of war at the strategic level, concerned with political decisions such as the 
definition of the war aim, the mobilization of manpower and material, the planning 
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and conduct of campaigns and the determination of the purpose as well as the 
context of battle. 7m 
This embraces an incredible number of roles, duties and responsibilities, the adroit 
performance of which would be critical to securing a successful outcome to a 
campaign. Managing the interaction of these elements was as important as bridging 
the gap between 'strategy' and 'tactics' in the early modern army; not that the latter 
was so simple as the manoeuvre-battle divide presupposed: armies were frequently 
engaged in daily skirmishes with each other as a consequence of the escort of convoys, 
the taking up of posts and general patrols, razias, partisan warfare and foragins'7+ As 
Erik Lund (colourfully) put it: 
If the Succession Wars are to be understood, it is in a large measure in terms of a 
conflict whose daily terms were set by soldiers scything down the green herbage in 
the fields under a haying sun amidst stands of muskets, watched by friends 
mounted and sweating in their armor as they waited for the warning shots, 
followed by fleeing pickets bursting through woodlots and over fences, drawing 
pursuers in range for a hasty countercharge or fusillade .m 
General and staff officers formed a vital component in the management of this 
everyday form of warfare. Their personal capacity and initiative, together with flexible 
systems of delegation, aided commanders in their prosecution of a campaign. 
Improvements, be they innovations or refinements, in the conduct of early modern 
warfare have not been described by any new rubric, but formed an important part of 
continuing military development. 
773 Ibid., p. 2. 
774 E. g. Lynn, French Army, pp. 128,538-546. 
775 Lund, War for the Every Day, p. 77. 
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Brigadiers (5): Hugh Wyndham (-; Col. 31.1.1692)x; The Hon. 
James Stanley (9.3.1702; Col. 1.8.1692)6; Cornelius W(xxi (9.3.1702; 
Col. 1.12.1693)6; Frederick Hamilton (9.3.1702; Col. 19.12.1692, recomm. 
1.10.1695)6; Henry Withers (9.3.1702; Lt-Col. 7.12.1696)6 
Caphiirt-Gi-ir1'rill nih I/('I irr ('1110 1011 \( 111 I: (11111., 
DUKE OF MAItLHOROUCA 1 (14.3.1702) 
Lieutenants-Gc'nereil (3): Charles Churchill (o). 3.1702; N1. y-c4,11. 
2.3.1694)7; John, Lord Cutts (11.2,1703; Mai-Gen. I. b. 1 i%rh ren. 4.3.1702) 7; 
Henry Lumley (11.2.1703; Mai-Gen. 27.4.1697 ren. ').;. 17(12)' 
1703b Majors-General (2): George I lamilton, Earl of Orkney (43.1702, 
Brig. 1.7.1695)7,8; Richard Inguldshk' ('). 3.171)2: lire; I (, IWa, )" 
Brigadiers (5): tHugh WN, ndham (- ;c ol aº I ºw>_I"; Cornelius 
Wood (9.3.1702; Col. 1.12.1nliz)'n; Frederick I L1milton (1). 1.1702, c'o, I. 
19.12.1092, rriomm, 1.10 I It'nr1' Witht'r-ý ('º 1 1702,1 t-(', )l 
2 I' Ih' )in C h, u It' Iýu>ý ýýi t1 t'2 .. I I Io 
Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief JOHN CHURCtfll., 
DUKE OF MARLBOR0001 (14.3.1702) 
General of Foot: Charles Churchill (15.9.1703; LI-Gen. 9.3.1702)ht 
Lieutenants-General (4): John, Lord Cutts (11.2.1703; MAI-4G m. 
2.3.1694); Henry Lumley (11.2.1703; Maj-Gcn. 27.4.1697); Ge orgle 
Hamilton, Earl of Orkney (1.1.1704; Mai-Gen. 9.3.1702)"; Richard 
1704, 
Ingoldsby (1.1.1704; Mai-G n. 9.3.1702)'' 
Majors-Genera! (2): Cornelius Wcxx1 (1.1.17114; Brig. 9.3.17112)'4; 
Henry Withers (1.1.1704; Brig. 9.3.1702)14 
Brigadiers (5): Frederick Hamilton (9.3.1702; Col. 19,12.169Z nr-omrn. 
1.10.1695)1'ß"I6; Charles Ross (9.3.1702; Col. 16.7.1695)'x; James 
Ferguson (9.9.1703; col. 25.8.1693)ls; tArchibald Row (; Col. 1.1.1697; 
d. 13.8.1704 Ns. )l Ob; John Richmond Webb (1.1.1704, C01. 
26.12.1695))5"17 
1705 + al)<<rin c rrrrýrl rrr 
l urrar rrr lý r rrr 7rrý /: )()1 1% (º it I(I 111 1, 
DUKE. OF MAR1. I )ROUCaI (I4.1.1702) 
2o1 
Gcºternl of Foot: Charles Churchill (15.9.1703; I. t-(; vn. 9.3 1702) 
Licutcnants-Geeºu'ral (4): $lohn, Lord Cutts (11.2.170.1; M, ij-(. en 
1.6.16%)Ih; Henry Lumlry (11.2.1703; Mai-Gen. 27.4.1697); (; rcºrge 
Hamilton, Earl of Orkney (1.1.1704; %bj-(; vn. (). 3. l702); Richard 
ingoldsby (1.1.1704; Mai-Gen. 9.3.1702)1" 
Majors-General (3): Cornelius Wood (1.1.1704; Brig. 9.: 1.1702); 
Charles Ross (1.1.1704; Brig. 9.11702)""; I lenrvv Withers (I 1.17(4, Brig. 
9.3.1702) 
Brigadiers (7): lames Ferguson (9.9.1703; C ol. 225. n. 1(93; d. 22.10 1705 
N. S. )-0; John Richmond Webb (1.1.1704; Col. 26.12.1h95); Thomas 
Meredvth (25.8.1704; Bvt Cu! 1.6.1701; Col. 12.2.1702)21; Francis I'almes 
(25.8.1704; Bvt Col. 10.3.1702; Col. 1.7.1702)21; William Cadcgan 
(25.8.1704; Bvt Col. 1.6.1701; Col. 2.3.1703)21; I lolcroft Blood (25. W17(4; 
Col. Art. 1702; Col. 26.8.1703)22; Lord John IL IN' (25.5 17(41 Rvt Col. 
10.3.1702; Col. 7.4.1704) 21 
Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief JOHN CHURCHILL, 
DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH (14.3.1702) 
General of Foot: Charles Churchill (15.9,1703; Lt-Gen. 9.3.1702) 
Lieutenants-General (3): Henry Lumley (11.2.1703; Mai-Gen. 
27.4.1697); George Hamilton, Earl of Orkney (1.1.1704; Mai-Gcn. 
9.3.1702); Richard Ingoldsby (1.1,1704; Mai-Gen. 9.3.1702) 
Majors-General (3): Cornelius Wood (1.1.1704; Brig. 93.1702); 
Charles Ross (1.1.1704; Brig. 9.3.1702)21; Henry Withers (1.1.1704; Brig. 
1706,, 9.3.1702). (See also Webb and Argyll, below. ) 
Brigadiers (7): lohn Richmond Webb (1.1.1704; Col. 2h. I2.1h95)24; 
JOHN CAMPBELL, DUKE OF ARGYLL ANI) EARL OF GREENWICH 
(1.1.17(14; Col. 29.9.1703)24; Thomas Meredyth (25.8.1704; Bvt Col 
1.6.1701; Col. 12.2.1702); Francis Palmes (25.8.1704; Bvt Col. 14.3.17(r2; 
Col. 1.7.1702)25; William Cadogan (25.8.1704; Bvt Col. 1.6.1701; Col. 
2.3.1703)25; Holcroft Blood (25.8.1704; Col. Art. 1702; Col. 26. S. 1703)25; 
tLord John Hay (25.8.1704; Bvt Col. 10.3.1702; Col. 7.4.1704; d. 25.8.1706 
N. S. )25 (Both John, Lord Dalrymple and Sir Richard Temple, Ri ren'J as hretael 
brigadiers in the latter stages tf 1706. See note 29. ) 
e liptau-G"e"ral a,, d III\( ýt 1« I ui I, 
DUKE. OF MARI. IuR000I I (14.3.1702) 
General of Foot: Charles Churchill (15'+. 1703; Lt-( e'n 1) 1 1702) 
Lieutenants-Grvre'rrrl (3): I Irnrv Lunmk's' (11.2 1703, M, q-k: ý"rý 
27.4.1697); GI{OR(1": I IAMII. ION, EARL OF ORKNFY (I 117113, Map l: rn 
1707r 
9.3.1702); Richard Ingoldsbv (1.1.1714; Maj-Gov 11.3.1702). (t\5arer.. 
W(n)it and I rnai ha n, s'rved in flue tu zpat't tv u' lieuh"nant xr"rrr"nrl IPI I: "U'", 'ee 
note 26, below. ) 
Majors-Ge'ne'ral (, 5): Cornelius Wood (I 1170 4. llr, r; 1) 1 I70') ^; 
Charles Ross (1.1.17(4; Brig. 1). 3.1702)-^; 1 Ienrv' Withers I1 117(4, Brig 
9.3.1702)24.; John Richmond Webb (I c, I70 , ling I 1170.1); 101 IN 
CAMI)RFI. I., DUKE. OF AI«; YI. I. AND EARL 01 (; I: 1 I M%1( 11 (1 r+ 1714,, 
Brig. 1.1.1714) 
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Brigadiers (7): Thomas Meredyth (25.8.1704; Bvt Col 1.6.1701; Col. 
12.2.1702); Francis Palmes (25.8.1704; Bvt Col. 10.3.1702; Col. 1.7.1702)27; 
William Cadogan (25.8.1704; Bvt Col. 1.6.1701; Col. 2.3.1703)27; 
tHolcroft Blood (25.8.1704; Col. Art. 1702; Col. 26.8.1703; d. 30.8.1707 
N. S. )28; Sir Richard Temple, Bt (1.6.1706; Col. 14.2.1702)27,29; 
WILLIAM, LORD NORTH AND GREY (1.6.1706; Col. 15.1.1703)27; JOHN, 
L(EI)D\I R)%Inr (I An I, FAI: I OI'ý; Iý\II, )(I(, I(iI II r()(') ' "' 
Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief. JOHN CHURCHILL, 
DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH (14.3.1702) 
Lieutenants-General (7): Thomas Erle (11.2.1703; Mai-Gen. 1.6.1696), 
Henry Lumley (11.2.1703; Maj-Gen. 27.4.1697); GEORGE HAMILTON, 
EARL OF ORKNEY (1.1.1704; Maj-Gen. 9.3.1702); tRichard Ingoldsby 
(1.1.1704; Maj Gen. 9.3.1702)30; Henry Withers (1.1.1707; Maj-Cen. 
1.1.1704)30; Cornelius Wood (1.1.1707; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1704); "; Charles 
Ross (1.1.1707; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1704)31 
Majors-General (4): John Richmond Webb (1.6.1706; Brig. 1.1.1704); 
JOHN CAMPBELL, DUKE OF ARGYLL AND EARL OF GREENWICH 
17088 (1.6.1706; Brig. 1.1.1704); Thomas Meredyth (1.1.1707; Brig. 25.8.1704)32; 
William Cadogan (1.1.1707; Brig. 25.8.1704)33. 
Brigadiers (5): Sir Richard Temple, Bt (1.6.1706; Col. 14.2.1702)3+; 
WILLIAM, LORD NORTH AND GREY (1.6.1706; Col. 15.1.1703)34; JOHN, 
DALRYMPLE, EARL OF STAIR (1.6.1706; Col. 1.1.1706)=; [Owen 
Wynne (1.6.1706; Col. 25.3.1705)35; George Hamilton (1.1.1707)351; 
Joseph Sabine (1.1.1707; Bvt Col. 1.1.1703; Col. 1.4.1705)'4; Gilbert 
Primrose (1.1.1707; Bvt Col. 1.3.1703; Col. 9.3.1708)'6; William Evans 
(1.1.1707; Col. 10.4.1703). 37; [George Kellum (1.1.1707; Bvt Col. 
27.6.1703)38; Thomas Crowther (1.1.1707; Bvt Col. 1.1.1704)"; Charles 
Sibourg (1.1.1707; Bvt Col. 1.1.1704)39 
C Mid ('tuinrinMlCr III-(lief JOHN CHURCHILL, 
DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH (14.3.1702) 
Lieutenants-General (9): Henry Lumley (11.2.1703; Mai-Gen. 
27.4.1697); GEORGE HAMILTON, EARL OF ORKNEY (1.1.1704; Mai-Gen. 
9.3.1702); Henry Withers (1.1.1707; Mai-Gen. 1.1.1704); Cornelius 
Wood (1.1.1707; Mai-Gen. 1.1.1704)39; Charles Ross (1.1.1707; Mal-Gen. 
1.1.1704), 19; *John Richmond Webb (1.1.1709; Maj-Gen. 1.6.1706)4°; 
*JOHN CAMPBELL, DUKE OF ARGYLL AND EARL OF GREENWICH 
1709h (1.1.1709; Mai-Gen. 1.6.1706)4°; 
*Thomas Meredyth (1.1.1709; Maj-Gen. 
1.1.1707)4°; *William Cadogan (1.1.1709; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1707)4° 
Majors-General (5): *Sir Richard Temple, Bt (1.1.1709; Brig. 
1.6.1706)41; *William, Lord North and Grey (1.1.1709; Brig. 1.6.1706)41; 
*John, Dalrymple, Earl of Stair (1.1.1709; Brig. 1.6.1706)4'; *Owen 
Wynne (1.1.1709; Brig. 1.6.1706)42; [George Hamilton (1.1.1707)431; 
[*George Macartney (1.1.1709; Brig. 25.10.1705)44] 
Brigadiers (7): Joseph Sabine (1.1.1707; Bvt Col. 1.1.1703; Col. 
1.4.1705)45; Gilbert Primrose (1.1.1707; Bvt Col. 1.3.1703; Col. 9.3.1708)45; 
William Evans (1.1.1707; Col. 10.4.1703)45; George Kellum (1.1.1707; 
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Bvt Col. 27.6.1703)45; Charles Sibourg (1.1.1707; Bvt Col. 1.1.1704)45; 
tSampson de Lalo (1.1.1709; Col. 5.2.1704)4h; Charles Boyle, Earl of 
Orrerv (Brig 17.5 I: OQ): Col L1 1704). 1 
Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief JOHN CHURCHILL, 
DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH (14.3.1702) 
Lieutenants-General (13): Henry Lumley (11.2.1703; Maj-Gen. 
27.4.1697); GEORGE HAMILTON, EARL OF ORKNEY (1.1.1704; Maj-Gen. 
9.3.1702); Henry Withers (1.1.1707; Mai-Gen. 1.1.1704); Cornelius 
Wood (1.1.1707; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1704); Charles Ross (1.1.1707; Maj-Gen. 
1.1.1704); [John Richmond Webb (1.1.1709; Maj-Gen. 1.6.1706)48]; JOHN 
CAMPBELL, DUKE OF ARGYLL AND EARL OF GREENWICH (1.1.1709; 
Maj-Gen. 1.6.1706); Thomas Mered. (1.1.1709; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1707)49; 
William Cadogan (1.1.1709; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1707); *Sir Richard Temple, 
Bt (1.1.1710; Maj. Gen. 1.1.1709; Brig. 1.6.1706)-90; *William, Lord North 
and Grey (1.1.1710; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1709; Brig. 1.6.1706)50; *John 
1710' 
Dalrymple, Earl of Stair (1.1.1710; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1709; Brig. 1.6.1706)90; 
*George Macartney (1.1.1710; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1709; Brig. 25.10.1705)49.50 
Majors-General (5): *Gilbert Primrose (1.1.1710; Brig. 1.1.1707)51; 
*Joseph Sabine (1.1.1710; Brig. 1.1.1707; Bvt Col. 1.1.1703; Col. 1.4.1705)51; 
*William Evans (1.1.1710; Brig. 1.1.1707; Col. 10.4.1703)"'; *George 
Kellum (1.1.1710; Brig. 1.1.1707; Bvt Col. 27.6.1703)51; *Charles Sibourg 
(1.1.1710; Brig. 1.1.1707; Col. 8.12.1710; Bvt Col. 1.1.1704)5'; [*? Charles 
Boyle, Earl of Orrery (1.1.1710; Brig. 17.8.1709; Col. 1.3.1704)52] 
Brigadiers (7): *Hans Hamilton (1.1.1710; Bvt Col. before 8.1704; Col. 
1.2.1706)53; *Richard Sutton (1.1.1710; Bvt Col. 2.8.1704; Col. 23.3.1709)5-''; 
*Henry Durell (Brig. 1.1.1710; Col. 17.2.1711; Bvt Col. 25.8.1704)53; 
*Richard Russell (1.1.1710; Col. 19.10.1704)53; *Henry Morrison 
(1.1.17V; Bvt Col. 19.10.1704)53; *Francis Godfrey (1.1.1710; Col. 
25.3.1705)53; * ohn Hill (1.1.1710; Col. 8.5.1705)53 
Gq/ hri; t-C; cnc'r rl am l Com i iii h"r iii . 
1/hf: 10I IN CHURCHILL, 
DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH (14.3.1702; dismissed 30.12.1711) 
General of Horse: Henry Lumley (31.1.1711; Lt-Gen. 11.2.1703)4 
General of Foot: GEORGE HAMILTON, EARL OF ORKNEY (31.1.1711; 
Lt-Gen. 1.1.1704)54 
Lieutenants-General (7): Henry Withers (1.1.1707; Maj-Gen. 
1.1.1704), 55; Cornelius Wood (1.1.1707; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1704)55; Charles 
Ross (1.1.1707; Mai-Gen. 1.1.1704)M-55; William Cadogan (1.1.1709; Maj- 
17111 Gen. 1.1.1707)55; Sir Richard Temple, Bt (1.1.1710; Maj. Gen. 1.1.1709)55; 
William, Lord North and Grey (1.1.1710; Mai-Gen. 1.1.1709)55; John 
Dalrymple, Earl of Stair (1.1.1710; Mai-Gen. 1.1.1709)55 
Majors-General (5): Joseph Sabine (1.1.1710; Brig. 1.1.1707)'; Gilbert 
Primrose (1.1.1710; Brig. 1.1.1707)x'; William Evans (1.1.1710; Brig. 
1.1.1707)'; Charles Sibourg (1.1.1710; Brig. 1.1.1707)56; George 
Kellum (1.1.1710; Brig. 1.1.1707)"' 
Brigadiers (11): Richard Sutton (1.1.1710; Bvt Coy. 2.8.1704; Col. 
23.3.1709)57; Henry Durell (Brig. 1.1.1710; Col. 17.2.1711; Bvt Col. 
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25.8.1704)57; Richard Russell (1.1.1710; Col. 19.10.1704)57; Henry 
Morrison (1.1.1710; Bvt Col. 19.10.1704)57, - Hans Hamilton (1.1.1710; Bvt 
Col. before 8.1704; Col. 1.2.1706)58; George Preston (12.2.1711; Col. 
1.1.1706)59; Henry Grove (12.2.1711; Bvt Col. 1.1.1706)58; George Freke 
(12.2.1711; Lt-Col. commanding 23.3.1709; Maj. 7.3.1706)58; Thomas 
Panton (12.2.1711; Bvt Col. 1.7.1706)58; Robert Napier (12.2.1711; Bvt 
Col. 1.6.1706)58; Patrick Meade (12.2.1711; Bvt Col. 1.1.1706)60 
Notes and authorities (all dates indicated in warrants and commissions O. S. unless otherwise noted). 
The names of general officers who were Members in the House of Commons at some point during a given 
calendar year are underlined those officers who were English, British or Scots Representative Peers in the 
House of Lords are indicated by SMALL CAPTIALS. * denotes a general officer who was promoted to that 
senior rank during the campaign (not including promotions made early or late in the calendar year, 
outside of operations); ta general officer who died during the campaign; and $a general officer who 
ceased serving with the army for other reasons. The dates of commission to a general officer's current rank 
(and any previous rank, to illuminate seniority) are given in brackets. 
(a) Warrant for pay to General Officers, 30 December 1701 to 25 December 1702 O. S. BL Add. MSS 61369, ff. 109- 
109b. Total sum of pay ordered by the warrant is £6254.12s. 6d., including staff officers. (b) ditto, 26 
December 1702 to 25 December 1703 O. S. The Hague, 29 December 1703 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61370, ff. 87b-88b. 
Total, including staff officers, amounted to £6350. (c) (i) ditto, 1704. The Hague, 15 December 1704 N. S. BL 
Add. MSS 61370, If. 182-183. Total, including staff officers, amounted to £11567.10s. 10d. (ii) BL, Add. MSS 
61317, ff. 169-170b. (d) (i) ditto, 1705. The Hague, 15 December 1705 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61371, ff. 70b-71b. 
Total, including staff officers, amounted to £12652.10s. 10d. (ii) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. i, pp. 2,11-13. 
(e) (i) ditto, 1706. The Hague, 18 November 1706 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61371, ff. 127b-129. Total, including 
staff officers, amounted to £12652.10s. 10d., the same as the year previous. (ii) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. 
i, pp. 126-128. (f) (i) ditto, 1707. The Hague, 6 November 1707 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61371, ff. 205-206b. Total, 
including staff officers, amounts to £15390.10d. (ii) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, p. 15. (g) (i) ditto, 1708. 
Camp at Meerlebeck, 10 December 1708 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61372, If. 99b-100. Total, including staff officers, 
amounted to £13236.9s. 6d. (ii) Payments to the several General Officers to make up their Pay according to the 
Posts they served in the year 1705 altho they were not provided for upon the Establishment of the sd. Forces that 
Year. HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, pp. 135,143-148,300-302. (h) (i) ditto, 1709. The Hague, 7 November 
1709 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61372, ff. 145-145b. Total, including staff officers, amounted to £13000.13s. 4d. (ii) 
HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, pp. 283-284,291-293,296-298. (iii) BL, Add. MSS 61317, f. 174. (i) (i) ditto, 
1710. The Hague, 5 December 1710 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61372, If. 256-256b. Total, including staff officers, 
amounted to £21,230.10d. (ii) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. iii, pp. 9,11,21-27,29-31. (j) (i) ditto, 1711. St 
James, 21 December 1711 O. S. BL Add. MSS 61373, If. 51b-52. Total, including staff officers, amounted to 
£23991.15s. 10d. (ii) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. iii, pp. 156-158. (iii) BL, Add. MSS 61317, If. 176-177b. 
(1) Rivers (c. 1654-1712) does not appear on Marlborough's warrant authorising pay to the general officers 
for their service in 1702, but was accounted for two aides-de-camp as a lieutenant-general for the same 
period on BL, Add. MSS 61369, f. 111. Relatively little note is taken of his service in 1702; he would later 
serve as commander-in-chief in Spain. See Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, v, p. 239; Murray, i, pp. 21,55; 
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D. N. B. (2) Lieutenant-general effective 9 March 1702 (Dalton, v, p. 15). Luttrell stated that Churchill was 
promoted lieutenant-general in his entry for 7 May 1702 O. S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, v, p. 171. (3) 
Commissions (renewed, in the case of Cutts and Lumley) of major-general dated 9 March 1702 (Dalton, v, 
p. 16). (4) Orkney and Ingoldsby are listed as brigadiers on the initial warrant, as per the establishment 
voted; a supplementary warrant (The Hague, 6 November 1702 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61369, f. 112) authorises 
making up their pay from brigadiers to majors-general for the six months of the campaign, out of the 
£10,000 'Contingencies' voted by Parliament and the balance of funds allocated the general officers by 
same; commissions as majors-general dated 9 March 1702 (Dalton, v, p. 16). (5) Date of commission of 
Wyndham as brigadier unknown, but he is listed as a brigadier in 1699 (Dalton, iv, p. 217). Wyndham's 
commission as a major-general antedated to 9 March 1702 (Dalton, v, p. 16). (6) Brigadiers Withers, Wood, 
Stanley and Hamilton had the pay of a single brigadier (£540, for the shortened year) divided between 
them for their service on the campaign (Dalton, v, p. 16). Luttrell noted that Stanley was made brigadier of 
the forces in the Low Countries in his entry of 14 July 1702 O. S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, v, p. 194. 
(7) Warranted to receive their pay as general officers for the full year, 26 December 1702 to 25 December 
1703. Although Cutts and Lumley are listed as majors-general on the warrant for general officers' pay, 
they clearly served in the capacity of lieutenant-general during the campaign of 1703 (see, for example, 
Murray, i, p. 96), and their commissions as such were dated 11 February 1703 O. S. (Dalton, v, p. 15). 
Luttrell noted that Cutts, Orkney (sic) and Lumley were all made lieutenants-general, in his entry of 13 
February 1703 O. S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, v, 268. (8) As per 1702, Orkney and Ingoldsby and 
were paid as brigadiers (for the full year, 26 December 1702 to 25 December 1703) on the establishment 
voted by Parliament, but had their pay as majors-general (for two-hundred days of the campaign) made 
up by other funds. In this instance, the difference came out of £1095 awarded to the pair out of the 
revenues of Ireland. This had originally been designed to pay Orkney and Ingoldsby £547.10s. each for 
pay as brigadiers; but as these heads were instead covered on the establishment of the forces in the Low 
Countries, the £1095 was put to contingent uses. In addition to making up the pay of Orkney and 
Ingoldsby, it provided the brigadier's pay of Wyndham for the early part of 1703, and the pay of aides-de- 
camp to the general officers for the campaign. By Marlborough's warrant made at The Hague, 30 October 
1703 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61370, ff. 87-87b. (9) Wyndham served in this capacity until 25 April 1703 O. S. For 
the source of his pay, see note (8), above. He later commanded as a major-general in Portugal. (10) 
Withers, Hamilton, Wood and Ross were paid as brigadiers for the period 1 May 1703 O. S. to 31 October 
1703 O. S. (11) Churchill's commission as general of the Foot made effective 15 September 1703 O. S. 
(Dalton, v, p. 15; BL Add. MSS 61321, ff. 5-6b); in an alternate list of dates of officers' commissions in BL 
Add. MSS 61321, ff. 7-8b, it is dated as 15 July 1704 O. S. John Marshall Deane still referred to Churchill as a 
lieutenant-general in April 1704. Deane, Journal, p. 2. Marlborough sought the rank for the dignity and 
command of the English soldiers in his absence. See Snyder, 1, nos 232 & 243, pp. 236-237,244-245. (12) 
Cutts' and Lumley's commissions dated 11 February 1703 O. S. (13) Ingoldsby is listed as a major-general 
on the warrant for pay. Orkney's and Ingoldsby's commissions were antedated 1 January 1704 O. S.; a copy 
of a list of commissions to be prepared and presented to Queen Anne (to be signified to that date), was 
made at the Court at St James, 5 April 1704 O. S.: Orkney and Ingoldsby are both listed for promotion to 
the rank of lieutenant-general. BL Add. MSS 61321, ff. 95-96b. Luttrell recorded their promotion to 
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lieutenants-general in his entry of 11 April 1704 O. S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, v, p. 412. See note 18, 
below. (14) Wood and Withers noted as brigadiers made up to majors-general for the six months of the 
campaign. Their commissions as majors-general were antedated 1 January 1704 O. S. (Dalton, v, 16). 
Wood's and Wither's commissions as majors-general are listed among those to be prepared and present to 
Queen Anne in April 1704 (BL Add. MSS 61321, ff. 95-96b). Luttrell recorded their promotion to majors- 
general in his entry of 11 April 1704 O. S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, v, p. 412. (An earlier entry by 
Luttrell of 20 January 1704 O. S. had Wood promoted major-general before this date; ibid, v, p. 382. ) Ross is 
not listed as a major-general on the initial warrant; he was declared major-general by Marlborough in the 
aftermath of Blenheim. Marlborough to Godolphin, Camp at Steinhem, 17 August 1704 N. S. (Snyder, i, no. 
363, pp. 351-352); this is also mentioned in Luttrell's entry of 22 August 1704 O. S.: Luttrell, Brief Historical 
Relation, v, p. 458. (15) For the dates of Ferguson's and Webb's commissions, see Dalton, v, p. 16. The date 
of Row's commission is unknown. William Cadogan, Lord John Hay, Francis Palmes and Thomas 
Meredith were declared brigadiers by Marlborough in the aftermath of Blenheim, but were not warranted 
as such-nor served in that role-for the balance of the campaign. Their commissions were made effective 
25 August 1704 O. S. Marlborough to Godolphin, Camp at Steinhem, 17 August 1704 N. S. (Snyder, i, no. 
363, pp. 351-352). Dalton, v, p. 17. See also Luttrell's entry for 22 August 1704 O. S. Luttrell, Brief Historical 
Relation, v, p. 458. (16) £273.15s. was warranted to Hamilton for his services as a brigadier in 1704; and the 
like amount to Archibald Row's executor's for the same, after he was killed at Blenheim. BL Add. MSS 
61370, f. 187b. (17) Webb does not appear on the initial warrant; a warrant for his pay as brigadier from 24 
December 1703 O. S. to 24 December 1704 O. S. (Court at St James, 15 January 1705 O. S. ) is copied in BL 
Add. MSS 61370, f. 186b. Luttrell recorded his promotion to brigadier in his entry of 11 April 1704 O. S. 
Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, v, p. 412. (18) On the warrant, Cutts is indicated as serving on the Low 
Countries establishment as a lieutenant-general until 30 June 1705 O. S., ere he took up his duties in 
Ireland. Ingoldsby took his place as lieutenant-general on the establishment on 1 July, having been paid as 
a major-general until that date. (Though he demonstrably served as lieutenant-general in the field in 1704. ) 
(19) Ross is still listed as a brigadier on the warrant for general officers' pay, though his commission as 
major-general was antedated 1 January 1704 O. S. and he served in that capacity in 1705. (A list of 
commissions duly ordered, dated Whitehall, 10 April 1705 O. S., signifies Ross to be made major-general. 
BL Add. MSS 612321, ff. 116-117b. ) (20) Ferguson is listed as a brigadier on the establishment until 21 
October 1705 O. S. He died at Bois-le-Duc, 22 October 1705 N. S. (21) Meredyth, Hay, Palmes and Cadogan 
are warranted for pay as brigadiers for their services'during the campaign', receiving £202.17s. 6d. each on 
the establishment. Although Marlborough expressed his desire for their promotion shortly after Blenheim 
(as he did for Ross), it was not effected until 1705: their brigadiers' commissions are among those ordered 
in a document, dated Whitehall, 10 April 1705 O. S. BL Add. MSS 61321, ff. 116-117b. (22) Blood is not 
listed on the warrant for general officers' pay for 1705; he did serve in that rank in 1705, however, and is 
among those officers ordered to be commissioned as brigadiers that April. (See note 21, above. ) Luttrell 
mentioned Blood's promotion in his entry of 7 April 1705 O. S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, v, p. 538. 
(23) Ross is still listed as a brigadier on the warrant for general officers' pay. (24) Webb and John 
Campbell, Duke of Argyll and Earl of Greenwich, both served as brigadiers for the majority of the 1706 
campaign. Though Argyll initially commanded the Scots Brigade in Dutch service, he also held the rank of 
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brigadier on the English establishment and acted in that capacity in other operations (though does not 
appear on the warrant for general officers' pay for 1706). Marlborough desired that both Webb and Argyll 
be promoted to the rank of major-general, writing to Godolphin to this effect on 12 September 1706 N. S. 
(Snyder, ii, no. 671, p. 662). Argyll returned to England to help with the negotiations for the Union, but 
Webb remained on the continent. A Dutch promotion of general officers led Marlborough to enact Webb's 
promotion provisionally, in the field. (See Snyder, ii, no. 681, pp. 672-3: Marlborough to Godolphin, 
Gramets, 20 September 1706 N. S. ) Both official commissions were antedated 1 June 1706 O. S. (25) Blood, 
Cadogan, Palmes and Hay were paid £273.15s. each from the establishment for their service during the 
campaign-i. e. half that due to a brigadier for a full year's service. (26) Withers, Wood and Ross were 
listed as majors-general on warrant for the general officers' pay for 1707. Luttrell noted in his entry of 13 
May 1707 O. S. that Woods was to be made a lieutenant-general; he recorded his actual promotion in his 
entry for 18 October 1707 O. S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, vi, pp. 171,225. On 15 November 1707 O. S., 
Luttrell recorded that Withers and Ross had been made lieutenants-general. Ibid, vi, p. 234. (27) Cadogan, 
Palmes, Temple, Dalrymple, and North and Grey were all allowed £507.10s. each (i. e. £40 less than a 
brigadier's annual pay) for their service as brigadiers in 1707; Meredyth received the full sum. Cadogan, 
Meredyth and Palmes were promoted majors-general in October 1707. See Luttrell's entries for 16 and 18 
October 1707 O. S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, vi, p. 224. (28) Blood died on 30 August 1707 N. S. in 
Brussels, after a lengthy illness. His executors were granted £200 on the establishment, for his pay for that 
year. (29) Both Sir Richard Temple, Bt and John, Lord Dalrymple had served as brevet brigadiers in the 
latter part of 1706 (Snyder, ii, no. 681, pp. 672-3: Marlborough to Godolphin, Gramets, 20 September 1706 
N. S. ). (30) Ingoldsby rolled as lieutenant-general on the establishment until 28 April 1708 O. S., at which 
point he took up his duties in Ireland. His place on the establishment was then taken by Lieutenant- 
General Withers, who had hitherto drawn pay as a major-general. (31) Though both Wood and Ross 
ranked as lieutenants-general, they drew pay as majors-general upon the establishment of the forces in the 
Low Countries. As Marlborough himself remarked in a letter of 21 February 1709 N. S. to Lord Raby: "... 
Mr. Wood and Mr. Ross, with several others, are obliged to serve on less pay than their characters would 
allow them. " (Murray, iv, pp. 451-2). Later, a royal warrant of 10 July 1709 O. S. ordered that Wood and 
Ross received back-pay as lieutenants-general for the period 10 August 1708 O. S. to 22 December 1708 
O. S.; confusingly, this also applied to Withers, whose pay for that period had been covered by the 
establishment (HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, p. 300). (32) Major-General Meredyth, hitherto paid as a 
brigadier, replaced Withers in his position as major-general on the establishment on 29 April 1708 N. S. His 
commission as major-general was antedated 1 January 1707 O. S. (Dalton, v, p. 159). See also Note 27, 
above. (33) Cadogan, though serving with the rank of major-general since late 1707, drew pay as a 
brigadier on the establishment for 1708. His commission as major-general was antedated 1 January 1707 
O. S. (Dalton, v, p. 159). Brydges' accounts note that his pay was later made up from brigadier to major- 
general (Brydges actually wrote 'lieu tenant-general', but it is clear from the figures that this was an error) 
for the period 24 December 1707 O. S. to 23 December 1708 O. S. (HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, p. 301). 
(34) Temple, Stair, North and Grey, and Sabine drew a full (leap) year's pay as brigadiers on the 
establishment (£549). (35) As the invasion scare developed in November 1708, Owen Wynne and George 
Hamilton were suggested by Marlborough as officers that might command a detachment of Erle's force, to 
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be sent to Antwerp. Murray, iv, p. 321: Marlborough to Erle, camp at Roeselare, 22 November 1708 N. S. 
They do not appear on the warrant for the general officers' pay for 1708. (36) Primrose drew pay only for 
his service as brigadier 'during the campaign' (£358.10s. ). (37) William Evans is not listed upon the 
warrant for pay for 1708, but did serve in the Low Countries in that year, and was referred to as'Brigadier 
Evans' on several occasions by Marlborough. See, for example: Murray, iv, pp. 221,271,280,283 etc. Evans 
also appears as a brigadier in Brydges accounts for those officers that served in 1708, beyond the 
establishment (HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, pp. 301-302). (38) Kellum and Crowther do not appear on 
Marlborough's warrant for 1708; but both are denoted by Brydges as serving in the capacity of brigadier 
for the year 1708 (HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, pp. 301-302). Charles Sibourg is not listed on the pay 
warrant for 1708, but Dalton lists him as being a brigadier at Oudenaarde. Dalton, v, 11, p. 22. Luttrell 
recorded Sibourg's promotion to the rank of brigadier in his entry of 15 November 1707 OS. Luttrell, Brief 
Historical Relation, vi, p. 234. Sibourg is also listed as a brigadier for 1708 by Brydges (HL, Stowe MSS, 
Stowe 8, vol. ii, pp. 301-302). (39) Wood and Ross continued to be paid as majors-general on the 
establishment. A royal warrant of 31 January 1709(/10? ) O. S. ordered that their pay be made up to that of 
lieutenants-general for the period 23 December 1708 O. S. to 23 December 1709 O. S. (HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 
8, vol. ii, pp. 296-297). (40) The lieutenants-general's commissions of Webb, Argyll, Meredyth and 
Cadogan were all antedated 1 January 1709 O. S. Dalton, vi, p. 17. Luttrell made mention of the promotions 
of Webb and Argyll on 2 April 1709 O. S. (Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, vi, p. 425), Cadogan (and 
Palmes) on 12 May 1709 O. S. (ibid, vi, p. 440) and Meredyth on 26 May 1709 O. S. (ibid, vi, p. 445). Cadogan 
continued to draw pay at the rank of brigadier on the warrant for 1709; Argyll, Webb and Meredyth were 
paid as majors-general. Argyll, Webb and Meredyth later had their pay as majors-general made up to that 
of lieutenants-general for the period 1 January 1709 O. S. to 22 December 1709 O. S. (HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 
8, vol. ii, p. 297); Cadogan had his made up from brigadier to lieutenant-general for the same period (ibid, 
pp. 297-298) -analysed in conjunction with Note 33, above, this suggests a period of a week at the end of 
December 1711 when Cadogan was paid only as a brigadier. (41) Commissions as majors-general 
antedated 1 January 1709 O. S. Dalton, vi, p. 17. Luttrell recorded their promotion on 2 April 1709 O. S. 
Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, vi, p. 425. All three continued to be paid at the rank of brigadier on the 
establishment for 1709. Their pay was later made up to that of majors-general for the period 1 January 1709 
O. S. to 22 December 1709 O. S. (HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, p. 298). (42) Wynne received pay as a 
brigadier on the establishment, according to the warrant for general officers' pay for 1709, but this was 
later made up to that of a major-general (see Note 41 above). Major-general's commission antedated I 
January 1709 O. S. Dalton, vi, p. 17. Marlborough wrote to him as a brigadier in February 1709. Murray, iv, 
p. 427: Marlborough to Brigadier Wynne, Brussels, 5 February 1709 N. S. Listed as a major-general, 9 July 
1709 N. S. Ibid, iv, p. 538. (43) Hamilton possessed the rank of a major-general in the British army, but 
served under Dutch command in 1709. Dalton, vi, p. 302. His commission as a lieutenant-general in the 
British army was antedated 1 January 1709 O. S., but he was, for example, listed under the dignity of major- 
general in July 1709. Murray, iv, p. 538. (44) Macartney's service as a general officer had been in Spain, and 
while a brigadier he was captured at the battle of Almanza. Following his exchange, he was accused of 
assaulting his housekeeper, and forced to sell his regiment (D. N. B. ). Macartney served as a volunteer with 
Marlborough in the Low Countries in 1709, and his rank is at the time is unclear; Dalton suggested he was 
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temporarily deprived of his commission in any case. Marlborough refers to him as a brigadier in a letter of 
26 April 1709 N. S. (Murray, iv, p. 492). He is not listed under any rank in the list of general officers made 
by Marlborough on 9 July 1709 N. S. (ibid, iv, p. 538). (45) Only Brigadier Kellum is listed as receiving pay 
as a brigadier on the warrant for pay according to the establishment in 1709. Sabine, Primrose, Evans and 
Sibourg all had to be paid beyond the establishment agreed for that year. BL, Add. MSS 61317, f. 174. (46) 
Sampson de Lalö s commission as brigadier was antedated 1 January 1709 O. S. Dalton, vi, p. 17. Luttrell 
made note of his promotion on 2 April 1709 O. S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, vi, p. 425. Lalo was killed 
at Malplaquet. Dalton, vi, p. 302. (47) Marlborough had desired a commission of brigadier for Orrery on 
account of his being the eldest colonel and a 'man of quality'. Although Marlborough had not received a 
written commission, upon hearing Anne's approbation of the move he declared it in the field, c. July- 
August 1709. See Snyder, iii, pp. 1288-1289,1301,1326-1327. There is confusion as to the date of Orrery's 
commissions in the secondary literature. This is because, in his list of general officers commissions, Dalton 
lists Orrey's as brigadier on 17 August 1709 O. S., and as major-general on 1 January 1710 O. S. (Dalton, vi, 
p. 17). But later the dates are switched: brigadier on 1 January 1709 O. S. and major-general on 17 August 
1710 O. S. (ibid, vi, p. 302). BL, Add. MSS 61321, f. 17 lists Orrery's commission as brigadier as bearing the 
date 17 August 1709 O. S. (48) Webb continued to be listed upon the establishment of the forces in the Low 
Countries for 1710, though he was invalided at the battle of Malplaquet in 1709, and there is little evidence 
that he served at his post subsequently. (49) Meredyth and Macartney were dismissed from the army on 8 
November 1710 O. S. (BL, Add. MSS 61321, ff. 245-246b), after the notorious incident of their (supposedly) 
drinking to the destruction of the Tory ministry. Jonathan Swift, journal to Stella. Letter 11, London, 9 
December 1710 O. S. Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, vi, p. 664. (50) Queen Anne signified a general 
promotion of officers on May 1710, with all commissions antedated 1 January 1710 O. S. (Dalton, vi, pp. 17- 
18). Temple, North and Grey, Stair and Macartney were made lieutenants-general. Luttrell, Brief Historical 
Relation, vi, p. 580 (9 May 1710 O. S. ). There were announced in the camp of the army c. 3 June 1710 N. S. 
Deane, Journal, p. 108. None of the newly promoted lieutenants-general received pay as such on the 
establishment; Macartney, Stair, Temple and North and Grey were all listed as majors-general on the pay 
warrant for 1710. A subsequent royal warrant, dated 19 February 1711 O. S., authorized the making-up of 
their pay to lieutenants-general for the period 1 January 1710 O. S. to 23 December 1710 O. S. (HL, Stowe 
MSS, Stowe 8, vol. iii, p. 29). (51) General promotion. See Note 50, above. Primrose, Sabine, Evans, Kellum 
and Sibourg were promoted majors-general. Only Primrose was warranted to receive pay as a major- 
general, according to Marlborough's warrant of 5 December 1710 N. S. Sabine, Evans, Kellum and Sibourg 
were all warranted to receive pay as brigadiers on the establishment. All four, however, later had their pay 
made up to the rank of major-general. (52) Orrery was also promoted major-general, but Deane does not 
list him as one of those declared major-general in the camp. See Note 47 on the confusion regarding the 
dates of his commissions. Orrery was listed as a brigadier on the warrant for general officers' pay for 1710. 
(53) General promotion. See Note 50, above. Deane listed the newly promoted brigadiers as comprising 
Durell, Russell, Morrison, 'Hamble', Godfrey, Sutton and Hill (Deane, Journal, p. 108). 'Ramble' is most 
probably Hans Hamilton, who was listed as a brigadier in Brydges' accounts for the year 1710 
(Huntington Library, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. iii, pp. 11,29). Excepting Durell, who was listed as the 
adjutant-general, none of these officers appear upon Marlborough's warrant for the general officers' pay in 
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1710. All-except Sutton-are listed as brigadiers in Brydges' accounts for 1710, however. Sutton was ill 
during 1710, and may have missed most or all of the campaign; he was also delayed in returning to the 
Low Countries in 1711. Hayton et at., HoC 1690-1715, v, pp. 598-600. (54) Lumley and Orkney were 
promoted to the rank of full general (of the Horse, and the Foot, respectively), antedated 31 January 1711 
O. S. (Dalton, vi, p. 19). Only one General of Foot was allowed on the establishment (and none of Horse): 
BL, Add. MSS 61317, ff. 176-177b. Marlborough's warrant for pay to the general officers denoted both 
Lumley and Orkney as receiving pay as lieutenants-general until 30 January 1711 O. S.; and as full generals 
from 31 January. Charles Ross was promoted to the novel rank of 'colonel-general of Dragoons', dated I 
May 1711 O. S. (Dalton, vi, p. 19) but this rank was not recognised upon the establishment or 
Marlborough's warrant for pay. The camp journal noted that both Orkney and Ross (there is no mention, 
as per usual, of the affairs of the Horse) were 'declared' general of the Foot and colonel-general of 
Dragoons, respectively, on 4 July 1711 N. S., at the camp at Lens (BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 136b). (55) 
Withers, Wood, Ross, Cadogan, Stair, Temple and North and Grey all received proper pay in their posts as 
lieutenants-general upon the establishment, as per Marlborough's warrant. The establishment allowed 
nine lieutenants-general but, following the elevation of Lumley and Orkney, only seven served. BL, Add. 
MSS 61317, ff. 176-177b. (56) Primrose, Sabine, Evans, Kellum and Sibourg were duly paid as majors- 
general, according to the establishment. (57) In Marlborough's warrant authorising general officers' pay 
for 1711, Sutton, Durell, Morrison and Russell were all accounted with usual brigadier's pay (£547.10s. 
p. a. ); this is echoed in the states of pay for the general officers listed in BL, Add. MSS 61317, if. 176-177b. 
(58) Grove, Freke, Panton and Napier had their commissions as brigadiers antedated 12 February 1711 O. S. 
(Dalton, vi, p. 19). The army's camp journal recorded that colonels Preston, Panton and Napier were 
'declared' brigadiers in its entry of 3 September 1711 N. S. (BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 147). Hamilton, Grove, 
Freke, Panton and Napier were accounted as brigadiers for 'part of the campaign' on Marlborough's 
warrant, and drew six months' pay each (£273.15s. ). Yet another state of pay for 1711 (c. September 1711; 
BL, Add. MSS 61317, ff. 176-177b) lists Preston (see Note 59, below), Panton and Napier as brigadiers who 
served from 12 February 1711 (the date of their commissions), and thus due £484.10s. each, at the usual 
rate of 30s. p. d. The same source states that Hamilton might be given a full year's pay, but 'did not serve' 
during the campaign; Freke and Groves only appear in the margin, as officers who might also receive 
£484.10s. each for their service as brigadiers from 12 February 1711 O. S. (59) George Preston's commission 
as brigadier was antedated 12 February 1711 O. S. (Dalton, vi, p. 19). By Marlborough's warrant, Preston 
('who commanded the English [that] winter at Lille", and for his part as Brigadier for part of the 
campaign) was to receive £350. See also Note 58, above. (60) Patrick Meade's commission as brigadier was 
antedated 12 February 1711 O. S. (Dalton, vi, p. 19). Marlborough's warrant for pay stated that Meade only 
joined the army when the troops were marching into their winter quarters, and should be given but £100. 
On this account, Meade was not mentioned in the state of pay made c. September 1711 (BL, Add. MSS 
61317, ff. 176-177b). 
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Table A. 2: Senior staff officers, 1702-1711 
Post Incumbents 
Thomas Meredyth 1.6.1701-25.8.1704 (Bvt Col. 1.6.1701; Col. 
12.2.1702; Brig. 25.8.1704; Mai-Gen. 1.1.1707; Lt-Gen. 1.1.1709)2; Henry 
Adjutant-Generate 
Durell 25.8.1704-19.2.1711 (A. a. c. 1701-1710; Capt. 6.1.1702; Lt-col. c. 
1703; Bvt Col. 25.8.1704; Col. 17.2.1711; Brig. 1.1.1710; died 1.12.1712)3; 
Metcalf Graham 19.2.1711- (n. D. c. 1707-1711; Corn. 14.4.1702; Bvt 
Quartermaster- 
General 
Deputy 
Quartermaster- 
General7 
Secretary to thc 
Commander-in-Critef 
Deputy Judge- 
Advocate 
Capt. 1.9.1704; Capt. -Lt 2.4.1708; Bvt Lt-Col. 14.5.1709; Bvt Co1.19.2.1711)4 
William Cadogan 1.. 1701-2-1.12.1, -12 (6% tc oi. l . t,. l 
,ul; ( ol. 
2.3.1703; Brig. 25.8.1704; Maj-Gen. 1.1.1707; Lt-Gen. 1.1.1709)5; John 
Armstrong 22.12.1712- (A. D. C. 1707-1711; Sub-Eng. 17.3.1704; Eng. 1707; 
ItX: (. iI, t 2(, i o17061 11% tI t-('o I. h% 4.17o, ))" 
Alexander Spotswood 1702? -c. 12.1709 (Ens. 20.5.1693; Lt 1.1.1696; 
Capt. 9.4.1703; Bvt Lt-Col. 1.1.1707; Dep. Gov. Virginia 1710)8; John 
Armstrong 1709/1710-22.12.1712 (A. D. C. 1707-1711; Sub-Eng. 
17.3.1704; Eng. 1707; Lt & Capt. 26.10.1706; Bvt Lt-Col. by 4.1709); Thomas 
Lascelles 22.12.1712- (Sub-Eng. 17.3.1704, Eng.; Capt. )9 
Adam (de) Cardonne1'0 
Walter Whitfield c. 1701-31.5.1702"; Henry Watkins 1.6.1702- 
3.1712 (chief clerk, Secretary-at-War's office, c. 1699-1702; deputy judge- 
advocate general 6.1702-3.1712; secretary to the embassy at The t{ague 
4.1711-1.1712; extraordinary envoy to Vienna 12.1711; secretary to the 
embassy at Utrecht 1.1712-3.1712; secretary to the duke of Ormonde as 
commander-in-chief in the Low Countries, 3.1712-)12 
Giles Spicer c. 1701 -c. 1.6.1 11 (Ens. 16.1. I i)-/S; Lt. _2t1.1.16ä3; Capt. -Lt Wagon master-Gei u'ral 17.7.1685; Capt. 31.12.1688; Maj. 31.3. Ib1)0; Lt-Cot. I. S. lb92; I. t. C. ov. Guernsey 
10.4.1711)"; Hugh Pudsey 1.6.1711- (1-t. 53.17081)11 
Deputy Paymastcr to 
the forces abroad (tit Benjamin Sweet (S)licitor to the Foot Guards 25.12.1704-1.1.1712)'' 
Aiiistcrdam) 
Deputy Paymaster (at 
.. Henry Cartwright 8.5.1706- (Cavt. 10.3.1702)1" 
Authorities (all dates are O. S., unless otherwise noted): (a) (oi i&' of w. irr, int, for Ihr I). i\ it I; cnrr. il and 
staff officers serving on the establishment in the Low Countries, various dates: I3L Adel. MSS 61309, it. 109- 
109b (1702); BL Add. MSS 61370, ff. 87b-88b (1703), ff. 182-183 (1704); BL Add. MSS 61371, if. 70-71 b (1705), 
ff. 127b-129 (1706), if. 205b-206b (1707); BL Add. MSS 61372, if. 99b-100 (1708), If. 145-145b (1709), If. 256- 
256b (1710); BL Add. MSS 61373, ff. 51b-52 (1711). (b) Huntington Library, Stowe MSS (the accounts of 
James Brydges, paymaster to the forces abroad). Stowe 8, vol. i, passim (24.6.1705-23.12.1706); vol. ii, 
passim (24.12.1706-24.12.1709); vol. iii, passim (23.12.1709-22.12.1712). (c) Dalton, iv-vi, passim. See, 
especially, Dalton's transcripts of the Blenheim (v, II, pp. 1-11) and Malplaquet (vi, II, pp. 299-306) rolls 
relating to general, staff and engineer officers. 
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Notes: (1) The post of adjutant-general does not appear on the warrants for the pay of general and staff 
officers for the years 1702 and 1703, although Meredyth's commission and function in that role is well 
attested (see note 2, below). (2) For a full copy of Meredyth's commission as adjutant-general, 1 June 1701, 
see BL Add. MSS 61336, ff. 175-176b. His staff commission was accompanied by a brevet as colonel of 
Horse. NA SP 44/168 (commissions entry book), pp. 351-352. Dalton, iv, pp. 264-265. (3) Durell replaced 
Meredyth as adjutant-general upon the latter's elevation to the generality, following Blenheim; he received 
a brevet as colonel of Foot. NA SP 44/170, pp. 327-328. Dalton, v, p. 157, (4) Graham was the senior aide- 
de-camp to Marlborough in 1711, and continued the tradition of the previous six years of that person 
occupying the rank of adjutant-general. Although his commission as adjutant-general was dated 19 
February 1711 (taking his rank as a colonel of Horse), there is evidence that he acted in that role before 
then, as at the siege of Aire, 1710 (BL Add. MSS 61372, ff. 241-242). NA SP 44/175, pp. 45-46. Dalton, vi, p. 
182. (5) Cadogan's commission as quartermaster-general was preceded by a brevet as colonel of Foot. NA 
WO 25/6, p. 102. Dalton, iv, pp. 264-265. (6) Cadogan continued to serve as quartermaster-general under 
James Butler, Duke of Ormonde, in 1712; his deputy, Armstrong, replaced him when Cadogan joined 
Marlborough in his Dutch exile. His commission as quartermaster general was dated 22 December 1712; 
his commission as deputy quartermaster-general is untraced. NA 44/175, p. 266. Dalton, vi, p. 184. (7) Also 
styled 'assistant quartermaster-general' and 'lieutenant quartermaster-general'. (8) Spotswood's 
commission as deputy quartermaster-general is untraced. He is indicated as serving in that post on the 
warrant for general and staff officers' pay, 1703. Spotswood himself suggested that he held this 'most 
active & Considerable Employment' in the 'first Campaign of this War' (i. e. 1702), and by the end of 1709 
had served in eight campaigns. Letter of Spotswood to his cousin, dated Virginia, 20 March 1710 O. S., 
quoted by Cappon, 'Correspondence of Alexander Spotswood', p. 228. Armstrong is referred to as 
'Lieutenant Quartermaster-General of Her Majesty's armies' in an order of 16 April 1709 N. S. (BL, Add. 
MSS 61372, f. 109) but Spotswood is still listed as serving in that post on the warrant for 1709. On his 
return to England from the campaign of 1709, he noted that he was 'as yet in the same station as formerly'. 
See the letter of Spotswood dated London, 24 December 1709 O. S., quoted by Cappon, ibid., p. 226. 
Spotswood's departure from the army was not altogether amicable. He was involved in a dispuate with 
certain cavalry officers after his capture at Oudenaarde, whom he accused of cowardice, an action that 
proved 'disagreeable to [Marlborough]' (Capon, ibid., p. 226 n. 29). Later, in 1709, Spotswoods complaints 
over his lack of station and remuneration (q. v. ) came to a head. Spotswood himself wrote: 
The prospect I then had of advancing my Fortunes was a fair One, especially considering the fine 
Promises made me: but these prov'd nothing better than a Will of the Wisp, which I follow'd during 
my last eight Campaigns through most excessive Labours & numerous Dangers, till at length quite 
tired out & sufficiently undeceiv'd how vainly a Man of Conscience & honest Principles pretends to 
thrive immediately under Those who think nought of a Crime that works their Ends, I was provok'd 
soon after the Battle of Taisniere to throw up my Commission & to tell them plainly that their continual 
breach of Promises was no longer to be endured. But a Man of my Business was not so readily to be 
spar'd, & therefore they endeavoured with fresh Assurances of Preferrment to reengage me; but I 
insisted upon immediate Performances, & protested that I would no more trust their Promises. 
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(Letter of Spotswood to his cousin, dated Virginia, 20 March 1710 O. S., quoted by Cappon, 
'Correspondence of Alexander Spotswood', p. 228. ) Though Spotswood was careful not to mention him by 
name, Cadogan was clearly involved. As John Drummond wrote to James Brydges, Spotswood had "in the 
general opinion of men of honour ... not been fairly treated by ... Cadogan, 
" whom Drummon believed 
took "particular care of himself, whatever may become of others. " Brydges had no sympathy for his friend 
Cadogan in the matter, not least because, as Drummond warned: "I wish [the affair] may have a good end, 
for if [Spotswood] is indifferent to whose interest & whose reputation suffers, if his actions turn him to his 
private advantage, let them never be so tyrannical or barbarous. " (See the letters of Drummond to 
Brydges, dated 20 November 1709 and 27 December 1709 N. S., HL, Stowe 58, vol. 5, pp. 49,69-71; and the 
letters of Brydges to Drummond, dated 1 December 1709 and 4 January 1710 O. S., Stowe 57, vol. 3, pp. 
115-117,133-135. ) (9) Lascelles was made deputy quartermaster-general when Armstrong succeeded 
Cadogan. NA SP 44/175, p. 267. Dalton, vi, p. 184. (10) Cardonnel served as Marlborough's secretary 
throughout the campaigns, replacing Richard Warre, who had accompanied the duke in 1701. (11) BL, 
Add. MSS 61369, if. 119-119b: warrant for deputy judge-advocate's pay, from Contingencies. Whitfield 
was paid in this post from 30 December 1701 to 31 May 1702 O. S. (12) Watkins succeeded Whitfield on the 
establishment and served in the post throughout Marlborough's tenure. (13) Spicer's commission is 
untraced. (14) For Spicer 's recommendation of Pudsey as his replacement, see BL, Add. MSS 61295, ff. 96- 
97b: Spicer to Marlborough, London, 24 April 1711 O. S. (15) BL, Add. MSS 61369, f. 66b contains a note of 
expenses due to Captain Francis Robinson, provost marshal-general, for the present campaign (i. e. 1702). 
Robinson had been appointed Provost-Marshal-General in 1691 (Dalton, iii, pp. 214-215 n. 16) and received 
a further commission to that extent in 1706 (Dalton, v, p. 158). (16) Fury was warranted as serving in his 
post from 1 July 1703 O. S. BL, Add. MSS 61370, f. 69: warrant to pay John Fury as provost marshal, out of 
Contingencies. The Hague, 29 October 1703 N. S. (17) The office at Amsterdam (or Rotterdam) was 
originally the sole paymaster's office in the Low Countries. Sweet initially received 12s. 6d. per day in this 
post, and sent accounts of his expenses to the Treasury. Circa 1710 this was increased to £3 p. d. (backdated 
to 25 June 1705) with a further 20s. daily for extraordinaries (backdated to 24 June 1706). Stowe 8, vol. iii, 
pp. 121,322. (18) After the conquest of much of the Spanish Netherlands in 1706, the army set up a parallel 
office in Antwerp, under Cartwright. Cartwright's pay was backdated to 1 November 1706, his 
extraordinaries to 1 October 1706. Ibid., pp. 122,322. 
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Table A. 3: Majors of brigade, 1702-1711 
Year Majors of brigade (by arm of service) 
Maj. [Philip] Chenevix [Horse? ] (Maj. 3.10.1700)', Maj. [Robert] 
Hunter [Dragoons? ] (Maj. 23.4.1698)2, Lt-Col. [Joseph] Sabine 
1702 
[Foot? ] (Lt-Col. 1.6.1695), ', Lt-Col. [William] Breton (Foot? ] (Capt. & 
Lt-Col. 3.7.1700; Lt-Col. 16.1.1702)4, Maj. [Mark Anthony Davessin 
de] Moncal [Foot? ] (Maj. ren. 7.7.1702)5, 'Maj. ' [Thomas] Oldfield 
[Foot? ] (Capt. Lt. in 1686; Bvt Maj. 1.10.1703)6 
'Maj. ' William Ashby 1/ for>c] ((oi. 2; . _;. lol), )) , 
Lt-Col. [Robert] 
Hunter [Dragoons? ] (Bvt Lt-Col. 1.1.1703), Lt-Col. [Joseph] Sabine 
1703 [Foot? ] (Lt-Col. 1.6.1695; Bvt Col. 1.1.1703), Maj. [Mark Anthony 
Davessin de] Moncal [Foot? ] (Maj. ren. 7.7.1702; Bvt Lt-Col. 1.10.1703), 
'Maj. ' Alexander Irwin 1Fooi/ (Capt. 21W1(. Q,, )8 
Lt William Ashby [Horse] (Cor. 27.3.1699; Lt 25.8.1704), Maj. Hugh 
Caldwell [Dragoons] (Capt. 1690s; Maj. 1.1.1703)9, Maj. Alexander 
Irwin [Foot; -2.7.1704] (Capt. 2.10.1695; Maj. 3.8.1704), Capt. Patrick 
1704 Gordon [Foot] (Capt. 3.8.1694)10, Capt. George Morgan [Foot] 
(Capt. 15.3.1695; Maj. 7.1704? )h1, Capt. Henry Whitney [Foot; 
2.7.1704- ] (Bvt Capt. 25.8.1703; Capt. 3.8.1704)12, Capt. Thomas 
Whitney [Foot? ] (Capt. 10.2.1695)13 
Lt Claudius Tetefolle OFForse] (t .t".. ti ýý , 
Capt. James 
1705 
Campbell (Dragoons? ) (Capt. 25.2.1702)j5, Capt. Patrick Gordon 
[Foot] (Capt. 3.8.16')4), Capt. Thomas Whitney /Foot? ] (Capt. 
ion, Capt. William Congreve 11'ooI)/ <<., E, t ;n-, 
Lt Claudius Tetefolle [Horse] (Lt 15.2.1699), Capt. James 
Campbell [Dragoons? ] (Capt. 25.2.1702; Lt-Col. 24.8.1706), Capt. 
1706 Thomas Whitney [Foot] (Capt. 10.2.1695; Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706), Capt. 
William Congreve [Foot] (Capt. 30.5.1696; Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706), Capt. 
Archibald Hamilton [Foot] (Capt. 23.6.1704)17 
Lt Claudius Tetefolle 11ior,; e] (1. t 15.2. Ib A), Capt. Charles 
Cathcart [Dragoons] (Capt. of Foot 29.1.1704; Capt. of Dragoons 
1707 24.8.1706)18, Maj. Thomas Whitney [Foot] (Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706), Maj. 
William Congreve [Foot] (Bvvt Maj. 1.7.1706), Capt. Archibald 
Hamilton jfootl (c , apt. 2; (,. X704) 
Capt. Claudius T@tefolle [Horse] (Capt. Lieut. 24.2.1708), Capt. 
Charles Cathcart [Dragoons] (Capt. of Foot 29.1.1704; Capt. of 
Dragoons 24.8.1706), Maj. Thomas Whitney (Foot] (Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706), 
Maj. William Congreve [Foot] (Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706), Capt. 
Archibald Hamilton [Foot] (Capt. 23.6.1704)" 
1708 
The following are not listed in the year's warrant and were not provided for 
on the establishment of the forces in the Low Countries, but served in the 
post of brigade-major, 24 December 1707 to 23 December 1708 (see I IL, 
Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, pp. 300-302): 
Capt. John Looker [Horse; to Brigadiers Sibourg and Kellum] 
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Brigadier Crowther] (Cor. 25.8.1709)20, Maj. John Ligonier [Foot; 
to Brigadier Primrose] (Capt. 30.3.1703; Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706)21, Capt. 
Edward Wolfe [Foot; to Brigadier Evans] (Capt. by 1709)22 
Capt. Claudius Tetefolle 11lor. c] ((aptA-wut.. a. 2. i, uS), Maj. 
Charles Cathcart [Dragoons] (Maj. 24.3.1709), Maj. Thomas 
Whitney [Foot] (Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706), Maj. William Congreve [Foot] 
(Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706), Maj. John Ligonier [Foot] (Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706), 
Capt. Archibald Hamilton [Foot] (Capt. 23.6.1704) 
1709 The following are not listed in the year's warrant and were not provided for 
on the establishment of the forces in the Low Countries, but served in the 
post of brigade-major, 23 December 1708 to 22 December 1709 (see HL, 
Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, pp. 296-299; there is no mention of Charles 
Lancaster serving as brigade-major for the year 1709**): 
Capt. John Looker [Horse] (Bvt Capt. 6.4.1708), Capt. Edward 
Wolfe f Fj) )tJ I, I7O 
Capt. Claudius Tetefolle [Horse] (Capt. Lt. 24.2.1708), Capt. John 
Looker [Horse] (Bvt Capt. 6.4.1708), Maj. Charles Cathcart 
[Dragoons; -31.5.1710] (Maj. 24.3.1709), Capt. George Skene 
[Dragoons; 1.6.1710- ] (Capt. 16.1.1707)23, Maj. Thomas Whitney 
1710 [Foot] (Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706), Maj. William Congreve [Foot; -9.7.1710] 
(Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706), Maj. John Ligonier [Foot] (Capt. 30.3.1703; Bvt 
Maj. 1.7.1706), Maj. Edward Wolfe [Foot] (Capt. by 1709; Maj. 
24.4.1710), Capt. George Grove [Foot; 9.7.1710- ] (Capt. 10.4.1703)24, 
Capt. Archibald Hamilton [Foot] (Capt. 23.6.1704) 
Capt. Claudius Tetefolle II lorsr] 2.4.1; 1), Capt. John 
Looker [Horse; -31.5.1711t] (Capt. Lt. 2.4.1711), Mr Charles 
Lancaster [Horse; 1.6.1711- ] (Lt 24.2.1710), Capt. George Skene 
[Dragoons] (Capt. 16.1.1707), Maj. Thomas Whitney [Foot] (Bvt 
1711 Maj. 1.7.1706), Maj. William Congreve [Foot] (Bvt Maj. 1.7.1706), 
Maj. Edward Wolfe [Foot; -19.2.17111 (Maj. 24.4.1710), Capt. 
George Grove [Foot] (Capt. 10.4.1703), Capt. Charles Legg [Foot] 
(Capt. 3.8.1704)25, Capt. Richard Roberts [Foot; 20.2.1711- ] (ca pt. 
1.4.1706)26 
Notes and authorities (all dates indicated in warrants and commissions O. S. unless otherwise noted). 
Majors of brigade that did not hold the substantive rank of major or higher were nevertheless often given 
the prefix 'major' in various sources; in these cases, 'Maj. ' is noted in inverted commas. The arm of service 
is indicated in square brackets, with note of the brigadier under whom the major served, if known -e. g. 
[Foot; Brigadier Evans]. Where the arm of service is not specifically indicated for a given year, but the 
regimental history and/or experience of the officer suggests the most likely choice, it is indicated in 
italicised square brackets-e. g. [Foot]. 
*An entry in the army's camp journal, dated 24 July 1708 N. S., notes that 'Captain Primrose' did the duty 
of major of brigade in Hamilton's absence (BL Add. MSS 61404, f. 84b). If the rank of captain is not an 
error, it probably refers to Archibald Primrose, whose promotion to lieutenant (and thus captain in the 
army) in the 1st Foot Guards is dated 1 April 1706 (Dalton, v, p. 45). The only other officers of close rank 
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are: William Primrose, commissioned as a 2nd lieutenant in Mordaunt's (formerly Row's) regiment of Foot, 
25 August 1704, and out of that regiment in 1708 (Dalton, v, p. 82; II, p. 57); and Gilbert Primrose, 
supposedly the natural son of the general officer of the same name, who served in Sabine's regiment of 
Foot (2nd lieutenant, 24.6.1706; 1 lieutenant, 23.2.1709) (Dalton, vi, pp. 341-342).. 
**The author is not the first to notice an awkwardness in Brydges' accounts. In the details of the charge for 
23 December 1708 to 22 December 1709 (inclusive), the six brigade-majors warranted by Marlborough are 
listed: Cathcart, Tetefolle, Whitney, Congreve, Hamilton and Ligonier (p. 283). Then, following, are the 
additions due to those officers who served in posts not allowed on the establishment for that period (as 
detailed in the special discharge, pp. 296-299); this includes note of Wolfe and Looker serving as majors of 
brigade in 1709. Immediately following that, Brydges details the sums due those officers who served in 
similar posts, not allowed on the establishment, in 1708 (a leap year; as detailed in the special discharge, 
pp. 300-302); this includes note of Wolfe, Looker, Lancaster and Ligonier serving as brigade-majors in 
1708. Taken in comparison, there is no record of Charles Lancaster serving as a major of brigade in 1709 or 
1710. 
1702: Warrant for pay to the majors of brigade, 1702. The brigade-majors received £91.10s. each for their 
services in the last campaign. The Hague, 2 November 1702. BL Add. MSS 61369, If. 110b-111.1703: 
Warrant for pay to the majors of brigade, 1703. Each brigade-major received £100 for two-hundred days' 
service during the campaign. Out of Contingencies. The Hague, 28 October 1703 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61370, 
f. 70b. 1704: (i) Warrant for pay to the majors of brigade, 1704. Each brigade-major received £100 for his 
service during the campaign. Out of Contingencies. The Hague, 17 December 1704 N. S. BL Add. MSS 
61370, f. 179b. (ii) Majors of Brigade who Served the last Campaigne. Marked 1704. BL Add. MSS 61321, f. 40. 
(iii) Blenheim Roll. Dalton, v, II, p. 2.1705: (i) Warrant for pay to the majors of brigade, 1705. Each brigade- 
major received £100 for his service in the campaign. Out of Contingencies. Camp at Kalmthout, 24 October 
1705 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61371, f. 45. (ii) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. i, pp. 4,58.1706: (i) Warrant for pay 
to the majors of brigade, 1706. Each brigade-major received £100 for his service in the campaign. The 
Hague, 15 November 1706 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61371, If. 129b-130. (ii) HL Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. i, pp. 
202-203,237.1707: (i) Warrant for pay to the majors of brigade, 1707. Each brigade-major received 
£182.10s. for his service (i. e. 10s. per day for a full calendar year). The Hague, 6 November 1707 N. S. BL 
Add. MSS 61371, f. 208. (ii) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, pp. 15,23.1708: (i) Warrant for pay to the 
majors of brigade, 1708. Each received £182.10s. Camp at Merelbeke, 10 December 1708 N. S. BL Add. MSS 
61372, f. 96b. (ii) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, pp. 300-302.1709: (i) Warrant for pay to the majors of 
brigade, 1709. Each received £182.10s. The Hague, 7 November 1709 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61372, f. 149. (ii) 
The Malplaquet Roll. Dalton, vi, p. 300. (iii) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. ii, pp. 283.285,293,296-299, 
1710: (i) Warrant for pay to the majors of brigade, 1710. Each receive pay at the rate of 10s. per day, for up 
to the full calendar year. The total amounted to £1261.10s. The Hague, 5 December 1710 N. S. BL Add. MSS 
61372, ff. 257b-258. (ii) Warrant to pay William Congreve £98.10s. for his pay as major of brigade for the 
'present year'. Although'1711' is noted in the margin, the warrant is dated The Hague, 30 December 1710 
N. S. BL Add. MSS 61372, f. 289b. (iii) HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. iii, pp. 10,25.1711: (i) Warrant for pay 
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to the majors of brigade, 1711. The total amounts to £1460. The Hague, 15 November 1711 N. S. BL Add. 
MSS 61373, f. 40b. (ii) Account of forage delivered to the army, 16 April to 24 May 1711 N. S. Lists Grove, 
Whitney, Looker, Congreve, Tetefolle and Legg as brigade-majors. BL Add. MSS 61372, If. 334b-335. (iii) 
HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. iii, pp. 158-159. 
(1) Also rendered 'Chevenix'. Huguenot; originally in the Ist Troop of Life Guards. Killed at Blenheim, 
where he served as major in Wyndham 's Horse, under Palmes' command. Dalton, v, II, p. 20. (2) First 
served as a brigade-major in Flanders, in 1695 (Dalton, iv, p. 112). Later governor of Virginia (1708) and 
New York (1709), and brigadier (1711). Dalton, v, II, pp. 27-28. (3) Wounded at Schellenberg; commanded 
Ingoldsby's regiment of Fusiliers at Blenheim; later brigadier and major-general under Marlborough. 
Sabine's role as major of brigade in the first two years of the war is unremarked in Dalton and the D. N. B. 
He is still referred to as lieutenant-colonel on the warrant for 1703. Dalton, v, II, pp. 60-61. (4) Originally of 
the 1st Foot Guards; wounded at Blenheim, where he commanded Howe's regiment of Foot. After various 
military appointments he was made envoy to the King in Prussia in 1711. Role as brigade-major 
unremarked. Dalton, v, II, pp. 48-49. (5) Also anglicized as 'Davison de Moncal'; variant spellings. 
Promoted brigadier, 12 February 1711. Dalton, v, pp. 68,111. (6) Served in Marlborough's (later Tatton's) 
regiment of Foot. Brevet colonel in 1711. Dalton, v, II, pp. 63-64. (7) Served in Wood's regiment of Horse. 
Dalton, v, II, pp. 2,7. (8) Served in Orkney's Royal Regiment of Foot. Wounded at Schellenberg; Capt. 
Henry Whitney (of the same regiment) did duty in his stead for the remainder of the campaign. Dalton, v, 
II, pp. 2,7. (9) Served in Flanders, 1694-7. An officer in Ross' regiment of Dragoons; wounded at 
Schellenberg. Indicated as a captain on the Blenheim Roll. Dalton, v, II, pp. 2,7. (10) Another officer from 
Orkney's; served under William III and Marlborough in Flanders. Dalton, v, II, pp. 2,7. (11) Served in 
Ingoldsby's regiment of Foot; lieutenant-colonel of Wynne's regiment of Foot in 1705. Dalton, v, II, pp. 2,7. 
(12) Served vice Alexander Irwin, upon the latter being wounded at Schellenburg. Originally of Webb's 
regiment of Foot; transferred to Orkney's following Blenheim. Does not appear on the warrant for brigade- 
majors' pay for the year 1704. Dalton, v, II, pp. 2,7. (13) Howe's regiment of Foot. Does not appear on 
either the warrant for brigade-majors' pay for 1704, or the list of 'Majors of Brigade who Served the last 
Campaign (1704). Does appear on the Blenheim Roll transcribed in Dalton. Dalton, v, 11, pp. 2,7. (14) 
Served in the Duke of Schomberg's regiment of Horse. Dalton, v, II, pp. 22-23. (15) Most likely The Ilon. 
James Campbell, youngest son of the 2nd earl of Loudoun. Commissioned as a captain in the Royal Scots 
Fusiliers (then Row's) in 1702. Transferred out of the regiment on 25 October 1704. Lieutenant-colonel of 
the Royal (North) British Dragoons (Stair's), 24 August 1706. Dalton, vi, p. 314. (16) Served in both 
regiments of Foot and Dragoons before receiving a commission of captain-lieutenant in Princess Anne of 
Denmark's Regiment of Foot (later Webb's) in 1694. Dalton, v, II, pp. 42-43. (17) Most probably the 
Archibald Hamilton who served with the Royal Regiment of Foot (Orkney's), being wounded at both 
Namur and Terra Nova in 1695. Hamilton and Ligonier, both brigade-majors under Marlborough, then 
served in that capacity under Argyll in Spain. Dalton, v, 11, pp. 33-34. (18) Son of the 7th Baron Cathcart. 
Captain in Macartney's newly raised regiment of Foot, in 1704, before transferring to the Scots Greys in 
1706. Dalton, vi, pp. 180,314-315. (19) Commissioned into the Duke of Schomberg's regiment of Horse in 
1696, and remained on its rolls inntil his death in 1711. His executors received his pay due. Dalton, v, 11, pp. 
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22-23. (20) The only'Charles Lancaster' noted in Dalton was commissioned comet in the First Regiment of 
Carabiniers (Palmes'), 25 August 1709; lieutenant, 24 February 1710. Also served as an aide-de-camp to the 
Duke of Marlborough. Dalton, vi, pp. 30,312. (21) The second son of a Huguenot, Ligonier would lead a 
distinguished career as a soldier, becoming Field-Marshal and Commander-in-Chief, and being elevated to 
the peerage. Served as a volunteer in Flanders in 1702, before being commissioned into Lord North and 
Grey's regiment of Foot. Dalton, v, II, pp. 45-46. (22) Father of Major-General James Wolfe (1727-1759). 
Commissioned as an ensign in Viscount Shannon's regiment of marines before transferring to the Foot. A 
captain in Sir Richard Temple's regiment of Foot in 1709; promoted major, 24 April 1710. Dalton, vi, pp. 
349-350. (23) Commissioned as a cornet in Teviot's (later Hay's) (Royal Scots) Dragoons in 1694; served on 
that regiment's rolls throughout the war. Acted as an agent for the Earl of Stair for several years. Dalton, v, 
II, pp, 24-25. (24) Commissioned into Fitzpatrick's (later Sir Charles O'Hara's/Lord Tyrawley's) regiment 
of Foot (the Royal Fusiliers) in 1692; captain in William Evan's newly raised regiment of Foot in 1703. 
Dalton, vi, pp. 353-354. (25) Lord North and Grey's regiment of Foot. Commission as brigade-major dated 
24 December 1710 (Dalton, vi, p. 182); may also have served as an aide-de-camp to the Duke of 
Marlborough. Dalton, v, 11, pp. 45,47 n. 21. (26) This officer appears on a list of brigade-majors for 1712 
consulted by Dalton, who (erroneously, it appears) inserted him into those serving in that post in 1709, on 
the Malplaquet Roll. Roberts is not listed on the pay warrants for 1709 and 1710. He served vice Wolfe in 
1711. Dalton, vi, pp. 300,303. 
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Table A. 4: Known aides-de-camp to the general officers, 1702-1711 
Name Rank Period General Officer; Notes 
Alcxander Aber+crombiel Capt. 16.3.1709 17114 Marlborough 
Capt. 31.5.1701; Bvt Maj. 
(Sir) James Abercrombie 1.7.1706; Bvt Lt-Col. 
(Bt)2 14.5.1709; Capt. & Lt. 1704,1709, "' Orkney 
Co]. 1710; Bvt Col. 
1.11.1711 
John Armstrong3 Lt & Capt. 26.10.1706; 1707-1711hi. 1"a. r"t Marlborough Bvt Lt-Col. by 4.1709 
Philip Bragg4 C. iht. 25. ~. 17(1-1; Ll-c ol. 1710-1711 P. 4 ýI lls r ;h h. 5.1700 I 
Exempt & Capt. 
Marlborough; killed at James Bringfields 1.12.1693; Bvt Maj. 1701-t1706a"c"i1-''", -' Ramillies 
6.3.1703 N. S. 
Sir James Chamberlain, Brig. & eldest Lt 1710m Marlborough Bt^ 1.1.1692; Capt. 12.4.1706 
N. N. Chanclos7 1711P Marlborough 
Capt. 1.9.1697; Maj. 
Charles Churchillµ 3.4.1706; Bvt Col. 1704, Chas. Churchill 
1.1.17071 C, ul 1 l70() 
Lt 15.2.1703; Capt. before 
Henry Disney9 8.1704; Capt. & Lt-Col. 1704,1706, Withers 
11.3.1708; Col. 23.10.1710 
Capt. 6.1.171)2; 1-t-( ol. c. 
Henry Durell1° 1703; Bvt Col. 
25.8.1704; 
1701-171Oa. c. d. e. g.. L, n"'. Marlborough Col. 17.2.1711; Brig. 
1.1.1710 
Capt. -Lt 15.7.1695; Capt. 
1.8.1695 (Lt-Col. c. 1702); 
William Evans" Col. 10.4.1703; Brig. 1702" Marlborough 
1.1.1707; Maj-Gen. 
1.1.1710 
[James] Eyton12 
Lt- 1.4.101)7; C, iht. 17fß 
1\ßn Li (, X-I%n ("J In 1\(, ßI 
21i. ä. 17111 rr}; inirnt. ) 
Thomas Foxon13 Capt. 10.4.1703; 
Lt-Col. 
t1709 
Cadogan; killed before 
6.5.1709 Mons 
l. Ipt. & Ia-l &)I.. i... Iý(l. i; 
Francis Godfrey14 Col. 25.3.1705; Brig. 1702« Marlborough 
1.1.1710 
[? l GoodMryn'5 Capt. in 1710 (see notes) 1710,1711u P Marlbo 
xf 
Corn. 14.4.1702; Bvt 
Capt. 1.9.1704; Capt. -Lt 
Metcalf Graham16 2.4.1708; Bvt Lt-Col. 1707-1711tiI, °mi t Marlborough 
14.5.1709; Bvt Col. 19.2. 
1711 
[Edward] Hamilton17 
Corn. 19.6.1702; Lt 
1704,23.8.1707 
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Ens. 20.7.1696; Lt 
In goldsby (Served in ve [Isaac] Jevereau18 1.2.1700; Capt. 1704,1709x, ' 
regiment. ) IngoldsbYsreiý b 24.12.1: 111 
Eng. 4.4.1704,17.3.1707; 
Capt. 25.3.1705; Bvt Lt- 
Richard King19 Col. 14.5.1709; Col. 1710m Cadogan, Marlborough 
12.2.1.710; Q. M. G. under 
Jack Hill 1.3.1711 
orn. 2?. S. I '01): lt Chdrk I nc, iýlcr'" Iý III-I' I Iý 
ý1ýI1 ýIýýýI U11 :; ýL Jý "ýý ýi'IAý'ýI 
242.1 iI0 iIril;, ii in"y i 
1I'eter? l ('orn. I. h. I607; It befort, . U! 
1 (fill]( '\ (tiree iI in 
13. ti_ I ý(1 } I inulcc . is :,, iinw nt 1 
[Charles or Richard] 
Marlborough; may also 
Legg23 Capt. 3.8.1704 or 1.2.1706 1710m have served as a brigade- 
major 
11 iIIiani l ýi}ýI)- 
1)v t xA1,11.10.4.1: 07, I1vt IýIU, II I' 
I_t-C 01, I. I. lil? 
Capt. 14.9.1693; Capt. & Chas. Churchill? (Served in [William] Lloyd2-9 Lt-Col. 25.8.1704; Bvt 1704s Churchill's regiment. ) Col. 1.1.1707 
N. N. Nlletrhail0- _ 
Ens. 14.4.1702; Capt. & 
Richard Molesworth27 Lt-Col. 5.5.1705/7; Col. 1706,1709' Marlborough 
9.7.1710 
lohn A1urr. iv-, .. 
\I iryuýýýý _ 
\l. i -IIýowt li kill(-, I it 
of III Ii l' irtiinr'` 
tt I Hv t Col. ý' 1700 ýl. iIjtI iýluý 1 
William dP Naccarn 
Zuylenstein, Viscount Bvt Col. 1.1.1704; 
Col. 
1704 
Tunbridge 12.4.1706,1.2.1707 
The Hon. Janwn O'I I, irasu 
Lt 15.3.1703; Capt. 
I . iý 24.3.1705 
[Lewis Oglethorpe]31 1704, Marlborough 
Capt. 20.4.1695; Bvt Lt- 
Thomas Panton32 Col. 25.10.1703; Bvt Col. 1702-1710 " +""ý"k "ý"^" "" Marlborough 
1.7.1706; Brig. 12.2.1711 
Ens. I. 6. I(95; Lt hq oI, i, hN .' (t rved 
in 
[Matthew] Pennefather4 
31.5.1701; Capt. before 
25.8.1704; Lt-Col. 1704, 
ingolilsby's regiment; later 
1.4.1705; Bvt Col. commissarv-genrral under him in Iml. ind ) 1.1.17117 
John Pitt35 Lt 27.3.1699; Capt. -Lt 1704-1711d, e-t. wLwtiw. Marlborough 24.8.1707. 
ý. 1nthorivI I'ujoI is 
It .4(. i, t. I ýý. a. l (, &) , 
' f ( apt. 1.1.1700 
[Thomas] Pulteney37 Ens. 16.11.1702; Lt & 1710,1711-P Marlborough Capt. 23.10.1708 
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N. N. Rolas38 
1Francis] Scawen40 
Charles Schomberg, 
Marquess of Harwich41 
Capt. & Lt-Col. 
1 _04 
3/42.1705 
Col. 27.1.1711 1710^ 
11702 
Aig rnoti ýC vh our, I . ýrl 
f 11( 11 ((Id ol. 
23.1U. 17011 1 
[Charles or Frederick] 
S Sibourg43 See note. 1702b 
[Georl es 5tcphrnson a 
Corn. 1.1(1.1702; Lt 
1 ýU Jý 
2ý 8 1704 
Adam or Francis] 
Williamson", Swr note. 1709 
Wilson47 
Corn. 1.6.1697; Lt and 
Bvt Capt. 5.8.1704. See 
note. 
17048 
( uttý 
Marlborough 
Cutts? (-ut ilotc 
Marlborough 
%1, irlkq'Il } 
Marlborough 
k%ood' (x-i ed in Wood's 
reginu'nt of I II, rw. ) 
Orknt , 11'ithrr', Argyll, 
Iý Il kit McIt. Jk t1 
Lumley? (May have served 
in Lumley's regiment of 
Horse. ) 
)'(,, I r, ()t , rrvit (- II Ii, t. d in ilalit, vv hcn lhtN LIrriv., Iruni ion , e"ri, ii, "11. illiul ,, gun ý, lr tlir I, Irnli( , III 
and Malplaquet Rolls), typically listing aides-de-camp to general officers other than Marlborough-these 
officers are rarely distinguished in the sources, and data is incomplete. An aide-de-camp who died in his 
post is marked by t at the termination of his service. 
General authorities (all dates indicated in warrants and commissions O. S. unless otherwise noted): (a) 
Warrant to pay the to aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough, 30 December 1701 to 25 December 1702. 
Paid out of Contingencies. The Hague, 19 November 1702 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61369, f. 1146. (b) Warrant to 
pay the general officers' aides-de-camp for the campaign of 1702. The Hague, November 1702 N. S. Also 
includes £50 each to be paid to Lt Col. Evans, Lt Col. Sibourg and Captain Panton, "as a gratification for 
their Service [to Marlborough] as Aids de Camp for part of the said Campagne. " BL Add. MSS 613h9, f. 
111. (c) Warrant to pay the aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough, 26 December 1702 to 25 December 
1703. Paid out of Contingencies. The Hague, 28 October 1703 N. S. BI, Add. MSS 61370, f. 696. (d) Warrant 
to pay the aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough for the year 1704. Paid out of Contingencies. The 
Hague, 15 December 1704 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61370, f. 176b. (e) Warrant to aV the aides-de-camp to the 
Duke of Marlborough for the year 1705. Camp at Kalmthout, 23 October 1705 N. S. Bl. Add. MSS 61371, ff. 
50-51b. (f) Warrant to pay the aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough for the year 1706. The Hague, 15 
November 1706 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61371, ff. 129-129h. (g) Warrant to pay the aides-de-camp to the Duke of 
Marlborough for the year 1707. The Hague, 6 November 1707 N. S. No specific mention of Contingencies. 
Whereas the previous warrants had only allowed for two aides-de-camp to be paid at the rate of 10s. per 
day for a full year, this warrant listed four aides due that allowance; see also authority (h), below. BI. Addl. 
MSS 61371, f. 2076. (h) Warrant to pay the aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough for the Year 1707. 
The Hague, 6 November 1707 N. S. An additional warrant, covering the pay of two further aides-de-camp, 
at 10s. per day for a full year. BL Add. MSS 61371, f. 2076. (i) Warrant to pay four aides-de-camp to the 
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Duke of Marlborough for the year 1708. Camp at Merelbeke, 10 December 1708 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61372, 
ff. 95b-96. (j) Warrant to pay two aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough for the year 1708. Camp at 
Merelbeke, 10 December 1708 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61372, f. 96. (k) Warrant to pay four aides-de-camp to the 
Duke of Marlborough for the year 1709. The Hague, 7 November 1709 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61372, ff. 145- 
145b. (1) Warrant to pay two aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough for the year 1709. The Hague, 7 
November 1709 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61372, f. 150b. (m) Notes on forage received by general and staff 
officers at the siege of Douai, 1710. Camp before Aire, 3 November 1710 N. S. These notes list twelve 
officers as being aides-de-camp to Marlborough at the siege; the majority appear temporary. BL Add. MSS 
61372, if. 241-242. (n) Warrant to pay four aides-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough for the year 1710. 
The Hague, 5 December 1710 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61372, f. 257. (o) Warrant to pay two aides-de-camp to the 
Duke of Marlborough for the year 1710. The Hague, 5 December 1710 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61372, f. 257b. (p) 
Account of forage delivered from 16 April to 24 May 1711 N. S. Seven aides-de-camp are listed (quite 
possibly in relation to Marlborough). BL Add. MSS 61372, ff. 334b-335. (q) Warrant to pay the aides-de- 
camp to the Duke of Marlborough for the year 1711. The Hague, 16 November 1711 N. S. Three aides-de- 
camp are paid the usual £182.10s. for the full year; two share that sum, receiving £91.5s. each for a full 
year's service. BL Add. MSS 61373, f. 43. (r) Warrant to pay two aides-de-camp to the Duke of 
Marlborough for the year 1711. The Hague, 16 November 1711 N. S. BL Add. MSS 61373, f. 43. (s) The 
Blenheim Roll. Twenty-one aides-de-camp appear on Dalton's transcribed (and emended) list. Dalton, v, 
II, p. 2. (t) The Malplaquet Roll. Nine aides-de-camp are named on Dalton's list. Dalton, vi, p. 300. 
Notes: (1) Received £91.5s., half the usual allowance, for his service as aide-de-camp to the Duke of 
Marlborough in 1711. Noted as a'captain' on the warrant, indicating the Alexander Abercrombie who was 
a captain in Tatton's regiment of Foot, as opposed to the lieutenant of the same name in Ross' Royal 
Regiment of Dragoons of Ireland. Served as the M. P. for Banffshire, 1707-1727, representing Scotland in 
the first parliament of Great Britain. Sought a captaincy in the Scots Guards by Marlborough, but was 
unsuccessful; enjoyed the patronage of the Earl of Seafield (whose brother had also sought the above 
vacancy) in other matters. Dalton, vi, pp. 343-344; Hayton et al., HoC 1690-1715, iii, pp. 1.5; Snyder, iii, pp. 
1225,1670. (2) Aide-de-camp to the Earl of Orkney at Blenheim (Dalton, v, Ii, p. 6); and Malplaquet 
(Dalton, vi, p. 300). Created a baronet in 1709 for his service. (3) The famous engineer, deputy 
quartermaster-general under Cadogan (date of his commission and brevet of lieutenant-colonel 
unforthcoming), and later quartermaster-general under Ormonde. Received 10s. per day as an aide-de- 
camp to Marlborough, 1707-1711. There is confusion in the secondary literature over Armstrong's rank in 
the army. The DNB suggests that, after distinguished service at Blenheim, Armstrong was given a 
lieutenancy of grenadiers in Howe's regiment of Foot; but Dalton lists no such commission (though a John 
Armstrong is listed as a lieutenant of grenadiers in Meredyth's, 1702: Dalton, iv, p. 282; v, p. 241). A John 
Armstrong also served in Wynne's regiment (captain, 25 March 1705, on its raising; out of the regiment, 24 
January 1708: Dalton, v, pp. 184-185,268). What is known is that the engineer held a commission as 
lieutenant and captain in the 1' Foot Guards (26 December 1706; Dalton, v, p. 45), and held this rank in 
1708 (as attested by instructions given to 'Captain Armstrong, of Her Majesty's first regiment of Foot 
Guards', 1 June 1708 N. S. -see Murray, iv, pp. 46-47). (4) Does not appear on the warrant for aides-de- 
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camp for 1710, but is listed as serving in that capacity under Marlborough at the siege of Douai that year. 
Commissioned as an ensign in the 1st Foot Guards in 1702, after serving four years as a volunteer (BL Add. 
MSS 61378, f. 16b); petitioned for a vacant company in Rivers' regiment of Foot, but instead took a 
captaincy in Tattons after Blenheim. Lieutenant-colonel in the Earl of Islay's regiment of Foot in 1709. 
Dalton, v, II, pp. 29,31. (5) Bringfield received the usual pay of an aide-de-camp (10s. per day, or £182.10s. 
for a calendar year) for the years 1702-1705. He died at Ramillies in 1706, decapitated by a cannonball as he 
aided the Duke of Marlborough in mounting his horse. His assigns received £70 for his 140 days' service in 
that post. Dalton, v, Il, p. 2,5. Dalton lacked a date for Bringfield's appointment as major of Horse, and 
lists it as '1702'; his brevet as major of Horse was actually signed at The Hague, 6 March 1703 N. S. (BL 
Add. MSS 61370, ff. 6-6b). (6) Succeeded to the baronetcy of Wickham, Oxfordshire, in 1699. Captain in a 
newly raised regiment of Foot (Viscount Tunbridge's) in 1706; out of the regiment, 13 March 1710. Listed 
as an aide-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough at the siege of Douai, 1710. Dalton, v, p. 199. (7) Untraced. 
Presumably related to Denis Francois Urbain Joseph de Retz de Brisuila de Chanclos, the Dutch general 
officer and governor. Listed as receiving forage as an aide-de-camp in 1711, in readiness for the siege of 
Bouchain. (8) Natural son of General Charles Churchill; nephew of Marlborough. Aide-de-camp to his 
father at Blenheim. Sedgewick (Ed. ), HoC 1715-1754, i. Dalton, v, II, p. 6 n. 31. (9) Disney (an Anglicization 
of 'Desaulnais') was the only aide-de-camp to general officers other than Marlborough to be named in the 
accounts seen by this author; he was noted as being an aide-de-camp to Major-General Withers in 1706 
(HL, Stowe MSS, Stowe 8, vol. i, p. 202). Disney was noted as being the 'loving friend' of Withers; the two 
had shared a house together, in Greenwich, since at least 1713 (see the article on Henry Withers, DNB). 
Dalton, v, II, p. 6 n. 34. (10) The longest-serving aide to the Duke of Marlborough during the War of the 
Spanish Succession. Durell continued to serve as an aide-de-camp to the duke upon the establishment 
whilst also doing duty as adjutant-general. Was given the honour of escorting several French generals 
back to England after the victory at Ramillies. Dalton, v, II, p. 5 n. 27. (11) Twice wounded at the siege of 
Namur, 1695. Evans received £50 "as a Gratification" for his service in 1702. Dalton, vi, p. 302 n. 9. (12) 
Spelt 'Eaton' in some sources; served at Malplaquet and Ramillies. Dalton, v, II, p. 6 n. 36. (13) Cadogan's 
aide-de-camp, he was killed on the evening of 25 September 1709 N. S., at the skirmish in which the 
quartermaster-general was wounded, before Mons. Deane, Journal, pp. 96-97. Captain in William Evans' 
newly raised regiment of Foot, 1703. Lieutenant-colonel en second in Colonel William Breton's regiment of 
Foot, 6 May 1709 O. S. Dalton, v, pp. 173-174. (14) Nephew of Marlborough (son of Arabella Churchill). 
Groom of the bedchamber to Prince George of Denmark, 1706. Inherited half the estate of George 
Churchill, by the latter 's will. Received £50 for his service as aide-de-camp to Marlborough in 1702. 
Godfrey received only £91 (or £90, according to annotation in the margin), instead of the £180 awarded 
Bringfield and Durell, for 'the like service during the campaign'. (15) Rendered 'Godwin' in some sources. 
The identity of this officer is not clear; he is mentioned as being a captain in both 1710 and 1711, receiving 
forage as an aide-de-camp. It could be one of three officers; indeed, the aides mentioned for 1710 and 1711 
need not necessarily be the same. The possibilities are: (i) John Goodwin, promoted lieutenant in Colonel 
Evans' regiment of Foot, 20 November 1708 N. S. There is no record of a captain's commission, and he was 
placed on half-pay in 1713. (ii) Captain William Goodwyn, who served at that rank in Lumley's Horse at 
Blenheim, and was believed to have been at Ramillies. He had left Lumley's regiment by 1709. Dalton, v, 
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II, p. 14. N. 6. (iii) (John) Philip Goodwyn, an officer in Stringer's/Argyll's/Orrery's/Sibourg's regiment of 
Foot. Captain, 15 March 1693; major, 24 April 1712; lieutenant-colonel, 1 June 1712. Dalton, vi, p. 144. (16) 
Received the full pay of £182.10s. p. a., 1707-1711. Graham succeeded Durell as adjutant-general and 
'senior' aide-de-camp in 1711, but was recorded as acting adjutant-general at the siege of Douai in 1710. 
Carried dispatches to England after the battle of Malplaquet. Dalton wrote that Graham served as 
Marlborough's aide-de-camp at Ramillies, but this author has found no evidence of that so far. Dalton, v, 
II, p. 19 n. 6. (17) Noted as an aide-de-camp at both Blenheim and Malplaquet. Served in Ross's regiment 
of Dragoons; Ross was only a brigadier at Blenheim, and would not have possessed an aide-de-camp. 
Wounded at Schellenberg. Dalton, v, II, p. 6 n. 45. (18) Wounded at Schellenberg. Noted as being an aide- 
de-camp at both Blenheim and Malplaquet. Dalton, v, II, p. 6 n. 40. (19) Served in various posts as a staff 
and engineer officer in the Low countries., 1704-1710. Dalton, v, II, p. 10 n. 18. His papers are held at the 
Royal Library, Windsor Castle. King received pay as an aide-de-camp to Cadogan in 1710 (KP, I(i)/98, 
212); received forage as an aide-de-camp to Marlborough at the siege of Douai, also in 1710. (20) 
Commissioned into Palmes' regiment of Carabiniers. Received the full £182.10s. in 1710 and 1711 as aide- 
de-camp to Marlborough. Dalton, vi, p. 312. A Charles Lancaster (and Dalton only lists one officer of this 
name) was also noted as serving as a major of brigade in 1708 and 1711; see Table 2.3. It was most 
probably this officer that the accounts for forage in 1710 and 1711 indicated, when referring to 'Major 
Lancaster'; see sources (m) and (p) above. Although Lancaster did not possess the substantive rank of 
major, those who served as majors of brigade were frequently denoted as 'Maj. ---'. (21) William 
Lancaster was commissioned as a comet to Lumley's own troop in the Queen's Regiment of Horse, 24 
October 1707. Dalton, vi, pp. 27,307. Lancaster received the standard 10s. p. d. as an aide-de-camp to 
Marlborough, for the years 1707-1709. (22) Dalton's supposition; Dalton, v, 11, p. 6 n. 43. Helpfully, two 
other potential candidates-Charles and Nathaniel Law-were both in the same regiment as Peter: 
Lumley's regiment of Horse. (23) There are two possibilities for the 'Captain Legg' mentioned: Richard 
Legg, a captain in Howe's regiment of Foot; or Charles Legg, a captain Lord North and Grey's regiment of 
Foot. If Charles Legg, he also served as a brigade-major in 1711. Dalton, v, II, p. 47 n. 21; p. 49 n. 13. (24) 
Probably the William Leigh of Erle's regiment of Foot (Dalton, vi, pp. 194,197,338 n. 4). Received £91.5s., 
half the usual allowance, for his service as aide-de-camp to the Duke of Marlborough in 1711. For the 
dispute over his brevet of major (which Leigh had received to the prejudice of many senior captains in his 
regiment), see NA WO 71/1, pp. 53,55,58-9,64-5. (25) Captain and lieutenant in Prince George of 
Denmark's (Churchill's) regiment of Foot in 1691; noted as a captain in Churchill's at Blenheim, but 
seemingly transferred soon after the battle: he was promoted captain and lieutenant-colonel in the First 
Foot Guards, 25 August 1704. Appears on Dalton 's list for Blenheim. Dalton, v, II, p. 6 n. 32. Lloyd appears 
immediately after Charles Churchill (fils) on the Blenheim Roll, and may also have been one of General 
Churchill's aides-de-camp. (26) Unknown. (27) Son of Robert Molesworth, Whig M. P. for East Retford, 
1705-1708. Saved Marlborough's life at the battle of Ramillies (Snyder, i, no. 596, pp. 584-585: Godolphin to 
Marlborough, 14 June 1706 O. S. ), where secondary sources typically list him as an aide-de-camp. He is also 
listed as an aide-de-camp on the Malplaquet Roll. Dalton, v, II, p. 34 n. 7 suggests his promotion as captain 
and lieutenant-colonel in the Coldstream Guards was effective 5 May 1705; but ibid, vi, p. 55 lists it as 5 
May 1707. (28) Eldest son of the Duke of Atholl. A Scots officer in largely Dutch service, Tullibardine 
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served as an aide-de-camp to Marlborough in 1706 (BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 60b: camp journal, 20 July 1706 
N. S. ). He was killed leading a regiment of the Scots Brigade at MaIplaquet. Dalton, vi, p. 201 n. 33. (29) 
Carried the second express from Marlborough to the court, after the battle of Blenheim, for which he 
received a royal bounty of £1000 (Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, v, p. 457). Dalton, v, II, pp. 5-6 n. 29. (30) 
Son of Baron Tyrawly; commissioned into his father's regiment of Fusiliers. Also served as an aide-de- 
camp to the Earl of Galway at the battle of Almanza, where he was wounded in saving his commander's 
life. Wounded at Malplaquet. Dalton, vi, p. 303 n. 14. (31) Equerry to Queen Anne. Luttrell recorded that 
Oglethorpe had been made aide-de-camp to Marlborough in his entry of 4 April 1704 O. S. (Luttrell, Brief 
Historical Relation, v, p. 410). He did not appear on any pay warrant for 1704. Died of wounds received at 
the storming of the Schellenberg. Dalton, v, II, p. 7 n. 45. (32) After Durell, Panton was the duke's second- 
longest serving aide-de-camp during the War of the Spanish Succession. Dalton, v, II, p. 5 n. 28. Received 
£50 as a gratification for his service as aide-de-camp in 1702; £100 for like service in 1703,1704,1705 and 
1706; and 10s. a day (182.10s. p. a. ) for his services, 1707-1710. (33) Parke carried Marlborough's first 
dispatch from Blenheim to England. Later Governor of the Leeward Islands, 25.4.1706; he was killed by an 
insurrection on Antigua in 1710. BL, Add. MSS 61293, f. 5: copy of a letter by favour of Colonel Gledhill, 
Montserrat, 5 January 1711 (O. S.? ), enclosed with William Churchill's letter, 12 March 1711 O. S. (ff. 3-4b). 
An account of Parke's murder. There is little information on his military service prior to Blenheim. Dalton, 
v, II, p. 6 n. 30. (34) Of a Tipperary family. Commissioned into Ingoldsby's regiment of Foot [Royal Welsh 
Fusiliers]. Wounded at Oudenaarde. BL, Add. MSS 61293, ff. 58-59b: petition of Colonel Pennefather to 
Marlborough. Commissary-General of Ireland, under commander-in-chief Ingoldsby. Dalton, v, II, p. 6 n. 
39. (35) Received £100 for his services as aide-de-camp in 1704 and 1705. In 1706, he received £112.10s., 
taking Bringfield's place upon the establishment after the latter died. For the remainder of his time as aide- 
de-camp to Marlborough, he received £182.10s. p. a. Based upon his sources, Dalton was hesitant in 
positively identifying the 'Captain Pitt' on the MS Blenbkeim Roll with the John Pitt of Wood's regiment of 
Horse (who was only promoted captain a few years later); this identification appears correct, however. In 
Marlborough's warrants authorising pay to the aides-de-camp, Pitt is consistently referred to as 'Mr. John 
Pitt' (commonly used in this context for those beneath the rank of captain) until 1707, when he was 
promoted Captain-Lieutenant. Dalton, v, II, pp. 6 it 33,17 n. S. (36) Transferred from the first regiment of 
Foot Guards to Ingoldsby's regiment of Foot in 1706. Dalton, v, II, p. 6 n. 41. (37) Youngest brother of 
William Pulteney, who was later created earl of Bath; commissioned into the first regiment of Foot Guards. 
Dalton, vi, p. 319 n. 8. Referred to as an aide-de-camp in accounts for forage made in 1710 and 1711. (38) 
Cutts' aide-de-camp, killed at the storming of Fort St Michel at the siege of Venlo, 1702. No mention in 
Dalton. (39) Unknown. (40) Of the Coldstream Guards. Dalton lists different dates for his commission in 
different entries. Dalton, v, p. 46; v, II, p. 6 n. 37; vi, p. 321. Scawen was most probably the aide-de-camp of 
Cutts in 1704; it appears he was either wounded, or taken ill, in the Blenheim campaign. A letter from his 
uncle, William Scawen, thanks Cutts for the 'singular care' the general showed his nephew in giving him 
his own lodgings and providing for him. BL, Add. MSS 61162, ff. 47-48b: William Scawen to Lord Cutts, 
Tunbridge Wells, 24 August 1704 O. S. (41) Only son of Meinhardt, 3rd Duke of Schomberg and 1s( Duke of 
Leinster. Died in 1713, from syphilis. (42) Only son of Charles Seymour, 6th Duke of Somerset. Went over 
to the Low Countries to serve as a volunteer in 1708 (Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, vi, p. 297). Present 
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with Marlborough after Malplaquet. Dalton, vi, pp. 86 n. 1,303. (43) The identity of this officer is unclear. 
In the warrant authorising £50 as a gratification of his service as aide-de-camp, the officer is listed as 'Lt- 
Col. Sibourg'. The warrant was dated November 1702; Charles Sibourg's commission as lieutenant-colonel 
was dated 1 March 1703 O. S. (His major's commission was dated 1 May 1694 O. S. ) It is possible the rank in 
the entry was a mistake; or it is also possible that the officer referred to was Frederick Sibourg, who left to 
undertake the role of adjutant-general to the forces sent to Portugal in 1703, and was killed with John 
Richards and Edward Thornicroft at Alicante, in 1709. (44) Of Wood's regiment of Horse. Dalton, v, 11, p. 6 
n. 44. (45) Dalton, v, II, p. 6 n. 35. A petition of George Watkins, undated (it is marked 'after 1704, before 
1708' in pencil'), desired of Marlborough a commission of lieutenant-colonel in the new levies, in view of 
past hardships and a lack of pay. The petitioner noted that he had served as aide-de-camp to the General 
of Foot (i. e. Charles Churchill) in the past three campaigns. BL, Add. MSS 61297, ff. 52-53b: petition of 
George Watkins to Marlborough. (46) The camp journal entry of 23 June 1709 N. S. noted that 'Mr 
Williamson' was declared the 'lieutenant-general's' aide-de-camp (BL, Add. MSS 61404, f. 109b). The 
British lieutenants-general of Foot present in the theatre at that time were Orkney, Withers, Argyll, Webb 
and Meredyth. Two possibilities for the aide are Adam Williamson, commissioned as a lieutenant in 
Meredyth's regiment of Foot, 12 May 1706 O. S. (Dalton, vi, p. 348 n. 11); and Francis Williamson, who was 
a lieutenant and captain in the Coldstream Guards (9 December 1703 O. S. ) before transferring to Charles 
Churchill's regiment of Foot, where he took a captain's commission (21 April 1706 O. S.; Dalton, vi, p. 326 
n. 7). The usage of 'Mr' to typically denote a rank lower than captain, combined with the presence of 
Meredyth and the possibilities for patronage, may indicate the former. (47) Dalton identifies this 
'Lieutenant Wilson' as Robert Wilson, who was commissioned in the Queen's Regiment of Horse 
(Lumley's). Dalton, v, IL p. 6 n. 42. Robert Wilson's brevet of captain (5 August 1704 N. S. ) might render the 
rank of lieutenant on the MS list an error; or point to other alternatives. The two other possibilities are 
Lieutenant John and (Captain-)lieutenant Archibald Wilson, both of Ferguson's regiment of Foot (the 
Cameronians). See Dalton, v, II, p. 67 n. 12 & 14. 
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Table A. 5: Michael Richards' itinerary on his journey from Vlierbeck to Vienna, and 
back to Frankfurt, 20 July 1705 to 7 August 1705 N. S. 
Date (N. S. ) Destination Time of arrival 
No. of Richards' comments 
posts 
Monday 20 
Tirlemont 9 P. M. -3 leagues July 1705 
tit I rund II Fý. ný. lý ýi, uý 
Tuesday 21 
Maastricht 4 a. m. 7 leagues; left at 8.30 a. m. July 1705 
Changed had 
ý1ti hin IIt. ný. Irn)<r nL 
7111,1h/ ltt'. had iu, l III 'I'll shut : 4/11. )1 
Richards urritaeul, but they uorn' i 'rued again. Cologne 9.30 p. m. Waited on the Prince of Saxon. u. Departed (it 
11 l,. rll 
Wednesday 
Warts 3 a. m. 22 July 1705 
I'hiho'ch 
8 leagues; via a chase with two horses. 
b league 
11'. ilnirnr, I lit 
Dokrken ? ? Sent the Elector of Trier's letters. 
-'i lIv1, Ii -4.31 r, lll, 
; III HI 
Cassel 8.30 p. m. ? 8 leagues; sent the Elector of Mainz's letters. 
, 
In 
&in ý' I'lu, "I 1l ýIt'P'il l I, 
III 
ýI ri! 
1, It'll 
I rjiiktti Ct () Iý. II1. I I. 
stjt; ( I ''I Jll 
Thursday 23 Hanau 7 a. m. 1 By chase. July 1706 
Hessenbach 11 a. m. 1.5 By chase; place mithin the woods. 
M 
1%, N& oll hi, l, '' IH 
By a good horse. The wood breaks, and the Esselbach 2.30 p. m. road too, bring stony. 2 or 3 goal inns. 
Rý inIii1 to a ýýý I, iii I hu ,ý", ;1 ýii.. (il: ý;, n i; rLi, r 
Würzburg 6.30 p. m. 1 
By a i'e'rv good horse. Handsome fi)rtified 
hnvn. 
Li a iIia "; Sowl t', "oj'Ir . ()/)(. I/ tiv, q. 
Poreaihem 11 P. M. 1 
Friday 24 
July 1706 
Langcnteld 
. 
3(1 a. ni. I 
ý icü+cben 4 a. m. 1 By a thane goad way. 
Farenbach 
7 a. m. 1 By good horses; good way. [Burgfarrnbach] 
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Nürnberg 8 a. m. 
15mall By a good horse and way. 
I cu: ht I O. 3U i. ni. lau Irýýr. r, ýr ý"Inrnr ýrýru 
I )cvningcn 
11 Vbml, ý] 
2.30 p. m. I (tu u. y1'ß', 1IWi W,, v 
Boarsberge 
[Parsberg] 5.30 p. m. 1 By a good horse; stony way. 
I . 1['(rg I b p. tn- I 
1 h/ 
low, Regensburg 8.30 p. m. 1 Good way. Crossed the Danube. 
I 'lb n/ tilo; r' airs/. I Id/ iy w (her, U17rn . rrtr ý1 'j', urýl 
Bhadern 9 P. M. 1.5 close by the Danube. Difficult and dangerous 
IJ'i, rlh, 'j it rý irrst 'i Ihr l rr( 
Saturday 25 The waters being 'much out, was forced 
July 1705 
Straubing 
4.30 a. m., 1.5 
down a stream in an attempted crossing. 
eventually Saved himself with some difficulty, and lay in 
a little house until day. 
(WA/ h, 'rrr ýH ul! ni,; I fir Pi it town 
8.30 a. m. [This eons Juli tf water on account o/ an Ol'erllou' of 
may have been the Isler, due to the recent weather. The local 
the originally wooden bridge broke while Richards was 
Plattling* estimated time; 2 there; he had no means to depart but by boat. 
elsewhere he says He departed by water at 10 a. m., travelling to 
he arrived at a nearby chateau a league away, where he 
noon. ] hired hors;; and roan teil the lri, \h ('ounirii to 
('leinting. 
Hired another boat (with three men) for 20 
ducats; left at past 1 p. m. on the Danube. 96 
leagues to Vienna. 
Pleinting* 12 noon 2 
* Richards' spelling of these two places 
' ' ' ' for the for the first; Pleitlinge Platleing ( 
second) is sufficiently similar to cause 
initial confusion - but they are separate 
places. 
Passed by 
2 p. m. Boat Vliescheren 
Passed by 
4 p. m. Boat Passau 
Sunday 26 
July 1705 
71ºe flood had been so great that all the islands 
Vienna 3.30 p. m. Boat 
of the Danube were under water. Upon 
arriving, Richards delivered all his letters and 
met Count Wratislaw. 
Monday 27 
1'il\ u nn. ý I ý;! ý, I ,: III I r, HIjul% 1701 
Tuesday 28 
Vienna - Dined with Count 
Wacherbach, from Poland. 
July 1705 
Wednesday 
Vienna -- Dined with Mr Stepney. 29 July 1705 
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Vienna Dined with 
Mr Brunitz, fron: the United 
Provinces. 
Friday 31 
July 1705 
ý ienna I ýrr, l , riIu hrru Oon H/ l, I 
Saturday 1 Vienna Took his leave. August 1705 
Sunday 2 Id! l'irnna al 2 Ip. nr. Passed the Danube' at 
August 1705 Enzser,, dur1 5 p. m. 1 hii wail t, ri/. Is Wurm, ' hriri'cn rrrrr 
Irý, tirrr. I ý'uur I1ýýýý It t!. 
Stockerau 7.30 p. m. 1 
By way of Cronenburg, through a small wood 
on a low ay. 
(A1trllrhurnJ p nl 
I 
e tu/. 
Hollabrun 10.30 p. m. 1 Ground rises more. Way good. 
CLILIIýrt I2 nhILiniu; hf 
Monday 3 Pulkau 2 a. m. 1.5 - 
Languenau 
[1 iII ýi]4a. 
m. 1 Hard wa. w; a little stonit. 
Fratting 
6 a. m. 1 Passed a firurood; stony hill. [Vratinin] 
S Il'ls' iIcj 
Zlabing 1 Partly good, partly rocky, partly made with [Slavonice] 10.30 a. m. timber. 
Kvning;. cgg 
F,. ni_ 1130 I 1, 
Neuhaus 
Uindnchdn 2 p. m. 1 Partly good, partly sandy, partly stony. 
Hradec) 
1\ , rl( \ý l'r rl i III Jul tII 'iII r: lli 
Their [Tyn nad 9.30 pm. ' 1.5 
Shorter stage. Stony, aprtl y made with 
Vlatavou? ] timber. 
Wodien 
12 midnight 1.5 1''i n Inrlc and stony roam. V' )Jmmnýý 
Tuesday 4 Strakonitz 
August 1705 [Strakonice] 5.30 a. m. 1.5 Shorter stage, but very stony. 
iur. iiýiuu it! 
.t ni 
I v h'r .! i (r 
Grurzberg [? ] 10 a. m. 1.5 Long stage. Partly good, partly stony hill. 
1(ktcin 
11'. 11 I Ilrýrý nr"; 1ý l, r; r 1'iýllI 'IIýll. 
Pilsen [Plzen] 3 p. m. 1 As above. Empty town. 
['lit 11111, r'1 'i 1() p 11 1 1Ull', lrlrlý h 0'' l 
Mies [Strfibro] 7 p. m. 1 Pretty good way, but long stage. Empty town. 
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[7J Hail( 11,111, 1 (; ood wan/. 
Wednesday 
5 August Plaar [Plana) 12.30 a. m. 1 
Extremely had descent and ascent at the 
1705 second lull. Rest of the way stony. 
A 1) 1 lo , 
Better way. As far as Eger he paid but half a 
Eger [Cheb] 5 a. m. 1 dollar per man, or 15 grosches. 29.5 posts to 
this point from Vienna. 
Frankenhauer 
Lorz,. stugt'.; liar,,, lu, il/ wall. I win Lýrr, 
jFrankerl? ) 9 a. m. 2 
Richards laid a florin per horse, or 20 
Berneck 12 noon 1.5 
Rocky, difficult, steep hills to the town (with 
ruined castles). 
A walled I n', i, with a chateau with Caeniwu. 
Bayreuth 3.30 p. m. 1 
Top rocky, then a pleasant bottom (but soft in 
the winter). A fine lake supplied with boats, 
Partly made way; three great descents, the 
Streitberg 8 P. M. 2 last into town situated in a fair narrow plain. 
An old castle at the entrance. 
Thursday 6 
1ltrnilurt ý11, i m I2 I ý 
1 , Irr Intl to ", Iu' IIJ a 7/nuI I' -ý a of l 
August 1705 . . Ilm, li rn,, rlr i iii, , 
Bamberg 2 a. m. 1 
Good way, A pretty town; passed the River 
Main by a bridge. 
Burckiseinheim 
[Burgwindheim? ] 
6.30 a. m. 1.5 C0011, i/ elI u', ru, laut lnirt 
Neissingen [? ] 9.30 Mn. 1 
'` 
.. »a* broken, vy long 
felg lhach 11.30 &m I Parthl rm0, ''i', W, Brie Neile, Lit' 
For the most part a good way and long. 
Würzburg Noon I Passed the River Main on a stone bridge. A 
pretty, fortified town. 
hm-niiingrn -4 p. m I H ", 'rý, il . f, 'iru 
Descended down a hill, then passed the River 
Esselbach 6 p. m. 1 Main on a ferry. Then ascended a stony way 
into the woods. 
RA11 , rune ti I,. ni. I I la'. f Iii iii it flue 
Besenbach 10 P. M. I 
The woods reached down to this village in a 
wet Bottum. 
Friday 7 
August 1705 
I )rilinýrn I . ý. ný- I II ýu , ý', Gu lall llir rý 1 ýl llir , rýu , ri. ,ý'ý, 1. 
e 11,11 i"ui ", 'iiiI ia III . 
\''h- rli, ir 11 
(rAut/ Ntr \ah's awn, tml ttoi tti lly op rrtr, l 
Frankfurt 6 a. m 
until 8 a. rn. 21 posts front Eger to I'rnnAjurt. 
Richards remained at F'rartkhtrt until 3 p. m., 
inee'ting with Mr Behage) and rnendin, '' his 
chase. 
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Table A. 6: Lieutenants- and majors-general of the day for the Foot, over a two-month 
period, August-October 1708776 
Date (N. S. ) Lieutenant-General of the Day Major-General of the Day 
[Coenraad] Wecke (Dutch; typically 
9 August 1708 [Henry] Withers (British) spelt'Wike' or'Week' in English 
sources) 
[G("( ,, r I Liiniiton, I irl of Orki 10 August 1708 
(Britis h) 
11011,111 1lwnrr %, 1111 1'. ill, 1n(it (I )iilrh) 
11 August 1708 
[Coenraad Willem van] Dedem [Stevan van] Welderen (Dutch) (Dutch) 
12 l\ugu. t i 7) 1ti'ithrrý (13rili-h) 
ý( )Iln \l, il; nuý l ýr"it ýýný I >ýýnliýýtl 
1'ru, si, in I) nliotl l 
14 August 1708 Dedem (Dutch) 
[John Campbell, Duke of] Argyll 
(British) 
I ti /1u1 ust 1 708 jBcngt, Count] Owiisticrna (Uut: h) John I ik linxornij I\t hb (BI01u lh) 
17 Augw t l708 Orknrv (ßriti!, h) tilv, trVA I J' IIvv, )[I/t. I'I (I ), I I'll 
[Lage] Hohendorff [Danish; 
presumably this officer, rather than 
18 August 1708 Dedem (Dutch) Georg Wilhelm von Iiohendorff, the 
Imperialist officer and adjutant to 
Eugene] 
11) Aii ti t I70t; C)vcn, ticrn. 1 (Plitt 11) I\ L LL (I )title h) 
21 
. 
Att u-t 1705 ( )rkii vI lirlti, ll) A\ rldt"rrn (I )tit, 11) 
22 AugtYst 1708 Dedem (Dutch) Dönhoff (Prussian) 
?. i t`tti, Li, t lill, ti ýý\(l1stll'I Ill tl)llt111) 
11)ýIllll'I\ o III Ictt. lll ll'l 1]` 1.111) 
24 August 1708 Withers (British) Argyll (British) 
2 /\LIgutit ! 7t)ii Orkii (I{fihtil)) I\ chl, (III it I'll) 
26 August 1708 Dedem (Dutch) Swartzell [Schwartzel? ] (Danish? ) f 
?` nil}, tlýt Iz ui) \1'itllrrn (RriUsl, ) 
II )rIIt ' mý ILlnti, lu (I Liný, ý ri, )n, In 
I hit, I. 't -I v I, t 
29 August 1708 Orkney (British) Wecke (Dutch) 
all ý1u uzt I7I)ti D&-kit-Ill (I)utý I)) I'. lll. lrnit Will, II) 
31 August 1708 Oxenstierna (Dutch) Weideten (Dutch) 
I Saht. iu1x-r 1 '08 Withers (British) 1)ünhutt (I'ruýa, lnl 
3ý-cpt& nhtr 1708 ncdem (Dutch) Webb (Briti'll) 
sep aber 1708 oxagner. (ný ,` y' ( w+) 
5 September 170 Wither,, (British) t /t-11 llx Iii irti. eI'I (Danish? ) 
776 BL, Add. MSS 61404, ff. 88-101: camp journal, 9 August to 10 October 1708 N. S. 
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6 September 1708 
[Francois Nicolaas, Baron] Fagel Hohendorff (Danish) 
(Dutch) 
ScptcIi )(r17UN C)rkii& (13ritiýh) I:, int/, iu(ILinkl%cl 1, in) 
O September 1708 C)vcnsticrna (Dutch) I'. ill, indl (I )Iitk li) 
10 September 1708 Withers (British) Welderen (Dutch) 
II hi ptcnibr r 1711; Fagcl (I)utiIi) I )i1IiI tl (l'ruý'i. inl 
12 September 1708 Orkney (British) Tettau (Prussian) 
II ptr"nihw- 170ti I)r. 1i m (I)ut&_Ii) 1r,; ß II (Rnliýli) 
19 c 1) te rnk r 17U$ 
20 September 1708 
21 September 1708 
23 September 1708 
25 '-ptcmhrr 17t1h 
0ycnstic rnýi (P ut: h) 
Withers (British) 
Fagel (Dutch) 
Dedcm (Dutch) 
Wt k (I)[Itt11) 
[Alexandre-Auguste, baron des] 
Villates (Dutch, Huguenot; 'Villat') 
I'all, in(it O)tit( h) 
I)ünho(( (l rti i. in) 
11'itlirrý I it i, hl nr}; ý II (I; riti'h) 
Fagel (Dutch) Swartzell [Schwartzel? ] (Danish? ) 
(lrkJ v (Briti>h) I lul1"nd'. ill (I )iniýi ) 
Dedem (Dutch) Rantzau (Hanoverian) 
2) - ph inE r I7 U Ovrfýticn, a (I)iit( Ii) A\ C, kC (I )Lit, Ii) 
[Ernst Ludwig von] Wilcke (Saxon in 
30 September 1708 Dutch and then Hessian service; Pallandt (Dutch) 
Milks') 
I October 17(Iä fd 4(. l (1)utrli) lt ý 1ý1ý nn (I )utkii) 
2 October 1708 Orkney (British) Dönhoff (Prussian) 
(ktt)l r I701; IhChili (Putt 10 
4 October 1708 Withers (British) Argyll (British) 
lht I I7II- tlýýnýtirrlm (I)utkI) 
6 October 1708 Fagel (Dutch) Hohendorff (Danish) 
O to hc r 17 OrlkiicV (tirili. IC) K. int;, iu II 
8 October 1708 Dedem (Dutch) Wecke (Dutch) 
(1 October 1708 Ownstierna (butch) fall IIUlt Wilk lII 
10 October 1708 Withers (British) tish) 
27 -iptcrüber 170 
28 September 1708 
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Appendix II 
The papers of Colonel Richard King relating to the War of 
the Spanish Succession in the Low Countries, (1704)-1710: 
a brief catalogue 
The papers of Colonel Richard King and Captain Robert King (fl. 18th century), are 
held at the Royal Archives, Windsor Castle. The papers are organised in two box files 
by date, marked KING$ PAPERS 1705-1710 and KING$ PAPERS 1711-1745. Attempts 
have been made to place the papers in chronological order, largely successful. Within 
each box, papers are bound into one or more loose bundles, by date and/or focus. 
Only those papers pertaining to the actions of Richard King in the Low Countries and 
Germany, 1704-1710, have been catalogued by myself. These are confined to the first 
box (with one possible exception), and in the main consist of nearly three hundred MSS 
forming the first, discrete bundle in said file. A note erroneously states that this bound 
collection relates largely to King's service with Jack Hill in Canada, and the 
preparations for such; however this more accurately applies to the second bundle, 
which also contains a few items pertaining to Flanders, 1709-1710. 
In the catalogue a scheme of identification is used, of the form 
KP I(i)/23b 
Where KP denotes 'King Papers' (excluded hereafter); I or II denotes the box; (i), (ii), 
(iii)... the bundle within same; 1,2,3... the ordinal number of the item within the 
bundle; and a, b, c... distinct parts within a given MS, or attachments to or 
continuations of a given item. Most items are discrete MSS, and easily identifiable as 
such. On occasion, I have assigned part-marks (a, b, c... ) as oposed to a new item 
reference (1,2,3... ), as when a MS represents a clear continuation of another item, or 
multiple MSS have been collected together by other hands (e. g. folded within one 
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another, attached with a metal pin, etc. ). The items below run from KP I(i)/1 to KP 
I(i)/264; KP I(ii)/11-17,28; and KP II(i)/35a-b. 
Accounts, company: I(i)/7 [23 October 1705 to 22 April 1706 O. S. ]; I(i)/12 [9 September 
to 4 December 1706 O. S.; latest date 12 December in notes]; I(i)/18 [23 April to 22 
October 1705 O. S. ]; I(i)/23 [23 April to 9 September 1706 O. S. ]; I(i)/27 [9 January to 5 
February 1706/7 O. S. ]; I(i)/28 [6 February to 5 March 1706/7 O. S. ]; I(i)/29 [6 March to 
2 April 1707 O. S. ]; I(i)/32 [3 April to 30 April 1707 O. S. ]; I(i)/33 [1 May to 7 May 1707 
O. S. ]; I(i)/34 [8 May to 4 June 1707 O. S. ]; I(i)/36 [5 June to 2 July 1707 O. S. ]; I(i)/39 [3 
July to 30 July 1707 O. S. ]; I(i)/40 [31 July to 27 August 1707 O. S. ]; I(i)/41 [28 August to 
24 September 1707 O. S. ]; I(i)/45 [25 September to 23 October 1707 O. S. ]; I(i)/46 [24 
October to 19 November 1707 O. S. ]; I(i)/47 [20 November to 17 December 1707 O. S. ]; 
I(i)/48 [18 December 1707 to 14 January 1707/8 O. S. ]; I(i)/53 [15 January to 11 
February 1707/8 O. S. ]; I(i)/54 [12 February to 10 March 1707/8 O. S. ]; I(i)/57 [11 March 
to 7 April 1708 O. S. ]; I(i)/59 [8 April to 28 April 1708 O. S. ]; I(i)/61a-h [Eight leaves tied 
by tag: 24 April 1708 to 4 May 1709 O. S. ]; I(i)/ 103 [5 May to 23 May 1709 O. S. ]; 
I(i)/108a-d [24 May 1709 to April 1710 O. S. ]; I(i)/256 [10 December 1710 O. S.? ]. 
Accounts, contingencies and various: I(i)/20 [Bread note for Rich. King's co., 10 May 
to 27 October 1706 N. S.? ]; I(i)/35 [Regimental contingencies for Orrery's Regiment, 6 
February to 26 May 1707 O. S.? ]; I(i)/42 [Regimental stoppages, with proportions due 
from each co., 28 October to 30 April - no years]; I(i)/43 [an account of co. subsistence, 
undated]; I(i)/44 [Regimental contingencies for Orrery's Regiment, 8 May to 23 
October 1707 O. S.? J; I(i)/60 [Regimental contingencies for Orrery's Regiment, 24 
October 1707 to 23 April 1708 O. S.? ]; I(i)/99 [Field equipage and accoutrements for the 
campaign of 1709, and regimental expences for Orrery's Regiment since 23 April 1708 
O. S.? ]. 
Accounts, personal: I(i)/37 [Rich. King's arrears, 24 February to 23 June 1707 O. S.? ]; 
I(i)/55 [February 1707/81; I(i)/58 (Rich. King's own subsistence, 23 March 1707/8 
O. S.? ]; I(i)/89 [Rich. King's arrears as Capt., to 22 December 1708 O. S.? ]; I(i)/98 [Rich. 
King's pay as ADC to Cadogan, 1710]; I(i)/101 [Rich. King's arrears, 1 March 1705? to 
23 June 1706 O. S.?; London, 3 March 1708/9 O. S. ); I(i)/102 [Rich. King's arrears, 24 
June 1706 to 23 February 1706/7 O. S.?; 3 March 1708/9 O. S. ]; I(i)/146 [Rich. King's 
295 
accounts, 23 December 1708 to 22 December 17091; I(i)/212 [Rich. King's accounts as 
ADC to Cadogan, 8 July 1710 O. S.? ]. 
Correspondence, by sender (all to Rich. King, unless otherwise noted): 
Comte d'Avelyn: I(i)/65a-b [Letter (a), with note (b) folded therein, Lille, 8 July 1708 
N. S. Regarding the movement of allied forces. ); I(i)/70 [Letter, 10 (20? ) July 1708 
N. S. I. 
Comtesse d'Avelyn: I(i)/113 [7 June 1709 N. S. I. 
Bridget Cadogan: I(i)/154 [London, 17 January 1709/10 O. S. Re: Prendergast affair. ]; 
I(i)/156 [25 February 1709/10 O. S. Re: Prendergast affair. ]; 1(i)/216a-b [Letter (a), 
copied, and note (b), both undated. Re: Prendergast affair]; I(i)/218 [28 July 1710 
O. S. Re: Prendergast affair. ] 
William Cadogan: I(i)/90 [Camp at Fretin, 10 September 1708 N. S. Re: convoy to 
Oudenarde and Menin; would have King go to Brussels to provision wagons. ]; 
I(i)/91 [Camp at Fretin, 13 September 1708 N. S. Re: Pascal's regiments passing to 
Brussels and the provisioning of the wagons; in the event of problems King was to 
seek Renswoude's help. Events at camp; asks King to write daily and give note 
when all was in ready. ]; I(i)/92 [Camp at Fretin, 18 September 1708 N. S. Glad all is 
near ready to leave; will send directions, with King ready to leave at 4 or 5 hours' 
warning. Enemy marched that morning; not certain whether to Douai or Tournai, 
but focused on disrupting convoys and forage. ]; I(i)/92 [Copy of a letter from 
Cadogan to John Laws, re: action at Wynendael; 20 October 1708 N. S. ]; I(i)/105 
[Brussels, 12 May 1709 N. S. Re: march of Prussians. King to be sent to conduct 
Palatine troops; Armstrong the Prussians. By his next Cadogan will note rations to 
be provided. ]; I(i)/109 [Brussels, 30 May 1709 N. S. Re: Palatine troops, to halt at 
Roermonde until further orders. Supplies for same. Note of Torcy returning to Paris, 
and thoughts on peace. Cadogan promised to refrain from using a count's villages 
for lodging or furnishing wagons; King must appoint new villages. ]; I(i)/110 
[Brussels, 1 June 1709 N. S. Cadogan sorry his last had not come in time to stop the 
Palatines crossing the Maas. Supply must be deposed of. Letter to commissary at 
Ruermonde re; bread enclosed (absent). More on peace, when Palatines might camp 
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along the Sambre, but King is to say naught to Palatine general. ]; I(i)/111 [Brussels, 
4 June 1709 N. S. Word from Torcy - no peace. King to direct Palatines on route 
settled; corps always to camp together. Enclosed letters from Eugene (absent) to 
press the march. After King had made dispositions for march of Foot, he was to 
come with the Horse. ]; I(i)/114 [Ghent, 13 June 1709 N. S. Re: Palatine troops. Letter 
from Eugene. King must acquaint comte de Vehlen that they are to receive no dry 
forage. Give direction to Solomon de Medina 's commissary re: bread. ]; I(i)/115 
[Ghent, 15 June 1709 N. S. Re: Palatine troops. Notes crossed notes. ]; I(i)/116 [Ghent, 
17 June 1709 N. S. Marlborough would have King come with the Palatine Foot to 
Ghent, to escort artillery thence to Courtrai. King will receive instructions from 
Geldermalsen to send artillery to Menin, and then King is to return to the army. 
Cadogan goes to Courtrai. ]; I(i)/132 [Camp at Havre, 25 September 1709 N. S. Re: 
convoys. First arrived that morning; will be unloaded and sent back. Would have 
King stay at Brussels until second convoy departs from there. Notes the army will 
break ground and make two attacks that night (N. B. Cadogan would be wounded 
that night). Enemy camped between Tournai and Valenhennes, and begin to 
march. ]; I(i)/135 [Camp at Havre, 10 October 1709 N. S. Unfortunate that the country 
had failed to furnish the wagons. Notes that King said his waiting on the authority 
of the Duke was a hindrance in the matter, yet King proposed naught to be done to 
empower him: if he gaveCardonnel notice, care would betaken to resolve matters. 
Note on bread wagons. ]; I(i)/140 [Camp at Havre, 16 October 1709 N. S. So no time 
is lost re: bread wagons, he sends an enclosed note (absent) to M. Vandenbrock to 
desire 120 of the 400 bring bread. ]; 1(i)/148 [Brussels, 25 December 1709 N. S. 
Approves of King's measures to be informed, re: Dunkirk. ]; 1(i)/151 [Brussels, V/57 
January 1710 N. S. Re: Dunkirk. Note on King employing agents. Note of Mr Brown 
in Ostend, whom he does not normally rely upon. ]; 1(i)/152 [Brussels, 7 January 
1710 N. S. More on intelligence from Dunkirk, no danger of a descent on foot. King 
no longer needed at Bruges, and may leave when he sees fit. ]; l(i)/159 [Brussels, 12 
March 1710 N. S. Approves of King's actions; would have him stay (? ) until matters 
finished. Notes supply of English bread and forage; if fails, has directed it be 
delivered upon King's orders. Cadogan to Hague day following. John Laws adds 
that he'd be obliged if King told him what was to pass. ]; 1(i)/161 [Brussels, 26 March 
1710 N. S. Received King's from Menin, since heard he went to Ghent; then received 
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King's of Courtrai. Re: forage. ]; I(i)/162 [Brussels, 11 April 1710 N. S. Enc. order for 
Lumley to march out the garrison of Ghent (absent). More on forage, and boats. 
Must be four days' hay at Lille and Tournai by the 8 May. Must give directions to 
the Dutch commissaries to receive bread and forage according to King's memorial 
drawn out of the General Dispositions; Vegelin assisting in necessary. ]; I(i)/172 
[Tournai, 16 April 1710 N. S. Re: poor state of artillery horses; when joined up again, 
will endeavour to replace wanting with the best of the bread wagon horses. 
Speeding Dutch troops. Marlborough to arrive at Oudenarde the day following at 9 
am, so an escort of 50 Horse must be sent this night, with an order to have 18 horses 
of relay ready. ]; I(i)/188 [Camp at Flines, 2 May 1710 N. S. Encloses disposition for 
bread and forage for Palatine and Hessian troops from Maastricht. King to settle 
with States of Brabant the wagons to carry forage. If anything wanting, King may 
use Marlborough's name. Let States know he has Cadogan's directions to help them 
in any way he can. ]; I(i)/197 [Camp before Douai, 18 May 1710 N. S. Sends route for 
Palatine troops. Length of some stages is desire of Provinces to have good troops 
present if Villars attacks. Siege advances extremely: hopes Douai will fall by the end 
of the month. ]; I(i)/208 [Tournai, 15 June 1710 N. S. Marlborough states the convoy 
must depart from Mons on the 16 June, though not all the wagons might be come. 
More on convoy. ]; I(i)/219 [Menin, 12 August 1710 N. S. Re: various matters of 
-supply. ]; I(i)/230 [Brussels, 23 October 1714N. S. Thanks King for accounts of the 
siege of Aire. Goes the next day to Ghent, and desires King to send away for his 
waggon with a saddle horse to Armentieres 'til he arrives. ]; I(i)/231 [Ghent, 25 
October 1710 N. S. More on horses and forage. ]; I(i)/232 [Camp at Aire, 1 November 
1710 N. S. Glad convoy arrived safely at Menin; Duke sends word to Collins to push 
hard with the boats with the bombs. Desires King to hasten the matter, then return 
to the camp. ]; I(i)/233 [Note from Cadogan, undated. ]. 
David Campbell: I(i)/100 [London?, 3 March 1708/9 O. S. Note regarding Rich. King's 
arrears and clearings, and payments and discharges thereupon]. 
Adam Cardonnel: I(i)/133 [Camp at Havre, 16 October N. S. Notes march of 12 
squadrons to escort the artillery, and further note of the wagons. ]; I(i)/136 [Camp at 
Havre, 10 October 1709 N. S. Marlborough sent squadrons to meet ammunition 
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wagons, to be brought in safe. ]; I(i)/137 [Camp at Havre, 11 October 1709 N. S. 
Horse to meet ammunition wagons from Brussels tomorrow morning at Soignies. 
Marlborough desires King to inform him ASAP how far Flanders and Brabant have 
complied with the arrangements for furnishing the wagons, and will require use for 
a fortnight longer. King to hasten dispatch of what is further wanting for the siege. ]; 
I(i)/138 [Camp at Havre, 12 October 1709 N. S. More on the wagons. ]; I(i)/139 
[Camp at Havre, 16 October 1709 N. S. More on wagons. Notes Cadogan will go to 
Brussels in 2-3 days to press things. ]; I(i)/141 [Camp at Havre, 14 October 1709 N. S. 
More on wagons: Marlborough surprised that none had yet come back to King. ]; 
I(i)/142 [Camp at Havre, 19 October 1709 N. S. Marlborough ordered escort to aid 
artillery wagons. Cadogan now on the road. ]; I(i)/147 [Whitehall, 20 December 1709 
O. S. Regarding matters at Dunkirk, of which King had informed Marlborough. ]; 
I(i)/153 [Whitehall, 10 January 1709/10 O. S. Re: Dunkirk. Marlborough received 
intelligence. ]; I(i)/155 [Westminster, 14 February 1709/10 O. S. Notes kind part King 
takes in his affairs. ]; I(i)/157 [The Hague, 21 March 1710 N. S. Notes Marlborough's 
regard for King's actions. ]; I(i)/160 [The Hague, 28 March 1710 N. S. Marlborough 
satisfied with King's actions at Courtrai. ]; I(i)/192 [Camp before Douai, 10 May 1710 
N. S. Marlborough approves King's actions and would have him continue same, re: 
forage and routes of German troops. Keep them to their route and prevent disorder 
until Palatines have arrived at Maastricht, then join them, set them on march, back 
to Hessians, then come with them to army. ]; I(i)/193 [Camp before Douai, 13 May 
1710 N. S. Notes on the Hessians, and hastening their march. Marlborough to send 
General Spiegel a new route, and not leave it to his discretion. ]; I(i)/196 [Camp 
before Douai, 17 May 1710 N. S. Re: Spiegel and the march. ]. 
John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough: I(i)/130 [Letter from Marlborough to comte de 
Tilly, regarding Cadogan's duties. ] 
Baron de Curtenai: I(i)/189 j2 May 1710 N. S. j; I(i)/190 [10 May 1710 N. S. ]; I(i)/191110 
May 1710 N. S. I. Regarding various matters of forage and movement. 
Richard King: I(i)/6 [? extract of a letter to Hen. St John, Tirlemont, 31 August 1705 
N. S. ]; I(i)/217 [Letter, unsent, to Bridget Cadogan]. 
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John Laws: I(i)/229 [Brussels, 19 October 1710 N. S. Asks King to spare two villages 
from the routes of march to winter quarters, due to the interest of a lady. Also the 
matter of a regiment, which wished to be quartered at Brussels, or at least Ghent. ]. 
General Spiegel: I(i)/195 [Wavre, 16 May 1710 N. S. Re: march. ]. 
M. Siestoyeff. I(i)/104 [10 May 1709 N. S. I. 
M. Vandenbroeck: I(i)/194 [Brussels, 13 May 1710 N. S. Re: march of Spiegel. ]. 
William Willys: I(i)/131 [Turin, 13 August 1709 N. S. Speaks of past correspondence, 
and events in Italy. Palmes, Daun and Duke of Savoy. List of enemy forces on his 
side of France. ]; I(i)/134 [Turin, 9 October 1709 N. S. Notes missing letters. Speaks of 
bias in Imperialist accounts of recent action. Events in Italy. Glad to hear King 
recovered from his sickness. ]; I(i)/176 [Vienna, 19 April 1710 N. S. Palmes would be 
grateful if King could send notes of the army, plans of sieges, lines of battle, etc. ]. 
Memorials, miscellaneous: I(i)/24a-b [Revenues and expences for the provinces of the 
Spanish Netherlands, undated; French]; I(i)/38 [List of French troops in Spain, June 
1707; French]; I(i)/62 [Disposition of forage for the Hanoverians and Prussians, 30 June 
1708 N. S; French]; I(i)/64 [Memorial on the subject of the baggage, 7 July 1708 N. S. J; 
I(i)/66 [Memorial regarding the move to Bissingen between Grenogne and Ypres, 18 
July 1708 N. S.; French]; I(i)/68 [Memorial on the canal of Brussels and the convoy of 
artillery coming from Ghent, 18 July 1708 N. S.; French]; I(i)/69 [Memorial, 18 July 1708 
N. S.; French]; I(i)/73 [Memorial, including notes on camp and dutiesof quartermasters, 
3 August 1708 N. S.; French]; I(i)/74 [Disposition of forage for the right wing, Camp at 
Werrick, 4 August 1708 N. S.; French]; I(i)/75 [Memorial, Camp at Helchin, 12 August 
1708 N. S.; French]; I(i)/77 [Dispositions for occupying the posts of Templeure and 
Lannoy to cover the passage of the artillery from Menin to Lille, Camp at I Helchin, 16 
August 1708 N. S. J; I(i)/79 [Dispositions for occupying the posts between Pont au Chin 
and Lannoy to cover the passage of the artillery from Menin to Lille, Camp at fTelchin, 
19 August 1708 N. S. ]; I(i)/88 [Memorial for the comte de Tilly, undated]; I(1)/94 
[Revenues for the province of Flanders, ending 1708; French]; I(i)/95 [Revenues for the 
province of Brabant, ending 1708; French]; I(i)/118 [Memorial of the posts that should 
be occupied between the army and Oudenarde, 1709]; I(i)/119 [Memorial on the 
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movements the army will make to form on both banks of the Dyle, 19 June to 21 June 
1709 N. S. ]; I(i)/120 [Memorial on the movements of the armies, 25 June 1709 N. S. ]; 
I(i)/121 [Memorial, 25 June 1709 N. S. ]; I(i)/122 [Memorial on the baggage, 26 June 1709 
N. S. ]; I(i)/123 [Memorial on the detachment of Marlborough's army, 26 June 1709 
N. S. ]; I(i)/183 [Memorial for the movements of the army, 23 April 1710 N. S. ]; l(i)/185 
[Memorial for the assembling of the army, 15? 25? April 1710 N. S. ]; I(i)/198a [Memorial 
for the detachments that will be sent to seek bread and forage at Louvain and Brussels, 
c. 1710; see I(i)/198b]; I(i)/206 [Dispositions for the wagons that need to be sent from 
the army to Mons to collect ammunition, first date 9 June 1710 N. S. ]; l(i)/207 [same as 
the above]; I(i)/210 [Dispositions for forage for the British troops in the vicinity of 
certain villages; Camp before Douai, 30 June 1710 N. S. ]; I(i)/215 [Memorial for the 
forage of the left wing between Liller and St Zenant; Aubigny, 6 August 1710 N. S. ]; 
I(i)/227 [Dispositions to bring up the batteries of artillery, 6 September 1710 N. S. ]; 
I(ii)/15 [Posts to be occupied, between the army and Villers Brulin; 1710]. 
Memorials, notes of troops: I(i)/4a [Hanoverians, Tirlemont, August 1705], l(i)/4b 
[Danes, Rousselaer, June 17061; I(i)/56 [Statement of allied forces: rank and file of the 
Horse, excluding officers etc., with an estimate of the French equivalent; calculated 26 
February 1708 N. S.; French]; I(i)/78 [Statement of allied forces: rank and file of the 
Foot, excluding officers etc., with an estimate of the French equivalent; 1708; French]; 
I(i)/128 [Notes on the proportions of the forces for the siege of Tournai furnished by 
the corps of the army, 29 June 1709 N. S. ]; I(i)/255 [List of Allied troops in Flanders, 
1710]. 
Memorials, personal: I(i)/21 [Part of Rich. King's journal of the siege of Ath, 1706; 
incomplete]; I(i)/149 [Queries concerning the carrying on the War in Flanders, 1709; 15 
pp]; I(i)/204 [Account of the siege before Douai, 1 June 1710 N. S. ]; I(i)/205a-b [Account 
of the march the French made to attack the allies before Douai, 2 June 1710 N. S. ]; 
I(i)/253 [Reflexions Upon the Siege of Douay; 17101; I(i)/254 [Rapport des Ingenieurs 
au Liege de Douay. 1710]; I(ii)/28 [self-penned memorandum for himself, as 
Quartermaster-General of Jack Hill's expedition, with notes of duty; 17111; II(i)/35a-b 
[? Thoughts on forming an academy for the education of engineers; 1706? in pencil], 
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Memorials and orders, march routes (excluding to winter quarters): I(i)/14 [Prussian 
troops, 4 November to 12 November 1706 N. S.; French]; I(i)/50 [Order of march of 
Prussian troops to winter quarters, 1707; French]; I(i)/51 [Order of march for the army 
to leave the camp at Templeune, undated; French]; I(i)/67 [Memorial on the march of 
the forces of Prince Eugene, 18 July 1708 N. S.; French]; l(i)/71 [Route for the wagons 
and horses that are to leave the army, 28 July 1708 N. S.; French]; l(i)/72 [Route for the 
bread wagons, 30 July 1708 N. S.; French]; I(i)/76 [Order of march to leave the camp at 
Helchin to go to that at Ath, Camp at Helchin, 12 August 1708 N. S.; French]; 1(i)/81 
[Order of march to leave the camps of Amongies to go to that at Ath, Camp at 
Amongies, 23 August 1708 N. S.; French; marked'N. 13']; I(i)/82 [as above; marked'N. 
14'1; I(i)/87 [Dispositions for the passage of the artillery and ammunition wagons from 
Brussels to the army, September 23 1709 N. S.; French]; I(i)/106 [Dispositions for the 
march of the Palatine troops from Dusseldorff to Roermonde, towards Flanders; 18 
May 1709 N. S.; French]; 1(i)/107 [Dispositions for the march of the troops from the 
Meuse to the camps at Affeleghem; Brussels, 21 May 1709 N. S.; French); 1(1)/112 [Route 
for the artillery, 26 June 1709 N. S.; French]; I(i)/117 [Route for the Palatine troops, to 
come from Ruermonde and engage in the campaign of 1709; 29 May to 8 June 1708 
N. S.; French]; I(i)/143 [March of the left wing from the camp at Boussois towards that 
of Roeux, 25 October 1709 N. S.; French]; I(i)/144 [Order of march for leaving the camp 
at Havre to go to that atThhusies, 25 October 1709 N. S.; French]; I(i)/158 [Memorial for 
the march of the Prussian troops to join the army in Flanders, La Haye, 21 March 1710 
N. S. ]; I(i)/164 [Dispositions and marches for the garrison of Maastricht and the troops 
camped, to go to the camp at Tongr6; 9 April 1710 N. S. ]; I(i)/165 [Dispositions for the 
passage of the baggage, 13 April 1710 N. S. ]; I(i)/166 [Memorial for the mare of 13 April 
1710 N. S. ]; 1(i)/167 [Order of march for the troops who are at Ghent and those camped 
at Schwynarde, to go to the camp at Heurne; Ghent, 13 April 1710 N. S. ]; 1(1)/ 168 [Order 
of march to leave the camp at Heyne for that of Warmerade; Heyne, 14 April 1710 
N. S. ]; I(i)/169 [as 1(i)/168]; I(i)/170 [Order of march for the 15 April from the camp of 
Cop le Grand towards that of Dongelberg; 14 April 1710 N. S. 1; 1(1)/171 [Order of march 
for the 16 April from the camp at Dongelberg towards the camp of ?; Dongelberg, 15 
April 1710 N. S. ]; I(i)/173 [Order of march for leaving the camp at Avelghem for that at 
Ottignies; Avelghem, 15 April 1710 N. S. ]; I(i)/174 [Order of march for the 17 April 
from the camp at Wavre towards that at Promelle; Wavre, 16 April 1710 N. S. ]; 1(i)/175 
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[Order of march for leaving the camp at Ottignies for that at Baissicu; Ottignies, 17 
April 1710 N. S. ]; I(i)/177 [Order of march for the detachment commanded by the Duke 
of Württemberg to leave the camp at Lezenny - no destination,; Tournal, 20 April 1710 
N. S. 1; 1(i)/178 [Order of march for the 21 April from the camp at Soignies towards that 
at Chievres; Soignies, 20 April 1710 N. S. ]; I(i)/179 [Order of march for the 22 April 
from the camp at Chievre towards that at Veran; Chievre, 21 April 1710 N. S. ]; I(i)/180 
[March route for the artillery, undated]; I(i)/181 [Order of march for leaving the camp 
at Lens; Lens, 22 April 1710 N. S. ]; I(i)/182 [Order of march for the 23 April from the 
camp at Veron towards that before Tournai, 22 April 1710 N. S. ); I(i)/187 [Route for the 
Palatine troops from Maastricht to the army before Douai - some days and locations 
left blank; Camp of T. lines, 30 April 1710 N. S. ]; I(i)/198b [Route the Hessian troops 
will take to Soignies, and how they will have bread and forage; dates 14 May to 18 May 
1710 N. S.; folded within I(i)/198a]; I(i)/199 [Order of march for leaving the camp at 
Flines for that at Gulezin, on the 24 May 1710 N. S. 1; I(i)/201 [Order of march for 
leaving the camp at Gealezin for that at Beaumont and Henin, on the 27 May 1710 
N. S. ]; I(i)/202 [same as the above]; I(i)/203 [March of the States' troops for Brussels, 
Malines and the frontier; undated]; I(i)/209 [Route for the Imperial recruits, and their 
passage of the Rhine, until close to Douai; copy, 1710]; I(i)/211 [Order of march for the 
corps commanded by Ross to Hedignine, and for the baggage of the army; undated]; 
I(i)/213 [Order of march to leave the camp at Henin for that at Neuville, on the 10 July 
1710 N. S. ]; I(1)/214 [Order of march for 12 July 1710 N. S. ]; I(i)/220 [Order of march for 
the corps commanded by Ross to Hedegniel, and for the baggage; 1 September? ]; 
I(i)/221 [see above]; I(i)/222 [Order of march for the baggage; Rebreune, 1 September 
1710 N. S. ]; I(i)/224 [Order of march for leaving the camp of Villerbrulin for that of I.. ier; 
1 September 1710 N. S. ]; I(i)/225 [same as above]; 1(1)/226 [Order of march for the 3 
September 1710 N. S. ]; I(i)/240 [Order of march for leaving the camp at Divion for that 
of Annay close to the Pont-a-Vendin, 16 November 1710 N. S. ]; 1(i)/241 [Order of march 
to leave the camp at Blessi for that at Divion on the 19 November 1710 N. S. I. 
Memorials and orders, winter quarters: I(i)/22 [List of winter quarters, 1706/7; 
French]; I(i)/26a [Memorial covering Flanders and Brabant, 1706/7; French); I(i)/26b 
[Memorial noting the actions of the enemy in regard to 26a; French]; I(i)/49 [List of 
winter quarters, 1707/8, tabled by garrison; Dutch]; I(i)/96 [List of winter quarters, 
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1707/8]; I(i)/97 [List of winter quarters, 1707/8; as above, Dutch); I(i)/145 [Notes of 
winter quarters for the old and new Prussian troops, 1709/10]; l(i)/228 [Dispositions 
for the impending move to winter quarters, and plans for the forage; 18 September 
1710 N. S. ]; I(i)/235 [Route for the Hanoverians to enter into their winter quarters aking 
the Demer; unfinished, c. November 1710]; I(i)/235 [Route for the Palatines to move 
from their camp at Soignies and enter into their winter quarters by the Meuse, c. 
November 1710]; I(i)/236 [Winter quarters for the Imperial troops, 1710]; 1(1)/237 
[Route for the Prussians to move from their camp at Iechin an262263d enter into their 
winter quarters, c. November 1710]; I(i)/238 [Route for the Prussians to move from 
their camp at St Quentins-Linnieke, and enter into their winter quarters; route 4 
November to 12 November 1710 N. S. J; I(i)/239a [Route for the Hanoverians to leave 
the camp at St Quentins-Linnieke and enter into winter quarters by the Deiner; route 4 
November to 8 November 1710 N. S. ], I(i)/239b [Route for the Prussians to attend 
likewise; route 4 November to 12 November 1710 N. S. ]; 1(1)/242 [Route for the British 
and Danes to leave the camp at Sechin to enter into their winter quarters in Flanders, 
17101; I(i)/243 [as above; route 18 November to 22 November 1710 N. S. ]; 1(i)/244 
[Dispositions for the march of the States' troops to various destinations, II November 
1710 N. S. J; I(i)/245 [Notes of the winter quarters for the British, Danes, Saxons and 
Hanoverians, 1710]; I(i)/246 [Route for the troops of the Meuse and the garrisons of 
Brabant, from the camp at Sechin to enter into their winter quarters, 1710); I(i)/247 
[Route for the Palatine troops to enter into their winter quarters along the Meuse, route 
20 November to 3 December 1710 N. S. ]; I(i)/248 [Route for the troops of the Meuse 
and the garrisons of Brabant and Holland, from the Canp at Sechin to their winter 
quarters, 18 November 1710 N. S. - ]; I(i)/249 [Route for the Imperial troops from the 
camp at Pont-a-Vendin as far as their winterquarters, 1710); 1(1)/250 [Route for the 
English squadrons from the camp at Sechin to their winterquarters at Brussels, Warum 
and Heusden; 1710]; I(i)/251 [Route for the Prussians to their winter quarters, 1710); 
I(i)/252 [Route from Louvain up to Roermonde for the Hessians returning to their own 
lands; 1710]; I(i)/257 [Memorial on the numbers of troops that have their winter 
quarters in the Spanish Netherlands, 1710]; I(1)/258 [Route for Hanoverians to move 
from the camp at Sechin, and enter into their winter quarters at Brussels, Malines, 
Leuven and alonf the Demer; 1710); I(i)/259 [Route for the Palatines at Soignics to 
enter into their winter quarters beyond the Meuse; 1710]; I(i)/260 [Route for the British 
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dragoons to go from the camp at Sechin to their winter quarters at Heusden and 
Gorchum; 1710]; I(i)/261 [see above]; I(i)/262 [Route for the horses of the British 
artillery to pass from Ghent to Breda; 1710]; I(i)/263 [Route for the British dragoons to 
pass from the camp at Sechin to their winter quarters at Heusden and Gorchum; 1710; 
see I(i)/260 and 2611; I(i)/264 [Distribution of the winter quarters for the Prussians; 
1710]; I(ii)/11 [Dispositions for winter quarters; 1710/111; I(ii)/13 [Dispositions for 
winter quarters; 1710(/11)]; I(ii)/16 [Distribution of the winter quarters for the 
Imperial troops; 1710/11]; I(ii)/17 [Distribution of the winter quarters for the Prussians 
(old and new corps); 1710/11]. 
Orders, Board of Ordnance: I(i)/1 [Board of Ordnance to Rich. King, 4 April 1704 O. S. 
Order to attend train of artillery under Col Holcroft Blood]; I(i)/2 [do, instructions 
relating to I(i)/11; I(i)/30 [Warrant of Anne to the Master General of Ordance, 
signifying that Rich. King should draw £100 p. a. as an engineer; 17 March 1706/ 7 O. S.; 
copy]; I(i)/31 [Note of receipt and action of above by Marlborough, to ho. Erle and 
the principal officers of the Ordnance; 31 March 1707 O. S.? ]. 
Orders, garrison: I(i)/13 [Garrison orders for Rich. King, Ghent, 30 October 1706 O. S. ]. 
Orders, tactical and poliorcetic: I(i)/83 [Dispositions for the attack of the right wing at 
Malplaquet, Camp at Blareguies, 10 September 1709 N. S.; French]; I(i)/84 [Dispositions 
for the attack of the left wing, Camp at Blareguies, 10 September 1709 N. S.; French]; 
I(i)/85 [Dispositions for the attack of the right wing, Camp at Blareguies, 10 September 
1709 N. S.; French]; I(i)/86 [Dispositions for the attack of the forces of Prince Eugene, 
Camp at Blaregries, 10 September 1709 N. S.; French]; I(i)/125 [Dispositions for the 
attacks on the town and citadel of Tournai, 3 July 1709 N. S. ]; I(i)/184 [Dispositions for 
the siege of Douai; Camp before same, 28 April 1710 N. S. J; I(i)/223 [Memorill for the 
siege of Aire and St Venant, 1710]; I(ii)/12 [Disposition of troops for the siege of 
Bethune, 1710]; I(ii)/14 [Proportions of troops for the siege of Aire, 1710]. 
Orders of battle: I(i)/3 [Camp at Kinderkingen, 9 July 1704 N. S. ]; I(i)/8 [Camp at 
Boissint, 8 August 1705 N. S. ]; I(i)/52 [Camp of Soignics, 21 August 1707 N. S. ]; 1(1)/63 
[Camp at Terbanck, 8 June 1708 N. S. ]; I(i)/80 [Camp at Hclchin, 21 August 1708 N. S. j; 
I(i)/124 [Camp at Willemeau, 2 July 1709 N. S. ]; I(i)/126a [Camp de Lomprez, 26 June 
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1709 N. S. ]; I(i)/126b [Camp at Esplechin, 3 July 1709 N. S. ]; l(i)/127a [Camp at 
Willemeau, 2 July 1709 N. S.; see l(i)/1241, I(i)/127b [copy of (a)]; l(i)/129 [Besieging 
Tournai, 5? July 1709 N. S. ]; I(i)/150 [Camp at Frctin, 1708/9]; l(i)/163a"b [Orders of 
battle for (a) the cavalry of the left wing of the corps on the Meuse, and (b) the infantry 
of same; 4 April 1710 N. S.; French]; I(i)/186 [Camp at T. lines, 25 April 1710 N. S. ]; 
I(i)/200 [Camp at Vitry, 24 May 1710 N. S. I. 
Plans: I(i)/10 [plan of assault on a fortress, batteries marked; undated]; I(i)/11 [plan of 
assault on a fortress, batteries marked; undated; more detailed version of l(i)/101; 
I(i)/25 [plan of assault on a fortress, undated]. 
Regulations: I(i)/9 [Extract of military regulations of the States General, concluded 15 
March 1706 - points concerning the sutlers of the army, Articles 82-92). 
Works, miscellaneous: I(i)/5a-c [The Maxims or general Rules which are observed in 
the Modem Fortifications; hand copied, 21 pp text +3 pp blank, no diagrams, undated 
- 1706 in pencil]; I(i)/15 [The New Exercise of the Ffirelock & Bayonet; hand copied; 
Ghent, 1706], I(i)/16 [undated scawled copy of the above, with some expansion and 
different terminology]; I(i)/17 [Mr Vane's Observations on Powder, undated); 1(1)/19 
[Les Calibres et les Noms des Pieces que 1'on fondoit anfiennemcnt, undated; hand 
copied, very small booklet -16pp but with text on only pp 1,3-7 - detailing the names, 
calibres, weight, length etc. of various artillery pieces]. 
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